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FROM



COBBETT'S POLITICAL WORKS:

BEING

A COMPLETE ABRIDGMENT OF THE 100 VOLUMES WHICH COMPRISE THE WRITINGS OF "PORCUPINE AND THE "WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER."

WITH NOTES,

HISTORICAL AND EXPLANATORY.

BY

JOHN M. COBBETT AND JAMES P. COBBETT.

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
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VOL. I.

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ERRATA IN THIS VOLUME.

Preface, p. vii, line 12, for “decoy the French Republic,” read “decry the French Republic.”

In “Priestley’s Emigration,” p. 16, Note, for “Belsham’s History of Geo. IV.,” read “Geo. III.”

Page 25, second Note, line 5, for “if a member,” read “if a number,” &c.

Page 297, Note, for “Number CVI.” read “Number CVIII.”

EDITORS' PREFACE.

THE political writings of our late father are contained in exactly one hundred octavo volumes, namely, of "*Porcupine's Works*" twelve, and of the "*Weekly Political Register*" eighty-eight; the former being a selection of pamphlets and articles written in a monthly publication, and articles written in a daily paper, at Philadelphia, from the year 1794 to the year 1800; and the latter being a weekly publication on politics, begun in the year 1802, and ended with its author's life, in June 1835.

Having undertaken to abridge these two works, it is but right that we should fully and frankly state why we do it at all; what we propose to give in the abridged shape, at what times we shall publish, and to what extent the work will go; and, in order to do this *fully*, we will first explain what tempted us to the undertaking. On looking at the formidable row of volumes, we could not help asking ourselves "What is the use of the works in their present shape?" For, the fame of an author must depend upon the notoriety and *usefulness* of his works, and, as these hundred volumes cannot be had, and therefore cannot be useful in their present shape, we resolved upon making the attempt to bring into a very much smaller compass the essence of what they contain. For this purpose we mean to take the best papers on the most interesting topics, from the earliest of our author's writing to the last; and to bring them together in such a way, as shall make it an easy task to trace his whole literary career, and the political history of the time in which he has taken a part in politics. We at first thought of an arrangement of *matters*, but found it impossible to make it. The chronological order of the writings will therefore be preserved, and his first essay in print will be the first of our abridgment; and, as the work will not extend to a greater length than six volumes, a perfect index will render it almost as easy to refer to particular papers and topics, as if the arrangement had been the one that we first intended.

That the publication will be useful we have no doubt. The matters treated of in the "*Register*," not only *have been* of interest and great

importance, but they are so still, and they are becoming more and more so every day that we live.

“ But why rake up the works of *Porcupine*? Porcupine was a Tory,” will, perhaps, be said to us by some of our friends. In the first place, Porcupine’s works *will live*, whether we like it or not; they have already become, if not absolutely scarce, more valuable by two fold than they were six months since; we cannot smother them, and if we could, we would not; and, as to the toryism, the publishing of selections from these works will give us the best means, and perhaps the fairest excuse, for clearing away much misapprehension on this score. The selections from Porcupine will show how greatly his objects and conduct have been misrepresented. We publish them in order to show how far his conduct was different from what the world has been taught to believe; and incidentally they will form a sort of history of American politics during an interesting period, and they will show his own progress in style and manner of writing.

It is very true that Mr. COBBETT at the age of 32, quitting France as the revolution broke out, and having lived eight years in the barracks of New Brunswick, in the condition of private soldier and then sergeant-major, did, in the United States, very warmly espouse the cause of England, of her King, Constitution, and people: it is true that when he looked on the bloody details of the revolution in France, and saw the people of America praising, imitating in their fashions and manners, and even praying for, the leaders and fraternities engaged in them; and that when he saw American writers attempting to change their old calendar for that of France, with its *fructidor* and *ventose*; and saw also the French Ambassador gravely propose to them to adopt a new French scheme of weights and measures in the place of the old English one; and a silly Scotchman attempt to persuade them to blot out all English recollections by changing the written language of their fathers, he burned with more than ordinary indignation; and it is also true, that when he saw a powerful faction, not merely in the country, but in the United States Government itself, anxious to injure his own country by procuring commercial connexions between France and America, for the avowed purpose; it is true that when he saw this, and saw an evident anxiety in the same faction, to accede to the declared wishes of France, by engaging America in war with England, he broke silence, and did his utmost to avert what must have been calamitous to her. This is all true; and it is also true, that in doing this, he did not stay to draw distinctions between English reformers and French revolutionists: all that looked with complacency on the National Convention, all that called themselves “ Citizen,” were, to him, blood-thirsty operatives of the guillotine, or the abettors of those who were so. But it is not true that he

ever was in his principles a tory, in the vulgar and modern sense of that word. "Tory" now means a man who would govern by corrupt means, a cruel, iron despot, a proud and greedy oppressor. These are the qualities that any ordinary man now attributes to the "Tory," and the Tories have acquired the character by their practices. But to say that "*Porcupine*" is chargeable with such, is the grossest misapprehension of character that can be imagined; and we think that every sensible reader of his works will be convinced, that the great aim of them is to unite the interests of the Kingly Government of England and of the Federal Government of America. There was nothing wrong in this; it was not only commendable, but it was the duty, of an Englishman, having the power, and being in the situation to give his power effect, to do his utmost to preserve to England the friendship of her lost colonies, and to prevent their throwing their weight into the scale of France.

It is a very common notion, that he wrote against the American Government; that he did nothing in America but abuse the statesmen and the people of that country. Nothing can be more false. He earnestly advocated the administrations of WASHINGTON and ADAMS, in opposing the French party in America, and it is not too much to say, that he gave them very efficient support. To understand this, the reader ought to be acquainted with American politics from the close of the old American war (the war of Independence) to the death of WASHINGTON; but, as it is not every reader that has the information, we cannot enter upon our task without giving a very short narrative of facts to prepare him for what we are about to place before him.

Mr. COBBETT arrived in America in the last week of October 1792, and fell immediately into the company of the numerous emigrants who had fled from France and St. Domingo to avoid the perils of revolution. He remained till August 1794, imbibing every day's news of the tragedies that were acting under the new French Republic, and learning the politics of the one in which he was living. His mind was quickly made up upon the iniquity of the scenes in France, and it was but another step, to hold in abhorrence all who applauded the revolution. On American politics, he learned, that the constitution at first established in that country after the war of Independence, had been found inefficient soon after it was tried, and that in 1787 it was reformed; and, moreover, that this reformation had divided the leading men of America into two formidable and fierce parties; one party desiring a close imitation of the English form of Government, and the other desiring a more popular and mere republic; the distinctive marks being, that one desired to have a President and Senate elected for life, and the other a President and Senate elected for terms of years. Add to this, that the party who were the admirers of the English form, wished to conciliate the friendship and alliance of

England, and that the other party wished for the friendship and alliance of France, and then we have the key to his motives for joining the English party, and pouring out his wrath upon that which favoured France. The event that provoked him to write his first essay, was something said against the English Government by Dr. PRIESTLEY, who arrived an emigrant from England in June 1794. Whatever was said by the infuriated party of America against her he could stand; but condemnation from an *Englishman* he could not; and, therefore, he attacked the Doctor in an anonymous pamphlet which was published at Philadelphia, which had a considerable sale, brought the writer at once into the field of strife, and made him, not long after, forsake his peaceful occupation for that boisterous one in which he passed the remainder of his days. At the age of 33, then, he published this pamphlet, on which we shall only remark here that the reader will see in it many of the excellences of his after writings; the same clearness, the same humorous bitterness, and a good deal of invective, though rather less grammatical accuracy. But of this he will be his own judge. The next publication was a pamphlet under the title of "*A Bone to gnaw for the Democrats;*" and the title suggests to us to explain further, that the American parties above alluded to, were known as *Democrats* and *Aristocrats*, or *Federalists* and *Anti-federalists*, or *Whigs* and *Tories*. These distinctions will be clearly understood if we take the ANTI-FEDERALIST and the FEDERALIST; for these were the real *American* distinctions, the others being borrowed either from France or England. At the close of the war of independence, in 1783, the thirteen States of America united under an Act of Confederation, but each State kept itself so completely sovereign in everything that concerned it, that, in matters of war and peace, and foreign commerce, there was no general government of sufficient power to give effect to the Confederation. This caused the reformation of 1787 before alluded to, which gave larger power to the Congress, and instituted an executive in the person of the President.

Federalist, *Aristocrat*, and *Tory*, mean the same; and *Anti-federalist*, *Democrat*, and *Whig*, mean the same. The principal federalists were, WASHINGTON, ADAMS, HAMILTON, JAY, and PINKNEY; and the principal anti-federalists were, JEFFERSON, MADISON, MONROE, RUSH, and RANDOLPH. We take such names only as will be found most noticed in the writings that we are about to republish. In all the political strife of the eight years (from 1792 to 1800) in which Mr. Cobbett moved in America, the prominent question was, "*Which country shall we seek to be allied with—England or France?*" The *anti federalists* were for France, and the *federalists* were for England. The mode of warfare, therefore, was to blacken the former as democratic traitors, ready to hand their country over to France for bribes received from that country; and with the other

party, to blacken the federalists as aristocrats, who wished to bring America again under the monarchical yoke of England. He is innocent of political warfare who will not give the parties credit for doing the amplest injustice to each other! For, although there might have been reason to suspect the subordinate men on both sides, it is impossible to believe that there was any design in the minds of such men as JEFFERSON or WASHINGTON to sell or give up their country to either France or England. Both, however, were hunted through their official career as suspicious, and both seem to have been pursued to the last by the exaggerations of their furious party opponents. They have paid the price of greatness as all great men do. This pamphlet, then, was an attack upon the French, or *anti-federal*, party; and the object of the author was, to decoy the French Republic, and hold up England to favour in the eyes of the American people. It is obvious enough, that it was not his intention to pull down the Government of General WASHINGTON, but to counteract those unfavourable impressions that were industriously made against England, to bring the Americans into a friendly feeling towards her; and, no English reader ought to consider this as an attack on his own opinions, however popular they may be. The pamphlet was very successful, had an immense sale, and was, as all Mr. COBBETT'S anonymous writings have been, attributed to different men of learning and importance. The anti-federalists felt the shafts which he flung at them, and unwisely compared him to the *porcupine*, a name which he instantly adopted, as he many years afterwards adopted that of Lord Castlereagh's "two-penny trash."

His *business*, from the very first week of his landing in America, was that of teacher of English to the French emigrants, who abounded in Philadelphia and its neighbourhood, and at this he earned between four and five hundred pounds a-year. His first pamphlet brought him no money, although it had a large sale; he wrote others, and sold the manuscript and copyright; but, at so low a price, that, whatever the bookseller may have done, the author earned only one hundred pounds in two years. The proof of their having been valuable, is, that he wanted to buy them back, years after they had been published, and though he offered as much for them as he had originally taken, the bookseller refused his offer. He became an important writer, and, as he very proudly expresses it, "*stood alone*," to bear the abuse and falsehoods of a teeming press. In the spring of 1796, he took a shop in Philadelphia for the purpose of selling his own writings, before which he had written some of the best of his pamphlets. The two principal ones are, "*A Little Plain English*," and "*A New Year's Gift to the Democrats*;" the first being a refutation of arguments put forth against the treaty of amity and commerce with England, entered into by the Presi-

dent WASHINGTON in 1794-5, through the mediation of Mr. JAY, and which treaty, being the first fruits of the reform of the constitution, threw the French party into violences bordering on treason. It is impossible to read it without admiring the ability with which the subject is handled; and it is impossible that an *Englishman*, even now, should not admire the boldness and energy of the man who could make so strong a defence for his country single-handed. In the progress of the ferment about the British treaty, a most awkward exposure of the Secretary of State, RANDOLPH, was made, and in a manner as curious as the whole affair was awkward. England being then at war with France, a French vessel from America, carrying dispatches from the French Minister at Philadelphia, was taken in the Channel; the French captain threw the dispatches overboard, and they fell into the hands of the English Government. Being found to contain an account of the American Secretary of State's treachery towards his own country, in concert with the French Minister, the English Government sent them to the President of America; and this affair furnished the friends of England with a weapon against the friends of France that "Porcupine" used effectively in the "*New Year's Gift to the Democrats*," the second of the two pamphlets above alluded to. The affair caused the immediate ratification of the British Treaty, which had been held in suspense by the Secretary's intrigues, and it ended in his disgrace.

In 1796, Mr. COBBETT, having quarrelled with his bookseller, opened a shop, and, in a manner truly characteristic of him, bade defiance to his opponents. His friends feared for his personal safety, for the people were infected with the love of France. "I saw," he says, "that I must at once set all danger at defiance, or live in everlasting subjection to the prejudices and caprice of the democratical mob. I resolved on the former; and as my shop was to open on a Monday morning, I employed myself all day on Sunday in preparing an exhibition, that I thought would put the courage and the power of my enemies to the test. I put up in my windows, which were very large, all the portraits that I had in my possession of *kings, queens, princes* and *nobles*. I had all the English Ministry, several of the bishops and judges, the most famous admirals, and in short every picture that I thought likely to excite rage in the enemies of Great Britain. Early on the Monday morning, I took down my shutters. Such a sight had not been seen in Philadelphia for twenty years!" The daring of this act produced excessive rage; the newspapers contained direct instigations to outrage, and threats were conveyed to him in the openest manner; but there were many amongst his political opponents, and even the people, who admired the "Englishman"; and, that the Government itself felt as it ought to do, will be seen in the course of our Selections.

He had already begun a monthly periodical work, one number of which had been published before he became his own publisher, called the "*Prospect from the Congress Gallery*;" which contained State papers, the substance of speeches made in the House of Representatives (the gallery of which he attended), and his own remarks upon them. He changed the title to that of "*The Political Censor*," and carried it on with great success till March 1797, when he thought that he must have something that would put him more on a level with his opponents, a daily newspaper. Then it was that he began the "*Porcupine's Gazette*," which immediately acquired a large number of readers, and in which he carried on his warfare upon more equal terms as to time, and enraged his enemies beyond all common bounds. In argument he was far beyond them, and his cruel satire raised a storm of abuse that is yet living in tradition throughout the United States: they accused *him* of being a flogged deserter from the army, who had subsequently earned his living by picking pockets in the streets of London; and, so slight was their respect for sex, that they made an attack which caused the following refutation in the CENSOR: "Since the *sentimental* dastard, who has thus aimed "a stab at the reputation of a woman, published his 'Pill,' I have shown "my marriage certificate to Mr. ABERCROMBIE, the minister of the church "opposite me." The selections from this *Gazette* will be but few, for they consist principally of personalities on *such* opponents, who were not of sufficient importance to create any interest now. Many are extremely good in themselves; and, though they were called abusive, allowance should be made where the provocation was so great. They are witty, rather than abusive, for wit sanctifies harsh terms, whatever puny critics may say. That which would be merely vulgar in a vapid writing, becomes wit when genius puts the point to it. POPE, DRYDEN, and SWIFT, have used hard words, and in their day were called abusive, too, but their very epithets are admired in ours. Wit can take liberties that dulness must not.

To say that there was *no error* in the writings of a man beginning his career at 33 years of age, having been born under a roof where knowledge was not to be gained, educated in a barrack, and always without a guide, would be impertinence; but he who says that a man thus qualified, and with a mind made by nature of the most vehement kind, is to answer rigidly for every error in giving his thoughts to the public once during every week for the space of nearly 40 years, demands that perfection of mind, that abundance of knowledge, and that foresight into events, which no man has hitherto shown. In "*Porcupine's*" writings then, he always assumes that the English Government, both in its form and in its practices, is the most perfect of governments; but he did it while living at three thousand miles from that Government, and in

a country where casual travellers *now* find it extremely difficult to preserve the republican notions with which they start from home. In the early stages of his political life, he was both scholar and teacher, and therefore, to forbid any change of opinion, would have been to forbid him to make progress. He always owns his changes of opinion, and gives the reason, following the rule laid down by Lord Chatham, who was himself accused of inconsistency:—"The extent and complication of political questions is such, that no man can justly be ashamed of having been sometimes mistaken in his determinations; and the propensity of the human mind to confidence and friendship is so great, that every man, however cautious, however sagacious, or however experienced, is exposed sometimes to the artifices of interest, and the delusions of hypocrisy; but it is the duty, and ought to be the honour, of every man to own his mistake, whenever he discovers it, and to warn others against those frauds which have been too successfully practised upon himself." [*Life, &c.*, vol. 1., p. 42.] And if the politicians of our day were to be tried upon this point, what havoc might be made! Indeed one has but to read the debates of the Parliament for examples.

A man who changes his opinion because he now knows more than he did, is not only not to blame for the change, but is dishonest if he does not avow it. Indeed, it can scarcely be called a *change of the mind*; it is becoming possessed of more information. The mind is not active, shifting of itself; it is passive, and receives impressions. It is the conduct which changes; and unless it can be shown that change of conduct arises from corrupt or other unworthy motives, a change of it is no crime. Something may, indeed, be said of the temerity of the man who speaks with great confidence on any topic before his knowledge and experience warrant it; but who is to decide when a man is to begin? Lord GREY, in abandoning his own famous Petition of 1793, said that a difference had arisen between his "present sentiments and his former impressions," and he excused it by saying that "he, indeed, must have either been prematurely wise, or must have learned little by experience, who, after a lapse of twenty years, can look upon a subject of this nature" (Reform) "in all respects in precisely the same light" (*Speech on the State of the Nation*, 1810). Mr. HOBHOUSE accused Lord GREY of "apostacy" in thus abandoning short Parliaments, and "electors as numerous as possible." [*Defence of the People*, pp. 62, 183], but even *he* has since joined Lord GREY'S Government, which not only refused to give us that radical reform for which both had so ably contended, but denied even the pittance of triennial Parliaments! Now these changes of conduct take place in men who have the least possible excuse for any change at all.

They are bred, for the most part, under the roofs of statesmen ; they are carefully educated for statesmen ; they have every chance which association with clever and experienced men can give them ; they have all the means afforded to them of gaining the best information ; and God knows they have due leisure to imbibe precepts, digest their reading, and to reflect on what they hear and read ; and yet we find *them* change ! Lord JOHN RUSSELL, in 1823, wrote a solemn book upon the Constitution, and, of course, weighed every principle, and almost every word that it contains, before he put it forth. His Lordship, in that book, admits the venality and mischiefs of rotten boroughs, but concludes that it would be unwise to make a change ; questions whether the remedy would not be worse than the disease ; and yet, in seven years after, he applied the famous " Russell purge," which cleared the body-politic of the baneful obstruction. In another part of the same book, Lord JOHN emphatically inveighs against the unconstitutional practices of the Tory Government, in proportioning our standing army to those of foreign powers ; and yet, in 1833, he sat quietly by, while Sir John Hobhouse, the Secretary at War, brought in his Army Estimates, and told the House of Commons, that " when gentlemen were called upon to vote how many troops we " should keep up, it was most necessary and proper that they should be " put in possession of the exact amount of the forces maintained by other " powers ;" and he made no remark even, much less did he give any opposition, when Sir John Hobhouse had finished reading his Tables of the relative numbers kept up in each of the continental states, as compared with our own.

Do we mean to *apply* this, then, and say, " because these statesmen have done these things, another has a right to do so ?" Not at all. It would be mere recrimination, which is a bad defence ; but the fact is, that more is made of it in one case than in the other, which is unjust. The able writing of Mr. Cobbett caused this, no doubt. He produced effect, and that caused hostility. Unable to *answer* him, his opponents always tried to lessen his effect, by showing that he once thought with them. Indeed, before he had had time to change his opinions at all, they made use of his name, to push into notice their own absurdities, and published as his what he had never written. He complains of this in Porcupine (vol. 4, p. 19). And when his views and conduct had changed, then they had nothing so formidable for him as his former self. The same might be done by every other man who has lived long, and written or spoken much, provided always he have been of sufficient importance to make it worth the trouble. In short, great changes of views and conduct must always happen in times of change ; and he who would hold, as an unqualified proposition, that a man's views are never to change, is not above contending that a doctor shall not change his medicines to suit the changed

condition of his patient. There *are* men whose pride and boast it is, that they have never changed in their lives ; that they have always adhered to one notion. A finger-post can say as much ; for, with equal merit and more modesty, it always stands in the same place where it was first planted, and “ most consistently ” says the same thing ; but, not unfrequently, in these improving times, when roads are turned and shortened, we see its awkward arm flying off in the wrong direction, promulgating a mischievous delusion, though still and for ever the very type of “ consistency ” in gesture and in language.

Porcupine’s forcible writings were soon known to the Government in England. He received invitations from some of its ablest writers and partizans to return home, and he left America for England in 1800. But, here we must remark, that even the English agents of the Government in America found him too self-willed and independent, to venture to give him decided and open approbation. He mentions (*Porcupine*, vol. 4, p. 63) that, being in a shop, unknown or unobserved, he heard himself characterized by the English consul as “ *a wild fellow* ; ” and upon this he remarks, in the same page (published in 1796), “ I shall only ob-
“ serve, that when the King bestows on me about five hundred pounds ster-
“ ling a year, perhaps I may become a *tame fellow*, and hear my master,
“ my friends, and my parents, belied and execrated, without saying a single
“ word in their defence.” * It was the same when he came home. Though the Government had discernment enough to see in him a man of great power, and a strong acquisition to any government that could have him for an advocate, it never had him in fact, and never thought it had. He came home at the time above stated, full of that confidence which the success of his writings had naturally given him ; he was immediately sought for by the late Mr. WINDHAM, was by him introduced to Mr. PITT, at a dinner-party, invited to Mr. WINDHAM’S house, was offered a share in the “ True Briton ” newspaper, with printing-machines and type ready furnished ; but refusing this offer, he set up a newspaper called

* The critics find that there is wanting a good excuse for attributing Mr. COBBETT’S writings to corrupt motives ; to *pay*, in short. One says that he was paid by the Government for his writings in America, a notion not very compatible with the tart rebuke quoted above ; for it is not the habit of paid scribes to publish such denials under the noses of those who would have to pay them. Again, they say, or insinuate, that he was paid no less than 3000 guineas *through Mr. Windham* for setting up a newspaper in London ; and another says that he was paid for his writings in favour of the Catholics, by the Catholic Association of Ireland. These assertions have one merit : they are *equally* true ; that is, they are all false. We notice them here only to show that we are mindful of them, and to observe that in the proper places they will all be answered. We think we shall be able to show that they are not only totally false, but that the writers of them could not have believed what they wished to make others believe.

“Porcupine’s Gazette,” which, as it did not suit his fancy, he gave up shortly, and opened a bookseller’s shop in Pall-mall, in partnership with his friend, Mr. John Morgan, an Englishman, with whom he was acquainted in Philadelphia. In this shop he might have made what fortune he pleased ; for never was man more favourably circumstanced. He had the choicest connexion that a tradesman could wish for, and as much of it as would have sated the appetite of the most thrifty man ; but then, he had no sooner entered upon this promising career, than he (1801) disputed the policy of the Peace of Amiens, then about to be made ; and, as he *would* speak out, he quarrelled with the Government, and in a series of letters to Lord HAWKESBURY and Mr. ADDINGTON, exposed their folly as manifested in the treaty ; broke off from the friendships that had been lavished upon him, and again almost “*stood alone*” against the English Government, as he had done against its foes while in America. In this stand, however, he concurred in opinion with Mr. WINDHAM, whose integrity and thoroughly English heart he always respected highly. In January 1802, he began the *Political Register* (calling it the Annual Register), which ultimately became what he never intended, a weekly Essay on Politics. It soon acquired a great sale and reputation ; contributors to it were numerous and excellent ; and, though its conductor wrote with his usual force, there is a moderation in the papers written by him at this time, which makes them somewhat tame in comparison with those which he wrote in America, and those which he has written since, when personal hostility mixed itself in the controversy. They are more dignified, but less personal ; and are for that reason the best specimens of his force in argument. His maxim (professed to be borrowed from SWIFT) was, “If a flea or a louse bite me, I’ll kill it if I can ;” and though this maxim made him too fond of killing fleas—too fond of striking at mean objects ; yet the spirit of his writings would not have been half what it was, but for the sallies of humour that it brought into play. He was not long left to this species of repose ; for the Government began to feel his powerful detections, and to fear the effects of a publication becoming so popular and wide of circulation. Its own scribes were, of course, let loose upon him ; and others, prompted by a wish to show their value, or by envy of a man who was gaining so much both of fame and wealth, were nowise behind : accordingly, he was soon engaged in personal strife again. Paragraphs incessant, and pamphlets of all dimensions, appeared against him ; but the favourite mode of attack was that of publishing in his name, and in close imitation of the *Register*, slanders on himself ; and so far was this carried, that its readers were actually served through the post with the fabrication instead of the Register ! He was “fool,” “vulgar,” “incendiary,” “knave,” “libeller,” “coward ;” when rich, lucre was his object ; when poor, they smote


him for his poverty : in short, a war with the whole legion of the press of England he waged, with scarcely a truce, from 1804 till the day, when death having put an end to the conflict, they came forward simultaneously, some to confess his power, some to express the pride of countrymen, some to deplore the loss of one so useful ; and one, the chief organ of the party to which he had been most opposed, to bestow on him the title of “ last of the Saxons.”

We have fulfilled our promise to state *fully* our reasons for publishing these selections ; but full as this Preface is, we have been tempted, more than once, to make it a vehicle for answering some current misrepresentations of the day. We have abstained with difficulty ; and shall conclude, by stating, as a summary, that the work will be published in weekly numbers, which, at the end of four weeks, may be had in parts, and, at the end of three months, in volumes ; that, according to our present calculations, the volumes will be altogether six in number ; and that a full index will conclude the publication.

JOHN M. COBBETT,

JAMES P. COBBETT.

London, 1st November, 1835.



OBSERVATIONS,

ON

PRIESTLEY'S EMIGRATION.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—MR. COBBETT went to France in March 1792; remained at the little village of Tilq, near St. Omers, till the 9th of August in that year, when he set out on his way to Paris, meaning to remain there during the winter. He had reached Abbeville on the 11th, and there heard of the dethronement of the King and the massacre of his guards, and could not but foresee such troubles as a man would not like to encounter, especially in company with a newly-marrid wife. He changed his route towards Havre-de-Grace, in order to get on ship-board to go to America, and reached it on the 15th. He travelled in a calèche, and, as the people were at every town looking out for “aristocrats” they stopped him so frequently, and the police examined all things so scrupulously, making him read all his papers in French to them, that he did not reach Havre till the 16th. He remained there a fortnight, which brings him to the 1st September, the day on which the general massacre began, of which he had heard some account from the captain of a vessel which quitted Havre later than the one in which he was, but which came up with, and spoke her on the passage. He landed in Philadelphia in the end of Oct. 1792, and went to Wilmington on the Delaware, where he found a number of French emigrants, who were greatly in want of a teacher of English, and as he was well able, he was soon in great request and had as many scholars as he could attend to. Partly from his own experience, and partly from the information derived from them, he formed his opinions on the revolution and the actors in it; but he did not put them into print till the arrival of Dr. Priestley, who, in his answers to addresses that were presented to him from political and other societies, put forth some observations against the English form of government. Then he published the following pamphlet.

WHEN the arrival of Doctor Priestley in the United States was first announced*, I looked upon his emigration (like the proposed retreat of Cowley to his imaginary Paradise, the Summer Islands) as no more than the effect of that weakness, that delusive caprice, which too often accompanies the decline of life, and which is apt, by a change of place, to flatter age with a renovation of faculties, and a return of departed genius. Viewing him as a man that sought repose, my heart welcomed him to the shores of peace, and wished him what he certainly ought to have wished himself, a quiet obscurity. But his answers to the addresses of the Democratic and other Societies at New York, place him in quite a different light, and subject him to the animadversions of a public, among whom they have been industriously propagated.

No man has a right to pry into his neighbour's private concerns; and the opinions of every man are his private concerns, while he keeps them

* He arrived at New York on the 12th of June 1794.

so; that is to say, while they are confined to himself, his family, and particular friends; but when he makes those opinions public, when he once attempts to make converts, whether it be in religion, politics, or any thing else; when he once comes forward as a candidate for public admiration, esteem, or compassion, his opinions, his principles, his motives, every action of his life, public or private, become the fair subject of public discussion. On this principle, which the Doctor ought to be the last among mankind to controvert, it is easy to perceive that these observations need no apology.

His answers to the addresses of the New York Societies are evidently calculated to mislead and deceive the people of the United States. He there endeavours to impose himself on them for a sufferer in the cause of liberty; and makes a canting profession of moderation, in direct contradiction to the conduct of his whole life.

He says he hopes to find here "that protection from violence which laws and government promise in all countries, but which he has not found in his own." He certainly must suppose that no European intelligence ever reaches this side of the Atlantic, or that the inhabitants of these countries are too dull to comprehend the sublime events that mark his life and character. Perhaps I shall show him that it is not the people of England alone who know how to estimate the merit of Doctor Priestley.

Let us examine his claims to our compassion; let us see whether his charge against the laws and government of his country be just or not.

On the 14th of July 1791, an unruly mob assembled in the town of Birmingham, set fire to his house and burnt it, together with all it contained. This is the subject of his complaint, and the pretended cause of his emigration. The fact is not denied; but in the relation of facts, circumstances must not be forgotten. To judge of the Doctor's charge against his country, we must take a retrospective view of his conduct, and of the circumstances that led to the destruction of his property.

It is about twelve years since he began to be distinguished among the dissenters from the established church of England. He preached up a kind of *deism** which nobody understood, and which it was thought the Doctor understood full as well as his neighbours. This doctrine afterwards assumed the name of Unitarianism, and the *religieux* of the order were called, or rather they called themselves, Unitarians. The sect never rose into consequence; and the founder had the mortification of seeing his darling Unitarianism growing quite out of date with himself, when the French revolution came, and gave them both a short respite from eternal oblivion.

Those who know any thing of the English Dissenters, know that they always introduce their political claims and projects under the mask of religion. The Doctor was one of those who entertained hopes of bringing about a revolution in England upon the French plan; and for this purpose he found it would be very convenient for him to be at the head

* BELSHAM, in his History of the Reign of Geo. IV., says of Dr. PRIESTLEY, that, "as a theologian, he had signalized himself as the grand restorer of the ancient Unitarian system, maintained at the era of the Reformation by Socinus and other learned men of the Polish or Cracovian school; and which, refusing divine honours to the Founder of the Christian religion acknowledged him merely in the character of a teacher and prophet sent from God, and demonstrating the authenticity of his mission by *signs and wonders*, which God did by him." Vol. 8, p. 347.—ED.

of a religious sect. Unitarianism was now revived, and the society held regular meetings at Birmingham. In the inflammatory discourses called sermons, delivered at these meetings, the English constitution was first openly attacked. Here it was that the Doctor beat his "drum ecclesiastic," to raise recruits in the cause of rebellion. The press soon swarmed with publications expressive of his principles. The revolutionists began to form societies all over the kingdom, between which a mode of communication was established, in perfect conformity to that of the Jacobin clubs in France.

Nothing was neglected by this branch of the Parisian *propagande* to excite the people to a general insurrection. Inflammatory hand-bills, advertisements, federation dinners, toasts, sermons, prayers; in short, every trick that religious or political duplicity could suggest, was played off to destroy a constitution which has borne the test and attracted the admiration of ages; and to establish in its place a new system, fabricated by themselves.

The 14th of July, 1791,* was of too much note in the annals of modern regeneration to be neglected by these regenerated politicians. A club of them, of which Doctor Priestley was a member, gave public notice of a feast, to be held at Birmingham, in which they intended to celebrate the French revolution. Their endeavours had hitherto excited no other sentiments in what may be called the people of England, than those of contempt. The people of Birmingham, however, felt, on this occasion, a convulsive movement. They were scandalized at this public notice for holding in their town a festival, to celebrate events which were in reality a subject of the deepest horror; and seeing in it at the same time an open and audacious attempt to destroy the constitution of their country, and with it their happiness, they thought their understandings and loyalty insulted, and prepared to avenge themselves by the chastisement of the English revolutionists, in the midst of their scandalous orgies. The feast nevertheless took place; but the Doctor, knowing himself to be the grand projector, and consequently the particular object of his townsmen's vengeance, prudently kept away. The cry of *Church and King* was the signal for the people to assemble, which they did to a considerable number, opposite the hotel where the *convives* were met. The club dispersed, and the mob proceeded to breaking the windows, and other acts of violence, incident to such scenes; but let it be remembered, that no personal violence was offered. Perhaps it would have been well, if they had vented their anger on the persons of the revolutionists, provided they had contented themselves with the ceremony of the horse-pond or blanket. Certain it is, that it would have been very fortunate if the riot had ended this way; but when that many-headed monster, a mob, is once roused and put in motion, who can stop its destructive steps?

From the *hotel of the federation* the mob proceeded to Doctor Priestley's meeting-house, which they very nearly destroyed in a little time. Had they stopped here, all would yet have been well. The destruction of this temple of sedition and infidelity would have been of no

* This day was not signalized by any acts of violence; the 14th July, 1792, was different. On the 1st July, 1791, Louis XVI. took an oath before the National Assembly, the clergy, the army and the people, in these words, "I, King of the French, swear to use the power which is given to me by the constitutional charter of the state, for the maintenance of the constitution as decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by me." BELSHAM, Vol. 4, p. 103.—THIERS, *Hist. Rev. Francaise*. Vol. 1 p. 197.—ED.

great consequence ; but, unhappily for them and the town of Birmingham, they could not be separated before they had destroyed the houses and property of many members of the club. Some of these houses, among which was Doctor Priestley's, were situated at the distance of some miles from town : the mob were in force to defy all the efforts of the civil power, and, unluckily, none of the military could be brought to the place till some days after the 14th of July. In the mean time many spacious and elegant houses were burnt, and much valuable property destroyed ; but it is certainly worthy remark, that during the whole of these unlawful proceedings, not a single person was killed or wounded, either wilfully or by accident, except some of the rioters themselves. At the end of four or five days, this riot, which seemed to threaten more serious consequences, was happily terminated by the arrival of a detachment of dragoons ; and tranquillity was restored to the distressed town of Birmingham.

The magistrates used every exertion in their power to quell this riot in its very earliest stage, and continued to do so to the last. The Earl of Plymouth condescended to attend, and act as a justice of the peace ; several clergymen of the Church of England also attended in the same capacity, and all were indefatigable in their endeavours to put a stop to the depredations, and to re-establish order.

Every one knows that in such cases it is difficult to discriminate, and that it is neither necessary nor just, if it be possible, to imprison, try, and execute the whole of a mob. Eleven of these rioters were, however, indicted ; seven of them were acquitted, four found guilty, and of these four two * *suffered death*. These unfortunate men were, according to the law, prosecuted on the part of the King ; and it has been allowed by the Doctor's own partisans, that the prosecution was carried on with every possible enforcement, and even rigour, by the judges and counsellors. The pretended lenity was laid to the charge of the jury ! What a contradiction ! They accuse the Government of screening the rioters from the penalty due to their crimes, and at the same time they accuse the jury of their acquittal ! It is the misfortune of Doctor Priestley and all his adherents ever to be inconsistent with themselves.

After this general review of the riots, in which the Doctor was unlawfully despoiled of his property, let us return to the merits of his particular case and his complaint : and here let it be recollected, that it is not of the rioters alone that he complains, but of the laws and Government of his country also. Upon an examination of particulars we shall find, that so far from his having just cause of complaint, the laws have rendered him strict justice, if not something more ; and that if any party has reason to complain of their execution, it is the town of Birmingham, and not Doctor Priestley.

Some time after the riots, the Doctor and the other revolutionists who had had property destroyed, brought their actions for damages against the town of Birmingham, or rather against the hundred of which that town makes a part. The Doctor laid his damages at 4122*l.* 11*s.* 9*d.* sterling, of which sum 420*l.* 15*s.* was for works in manuscript, which, he said, had been consumed in the flames. The trial of this cause took up nine hours : the jury gave a verdict in his favour, but curtailed the damages to 2502*l.* 18*s.* It was rightly considered that the imaginary value of the manuscript works ought not to have been included in the damages ; because

* BELSHAM says it was *three*. Vol. 8, p. 350.—ED.

the Doctor being the author of them, he in fact possessed them still, and the loss could be little more than a few sheets of dirty paper. Besides, if they were to be estimated by those he had published for some years before, their destruction was a benefit instead of a loss, both to himself and his country. The sum, then, of 420*l.* 15*s.* being deducted, the damages stood at 370*l.* 16*s.* 9*d.*; and it should not be forgotten, that even a great part of this sum was charged for an apparatus of philosophical instruments, which, in spite of the most unpardonable gasconade of the philosopher, can be looked upon as a thing of imaginary value only, and ought not to be estimated at its *cost*, any more than a collection of shells or insects, or any other of the *frivola* of a virtuoso.

Now it is most notorious, that actions for damages are always brought for much higher sums than are ever expected to be recovered. Sometimes they are brought for three times the amount of the real damage sustained; sometimes for double, and sometimes for only a third more than the real damage. If we view, then, the Doctor's estimate in the most favourable light, if we suppose that he made but the addition of one third to his real damages, the sum he ought to have received would be no more than 2467*l.* 17*s.* 10*d.*, whereas he actually received 2502*l.* 18*s.*, which was 35*l.* 0*s.* 2*d.* more than he had a right to expect. And yet he complains that he has not found protection from the laws and government of his country! If he had been the very best subject in England, in place of one of the very worst, what could the laws have done more for him? Nothing certainly can be a stronger proof of the independence of the courts of justice, and of the impartial execution of the laws of England, than the circumstances and result of this cause. A man who had for many years been the avowed and open enemy of the Government and constitution, had his property destroyed by a mob who declared themselves the friends of both, and who rose up against him because he was not. This mob were pursued by the Government, whose cause they thought they were defending; some of them suffered death, and the inhabitants of the place where they assembled were obliged to indemnify the man whose property they had destroyed. It would be curious to know what sort of protection this *reverend* Doctor, this "friend of humanity," wanted. Would nothing satisfy him but the blood of the whole mob? Did he wish to see the town of Birmingham, like that of Lyons, razed, and all its industrious and loyal inhabitants butchered, because some of them had been carried to commit unlawful excesses, from their detestation of his wicked projects? BIRMINGHAM HAS COMBATED AGAINST PRIESTLEY. BIRMINGHAM IS NO MORE. This, I suppose, would have satisfied the charitable modern philosopher, who pretended, and who the Democratic Society say, did "return to his enemies blessings for curses." Woe to the wretch that is exposed to the benedictions of a modern philosopher! His "*dextre vengresse*" is ten thousand times more to be feared than the bloody poniard of the assassin: the latter is drawn on individuals only, the other is pointed at the human race. Happily for the people of Birmingham, these blessings had no effect; there was no National Convention, Revolutionary Tribunal, or guillotine,* in England.

* At the time that this was written the French Revolution had assumed its most horrible forms; CARRIER was murdering men, women, and little children by thousands at Nantes; and the very stench of dead unburied bodies had caused an epidemic in that devoted city; TRIVILLE had built his tribunal at Paris, suiting the place to his occasions, by taking that room which had before been set

As I have already observed, if the Doctor had been the best and most peaceable subject in the kingdom, the Government and laws could not have yielded him more perfect protection; his complaint would, therefore, be groundless, if he had given no provocation to the people, if he had in no wise contributed to the riots. If, then, he has received ample justice, considered as an innocent man and a good subject, what shall we think of his complaint, when we find that he was himself the principal cause of these riots; and that the rioters did nothing that was not perfectly consonant to the principles he had for many years been labouring to infuse into their minds?

That he and his club were the cause of the riots will not be disputed; for, had they not given an insulting notice of their intention to celebrate the horrors of the 14th of July, accompanied with an inflammatory hand-bill, intended to excite an insurrection against the Government,† no riot would ever have taken place, and consequently its disastrous effects would have been avoided. But it has been said, that there was nothing offensive in this inflammatory hand-bill; because, forsooth, "the matter of it" (however indecent and untrue) was not *more virulent* than Paine's "Rights of Man, Mackintosh's Answer to Burke, Remarks on the Constitution of England, &c. &c., which had been lately published without incurring the *censure of Government.*" So, an inflammatory performance, acknowledged to be *indecent* and *untrue*, is not offensive, because it is not *more virulent* than some other performances which have escaped the censure of Government! If this is not a new manner of arguing, it is at least an odd one. But this hand-bill had something *more malicious* in it, if not *more virulent*, than even the inflammatory works above mentioned. *They* were more difficult to come at; to have *them*, they must be bought. *They* contained something like reasoning, the fallacy of which the Government was very sure would be detected by the good sense of those who took the pains to read them. A hand-bill was a more commodious instrument of sedition: it was calculated to have immediate effect. Besides, if there had been nothing offensive in it, why did the club think proper to disown it in so ceremonious a manner? They disowned it with the most solemn asseverations, offered a reward for apprehending the author, and afterwards justified it as an inoffensive thing. Here is a palpable inconsistency. The fact is, they perceived that this precious morsel of eloquence, in place of raising a mob for them, was like to raise one against them: they saw the storm gathering, and, in the moment of fear, disowned the writing. After the danger was over, seeing they could not exculpate themselves from the charge of having published it, they defended it as an inoffensive performance.

The Doctor, in his justificatory letter to the people of Birmingham, says, that the company were assembled on this occasion "to celebrate the emancipation of a neighbouring nation from tyranny, without inti-

apart for counsel, clients, and audience; and, as counsel were not allowed, and audience did not care to attend, making it a vast dock for prisoners, whom he wished to try by the 150 at a time. He was, to use his own expression, making "heads fall like tiles:" and LEBON was going through the northern provinces with an assortment of *judges*, and, with a portable guillotine, slaughtering where ever he rested. THIERS, *Hist. Rev. Française*, vol. 6, p. 275.—ED.

† This hand-bill was disowned by the club, and they offered a reward for apprehending the author; but they took care to send him to France before their advertisement appeared.

“mating a desire of *any thing more than an improvement of their own constitution.*” Excessive modesty! *Nothing but an improvement!* A LA FRANÇOISE, of course? However, with respect to the church, as it was a point of conscience, the club do not seem to have been altogether so moderate in their designs. “Believe me,” says the Doctor, in the same letter, “the Church of England, which you think you are supporting, has received a greater *blow* by this conduct of yours, than *I* and *all my friends* have ever aimed at it.” They had then, it seems, aimed a *blow* at the established church, and were forming a plan for *improving* the constitution; and yet the Doctor, in the same letter, twice expresses his astonishment at their being treated as the enemies of church and state. In a letter to the students of the College of Hackney, he says, “A hierarchy, equally *the bane of Christianity and rational liberty*, now confesses its weakness; and be assured, that you will see its complete reformation or *its fall.*” And yet he has the assurance to tell the people of Birmingham that their superiors have deceived them in representing him and his sect as the enemies of church and state.

But, say they, we certainly exercised the right of freemen in assembling together; and even if our meeting had been unlawful, cognizance should have been taken of it by the magistracy: there can be no liberty where a ferocious mob is suffered to supersede the law. Very true. This is what the Doctor has been told a thousand times, but he never would believe it. He still continued to bawl out, “The sunshine of reason will assuredly chase away and dissipate the mists of darkness and error; and when the majesty of the people is *insulted*, or they feel themselves oppressed by *any set of men*, they have the power to redress the grievance.” So the people of Birmingham, feeling their majesty insulted by a *set of men* (and a very impudent set of men too), who audaciously attempted to persuade them that they were “*all slaves and idolaters,*” and to seduce them from their duty to God and their country, rose “*to redress the grievance.*” And yet he complains? Ah! says he, but, my good townsmen,

“————— you mistake the matter:
 “For, in all scruples of this nature,
 “No man includes *himself*, nor turns
 “The point upon his own concerns.”

And therefore he says to the people of Birmingham, “You have been misled.” But had they suffered themselves to be misled by himself into an insurrection against the Government; had they burnt the churches, cut the throats of the clergy, and hung the magistrates, military officers, and nobility, to the lamp-posts, would he not have said that they exercised a sacred right? Nay, was not the very festival, which was the immediate cause of the riots, held expressly to celebrate scenes like these? to celebrate the inglorious triumphs of a mob? The 14th of July was a day marked with the blood of the innocent, and eventually the destruction of an empire. The events of that day must strike horror to every heart except that of a deistical philosopher, and would brand with eternal infamy any other nation but France; which, thanks to the benign influence of the Rights of Man, has made such a progress in ferociousness, murder, sacrilege, and every species of infamy, that the horrors of the 14th of July are already forgotten.

What we celebrate, we must approve; and does not the man who approved of the events of the 14th of July, blush to complain of the Birmingham riots? “Happily,” says he to the people of Birmingham,

“happily the minds of Englishmen have a horror for *murder*, and therefore you did not, I hope, think of that; though, by your clamorous demanding me at the hotel, it is probable that, at that time, some of you intended me some personal injury.” Yes, sir, happily the minds of Englishmen have a horror for murder; but who will say that the minds of English men or English women either, would have a horror for murder, if you had succeeded in overturning their religion and constitution, and introducing your Frenchified system of liberty? The French were acknowledged to be the most polite and amiable people in all Europe: what are they now? Let La Fayette, Brissot, Anacharsis Cloots, or Thomas Payne himself, answer this question.

Let us see, a little, how mobs have acted under the famous Government that the Doctor so much admires.

I shall not attempt a detail of the horrors committed by the cut-throat Jourdan and his associates in Provence, Avignon, Languedoc, and Roussillon—towns and villages sacked, gentlemen’s seats and castles burnt, and their inhabitants massacred; magistrates insulted, beat, and imprisoned, sometimes killed; prisoners set at liberty, to cut the throats of those they had already robbed. The exploits of this band of *patriots* would fill whole volumes. They reduced a great part of the inhabitants of the finest and most fertile country in the whole world, to a degree of misery and ruin that would never have been forgotten, had it not been so far eclipsed since, by the operation of what is, in “that devoted country,” called the law. The amount of the damages sustained in property, perhaps a hundred thousand times as great as that sustained by the revolutionists at Birmingham. When repeated accounts of these murderous scenes were laid before the National Assembly, what was the consequence? what the redress? “We had our fears,” says Monsieur Gentil, “for the prisoners of Avignon, and for the lives and property of the inhabitants of that unhappy country; but these fears are now changed into a certainty: the prisoners are released; the country seats are burnt, and”—Monsieur Gentil was called to order, and not suffered to proceed; after which these precious “Guardians of the Rights of Man” passed a censure on him, for having slandered the patriots. It is notorious, that the chief of these cut-throats, Jourdan, has since produced his butcheries in Avignon; as a proof of his *civism*, and that he is now a distinguished character among the real friends of the revolution.

Does the Doctor remember having heard any thing about the glorious achievements of the 10th of August 1792?*

* The 10th of August, 1792, was the beginning of the “Reign of Terror.” The King and his family were imprisoned, and all regular government ceased; Paris was governed by different clubs, who extorted from the feeble remains of the National Assembly what laws they pleased; but that which delivered the city into the hands of a set of infuriated butchers, was a law by which the gates of it were closed for twenty-four hours, guarded to prevent any one going out, and every one desired to remain at home. Visits were made to every house in Paris, and every man or woman *suspected* of aristocratic notions was thrown into prison; the jails and churches were crowded, and, on the 1st September following, a general massacre began which lasted till the 5th, and in which from 6,000 to 12,000 people were slaughtered by the hands of men hired at so much per day to kill; and, in the Register of one of the Communes of Paris, there is an entry showing that on the 4th, 1463 francs were paid to these executioners, who appear to have been stopped at last, rather by the encumbrance of blood and dead bodies than by the want of victims or of a desire to proceed.—THIERS, Vol. 3, p. 60 to 67.]—ED.

mate of the property destroyed in Paris on that and the following days? Let him compare the destruction that followed the steps of that mob, with the loss of his boasted apparatus; and when he has done this, let him tell us, if he can, where he would now be, if the Government of England had treated him and his friends as the National Assembly did the sufferers in the riots of the 10th of August. But, perhaps, he looks upon the events of that day as a glorious victory, a new emancipation, and of course will say, that I degrade the *heroes* in calling them a mob. I am not for disputing with him about a name; he may call them the heroes of the 10th of August, if he will: "The heroes of the 14th of July," has always been understood to mean, a *gang of blood-thirsty cannibals*, and I would by no means wish to withhold the title from those of the 10th of August.

Will the Doctor allow, that it was a mob that murdered the state prisoners from Orleans? Or does he insist upon calling that massacre an *act of civism*, and the actors in it the heroes of the 12th of September? But whether it was an act of civism, a massacre, or a victory, or whatever it was, I cannot help giving it a place here, as I find it recorded by his countryman, Doctor Moore.

"The mangled bodies," says he, "were lying in the street, on the left hand, as you go to the *Chateau*, from Paris. Some of the lower sort of the inhabitants of Versailles were looking on; the rest, struck with terror, were shut up in their shops and houses. The body of the Duke of Brissac was pointed out, the head and one of the hands was cut off: a man stood near smoking tobacco, with his sword drawn, and a human hand stuck on the point: another fellow walked carelessly among the bodies with an entire arm of another of the prisoners fixed to the point of his sword. A wagon afterwards arrived, into which were thrown as many of the slaughtered bodies as the horses could draw: a boy of about fifteen years of age was in the wagon, assisting to receive the bodies as they were put in, and packing them in the most convenient manner, with an air of as much indifference as if they had been so many parcels of goods. One of the wretches who threw in the bodies, and who probably had assisted in the massacre, said to the spectators in praise of the boy's activity, '*See that little fellow there; how bold he is!*'"

"The assassins of the prisoners were a party who came from Paris the preceding evening, most of them in post-chaises for that purpose, and who attacked those unhappy men while they remained in the street, waiting till the gate of the prison, which was prepared for their reception, should be opened. The detachment which had guarded the prisoners from Orleans, stood shameful and passive spectators of the massacre. The miserable prisoners being all unarmed, and some of them fettered, could do nothing in their own defence; they were most of them stabbed; and a few, who attempted resistance, were cut down with sabres.

"There never was a more barbarous and dastardly action performed in the face of the sun. Gracious Heaven! were those barbarities, which would disgrace savages, committed by Frenchmen! by that lively and ingenious people, whose writings were so much admired, whose society has been so much courted, and whose manners have been so much imitated by all the neighbouring nations? This atrocious deed executed in the street of Versailles, and the horrors committed in the prisons of Paris, will fix indelible stains on the character of the French nation. It is said, those barbarities revolted the hearts of many of the citizens of Paris and Versailles, as much as they could those of the inhabitants of London or Windsor. It is also said, that those massacres were not committed by the inhabitants of Paris or Versailles, but by a set of hired assassins. But who hired those assassins? Who remained in shameful stupor and dastardly inactivity, while their laws were insulted, their prisons violated, and their fellow-citizens butchered in the open streets? I do not believe, that from the wickedest gang of highwaymen, housebreakers, and pickpockets, that infest London and the neighbourhood, men could be selected who could be bribed to

"murder, in cold blood, such a number of their countrymen. And if they could, I am convinced that no degree of popular delusion they are capable of, no pretext, no motive whatever, could make the inhabitants of London or Windsor, or any town of Great Britain, suffer such dreadful executions to be performed within their walls."

No; I hope not: yet I do not know what might have been effected by an introduction of the same system of anarchy, that has changed the airy French into a set of the most ferocious inhuman bloodhounds that ever disgraced the human shape.

From scenes like these, the mind turns for relief and consolation to the riot at Birmingham. That riot, considered comparatively with what Dr. Priestley and his friends wished and attempted to stir up, was peace, harmony and gentleness. Has this man any reason to complain? He will perhaps say, he did not approve of the French riots and massacres; to which I shall answer, that he did approve of them. His public celebration of them was a convincing proof of this; and if it were not, his sending his son to Paris in the midst of them, to request the *honour* of becoming a French citizen, is a proof that certainly will not be disputed.* If, then, we take a view of the riots of which the Doctor is an admirer, and of those of which he expresses his detestation, we must fear that he is very far from being that "*friend of human happiness*," that the Democratic Society pretend to believe him. In short, in whatever light we view the Birmingham riots, we can see no object that excites our compassion, except the inhabitants of the hundred, and the unfortunate rioters themselves.

It was the *form* of the English Government, and those artificial distinctions; that is to say, of King, Prince, Bishop, &c. that he wanted to destroy, in order to produce that "*other system of liberty*," which he had been so long dreaming about. In his answer to the address of "the republican natives of Great Britain and Ireland resident at New York," he says, "the wisdom and happiness of republican Governments, and the evils resulting from hereditary monarchical ones, cannot appear in a stronger light to you, than they do to me;" and yet this same man pretended an inviolable attachment to the *hereditary monarchical Government* of Great Britain! Says he, by way of vindicating the principles of his club to the people of Birmingham, "the first toast that was drunk was, '*The King and Constitution*.'" What! does he make a merit in England of having *toasted* that which he abominates in America? Alas! philosophers are but mere men.

It is clear that a parliamentary reform was not the object; an after-game was intended, which the vigilance of Government, and the natural good sense of the people, happily prevented; and the Doctor, disappointed and chagrined, is come here to discharge his heart of the venom it has been long collecting against his country. He tells the Democratic Society that he cannot promise to be a better subject of this Government, than he has been of that of Great Britain. Let us hope that he intends us an agree-

* Let us hear the Doctor again. "My second son, who was present both at the riot, and the assizes, felt more indignation still, and willingly listened to a proposal to settle in France; and there his reception was but too flattering." It is useless to ascertain the time of this flattering reception, in order to prove that it was in the midst of massacres; for the revolution has been one continued scene of murder and rapine; but, however, if the reader has an opportunity of examining the Paris papers, he will find that the ceremony took place within a very few days of the time when Jourdan filled the *ice-house* at Avignon with mangled bodies.

able disappointment; if not, the sooner he emigrates back again, the better.

System-mongers are an unreasonable species of mortals: time, place, climate, nature itself, must give way.* They must have the same government in every quarter of the globe; when perhaps there are not two countries which can possibly admit of the same form of government at the same time. A thousand hidden causes, a thousand circumstances and unforeseen events, conspire to the forming of a government. It is always done by little and little. When completed, it presents nothing like a *system*; nothing like a thing composed, and written in a book.† It is curious to hear people cite the American Government as the summit of human perfection, while they decry the English; when it is absolutely nothing more than the Government which the Kings of England established here, with such little modifications as were necessary on account of the state of society and local circumstances. If, then, the Doctor is come here for a change of government and laws, he is the most disappointed of mortals. He will have the mortification to find in his "*asylum*" the same laws as those from which he has fled, the same upright manner of administering them, the same punishment of the oppressor, and the same protection of the oppressed. In the Courts of Justice he will every day see precedents quoted from the English law-books; and (which to him may appear wonderful) we may venture to predict, that it will be very long before they will be supplanted by the bloody records of the revolutionary tribunal.

Happiness being the end of all good government, that which produces the most is consequently the best; and comparison being the only method of determining the relative value of things, it is easy to see which is preferable, the tyranny which the French formerly enjoyed, or the liberty and equality they at present labour under. If the Doctor had come about a year sooner, he might have had the satisfaction of being not only an ear, but an eye witness also, of some of the blessed effects of this celebrated revolution. He might then have been regaled with that sight, so delectable to a modern philosopher; opulence reduced to misery.

The stale pretence, that the league against the French has been the cause of their inhuman conduct to each other, cannot, by the most perverse sophistry, be applied to the island of St. Domingo. That fine rich colony was ruined, its superb capital and villas reduced to ashes,

* "LOCKE was employed to frame a constitution for Carolina, but it abounded "so much with regulations inapplicable to the state of things for which it was "designed, so full of theoretic whimsies, that it was soon thrown aside."—WM. SMITH. (*American Minister to Portugal.*) *Character of Jefferson.*—Ed.

† Lord GREY, in 1810, in bringing a motion on the state of the nation, before the House of Lords, alluded to Mr. Fox's opinion of written constitutions in these words: "Never can I forget his powerful observations, when he stated "his conviction of the absolute impossibility of providing for all the variety of "human events, by any previous speculative plans. For, said he, if a member "of the wisest, ablest, and most virtuous men that ever adorned and improved "human life, were collected together, and seated round a table to devise *à priori*, "a constitution for a state, it is my persuasion, that notwithstanding their ability "and virtue, they would not succeed in adapting a system to the purposes re- "quired, but must necessarily leave it to be fitted by great alterations in practice, "and many deviations from the original design. And this opinion he was wont "to illustrate by the familiar example of building a house, and he used to re- "mark, that, however fine to look at a regular paper-plan might be, no house "was so commodious and habitable as one which was built from time to time, "piece-meal, and without any regular design."—Ed.

one half of its inhabitants massacred, and the other half reduced to beggary, before an enemy ever appeared on the coast. No : it is that system of anarchy and blood that was celebrated at Birmingham, on the 14th of July 1791, that has been the cause of all this murder and devastation.

Nor let the Doctor pretend that this could not be foreseen. It was foreseen, and foretold too, from the very moment a part of the deputies to the States General were permitted to call themselves a National Assembly. In proof of this, I could mention a dozen publications that came out under his own eye ; but I shall content myself with giving a short extract from a speech in the British Parliament, which is the more proper on this occasion, as it was delivered but a few weeks before the period of the riots.

“ The Americans,” said Mr. Burke, “ have what was essentially necessary for freedom : they have the phlegm of the good-tempered Englishmen—they were fitted for republicans by a republican education. Their revolution was not brought about by base and degenerate crimes ; nor did they overturn a government for the purposes of anarchy ; but they raised a republic, as nearly representing the British Government as it was possible. They did not run into the absurdity of France, and by seizing on the *rights of man*, declare that the nation was to govern the nation, and Prince Prettyman to govern Prince Prettyman. There are in Canada many of the ancient inhabitants ; will it be proper to give them the French Constitution ? In my opinion, there is not a single circumstance that recommends the adoption of any part of it, for the whole is abominably bad, the production of folly, not wisdom—of vice, not virtue ; it contains nothing but extremes, as distant from each other as the poles—the parts are in eternal opposition to each other—it is founded on what is called the *rights of man* ; but, to my conviction, it is founded on the *wrongs of man* ; and I now hold in my hand, an example of its effects on the French colonies. Domingo, Guadaloupe, and the other French islands, were rich, happy, and growing in strength and consequence, in spite of the three last distressing wars, before they heard of the new doctrine of the rights of man ; but these rights were no sooner arrived at the islands than any spectator would have imagined that Pandora’s box had been opened, and that hell had yawned out discord, murder, and every mischief ; for anarchy, confusion, and bloodshed, raged every where ; it was a general summons for

“ Black spirits and white,
“ Blue spirits and gray,
“ Mingle, mingle, mingle,
“ You that mingle may.”

“ When the Assembly heard of these disorders, they ordered troops to quell them ; but it proves that the troops have joined the insurgents, and murdered their commander. I look on the revolution with horror and detestation ; it is a revolution of consummate folly, formed and maintained by every vice.”

But perhaps the Doctor’s intense studies, “ his continual labours for the good of mankind,” might not leave him time to peruse the debates of Parliament ; however, we may fairly presume, that he read the letters addressed to himself ; and if so, he has read the following passage : “ You think that a neighbouring nation is emancipated from tyranny, and that a company of Englishmen may laudably express their joy on the occasion. Were your premises true, I would allow your conclusion. But let us wait the event. Philosophers should not be too credulous, or form their determinations too rashly. It is very possible that all the magnificent schemes of your august diet in France may be succeeded by a ridiculous, a villanous, or a bloody catastrophe.”

Either he foresaw the consequences of the French revolution, or he did not foresee them : if he did not, he must confess that his penetration was far inferior to that of his antagonists, and even to that of the

multitude of his countrymen; for they all foresaw them. If he did foresee them, he ought to blush at being called the "friend of human happiness;" for, to foresee such dreadful calamities, and to form a deliberate plan for bringing them upon his country, he must have a disposition truly diabolical. If he did not foresee them, he must have an understanding little superior to that of an idiot; if he did, he must have the heart of a *Marat*. Let him choose.

But it is pretty clear that he foresaw the consequences, or, at least, that he approves of them; for, as I have observed above, he sent his son into France, in the very midst of the massacres, to request the honour of becoming a French Citizen; and in his answers to the addressers at New York, he takes good care to express his disapprobation of the war pursued by his country (which he calls an infatuation), because its manifest tendency is to destroy that hydra, that system of anarchy which is the primary cause. Besides, is not his emigration itself a convincing proof that his opinion still remains the same? If he found himself mistaken, he would confess his error; at least tacitly, by a change of conduct. Has he done this? No: the French revolution is his system, and sooner than not see it established, I much question if he would not with pleasure see the massacre of all the human race.

Even suppose his intended plan of improvement had been the best in the world, instead of the worst, the people of England had certainly a right to reject it. He claims as an indubitable right, the right of thinking for *others*, and yet he will not permit the people of England to think for *themselves*. Paine says, "What a whole nation *wills*, it has a right to *do*." Consequently, what a whole nation does *not will*, it has a right *not to do*. Rousseau says, "The majority of a people has a right to *force* the rest to be *free*:" but even the "insane Socrates of the National Assembly" has never, in all his absurd reveries, had the folly to pretend that a club of dissenting malcontents has a right to *force* a whole nation to be *free*. If the English choose to remain slaves, bigots, and idolaters, as the Doctor calls them, that was no business of his: he had nothing to do with them. He should have let them alone; and perhaps in due time, the abuses of their Government would have come to that "*natural termination*," which he trusts, "will guard against future abuses." But no said the Doctor, I will reform you—I will enlighten you—I will make you free. You shall not, say the people. But I will! says the Doctor. By —, say the people, you shall not! "*And when Ahithophel saw that his counsel was not followed, he saddled his ass, and arose, and gat him home to his house, to his city, and put his household in order, and hanged himself, and died, and was buried in the sepulchre of his father.*"

I now beg the reader's company, in a slight review of the addresses delivered to the Doctor by the several patriotic societies at New York.*

It is no more than justice to say of these addresses, in the lump, that they are distinguished for a certain barrenness of thought and vulgarity of style, which, were we not in possession of the Doctor's answer, might be thought inimitable. If the parties were less known, one might be tempted to think that the addressers were dull by concert; and that, by

* I. An address from the "*Democratic Society*."

II. From the "*Tammany Society*."

III. From the "*Associated Teachers*."

IV. From the "*Republican Natives of Great Britain and Ireland*."

These addresses, with the answers to them, having all appeared in the *Gazettes*, it will be useless to give them at length here.

way of retaliation, the Doctor was resolved to be as dull as they. At least, if this was their design, nobody will deny but they have succeeded to admiration.

“The Governments of the old world,” say the Democratic Society, “are most of them now basely combined to prevent the establishment of liberty in France, and to effect the total destruction of the rights of man.”

What! The rights of man yet? I thought that *liberty and equality, the rights of man*, and all that kind of political cant, had long been proved to be the grossest imposition. Are there people in this country, and people who pretend to possess a superior degree of sagacity too, who are dolts enough to talk about *French liberty*, after what passes under their eyes every day? Is not every Frenchman in the United States obliged to go to a justice of the peace every two or three months, to have a certificate of residence? And must he not have this certificate sworn to, and signed by four inhabitants besides the magistrate? And must he not pay for this too? And if he fails in any part of this slavish ceremony, or goes into Canada or Florida, is he not marked out for the guillotine? An Englishman may come when he will, stay as long as he pleases, go where he will, and return when he will to his own country, without finding any law of proscription or confiscation issued against him or his property. Which has the most liberty?

I thought no one would dun our ears with *French liberty*, after the decree which obliges every merchant, under the pain of the guillotine, to make a declaration of all his property in foreign countries, and to give up his right and title of such property to the Convention; and not only to make a declaration of his own, but of his neighbours' property also, under the same penalty! It has long been customary to express a detestation of the tyranny and cruelty of the Inquisition: but the Inquisition, in the height of its severity, was never half so tyrannical as this decree. This is the boasted “Gallic liberty.” Let us hear their own definition of this liberty. “Liberty,” says Barrere, in his report to the National Convention, on the 3rd of January 1794, “Liberty, my dear fellow citizens, is a privileged and general creditor: not only has she a right to our *property* and *persons*, but to our *talents* and *courage*, and even to our *thoughts!*” Oh, liberty! what a metamorphosis hast thou undergone in the hands of these political jugglers!

If this be liberty, may God in his mercy continue me the most abject slave! If this be liberty, who will say that the English did not do well in rejecting the Doctor's plan for making them free? The democrats of New York accuse the allies of being combined to prevent the establishment of liberty in France, and to destroy the rights of man; when it is notorious that the French themselves have banished the very idea of the thing from amongst them; that is to say, if they ever had an idea of it. Nay, the author of the *Rights of Man*,* and the authoress of the *Rights of Women*, are at this moment starving in a dirty dungeon, not a hundred paces from the *sanctum sanctorum* of liberty and equality; and the poor unfortunate goddess herself is guillotined! † So much for liberty and the rights of man.

* MR. PAINE and MARY WOLTSENCRAFT were in prison at Paris at the time of this writing.—ED.

† Madame Hebert, who had the honour of representing this deity, and who received, for a considerable time, the adorations and incense of the devout Parisians, was guillotined not long ago. It is impossible to say for what she

The Tammany Society comes forward in boasting of their "*venerable ancestors*," and, says the Doctor in his answer, "Happy would our venerable ancestors have been to have found, &c." What! were they the Doctor's ancestors too? I suppose he means in a figurative sense. But certainly, gentlemen, you made a *faux pas* in talking about your ancestors at all. It is always a tender subject, and ought to be particularly avoided by a body of men "who disdain the shackles of tradition."

You say that in the United States "there exists a sentiment of free and candid inquiry, which disdains the shackles of tradition, preparing a rich harvest of improvement, and the glorious triumph of truth." Knowing the religious, or rather irreligious principles of the person to whom this sentence was addressed, it is easy to divine its meaning. But, without flattery, your zeal surpasses that of the Doctor himself: he disdains *revelation only*; the authority of Moses, David, and a parcel of folks that nobody knows; but you disdain what your fathers have told you: which is the more surprising, as, at the same time, you boast of your "*venerable ancestors*." People should always endeavour to be consistent, at least *when interest does not interfere*. However, suppose the shackles of revelation and tradition both completely shaken off, and the infidel Unitarian system established in their stead, what good would the country derive from it? This is certainly worth inquiry, because a thing that will do no good, can be good for nothing. The people of these States are, in general, industrious, sober, honest, humane, charitable, and sincere; dutiful children, and tender parents. This is the character of the people, and who will pretend to say that the Gospel, the belief of which has chiefly contributed to their acquiring of this amiable character, ought to be exchanged for the atheistical or deistical doctrines of a Monvel* or a Priestley? For my part, I can see nothing to induce us to try the experiment; no, not even "the rich harvest of improvement, and the glorious triumph of truth," that you say it promises. We know *the truth* already; we want no improvement in religious knowledge; all

was executed, as the court, by which she was tried, do not waste their precious time in committing their proceedings to writing. The "Feast of Reason" was celebrated on the 10th of November, 1793. The Cathedral of Notre Dame was then called the Temple of Reason; the bishop and clergy of Paris had abdicated their functions; according to LEMAIRE they even declared their religion an imposture; and hereupon the festival opened with singing and playing national airs. Towards the middle of the new ceremony, CHAUMETTE called on the congregation to renounce all religion but that of reason, and then, throwing the veil off from a handsomely-dressed woman, he introduced her as the Goddess of the new Faith, and gave her a fraternal kiss amidst the plaudits of the people. She was, according to THIERS, vol. v. p. 342, the wife of a printer, Monmoro; but, according to LEMAIRE, vol. i. p. 70, a well-known actress of one of the theatres; and by others, she is said to have been the wife of Monmoro, living with HEBERT, publisher of a virulent periodical. Madame Hebert was guillotined in 1794, at the same time with Chaumette.—ED.

* Upon the article of religion, Monvel says, "The world has seen three infamous impostors, Moses, Mahomet, and Jesus Christ. Men have ever been divided into two classes, the deceivers and the deceived; they have always had false fears and vain hopes. These have introduced religions, that is to say cheats and dupes: and in short, the soul of a man and that of a dog are just as precious, and as immortal, the one as the other."

This Monvel was a player, and was chosen by the National Convention of France as priest of atheism. The above sentiments, making part of a discourse delivered by him in the church of St. Roch, at Paris, were translated from the *Journal Republicain de Paris*.

we want is, to practise better what we know; and it is not likely that our practice would be improved by disdaining the theory.

You allow that a public and sincere spirit of toleration exists among us. What more is wanted? If you were to effect a general disdain of the shackles of tradition, perhaps the "rich harvest" would be a corruption of manners, discord, persecution, and blood. The same causes generally produce the same effects: to see and be terrified at those effects, we have only to turn our eyes to that distracted country, where it must be allowed, even by yourselves, the shackles of tradition are sufficiently disdained.

Doctor Priestley professes to wish for nothing but toleration, liberty of conscience. But let us contrast these moderate and disinterested professions with what he has advanced in some of his latest publications. I have already taken notice of the assertion in his letters to the students of Hackney, "that the established church *must fall*." In his address to the Jews (whom, by-the by, he seems to wish to form a coalition with), he says, "all the persecutions of the Jews have arisen from *Trinitarian*, that is to say, *idolatrous Christians*." Idolatrous Christians! It is the first time, I believe, these two words were ever joined together. Is this the language of a man who wanted only toleration, in a country where the established church, and the most part of the Dissenters also, are professedly *Trinitarians*? He will undoubtedly say, that the people of this country are *idolaters* too, for there is not one out of a hundred at most, who does not firmly believe in the doctrine of the Trinity.

Such a man complains of persecution with a very ill grace. But suppose he had been persecuted for a mere matter of opinion; it would be only receiving the measure he has meted to others. Has he not approved of the unmerciful persecution of the unfortunate and worthy part of the French clergy? men as far surpassing him in piety and utility as in suffering. They did not want to coin a new religion; they wanted only to be permitted to enjoy, without interruption, the one they had been educated in, and that they had sworn, in the most solemn manner, to continue in to the end of their lives. The Doctor says, in his address to the Methodists, "You will judge whether I have not reason and Scripture " on my side. You will at least be convinced, that *I have so persuaded " myself*: and you cannot but respect a real lover of truth, and *a desire " to bring others into it*, even in the man who is unfortunately in an error." Does not this man blush at approving of the base, cowardly, and bloody persecutions that have been carried on against a set of men, who erred, if they did err at all, from an excess of conscientiousness? *He* talks of persecution, and puts on the mockery of woe: theirs has been persecution indeed. Robbed, dragged from their homes, or obliged to hide from the sight of man, in continual expectation of the assassin's stab; some transported like common felons, for ever; and a much greater number butchered by those to whose happiness their lives had been devoted, and in that country that they loved too well to disgrace by their apostacy! How gladly would one of these unfortunate conscientious men have escaped to America, leaving fortune, friends, and all behind him! and how different has been the fate of Dr. Priestley! Ah, gentlemen! do not let us be deceived by false pretenders; the manner of his emigration is of itself a sufficient proof that the step was not necessary to the enjoyment of "protection from violence."

You say he has "long *disinterestedly* laboured for his country." 'Tis true he says so, but we must not believe him more disinterested than

other reformers. If toleration had been all he wanted; if he had contented himself with the permission of spreading his doctrines, he would have found this in England, or in almost any other country, as well as here. The man that wants only to avoid persecution, does not make a noisy and fastidious display of his principles, or attack with unbridled indecency the religion of the country in which he lives. He who avoids persecution, is seldom persecuted.

“ The lifted axe, the agonizing wheel,
 “ Luke’s iron crown and Damien’s bed of steel,
 “ To men remote from pow’r but rarely known,
 “ Leave reason, faith, and conscience all our own.”

But the Doctor did not want to be remote from power or *profit* either; for in his sermon on the test laws, he proposes “ to set apart one church for the Dissenters in every considerable town, and a certain allotment of *tithes* for their minister, proportioned to the number of Dissenters in the district.” A very modest and disinterested request truly! Was this man seeking peace and toleration *only*? He thinks these facts are unknown in America. After all his clamour against tithes, and his rejoicing on account of their abolition in France, he had no objection to their continuing in England, provided he came in for a share. Astonishing disinterestedness!

In this country there is nothing to fear from the Doctor’s disinterestedness, because there being no public revenue annexed to any worship whatever, there is nothing to wrangle for; but from the disseminating of his deistical doctrine, there is much to fear. A celebrated deist in England says, that there can be no such thing as an atheist; that it is impossible: for, says he, “ every one must necessarily believe that some cause or other produced the universe; he may call that cause what he pleases; *God, nature, or even chance*; still he believes in the efficacy of that cause, and therefore is no atheist.” And, indeed, we shall find that deism is but another name for atheism, whether we consider it in theory or in practice. That we should not be bettered by the introduction of deism or atheism, I think is a clear case. “ The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.” While this fear existed in France, there was some kind of manners, some kind of justice left; but ever since the deluded people have been taught that Jesus Christ was an infamous impostor, and the worship of him has been forbidden as “ idolatrous,” the whole infernal legion seems to be let loose amongst them, and the nation appears marked out for a dreadful example to mankind: indeed some such example was necessary to cure the world of the infidel philosophy of Voltaire, Rousseau, Gibbon, Priestley, and the rest of that enlightened tribe.

We are continually exclaiming against prejudice, without attending to its effect on ourselves. I am afraid prejudice in favour of the French revolution has led Americans to approve many things which, a few years ago, they would have viewed with the utmost abhorrence, and that they would even now view with abhorrence in any other nation; and here I cannot help taking notice of an article that appeared, not many days ago, in one of our public papers. The writer is giving a list of eminent persons who have “ arisen on the democratic floor,” which he concludes with *Marat, St. Paul, and Jesus Christ*. Is it not a most horrid blasphemy to put the Son of God, the Prince of Peace, on a footing with the bloody author of the massacres at Paris and Versailles? I hope and

believe, that such blasphemers are rare in the United States; and the only way to keep them so is, for the people to reject unanimously every attempt to debase Christianity, in whatever shape, and under whatever disguise it may appear.

In the address of "the republican natives of Great Britain and Ireland, resident at New York," we find a very extraordinary passage indeed:—"Participating in the many blessings which the Government is calculated to ensure, we are happy in giving it this proof of our respectful attachment. We are only *grieved* that a system of such beauty and excellence should be at all *tarnished* by the existence of *slavery in any form!* but, as friends to the equal rights of man, we must be permitted to say, that we wish these rights extended to every human being, *be his complexion what it may*: we, however, look forward with pleasing anticipation to a *yet more perfect state of society*; and from that love of liberty which forms so distinguished a trait in the American character, are taught to hope that this *last, this worst disgrace to a free government*, will finally and for ever be done away." So! these gentlemen are hardly landed in the United States, before they begin to cavil against the Government, and to pant after a *more perfect state of society!* If they have already discovered that the system is *tarnished by the very last and worst disgrace of a free government*, what may we not reasonably expect from their future researches? If they, with their virtuous President, had been landed in the southern States, they might have lent a hand to finish the great work so happily begun by Citizens Santhonax and Polverel: they have caught the *itch* of addressing, petitioning, and remonstrating in their own country; let them scratch themselves into a cure; but let them not attempt spreading their disorder: they ought to remember, that they are come here "to seek freedom and protection" *for themselves*, and not *for others*. When the people of these States are ready for a total abolition of negro slavery, they will make a shift to see the propriety of adopting the measure without the assistance of these northern lights. In the mean time, as the Convention cannot here enter on the legislative functions, they may amuse themselves with a fable written for their particular use:—

THE POT-SHOP, A FABLE.

In a pot-shop, well stocked with ware of all sorts, a discontented ill-formed pitcher unluckily bore the sway. One day, after the mortifying neglect of several customers, "Gentlemen," said he, addressing himself to his brown brethren in general, "Gentlemen, with your permission, we are a set of tame fools, without ambition, without courage; condemned to the vilest uses, we suffer all without murmuring; let us dare to declare ourselves, and we shall soon see the difference. That superb ewer, which, like us, is but earth; those gilded jars, vases, china, and, in short, all those elegant nonsenses, whose colours and beauty have neither weight nor solidity, must yield to our strength, and give place to our superior merit."

This civic harangue was received with peals of applause, and the pitcher (chosen president) became the organ of the assembly. Some, however, more moderate than the rest, attempted to calm the minds of the multitude; but all those which are called jordsen, or chamber-pots, were become intractable; eager to vie with the bowls and cups, they were impatient, almost to madness, to quit their obscure abodes, to shine upon the table, kiss the lip, and ornament the cupboard.

In vain did a wise water-jug (some say it was a platter) make them a long and serious discourse upon the peacefulness of their vocation: "Those," says he, "who are destined to great employments are rarely the most happy. We are all of the same clay, 'tis true; but he who made us, formed us for different functions; one is for ornament, another for use. The posts the least important are often the most necessary. Our employments are extremely different, and so are our talents."

This had a wonderful effect; the most stupid began to open their ears: perhaps it would have succeeded, if a grease-pot had not cried out with a decisive tone, "You reason like an ass; to the devil with you and your silly lessons."

Now the scale was turned again: all the horde of jordens, pans, and pitchers, applauded the superior eloquence and reasoning of the grease-pot: in short, they determined on the enterprise; but a dispute arose who should be chief: all would command, but none obey. It was then you might have heard a clutter: pots, pans and pitchers, mugs, jugs and jordens, all put themselves in motion at once; and so wisely, and with so much vigour, were their operations conducted, that the whole was soon changed—not into china, but *rubbish*.

Let us leave the application of this fable to those for whom it is intended, and come to the address of "The Associated Teachers in the city of New York."

From the profession of these gentlemen one would have wished not to find them among the Doctor's addressers; and it will be for those who employ the "Associated Teachers" to judge, how far their approbation and praise of the writings of such a man is a proof of their being calculated for "the arduous and *important* task of cultivating the human mind." They very civilly invite the Doctor to assist them to "*form the man*;" and, in his answer, he seems to hint that he may possibly accept the invitation. All I can say on this matter is, if he should embrace this profession, I hope he will be exactly as successful in forming the man as he has been in reforming him.

In the answer to the "Associated Teachers," the Doctor observes, that, *classes* of men, "as well as *individuals*, are apt to form *too high* ideas of their *own importance*." Never was a juster observation than this, and never was this observation more fully verified than in the parties themselves. The Doctor's self-importance is sufficiently depicted in the quotation that I have given from his letter to the people of Birmingham; and as for the "Associated Teachers," how familiarly soever they may talk of "the intriguing politics and vitiating refinements of the European world," I must say, I think they know but little of what passes in that world, or they never would have larded with such extravagant eulogiums productions which, in general, have been long exploded.

As to his talents as a writer, we have only to open our eyes to be convinced that they are far below mediocrity. His style is uncouth and superlatively diffuse. Always involved in *minutiæ*, every sentence is a string of parentheses, in finding the end of which the reader is lucky if he does not lose the proposition they were meant to illustrate. In short, the whole of his phraseology is extremely disgusting; to which may be added, that even in point of grammar he is very often incorrect.

As a proof of what I have here asserted, I could give a thousand

sentences from his writings; but I choose one or two from his answers to the addressers, as these pieces are in every body's hands; and, not to criticise unfairly, I shall take the first sentence I come at—it runs thus:

“Viewing with the deepest concern, as you do, the prospect that is now exhibited in Europe, those troubles which are the natural offspring of their forms of government, originating indeed in the spirit of liberty, but gradually degenerating into tyrannies equally degrading to the rulers and the ruled, I rejoice in finding an asylum from persecution in a country in which those abuses have come to a natural termination, and produced another system of liberty, founded on such wise principles as, I trust, will guard against all future abuses; those artificial distinctions in society, from which they sprung, being completely eradicated, that protection from violence, which laws and government promise in all countries, but which I have not found in my own, I doubt not I shall find with you, though I cannot promise to be a better subject of this Government, than my whole conduct will evince that I have been to that of Great Britain.”

This is neither the *style periodique*, nor the *style coupé*; it is, I presume, the *style entortillé*; for one would certainly think that the author had racked his imagination to render what he had to say unintelligible. This sentence of monstrous length is cut asunder in the middle by a semicolon, which, except that it serves the weary reader by way of half-way house, might be placed in any other part of the sentence, to, at least, equal advantage: in fact, this is not a sentence; it is a rigmarole ramble, that has neither beginning nor ending, and conveys to us no idea of any thing but the author's incapacity.

“Viewing with the deepest concern, as you do, the prospect that is now exhibited in Europe, those troubles which are the natural offspring of their forms of government.” What in the name of goodness does this mean? *Troubles* is the only antecedent that can be found to *their*; and the necessary conclusion is, *troubles have their forms of government*.

The Doctor says, in his answer to the Tammany Society, “Happy would our venerable ancestors,” as you justly call them, “*have been, to have found* America such a retreat to them.” It may, perhaps, be useful to the learned Doctor to know, that he ought to have said, “Happy would our venerable ancestors, as you justly call them, have been, to *find* America, &c.”

I grant that there is great reason to believe, that the Doctor was resolved to be as dull as his addressers; but I assert, that it is impossible for a person accustomed to commit his thoughts to paper, with the smallest degree of taste or correctness, to fall into such gross solecism, or to tack phrases together in such an awkward homespun manner: in short, he cannot be fit for even the post of *castigator*; and therefore it is to be hoped that the “Associated Teachers” will not lessen their “importance” by admitting him amongst them, that is to say, except it be as a pupil.

There are many things that astonish us in the addresses, among which the *compassion* that the addressers express for that “*infatuated*” and “*devoted country*,” Great Britain, certainly is not the least.

The Democratic Society, with a hatred against tyranny that would have become the worthy nephew of Damien,* or the great Marat himself, say, “The multiplied oppressions which characterize that Government, excite in us the most painful sensations, and exhibit a spectacle as disgusting in itself as dishonourable to the British name.”

And what a tender affectionate concern do the sons of Tammany express for the poor distressed unfortunate country of their “venerable ances-

* Robespierre.

tors !”—“ A country,” say they, “ although now presenting a prospect “ frightful to the eye of humanity, yet *once* the nurse of sciences, of arts, “ of heroes, and of freemen ; a country which, although at present apparently *devoted to destruction*, we *fondly* hope may yet *tread back the steps “ of infamy and ruin*, and *once more rise conspicuous among the free nations “ of the earth.*”

But of all the addresses, none seem so zealous on this subject as “ the republican natives of Great Britain and Ireland.”—“ While,” say they, “ we look back on our native country with emotions of pity and indignation at the outrages human nature has sustained in the persons of the “ virtuous *Muir* and his patriotic associates, and deeply lament the fatal “ apathy into which our *countrymen* have fallen, we desire to be thankful “ to the great Author of our being that we are in America, and that it “ had pleased him, in his wise providence, to make these United States “ an asylum, not only from the immediate tyranny of the British Government, but also from those impending calamities which its increasing “ despotism and multiplied iniquities must infallibly bring down on a “ deluded and oppressed people.” What an enthusiastic warmth is here ! No Solemn league-and-covenant prayer, embellished with the nasal sweetness of the Conventicle, was ever more affecting.

To all this the Doctor very piteously echoes back “ sigh for sigh, and groan for groan ; and when the fountain of their eyes is dry, his supplies the place, and weeps for both.”

There is something so pathetic, so irresistibly moving in all this, that a man must have a hard heart indeed to read it, and not burst into laughter.

In speaking of monarchies, it has often been lamented, that the sovereign seldom or never hears the truth ; and much afraid I am, that this is equally applicable to democracies. What court sycophants are to a prince, demagogues are to a people ; and the latter kind of parasites is by no means less dangerous than the former ; perhaps more so, as being more ambitious and more numerous. God knows, there were too many of this description in America before the arrival of Doctor Priestley ; I can, therefore, see no reason for boastings and addressings on account of the acquisition.

Every one must observe how the Doctor has fallen at once into the track of those who were already in possession of the honourable post. Finding a popular prejudice prevailing against his country, and not possessing that *patriæ caritas* which is the characteristic of his countrymen, he has not been ashamed to attempt making his court by flattering that prejudice. I grant that a prejudice against this nation is not only excusable, but almost commendable, in *Americans* ; but the misfortune is, it exposes them to deception, and makes them the sport of every intriguing adventurer. Suppose it be the interest of Americans that Great Britain should be ruined, and even annihilated, in the present contest, it can never be their interest to believe that this desirable object is already nearly or quite accomplished, at a time when she is become more formidable than ever in every quarter of the globe : and with respect to the internal situation of that country, we ought not to suffer ourselves to be deceived by “ gleanings from *Morning Chronicles* or *Dublin Gazettes* ;” for if we insist that newspaper report is the criterion by which we ought to judge of the governments and the state of other countries, we must allow the same measure to foreigners with respect to our own country ; and then what must the people of England think of the Government of

the United States upon reading a page or two from the slovenly pen of *Agricola*?

“It is charitable,” says this democrat,* “it is charitable to believe many who signed the constitution never dreamed of the measures taking place, which, alas! we now experience. By this double Government we are involved in unnecessary burdens, which *neither we nor our fathers* ever knew: such a *monster of a Government* has seldom ever been known on earth. We are obliged to maintain two Governments, with their full number of officers from head to foot. Some of them receive such wages as never were heard of before in any Government upon earth; and all this bestowed on *aristocrats* for doing next to nothing. A blessed revolution! a blessed revolution indeed! but farmers, mechanics, and labourers, have no share in it; we are the asses who must have the honour of paying them all, without any adequate service. Now let the impartial judge, whether our Government, taken collectively, answers the great end of *protecting our persons and property!* or whether it is not rather calculated to drain us of our money, and give it to men who have not rendered adequate service for it. Had an inspired prophet told us the things which our eyes see in the beginning of the revolution, he might have met Jeremiah’s fate; or, if we had believed him, *not one in a thousand would have resisted Great Britain.* Indeed, my countrymen, we are so loaded by our new Governments that we can have little heart to attempt to move under all our burdens. We have this consolation, when things come to the worst there must be a change, *and we may rest satisfied that either the Federal or State Governments must fall.*”

If “gleanings” like these were published in England, would not the people naturally exclaim, What! the boasted Government of America come to this already? The poor Americans are dreadfully tyrannized by the aristocrats! There will certainly be a *revolution* in America soon! They would be just as much mistaken as the people in this country are when they talk of a revolution in England.

Neither ought we to look upon the emigration of persons from England to this country as a proof of their being persecuted, and of the tyranny of the English Government. It is paying America a very poor compliment to suppose that nothing short of persecution could bring settlers to its shores. This is, besides, the most unfortunate proof that could possibly be produced by the advocates of the French revolution: for if the emigration of a person to this country be a proof of a tyranny existing in that from which he comes, how superlatively tyrannical must the Government in France be? But they say, those who emigrate from France are aristocrats; they are not persecuted; they emigrate because they *hate a free country.* What! do they really come to *America* because they *hate a free country?* Did the governors of Martinico, &c., make a capitulation to be sent here, *to avoid going to a free country?* The Democratic Society will certainly oblige the world very much in explaining this enigma.

I am one of those who wish to believe that foreigners come to this country from choice, and not from necessity. America opens a wide field for enterprise; wages for all mechanics are better, and the means of subsistence proportionably cheaper, than in Europe. This is what brings foreigners amongst us: they become citizens of America for the honest purposes of commerce, of turning their industry and talents to the best account, and of bettering their fortunes. By their exertions to enrich themselves they enrich the state, lower the wages, and render the country less dependent upon others. The most numerous, as well as the most useful, are mechanics. Perhaps a cobbler, with his hammer and awls, is a more valuable acquisition than a dozen philosophi-theologi-political empirics, with all their boasted apparatus.

* The Constitution of 1787.—ED.

BONE TO GNAW FOR THE DEMOCRATS.

THE proceedings of the United Irishmen, like those of the American self-created societies, contain general accusations against every branch of the government. An advantageous distribution of the words *liberty, tyranny, slavery, &c.*, does wonders with the populace; but the intelligent reader looks deeper, general accusations do not satisfy; he seeks for instances of oppression, before he will believe that a government is oppressive. Let us extract, then, the instances of oppression complained of by the United Irishmen, from the bombastical rhapsody in which they are buried, and see to what they amount. They tell us that Butler, Bond, Rowan, and about four or five others, were detained some months in prison; and that Muir,* Palmer, and Margatot, with two or three more, were transported; and all this (they say), for having done no more than what the good of their country dictated. I am sure the reader is very well satisfied, that these men were all guilty of the crimes laid to their charge; but to avoid disputation with respect to this fact, I shall suppose them all innocent, and then the sum total of the tyranny against which the United Irishmen exclaim, will amount to eight or nine false imprisonments, and five or six unjust sentences of transportation. This is certainly a great deal too much; may the hand be withered that ever wields a pen in its justification! but, as the United Irishmen wished, as a mean of avoiding such acts of oppression in future, to overturn their monarchical government, and establish a democratic one in its stead, it becomes incumbent on the reader, who would not be their dupe, to contrast the conduct of the government which they wanted to overturn with that of the one they intended to adopt. They have represented the British Government as being arrived at its last stage of tyranny, it will not then, I hope, be esteemed unfair, if I oppose to it the democratic Convention of France, when about the midway of its career.

It is not my intention to give a general character of this assembly; that would be superfluous: nor will I give way to that indignation which every man, who is not by nature a slave, must feel at the very mention of such a divan. General charges against any man, or set of men, as they are very seldom accurate, so they are little attended to, particularly when

* Mr. MUIR was prosecuted in Aug. 1793 under the libel-law in Scotland for seditious libel. He had imprudently gone to France in that year, but not, as was falsely stated, a deputy from the Scotch Reformers to the French Republic. It caused a prejudice against him for which only we can account for the denunciation contained in the paper here republished, which is an unjust attack, and was thought so by its author when he became more acquainted with English politics. His fate was lamented in a pathetic letter to him by Dr. PARR, and a narrative of his life, trial, and sufferings, has been published by Mr. MACKENZIE, where it will be seen that he was one of the first victims of PITT's apostacy.—ED.

addressed to a reader, who is rather inclined towards the party accused. For this reason, I shall confine myself to a particular epoch, and even a particular spot. Lyons affords us the properest scene to be described on the present occasion; not because the dreadful deeds committed there surpass those at Nantz, and many other places; but because, taking place within a short space of time, they admit with more facility the form of a compact relation.

In the perusal of this relation the candid reader will make me some allowances; my taste is far from the tragic; scenes such as these must lose half their terrors when drawn by a hand like mine: Melpomene alone should record the actions of the National Convention.

Some time after the death of Louis XVI. the city of Lyons was declared, by the Convention, in a state of revolt, it was attacked by a numerous army of democrats, and after having stood a siege of above two months, was obliged to surrender. What followed this surrender, it is my intention to relate; but first, it is necessary to go back to the causes that led to the revolt; for though no earthly crime could justify the cruelties inflicted upon the brave and unfortunate Lyonnese, yet those cruelties do not appear in their deepest hue, till the pretended crimes of the sufferers are known.

By the new constitution of France,* the King could not be dethroned, unless found at the head of an army marching against his country. This was to be regarded as the highest crime he could possibly commit, and even for this he could be punished no otherwise than by being dethroned. "No crime whatever," says the constitution, "shall be construed to affect his life." This constitution every Frenchman had sworn, "to obey, and to maintain with all his might." When, therefore, it was proposed to the Lyonnese, by the emissaries of the National Convention, to petition for the death of the king, they replied almost with one voice: "No; we have sworn, with all France, to maintain the new constitution with all our might; that constitution declares that no crime whatsoever shall affect the life of the king. For any thing we have yet seen or heard, we believe him innocent of every crime that has been laid to his charge. The mode of his trial is unprecedented in the annals of injustice, the Convention being at once accuser, evidence, and judge. We believe him perfectly innocent; but whether he be or not, the constitution that we have, by a solemn oath, bound ourselves to maintain with all our might, declares that no crime whatever shall be construed to affect his life; that life, therefore, we cannot, we will not demand. The rest of the nation may sport with engagements which they have called the Almighty to witness, they may add the crime of assassination to that of perjury, they may stain themselves with the blood of their innocent and unfortunate prince, the Lyonnese never will."

Reader, you will hardly believe that this answer, so full of good sense, justice, piety, and honour, drew down on the gallant Lyonnese the most dreadful chastisement that ever was inflicted on any part of the human race. Read and be convinced.

No sooner was the determination of the Lyonnese made known to the Convention, than the latter began to concert schemes of vengeance. A numerous army was prepared, while the democratic agents of the Convention, who still had the executive authority at Lyons, spared no pains

* The Constitution of 1791.—Edit.

in endeavouring to drive the city to what they termed open rebellion, and thus to furnish a pretext for its destruction. The doctrine of equality, so flattering to those who possess nothing, had gained them many converts among the lower classes of the people. To these was committed all authority, civil and military, and it is hardly necessary to say that they exercised every species of tyranny that envy, revenge, and popular fury could invent. All this was borne with a degree of resignation that has been justly regarded as astonishing in people who have since exhibited such unequivocal proofs of inherent valour. A sense of more immediate danger, however, roused them from their lethargy.

There was held, every night, a meeting of the leaders among the partizans of the Convention. It consisted, in general, of men of desperate fortunes, bankrupts, quacks, the dregs of the law, apostate priests, and the like, not forgetting some who had been released from the galleys. In this infamous assembly, which took the name of Democratic Club, a plot was laid for the assassination of all the rich in one night; but this plot, notwithstanding the precautions of the conspirators, was happily discovered; the President Challier, and two others, were tried and condemned to die, the democrats were driven from all the public offices, and the former magistrates reinstated.

This act of self-preservation was called a revolt against the republic, and in consequence of it, the Convention passed* decree upon decree, bearing death and destruction against the Lyonnese. Thus, those very men who had formed a constitution, which declares resistance against oppression to be a natural right, passed an act of proscription against a whole city, because they had dared to lift their hands to guard their throats against the knives of a band of assassins!

The city now began to arm for its defence; but being totally unprepared for a siege, having neither fortifications nor magazines, and being menaced on every side by myriads of ferocious enemies, the people were backward in declaring for hostility, knowing that in that case death or victory must be the consequence. There were, therefore, but about ten thousand men who had the courage to take up arms; but the desperate bravery of these amply made up for every want. During the space of sixty days they withstood an army of fifteen times their strength, plentifully provisioned, and provided with every instrument of destruction. Never, perhaps, were there such feats of valour performed as by this little army; thrice their numbers did they lay dead before their injured city.

The members deputed from the Convention to direct the attack, left nothing untried that might tend to the accomplishment of their object. They succeeded at last, in opening a communication with their partizans in the city, and in seducing many of the mob to espouse their interest. This was the more easy to effect, as the besieged were, by this time, upon the point of starving; the flesh of horses, dogs, and cats, had been for some days their only food, and even that began to grow extremely

* October, 1793. The decree of the Convention contained these clauses: "Lyons shall be destroyed: Nothing shall be preserved but the poor-house, the manufactories, shops of handicraft, the hospitals, and the public monuments: the city shall no longer be called *Lyons*, but, *the free Commune* (Commune aff. anarchic): On the ruins of Lyons a monument shall be erected, bearing these words, '*Lyons revolted against liberty; Lyons is no more!*'"—THIERS, v. p. 251. The deputies from the Convention set the example of destruction, by giving a blow with a hammer to one of the finest houses in the city, and immediately 800 workmen went to work to demolish the streets.—THIERS, v. p. 282.—ED.

scarce. In this situation, without the least hopes of succour, some of those who wished well to their city, and who had not borne arms during the siege, undertook to capitulate with the enemy; but these, knowing the extremities to which they were driven, insisted upon executing the decrees of the Convention, which ordered them to put to death indiscriminately, all those who had taken up arms against its authority.

The besieged, then, seeing no hopes of a capitulation, seeing the city without another day's provision, and the total impossibility of succour from without (being completely invested on every side), had but one measure to adopt; to cut their way through their enemy, or fall in the attempt. A plan of retreat was therefore settled upon; the outposts were to be called in, and the whole were to assemble at the Vaise.

In the mean time, the deputies from the Convention, who were informed by their spies of all that was passing in the city, took care to have the road by which the retreating army was to pass, well lined with troops. The whole country round was under arms. Every person was ordered, on pain of death, not to let pass, or give shelter to, a single Lyonnese, man, woman, or child.

The out-posts were hardly called in, when their stations were taken possession of by the democratic army. Being so closely pressed, rendered the assembling more difficult; all was bustle, confusion, and terror. Not half of these who were under arms had time to join. A little corps was, however, at last formed. It consisted of between three and four thousand persons in all, headed by four field-pieces, and followed by six waggons, bearing the wreck of many a splendid fortune. Thus marched off the remains of these generous defenders of their city, bidding an eternal adieu to the scenes of their youth, the dwellings of their ancestors; resolving to die bravely, as they had lived, or find an asylum in a foreign land.

It was midnight when they began their retreat, lighted by the blaze of bombs and burning houses.—Reader, cast your eyes on this devoted city. See children clinging to their fathers, distracted mothers to their sons; wives, holding in their arms what they held dearer than life, forgetting all but their husbands, marching by their side, and braving death from ten thousand hands!

They had hardly begun their march, when a discharge of artillery, bearing full upon them, threw them into some confusion. One of their waggons, in which were several old men and some children, was set on fire by a shell. Morning coming on, they perceived themselves beset on every side; they were charged by the cavalry, exposed to the fire of a numerous artillery, harassed at every turning, fired upon from every house, every bank and every hedge. Seeing therefore no hopes of escape, they were determined to sell every drop of blood as dear as possible. They broke off into platoons, putting their wives and children in the centre of each, and took different directions, in order to divide the force of the enemy. But what were they to do against fifty times their number? The whole, about fifty persons excepted, were either killed or taken.

The victors showed such mercy as might be expected from them: not content with butchering their prisoners in cold blood, they took a pleasure in making them die by inches, and insulting them in the pangs of death. Placing several together, they killed one of them at a time to render death more terrible to the rest. Neither sex nor age had any weight with them; above two hundred women, thirty of whom had children at the breast,

whom conjugal love had led to follow their husbands; more than fifty old men, whom filial piety had snatched from the assassin's stab, were all most savagely butchered. The death of Madame de Visague deserves particular notice. This young lady was about seventeen years of age, and very near her time of delivery: a party of the democrats found her behind a hedge, to which place she had drawn her husband, who was mortally wounded. When the cannibals discovered her, she was on her knees supporting his head with her arm: one of them fired upon her with a carabine, another quartered her with his hanger, while a third held up the expiring husband to be a spectator of their more than hellish cruelty.

Several wounded prisoners were collected together, and put into a ditch, with sentinels placed round them to prevent them from killing themselves, or one another; and thus were they made to linger, some of them two or three days, while their enemies testified their ferocious pleasure by all the insulting gesticulations of savages.

Such was the fury of the triumphant democrats, that the deputies from the Convention gave an order against burying the dead, till they had been cut in morsels. Tollet, the infamous Tollet, a democratic priest (that is to say, an apostate) of Trevoux, went, blood-hound like, in quest of a few unhappy wretches who had escaped the bloody 9th of October; and when, by perfidious promises, he had drawn them from their retreats, he delivered them up to the daggers of their assassins.

Of all the little army that attempted the retreat, only about forty-six escaped; six hundred and eighteen were brought back in chains; some of them died of their wounds, and all those who were not relieved from life this way, were dragged forth to an ignominious death.

During these dreadful scenes the deputies from the Convention, who were now absolute masters of the unfortunate city, were preparing others, if possible, still more dreadful. As a preliminary step, they reorganized the Democratic Society. To this infernal rendezvous the deputy *Javouges* repaired, and there broached his project in a speech, the substance of which was nearly as follows: After having represented *Challier* as a martyr in the cause of liberty, as the hero of the republic, and the avenger of the people, he addressed himself to the assembly in nearly these terms. "Think," said he, "of the slavery into which you are plunged by being the servants and workmen of others; the nobles, the priests, the proprietors, the rich of every description, have long been in a combination to rob the democrats, the real sans culotte republicans, of their birth-right; go, citizens; take what belongs to you, and what you should have enjoyed long ago.—Nor must you stop here, while there exists an aristocracy in the buildings, half remains undone: down with those edifices raised for the profit or pleasure of the rich; down with them all: commerce and arts are useless to a warlike people, and destructive of that sublime equality which France is determined to spread over the whole globe." He told this enslaved, this degraded populace, that it was the duty of every good citizen to discover all those whom he knew to be guilty of having, in thought, word, or deed, conspired against the republic. He exhorted them to fly to the offices (opened for receiving such accusations), and not to spare one lawyer, priest, or nobleman. He concluded this harangue, worthy of one of the damned, with declaring, that for a man to accuse his own father was an act of civism worthy a true republican, and that to neglect it was a crime that should be punished with death.

The deeds that followed this diabolic exhortation were such as might be expected. The bloody ruffians of democrats left not a house, not a hole unsearched; men and women were led forth from their houses with as little ceremony as cattle from their pens; the square where the guillotine stood was reddened with blood, like a slaughter-house, while the piercing cries of the surviving relations were drowned in the more vociferous howlings of *Vive la Republique!*

It is hard to stifle the voice of nature, to stagnate the involuntary movements of the soul; yet this was attempted, and in some degree effected, by the deputies of the Convention. Perceiving that these scenes of blood had spread a gloom over the countenances of the innocent inhabitants, and that even some of their soldiers seemed touched with compunction, they issued a mandate, declaring every one suspected of aristocracy, who should discover the least symptoms of pity, either by his words or his looks!

The preamble of this mandate makes the blood run cold: "By the thunder of God! in the name of the representatives of the French people; on pain of death it is ordered," &c. &c. Who would believe that this terrific mandate, forbidding men to weep, or look sorrowful, on pain of death, concluded with, *Vive la Liberté!* (Liberty for ever!)? Who would believe that the people, who suffered this mandate to be stuck up about their city like a play-bill, *had sworn to live free, or die?*

However, in spite of all their menaces, they still found that remorse would sometimes follow the murder of a friend, or relation. Conscience is a troublesome guest to the villain who yet believes in an hereafter; the deputies, therefore, were resolved to banish this guest from the bosoms of their partisans, as it had already been banished from their own.

With this object in view they ordered a solemn *civic festival* in honour of Challier. His image was carried round the city, and placed in the churches. Those temples which had (many of them), for more than a thousand years, resounded with hosannas to the Supreme Being, were now profaned by the adorations paid to the image of a *parricide*.

All this was but a prelude to what was to follow the next day. It was Sunday, the day consecrated to the worship of our blessed Redeemer. A vast concourse of democrats, men and women, assembled at a signal agreed on, formed themselves into a sort of a mock procession, preceded by the image of Challier, and followed by a little detached troop, each bearing in its hand a chalice, or some other vase of the church. One of these sacrilegious wretches led an ass, covered with a priest's vestment, and with a mitre on his head. He was loaded with crucifixes and other symbols of the Christian religion, and had the Old and New Testament suspended to his tail. Arrived at the square called the *Terreaux*, they then threw the two *Testaments*, the crucifixes, &c. into a fire prepared for the purpose; made the ass drink out of the sacramental cup, and were proceeding to conclude their diabolical profanations with the massacre of all the prisoners, to appease the ghost of Challier, when a violent thunder-storm put an end to their meeting, and deferred the work of death for a few hours.

The pause was not long. The deputies, profiting by the infamous frenzy with which they had inspired the soldiery and the mob, and by the consternation of the respectable inhabitants, continued their butchery with redoubled fury. Those who led the unhappy sufferers to execution were no longer ordered to confine themselves to such as were entered on

the list of proscription, but were permitted to take whoever *they thought worthy of death!* To have an enemy among the democrats, to be rich, or even thought rich, was a sufficient crime. The words *nobleman, priest, lawyer, merchant,* and even *honest man,* were so many terms of proscription. Three times was the place of the guillotine changed, at every place holes were dug to receive the blood, and yet it ran in the gutters! the executioners were tired, and the deputies, enraged to see that their work went on so slowly, represented to the mob that they were *too merciful,* that vengeance lingered in their hands, and that their enemies ought to perish *in mass!*

Accordingly next day, the execution *in mass* began. The prisoners were led out, from a hundred to three hundred at a time, into the outskirts of the city, where they were fired upon or stabbed. One of these massacres deserves a particular notice. Two hundred and sixty-nine persons, taken indiscriminately among all classes and all ages, were led to *Brotteaux,* and there tied to trees. In this situation they were fired upon with grape-shot. Here the *cannoneers of Valenciennes,* who had not had the courage to defend their own walls, who owed their forfeited lives to the mercy of royalists, valiantly pointed their cannons against them, when they found them bound hand and foot!—The coward is ever cruel.—Numbers of these unfortunate prisoners had only their limbs broken by the artillery; these were dispatched with the sword or the musket. The greatest part of the bodies were thrown into the Rhone, some of them before they were quite dead; two men in particular had strength enough to swim to a sand-bank in the river. One would have thought, that thus saved as it were by miracle, the vengeance of their enemies would have pursued them no farther; but no sooner were they perceived, than a party of the *dragoons of Lorraine* crossed the arm of the river and stabbed them, and left them a prey to the fowls of the air.—Reader, fix your eyes on this theatre of carnage.—You barbarous, you ferocious monsters! You have found the heart to commit those bloody deeds, and shall no one have the heart to publish them in a country that boasts of an unbounded liberty of the press? Shall no one tell, with what pleasure you plunged your daggers into the defenceless breasts of those whose looks had often appalled your own coward hearts? Shall no one tell, with what heroic, what godlike constancy they met their fate? How they smiled at all your menaces and cannibal gesticulations? How they despised you in the very article of death?—Strewed with every sweetest flower be the grave of *Mons. Chapuis de Maubourg,* and let his name be graven on every faithful heart! This gallant gentleman, who was counted one of the first engineers in Europe, fell into the hands of the democrats. They offered to spare his life, if he would serve in the armies of the Convention: they repeated this offer, with their carabines at his breast. “No,” replied he, “I have never fought but for my God and my king; despicable cowards! fire away!”

The murder *in mass* did not rob the guillotine of its prey: there the blood flowed without interruption. Death itself was not a refuge from democratic fury. The bodies of the prisoners who were dead of their wounds, and of those who, not able to support the idea of ignominious death, had given themselves the fatal blow, were carried to the scaffold, and there beheaded, receiving thousands of kicks from the sans culottes, because the blood would not run from them. Persons from their sick beds, old men, not able to walk, and even women found in child-bed,

were carried to the murderous machine. The respectable Mons. Lauras was torn from his family of ten children and his wife big with the eleventh. This distracted matron ran with her children, and threw herself at the feet of the brutal deputy Collot d'Herbois.—No mercy!—Her conjugal tenderness, the cries of her children, every thing calculated to soften the heart, presented themselves before him, but in vain. "Take away," said he, to the officious ruffians by whom he was surrounded, "take away the she rebel and her whelps." Thus spurned from the presence of him who alone was able to save her beloved husband, she followed him to the place of execution. Her shrieks, when she saw him fall, joined to the wildness of her looks, but too plainly foretold her approaching end. She was seized with the pains of childbirth, and was carried home to her house; but, as if her tormentors had shown her too much lenity, the sans culotte commissary soon after arrived, took possession of all the effects in the name of the sovereign people, drove her from her bed and her house, from the door of which she fell dead in the street.*

About three hundred women hoped, by their united prayers and tears, to touch the hearts of the ferocious deputies; but all their efforts were as vain as those of Madame Lauras. They were threatened with a discharge of grape shot. Two of them, who, notwithstanding the menaces of the democrats, still had the courage to persist, were tied during six hours to the posts of the guillotine; their own husbands were executed before their eyes, and their blood sprinkled over them!

Mademoiselle Servan, a lovely young woman of about eighteen years of age, was executed, because she would not discover the retreat of her father! "What!" said she nobly, to the democratic committee, "what! betray my father! impious villains, how dare you suppose it?"

Madame Cochet, a lady equally famed for her beauty and her courage, was accused of having put the match to a cannon during the siege, and of having assisted in her husband's escape. She was condemned to suffer death; she declared herself with child, and the truth of this declaration was attested by two surgeons. In vain did she implore a respite, in vain did she plead the innocence of the child that was in her womb: her head was severed from her body amidst the death-howl of the democratic brigands.

Pause, here, reader, and imagine if you can, another crime worthy of being added to those already mentioned. Yes, there is one more, and hell would not have been satisfied if its ministers had left it uncommitted. *Libidinous brutality!* *Javouges*, one of the deputies from the Convention, opened the career. His example was followed by the soldiery and the mob in general. The wives and daughters of almost all the respectable inhabitants, particularly of such as had emigrated, or who were murdered or in prison, were put in a state of requisition, and were ordered on pain of death, to hold their bodies (I spare the reader the term made use of in the decree) in readiness for the embraces of the

* Citizen Benjamin Franklin Bache's Gazette says, that "it would be an easy matter to apologize for all the murders committed in France;" let him apologize for this. Not that I imagine he cannot do it according to the democratic creed, but it would be curious to hear his apology. Doctor Priestley also says, that all these things are for the good of the Unitarian religion, and therefore, says he, "we must look upon them as a *blessing!*"

"Thus, if eternal justice rule the ball,

"Thus shall their wives, and thus their children fall."

true republicans! Nor were they content with violation: the first ladies of the city were led to the tree of Liberty (of Liberty!) and there made to take the hands of chimney-sweepers and common felons! Detestable wretches! At the very name of democrat, humanity shudders, and modesty hides its head!

I will not insult the reader's feelings by desiring him to compare the pretended tyranny of the British Government with that I have here related; nor will I tell the United Irishmen, that even an Irish massacre is nothing compared to the exercise of the democratic laws of France; but I will ask them to produce me, if they can, an instance of such consummate tyranny in any government, or in any nation. Queen Mary of England, during a reign of five years, caused about five hundred innocent persons to be put to death; for this, posterity has, very justly too, branded her with the surname of bloody. What surname, then, shall be given to the assembly that caused more than that number to be executed in one day at Lyons? The massacre of St. Bartholomew, an event that filled all Europe with consternation, the infamy and horrors of which have been dwelt on by so many eloquent writers of all religions, and that has held Charles IX. up to the execration of ages, dwindles into child's play, when compared to the present murderous revolution, which a late writer in France emphatically calls "a St. Bartholomew of five years." According to Mons. Bousset, there were about 30,000 persons murdered, in all France, in the massacre of St. Bartholomew; there has been more than that number murdered in the single city of Lyons and its neighbourhood; at Nantz there have been 27,000; at Paris, 150,000; in La Vendée, 300,000.* In short, it appears that there have been two millions of persons murdered in France, since it has called itself a republic, among whom are reckoned two hundred and fifty thousand women, two hundred and thirty thousand children (besides those murdered in the womb), and twenty-four thousand Christian priests!

And is there, can there be a faction in America so cruel, so bloody-minded, as to wish to see these scenes repeated in their own, or any other country? If there be, Great God! do thou mete to them, ten-fold, the measure they would mete to others; inflict on them every curse of which human nature is susceptible; hurl on them thy reddest thunder-bolts; sweep the sanguinary race from the face of the creation!

AN ACCOUNT OF SOME RECENT FEATS PERFORMED BY THE FRENCHIFIED CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

If such, then, are the principles of those men called Democrats, ought not every good man in this country to be very cautious how he gives them the least countenance? Ought he not to follow them in all their actions with an attentive eye, and let slip no opportunity of exposing their ambitious and destructive designs? For my part, I by no

* This computation is taken from *les Détails des Cruautés des Jacobins*, lately published at Paris.

means desire to assume the dubious name of patriot ; what I am doing, I conceive to be my duty ; which consideration, as it will justify the undertaking, will in some measure apologize for the want of abilities that may appear in the execution.

Upon a view of the horrible revolution that at present agitates the world, we perceive that though the grand object of the democrats has been every where the same, yet their pretended motives have varied with their situation. In America, where the Federal* Constitution had just been put in movement, and had begun to extend its beneficent effects, it was impossible to talk of *reformation* ; at least it was impossible to make the people believe that it was necessary. The well-known wisdom and integrity and the eminent services of the President,† had engraven such an indelible attachment for his person on the hearts of *Americans*, that his reputation or his measures could be touched but with a very delicate hand. A plan of indirect operations was therefore fixed upon ; and it must be allowed, that, by the help of a foreign agent, it was not badly combined. The outlines of this plan were to extol to the skies every act of the boxing legislators of France ; to dazzle *those who have nothing* with the sublime system of "equality ;" to make occasional reflections on the resemblance between this government and that of Great Britain ; to condemn the British laws (and consequently our own at the same time) as aristocratic, and from thence to insinuate that "*something yet remained to be done*;" and finally, to throw a veil over the insults and injuries received from France, represent all the actions of Great Britain in the most odious light, plunge us into a war with the latter, put us under the tutelage of the former, and recall the glorious times of violence and plunder. Thanks to Government ; thanks to the steady conduct of the executive power, this abominable plan has been disconcerted ; the phalanx has been broken ; but it is nevertheless prudent to pursue the scattered remains, draw them from their caballing assemblies, and stretch them on the rack of public contempt. ‡

I do not know whether there were any of the United Irishmen, or their retainers, at the last St. Patrick's feast, in this city ; but I know that they drank to the memory of "Brutus and Franklin (a pretty couple), to the Society of the United Irishmen, to the French, and to their speedy arrival in Ireland." After this, I think it would be cruel to doubt of the patriotism of the United Irishmen, and their attachment to the British constitution.

In these toasting times it would have been something wonderful if the sans culottes in America had neglected to celebrate the taking of Amsterdam by their brethren in France. I believe from my soul there have been more cannons fired here in the celebration of this conquest, than the French fired in achieving it. I think I have counted twenty-two grand civic festivals, fifty-one of an inferior order, and one hundred and ninety-

* The Federal Constitution of America settled in 1797.—ED.

† Washington.

‡ The great struggle between the French and English parties in America was going on at this time about the Treaty with England, which was received by the President on the 7th March 1795, but was not yet made public, though its contents had become partially known. The President was reviled in almost every print, and meetings the most violent were denouncing the Treaty.—MARSHALL'S *Life of Washington*.—ED.

three public dinners; at all which, I imagine, there might be nearly thirty thousand people; and as twenty thousand of them, or thereabouts, must have been married men, it is reasonable to suppose that eighteen or nineteen thousand women with their children were at home wanting bread, while their husbands were getting drunk at a civic feast.

There is in general such a sameness in those feasts, that it would be tiring the reader to describe them; and it would, besides, be anticipating what I intend to treat more at large, as soon as my materials for the purpose are collected. The grand civic festival at Reading (Massachusetts), however, deserves a particular mention, as it approaches nearer to a real French civic feast than any thing I have yet heard of in this country.

“ The day was ushered in by the ringing of the bells, and a salute of fifteen discharges from a field-piece. The American flag waved in the wind, and the flag of France *over the British in inverted order*. At noon a large number of *respectable* citizens assembled at citizen Rayner’s, and partook of an elegant entertainment — after dinner Captain Emerson’s military company in uniform assembled, and escorted the “citizens” (to the grog-shop, I suppose, you think?) “to the *meeting-house*!! where an address, pertinent to the occasion, was delivered by “the *Reverend citizen Prentiss*, and united prayers and praises were “offered to God, and several hymns and anthems were well sung; after “which they returned in procession to citizen Rayner’s, when three “farmers with their frocks and utensils, and with a tree on their shoulders, were escorted by the military company, formed in a hollow “square, to the common, where the tree was planted in form, as an “emblem of freedom, and the Marseillois hymn was sung by a choir “within a circle round the tree. Major Bondman, by request, superintended the business of the day, and directed the manœuvres.”

These manœuvres were very curious to be sure, particularly that of the Reverend citizen Prentiss, putting up a long snuffing prayer for the successes of the French atheists! A pretty minister truly! There was nothing wanted to complete this feast but to burn the Bible, and massacre the honest inhabitants of the town. And are these the children of those men who fled from their native country to a desert, rather than deviate from what they conceived to be the true principles of the gospel? Are they such men as Prentiss, to whom the people of Massachusetts commit the education of their children and the care of their own souls? God forgive me if I go too far, but I think I would as soon commit my soul to the care of the devil.

Nor was the Reverend citizen Prentiss the only one who took upon him to mock Heaven with thanksgivings for the successes of the French sans culottes. From Boston they write: “It was highly pleasing to republicans to hear some of our clergy yesterday returning thanks to the Supreme Being for the successes of the good sans culottes.” Yes, reader, some of the clergy of Boston put up thanksgivings for what they imagined to be the successes of a set of impious wretches, who have in the most solemn manner abolished the religion these very clergymen profess, who have declared Christianity to be a farce, and its Founder an infamous impostor, and who have represented the doctrine of the immortality of the soul as a mere cheat, contrived by artful priests to enslave mankind. There is but too much reason to fear that many of those whose duty it is to stand on the watch-tower, whose duty it is to resist this pernicious

doctrine, are among the first to espouse it; but let the clergymen of Boston remember—

“ That those whose impious hands are join’d
 “ From Heaven the thunderbolt to wrest,
 “ Shall, when their crimes are finished, find,
 “ That *death is not eternal rest.*”

But they tell us that it is because the French are true republicans, that we ought to applaud them. What a sarcasm on republicanism! As if fire and sword, prisons and scaffolds, the destruction of cities, the abolition of all religious worship, the inculcation of a doctrine which leads to every crime, stifles remorse, and prevents a return to justice and humanity, were the characteristics of a true republic. If it be so, we ought to blush to call ourselves republicans.

Some of the democratic tribe have cried aloud against me, for speaking of the Dutch and French under the names of *Nick Frog* and the *Baboon*; but let them remember, that while they talk about *John Bull*, I must, and will be permitted to keep up the allegory, * particularly at a time when it is become more strikingly à-propos than ever. “*Jupiter*,” says the fable, “sent the frogs a log of wood † to reign over them; but a bull being let loose in the pasture, and having trod the guts of a few of them out, they set up a terrible outcry against the stupidity and negligence of king log. Jupiter tired at last with their everlasting croakings, and determined to punish them for their ingratitude to his anointed log, sent them a huge baboon that gobbled them up by hundreds at a meal.”

Patriot Paine, the heathen philosopher, has observed that republics never marry. There is more humour than truth in this observation; for though one would imagine that the name of *sister* which they give to each other would be an insuperable bar to such an union, yet experience proves the contrary; for the French republic does not only marry, but is guilty of polygamy. She has already espoused the republic of Batavia (commonly called Holland), and the poor little Geneva, and she is now swaggering about like a Jack wh—e with a couple of under punks at her heels. She wanted to make love to the cheek of John Bull, but John, beast as he is, had too much grace to be seduced by her. “No,” said John, “you heathenish cannibal, I will not touch you; you reek with blood; get from my sight, you stabbing strumpet!” John was half right; for she is indeed a cruel spouse; something like the brazen image formerly made use of in Hungary, that cracked the bones, and squeezed out the blood and guts of those who were condemned to its embraces.

How happy were we in escaping a marriage with a termagant like this! we were, indeed, within an inch of it. Brissot and his crew sent out one of their citizens ‡ (who had been employed with so much success in negotiating the marriage with Geneva) to marry us by proxy, and the democrats were beginning to sing “Come haste to the wedding,” when

* The reader has seen the allegory I allude to in Swift’s works.

† The Stadtholder is well represented by a log.

‡ In April, 1793, Genet arrived in America, Minister for the French Republic; he was received by the governor and citizens of Charleston in a manner expressive of their warm attachment to his country, and their warm approbation of the change of her institutions. He assumed the authority of expediting privateers from that port to cruise against the vessels of nations who were enemies to France, but at peace with the United States; a procedure forbidden

the president, who had not burnt his bible, saw that the laws of consanguinity did not allow of a marriage between two sisters, and therefore, like a good old father of his country, he peremptorily forbad the bans. Heavens bless him for it! if he had not done this, we might long ago have seen the *citizen inviting* the Congress, as Pichegru does the Dutch assembly, to send him five hundred oxen for breakfast. He had already begun to scamper about our streets with his sans culottes dragoons (among whom, be it remembered, some of our democrats were base enough to enrol themselves), and he would by this time, perhaps, have ordered us, and not without reason, to call Philadelphia, Commune Affranchie.

The Convention, finding that we were not to be won by this boorish kind of courtship, began to send us billets-doux to soothe us into compliance. Among these, that which *invites* us to change our weights and measures* is remarkable enough to merit a particular notice. A citizen somebody had been to measure the terrestrial *arc* contained between Dunkirk and Barcelona, from which operation it appeared that *we* ought (at the invitation of the French) to divide our *pound* into *ten ounces*, our *gallon* into *ten quarts*, our *day* into *ten hours*, our *quadrant* into a *hundred degrees*, &c. &c. &c., just like Hudibras,

“ For he by geometric scale
 “ Could take the size of pots of ale,
 “ And tell by sines and tangents straight,
 “ If bread and butter wanted weight.”

This communication was a sort of a present by way of breaking the ice; artful gallants begin with trifles—a handkerchief, a ring, any bauble marked with the lover's name, paves the way in affairs of love. If we had set about making the alterations, which we were invited to make, we should, undoubtedly, have been invited to divide our year according to the decadery calendar, abolish Christianity, and punish with death those who should have dared to worship “ *the ci-devant God.*” I almost wonder that these generous *enlighteners* of the world, these generous encouragers of the arts and sciences, had not sent us, along with the models of weights and measures, models of their *lantern-posts* and *guillo-*

“ by the laws of nations. The British Minister complained to the President, who directed Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, to lay before the Minister of France the principles which regulate the executive in relation to the powers at war. Relying on the popularity of his nation, he attempted, by insolent and offensive declamations, to drive the President from his ground. He threatened to appeal from the Government to the People.” The American Government remonstrated with that of France, and Genet's powers were annulled; but as he was afraid to go back to France, he remained in America.—*See History of the United States, published by Miller, 1826, p. 352.* That Genet was sent to America to excite its government to war with England, is clear from all the instructions which he carried, for he was to call on them “ *to make common cause* with the French Republic;” and, in his confidence, he began making war without the sanction of the Government.—ED.

* 2nd August, 1794. Fouchet, then French Minister in America, announced to the Government, that citizen Dombey had arrived with the new apparatus of weights and measures adopted in France. He says that the intention with which the communication is made, is “ *to cement the political and commercial connec-tions of the two countries*, and to destroy those customs more or less absurd “ *which shackle the relations of nations.*”—*Letter to Randolph, Sec. of State.* No notice was taken of this piece of civility, though Dombey was sent expressly with his weights and measures, under an order of the Committee of Public Safety, signed by ROBESPIERRE.—*Porcupine*, vol. 2, p. 222.—ED.

tines. They talk about their *nautical discoveries*, why had they not sent us, then, a model of their *drowning-boats*, by which fifty women and children were sent to the bottom at a time? They might also have obliged us with an essay on the method of making bread, without taking the bran out of the flour; and how well pleased must the Congress have been with a treatise on legislative boxing!* But, as the French have all the honour of these discoveries, so, I suppose, they mean to have all the profit too; and God punish the villain that would wish to rob them of it, I say.

The Convention, in this communication, resemble *Jack* in the *Tale of a Tub*: "Flay, pull, tear all off," say they, "let not a single stitch of the livery of that d——d rogue, John Bull, remain." The Congress, however, have thought proper to imitate the phlegmatic good-nature of Brother Martin. "Steady, boys, steady," said they one to another; "those fellows, there, are got keel uppermost, and they want to see us in the same plight." I would have given a trifle for a view of the senators when they received this *ten-ounces-to-the-pound* proposal; the gravity of a senator surpasses what I conceived of it, if they did not run a risk of bursting their sides. The notice they have taken of it will, I hope, prevent like *invitations* for the future; and convince the French that our Congress is not an assembly

"Where *quicks* and *quirks*, in dull debates,
 "Dispute on *maximms* and *weights*,
 "And cut the land in *squares*;
 "Making king mob gulp down the cheat,
 "And singling for *themselves the wheat*,
 "Leave for the *herd the tares*."

I do not know whether the French are irritated at our *sang froid*, or at our consulting our interests with other nations, or how it is, but certainly they begin to show their good-will to us in a very odd manner. Their depredations on our commerce have already surpassed those of the English. One captain writes, "I have been *robbed by them*; they have *broken open my trunks, and took my all*." Another says: "They have called me a *damned Anglo-American, beat me, and thrown me into prison*." Another says: "They have kept me here these four months; they do what they please with my cargo; and *the Lord knows what will become of me!*" Another *petitions* the sans culotte general, and concludes with, "your petitioner shall ever *pray!*"—And is this all? Do they now talk of these things with the humility of slaves? No, execrations! Have they emptied their galls on the English? Is there not one curse, one poor spiteful curse, left for the sans culottes? Ye Gods! how men are sometimes ice and sometimes fire! When the English took our vessels, what *patriot* bosom did not burn with rage? There was nothing talked of but vengeance, war, and confiscation.† Where is now all this "republican ardour," where are all those young men who "burnt for an opportunity to defend the *liberty, rights, and property* of their country?" Where are all those courageous *captains* who entered into an association to oblige the

* See Dunlap's Gazette of May 8th 1795, for an account of a bruising match in the National Convention.

† Attempts were made to show that England committed such depredations on the Americans at sea as called for war, and a report was called for by the French party; it was given to the President by the Secretary of State, in October, 1796, and showed that very few had been committed by English vessels, but a great number by the French. *Porc.* vol. 6, p. 230.—Ed.

government to declare war? Are they dead? do they sleep? or are they gone with their chief, *Barney*, to fight, like Swisses, for the French Convention? Last year, about this time, nothing was to be heard but their malicious left-handed complaints; a rough word or a wry look was thought sufficient to rouse the whole Union to revenge the insults they received on the high seas. They now seem as insensible to every insult as the images at the head of their vessels; submit to their fate with Christian resignation, with, "Lord have mercy upon us," and, "your petitioners will ever pray!"

If any one wants to be convinced that the democratic outcry about the British depredations was intended to plunge us into war and misery, let him look at their conduct at the present moment. An Envoy* Extraordinary was sent to England to demand restitution, which has not only been granted, but a long wished-for commercial treaty has also been negotiated. One would think that this would satisfy all parties; one would think that this would even shut the mouths of the democrats;—but no; this is all wrong, and they are beginning to tear the treaty to pieces, before they know any thing about it; they have condemned the whole, before they know any single article of it. They were eternally abusing Mr. Pitt, because he kept aloof in the business; and, now he has complied, they say that no such thing should ever have been thought of. "What!" say they, "make a treaty with Great Britain!"—And why not, wiseacres? Who would you make a treaty with, but those with whom you trade? You are afraid of giving umbrage to France, eh? Is this language worthy an independent nation? What is France to us, that our destiny is to be linked to hers? that we are not to thrive because she is a bankrupt? She has no articles of utility to sell us, nor will she have wherewith to pay us for what she buys. Great Britain, on the contrary, is a ready-money customer; what she furnishes us is, in general, of the first necessity, for which she gives us, besides, a long credit; hundreds and thousands of fortunes are made in this country upon the bare credit given by the merchants of Great Britain.

Think not, reader, whatever advantages we are about to derive from the treaty with Great Britain, that I wish to see such a marked partiality shown for that nation, as has hitherto appeared for the French; such meannesses may be overlooked in those despicable states that are content to roll as the satellites of others, in a Batavia or Geneva, but in us it never can. No; let us forget that it is owing to Great Britain that this country is not now an uninhabited desert; that the land we possess was purchased

* When Mr. Jay came to England, he was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the French party laid hold of the circumstance to excite hatred against the President. According to the constitution (Article I. Sec. 3.), the Chief Justice must preside at the impeachment of a President, and thus, it was said, "the President has violated the constitution, for, the Chief Justice being away, *no impeachment can be had.*" Jay himself was abused in these terms: "Notice is hereby given, that, if the treaty entered into by that d—d arch traitor J—n J—y with the British tyrant should be ratified, a petition will be presented to the next General Assembly of Virginia at their next session, praying that the said State *may recede from the Union*, and be left under the government and protection of one hundred thousand free and independent Virginians."

"P.S. As it is the wish of the people of the said State, to enter into a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation with any other State or States of the present Union, who are averse to returning again under the galling yoke of Great Britain, the Printers of the (at present) United States are requested to publish the above notification." (*Porc.* vol. 2, 275.) Papers of this description were put forth

from the aborigines with the money of an Englishman;* that his hands traced the streets on which we walk. Let us forget from whom we are descended, and persuade our children that we are the sons of the gods, or the accidental offspring of the elements; † let us forget the scalping knives of the French, to which we were thirty years exposed; but let us never forget that we are not Frenchmen.

A LITTLE PLAIN ENGLISH,

Addressed to the People of the United States, on the Treaty, and on the Conduct of the President relative thereto, in answer to "the Letters of Franklin."

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—In our selections from the "*Bone to Gnaw*," the reader has seen that its author's object was, to deter the people of America from seeking an alliance with France. In this pamphlet it was his object to reconcile them to the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with England, which was conditionally ratified on the 24th June, 1795, by the President WASHINGTON. The Federalists were in favour of a treaty with England, and the Antifederalists wanted a treaty with France: WASHINGTON was of the former party; but his Secretary of State (JEFFERSON) was of the latter party. The French, through their Minister, GENET, had made a proposal that France and America should join against England, and that America should cease all commercial transactions with her. In accordance with this, JEFFERSON made a report on commerce to Congress in the fall of 1793, recommending the "burdening with duties, or excluding, such foreign manufactures as we take in the greatest quantity; for such duties, having the effect of indirect encouragement to domestic manufactures of the same kind, may induce the manufacturer to come himself into these States." He was thus, as far as his office would allow him, thwarting the views of the President, but he was answered by a member of Congress, who showed the folly of such a system, and who showed, too, JEFFERSON'S inconsistency, by quoting his Notes on Virginia, which contain this passage: "While we have land to labour, then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied, at a work-bench, or twirling the distaff. Carpenters, masons, smiths, are wanting in husbandry: but, for the general operation of manufactures, let our workshops remain in Europe. It is better to carry provisions and materials to workmen there, than bring them to the provisions and materials, and with them their manners and principles."—Notes on V. Query XIX. The report was evidently aimed at England; and, to make this clear, MADISON, Jefferson's bosom friend, in January 1794, moved a string of resolutions, proposing to follow it up, by imposing a higher scale of duties on leather, hard-ware, cottons, wool, and other articles, which were those then imported from England. The resolutions were negatived; but they were more than suspected to be JEFFERSON'S, and, in the intercepted dispatch from the

from the Democratic Societies all over the United States. The one that we have cited was from a society at Richmond, Virginia; but those from the societies of Baltimore, Philadelphia, &c. were equally violent against the treaty. A meeting at Pittsburg, on the 1st April 1795, declared themselves weary of the tardiness of the Congress in not going to war with England, and, that they were "almost ready to wish for a state of revolution, and the guillotine of France for a short space, in order to punish the miscreants who enervate and disgrace the Government."—ED.

* WILLIAM PENN.—ED.

† In the war of 1756 which ended in the English taking Canada from the French, the latter employed the Indians, who committed great cruelty in scalping the English prisoners of war.—FRANKLIN'S GAZETTE, 25th August 1757. HIST. OF UNITED STATES, p. 176.—SMOLLETT, *Hist. of Eng.*, vol. 3, p. 534.—ED.

French Minister, FAUCHET, alluded to in the preface to this work as bringing to light the treachery of Randolph, he says that they were JEFFERSON'S. The dispute between the English and French parties had now (1794) become, not warm, but *hot*; the depredations of English privateers and cruisers on the vessels of Americans, were made the stalking-horse of the friends of France; and, on the 27th March, 1794, Mr. DAYTON moved a resolution, that "all debts due from citizens of the United States, to the subjects of the king of Great Britain should be sequestered." It was carried by the Lower House, but *rejected by the Senate*; and now, JEFFERSON, finding himself in a cabinet to which he was so much opposed, and against which he was even working, retired to his estate in Virginia; but, before doing so, he recommended *Randolph* to WASHINGTON as his successor (see *Jefferson's Life*, vol. 4, p. 506). WASHINGTON attempted to stem the tide, by desiring his new Secretary to lay before Congress a report of the depredations committed by England, France, Spain and Holland, on American commerce, and, though it appeared that *France* had committed the greatest, still the French party moved onward; the President was abused as a traitor to his country, and a Mr. CLARKE moved a resolution in the Lower House for *suspending all commerce with England*. While the resolution was debating, WASHINGTON, by advice of the Senate, sent JAY (Chief Justice) off to England to negotiate this famous treaty. The Lower House passed CLARKE'S resolution, but the Senate rejected it; the storm thickened—but enough of this has been seen in the "*Bone to Gnaw*." When the treaty arrived in America, the friends of France fell upon it and its makers, and we now see that JEFFERSON, in retirement, launched his execrations on it in letters to his correspondents: in one he thus invokes MADISON'S pen to put down the writers on the English side—"for God's sake take up your pen, and give a fundamental reply to Curtius and Camillus" (*Life and Correspondence*, vol. 3, p. 322); and, in a letter to RUTLEDGE, he says, "I join you in thinking the Treaty an execrable thing. I trust the popular branch of our legislature will disapprove of it, and thus rid us of this infamous act, which is really nothing more than a treaty of alliance between England and the Anglomen of this country" (*Life &c.* vol. 3, p. 323). The following pamphlet, then, is an answer to one supposed to be written by Mr. DALLAS, Secretary of the State of Pennsylvania, but published under the assumed name of *Franklin*. It is a defence of the treaty, of Mr. JAY, and of the President. It is one of the best in the works of "*Porcupine*," and, therefore, as well as that it shows the objects that the writer had in view, we place it in these selections, observing, that it was on account of writings in this manner and at so critical a juncture, that Mr. WINDHAM, some years after (*Debate 5th Aug.* 1803), said in the House of Commons, in answer to an attack on Mr. COBBETT by Mr. SHERIDAN: "Before I had the pleasure to know him personally, I admired the conduct which he pursued through a most trying crisis in America; where, by his own unaided exertions, he rendered his country services that entitle him to a statue of gold."

A TREATY of amity, commerce, and navigation, with Great Britain, is a thing which has been so long and so ardently desired on your part, and so often solicited by your government, that one cannot help being astonished that even the democratic, or French, faction should have the temerity to raise a cry against it, now it is brought so near a conclusion. It is true this perverse faction is extremely contemptible, as to the property they possess, and the real weight they have in the community; and their dissatisfaction, which is sure to accompany every measure of the Federal Government, is a pretty certain sign of the general approbation of those who may be properly called the people: but it must be acknowledged at the same time, that they have for partisans almost the whole of that description of persons, who, among us royalists, are generally designated by the name of mob.

The letters of Franklin are a string of philippics against Great Britain and the executive of the United States. They do not form a regular series, in which the subject is treated in continuation: the first seems to be the overflowings of passion bordering on insanity, and each succeeding

one the fruit of a relapse. To follow the author step by step through such a jumble, would be to produce the same kind of disgust in you as I myself have experienced; I shall therefore deviate from the order, or rather disorder, which Franklin has found it convenient to employ, and endeavour to bring the subject before you in a less complicated point of view.

The censure of Franklin has three principal objects; the treating with Great Britain at all, the terms of the treaty, and the conduct of the President relative to the negotiation.

I. He asserts, that to form a commercial treaty with Great Britain is a step, at once unnecessary, impolitic, dangerous and dishonourable.

II. That, if forming a treaty with Great Britain were consistent with sound policy, the terms of the present treaty are disadvantageous, humiliating and disgraceful to the United States.

III. That supposing the terms of the treaty to be what every good American ought to approve, yet the conduct of the President, relative to the negotiation and promulgation of it, has been highly improper, and even monarchical, and for which he deserves to be impeached.

If Franklin has made out any one of these assertions; if he has proved, that to treat with Great Britain is unnecessary, impolitic, dangerous and dishonourable, that the terms of the present treaty are disadvantageous, humiliating and disgraceful, or that the President has pursued a conduct in the negotiation for which he deserves to be impeached, you will all do well to join the remonstrating throng, that are now hunting the President to his retreat at Mount Vernon; but if he has proved none of these; if all that he has said on the subject be mere cavilling and abuse, scolding, reviling, and execrating; if he be every where detected of misrepresentation, inconsistency, and flat contradiction; if, in short, it appears, that his ultimate object is to stir up the unwary to an indecent and even violent opposition against the Federal Government, then, if you consult your own interests, you will be upon your guard, and weigh well the consequences, before you determine on such an opposition.

I. Franklin asserts, that to form a commercial treaty with Great Britain is a step, at once unnecessary, impolitic, dangerous and dishonourable.

1. It is unnecessary, because "commercial treaties are an artificial means to obtain a natural end. They are the swathing bands of commerce, that impede the free operations of nature." This will not detain us long; it is one of those chimerical notions that so well characterize the Parisian school. Nobody but a set of philosophical politicians ever imagined the plan of opening all the ports in the world to all the vessels in the world, "of interweaving and confounding the interests of all nations, of forming the inhabitants of the earth into one vast republic, of rendering the whole family of mankind enlightened, free and happy." When this plan shall be put in execution with success, I will allow that commercial treaties are unnecessary, but, till then, I must contend for the contrary.

"The two countries," says Franklin, "if necessary in their products to each other, will seek an intercourse." This is all I wanted him to admit, to prove that an exchange of commodities between our countries is necessary; for that they have sought an intercourse with each other, and that they do now seek that intercourse more than ever, is most certain; so much so with respect to this country, that about one-half of her exports are now made to Great Britain and her dominions. But, says he, "this exchange ought to be left to itself; for the commerce

“ of nations ought to be like the trade between individuals, who deal “ with those who give them the best treatment, and the best bargains.” I subscribe to the justice of the latter part of this remark with all my heart ; nothing could be more convenient for my purpose ; for if nations, like individuals, trade with those who treat them best, and give them the best bargains, how much better treatment and better bargains must you receive from Great Britain than from other nations, when you purchase from her three times as much as from all the rest of the world put together ? But, that this extensive exchange, however necessary to both parties, should be left to regulate itself, I cannot believe ; for, keeping up the comparison, the commerce of nations being like the trade between individuals, it will ever be found, I believe, that treaties are as necessary to a continuance of good understanding in the former as written contracts are in the latter.

An observation presents itself here, which must not be omitted. Franklin objects to forming a treaty with Great Britain, because, says he, “ She is famed for perfidy and double dealing, her polar star is interest, artifice with her is a substitute for nature, &c. &c.” God knows if all this, and much more that he has said, be true ; but, if it be, I am sure it makes strongly for a treaty, in place of against one ; for proceeding still upon his own comparison, “ that commerce between nations is like trade between individuals,” certainly no individual would ever think of dealing to any amount with a person famed for perfidy and double dealing, without binding him down by written articles.

Out of this observation grows another of not less importance. Franklin has taken an infinite deal of pains to persuade you that the President should have formed a treaty with France instead of Great Britain ! Your commerce with France, even in the fairest days of her prosperity, never amounted to more than a fifth part of your commerce with Great Britain ; and, if what Franklin says be true, France is the most magnanimous, generous, just, honourable, (*humane!*) rich, and powerful nation upon the earth ; and can you then want a written bargain with France, when a mere trifle is the object, and none with Great Britain, when half you have is at stake ? Shall it be said that you distrust France, that honourable, that *rich* nation ? that you bind her down with “ hard biting laws,” while you admit Great Britain, “ whose days,” Franklin assures you, “ are numbered,” to a kind of family intercourse, where the bands of affection are supposed to supply the place of law ?

Franklin incautiously acknowledges, “ that you repeatedly solicited a commercial treaty with Great Britain,” and this is very true. The first question put to Mr. Hammond,* on his arrival here, was to know, if he was authorized to treat on that subject. This was also the ostensible object of Mr. Madison’s famous resolutions. “ To force the nations of Europe, and particularly Great Britain, to enter into commercial treaties with you.” The words, nations of Europe, were afterwards changed for Great Britain. These resolutions were a long time and are still a favourite theme of panegyric among the French faction ; all the democratic societies in the Union have passed resolves in approbation of them ; they have been toasted at every patriotic dinner, every civic feast, and even our Franklin himself sings forth their praises. How comes it then, that all these people now deprecate the idea of making a treaty

* English Minister at Philadelphia.—Ed.

with Great Britain? This will be no longer a secret, when patriot Madison's real object is known, and to know this you have only to compare his resolutions with a passage in citizen Genet's instructions. The fact is, patriot Madison had no such thing as a treaty in view; nothing on earth was further from his wishes. War was his object; but this he could not propose in direct terms, and therefore, he proposed such restrictions on the British commerce, as he was sure, if adopted, would produce a war. He failed, and Great Britain, in consenting to what he pretended was the object of his resolutions, and the President and Senate in ratifying it, are now loaded with the execrations of all his partisans. But what must be the patriot's remorse? What will he be able to say against treating with a nation, whom he wished to force to a treaty with you?

2nd. Treaties are impolitic, because they lead to war; and, consequently a treaty with Great Britain is exceptionable on that account. This is another idea borrowed from the legislators of your sister republic, and surely it is not, for that reason, less whimsical. "Treaties lead to war," says Franklin, "and war is the bane of republican government." Treaties of alliance offensive and defensive lead to war, it is their object; but how treaties of amity, commerce and navigation, can lead to war; how a treaty like that under consideration, made expressly to terminate all differences in an amicable manner, to produce satisfaction and good understanding, to establish universal peace and true friendship between the parties, how a treaty like this can lead to war, is to me inconceivable. With just as much reason might it be said, that treaties of peace lead to war, that independence leads to subjugation, that liberty leads to slavery, and that good leads to evil.

"Treaties," says our demagogue, "are like partnerships, they establish intimacies, which sometimes end in profligacy, and sometimes in ruin and bankruptcy, distrust, strife and quarrel;" and then on he goes with an abusive apostrophe (which decency prevents me from copying here) inferring that you ought, on this account, to avoid a connection, as he terms it, with Great Britain. This comparison is not so good as the last we quoted; treaties of amity and commerce do not at all resemble partnerships. "The commerce of nations is like trade between individuals;" but commercial treaties resemble contracts between individuals of separate interests, and not co-partnerships. A co-partnership implies an union of interests, a participation in profits and losses, in debts and credits. Are any of these understood by a commercial treaty? Assuredly not. In a commercial treaty two nations say: On these terms we will buy and sell, of and to each other. Had you made a treaty with Great Britain to club your merchandise and revenues, and to carry on trade under the firm of Madam Britain and Miss America, such a treaty would, indeed, have resembled a partnership, and would very probably have been attended with all the inconveniences stated by Franklin; but commercial treaties are, I repeat it, among nations what written bargains are among individuals, and the former have exactly the same tendency as the latter, that is, to render mistakes, disputes, and quarrels, less frequent.

But, however, even if treaties do lead to war, it is rather surprising to hear Franklin object to them on that account, when one-third part of his book is taken up with invectives against the President for not forming a treaty with France, the direct object of which was your taking a part

with her in the present war. "The treaty proposed by citizen Genet," says he, "was a treaty on liberal and equitable principles." What were these liberal principles now? Citizen Genet came forward with an offer to treat, which offer, it must be confessed, contained no express desire of involving you in a war; but what were the citizen's private instructions concerning this treaty? For it is from these that you are to judge, and not from the contents of a mere complimentary letter. What were they then?

"Citizen Genet," says the Executive Council, "shall open a negotiation, which may become a national agreement in which two great people shall suspend their commercial and political interest, to befriend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced. Such a pact, which the people of France will support with all the energy that distinguishes them, will quickly contribute to the general emancipation of the New World. But should the American administration adopt a wavering conduct, the executive council charges him, in expectation that the American government will finally determine to make a common cause with us, to take such steps as will appear to him exigencies may require, to serve the cause of liberty and the freedom of the people. The guarantee of our West India islands shall form an essential clause in the new treaty which will be proposed: the executive council, in consequence, recommend to citizen Genet to sound early the disposition of the American government, and to make it a *sine qua non* of their free commerce to those islands, so essential to the United States."

Here then are the "liberal principles," so much boasted of by the partisans of France! A treaty on these principles is what Franklin would have approved of. For not forming a treaty on these principles he loads your President with abuse, while he declares, that his objection to treaties, is "they lead to war, and war is the bane of republican government!" A demagogue, like a liar, should have a good memory.

3rd. To form a treaty of commerce with Great Britain is dangerous, he says, because "it is forming a connection with a monarch, and the introduction of the fashions, forms, and precedents of monarchical governments, has ever accelerated the destruction of republics." To suppose this man in earnest would be to believe him guided by something below even the imbecility of a frenchified republican. It would be to suppose him almost upon a level with a member from the southward, who gave his vote against a law, merely because it appeared to him to be of monarchical origin, while at the same moment he represented a state,* whose declaration of rights says: "The good people are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law, and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed at the time of their emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and of such others as have been since made in England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced here, &c." Can the people who have been so careful in preventing their future rulers from depriving them of the benefit of the laws of England, who look upon the being governed by those laws as the most inestimable of their rights, be afraid of introducing among them the fashions, forms, and precedents of England? Can it be possible, that they are afraid of introducing among them what they already possess, and what they declare they will never part with?

It is not my object to intrude on you my opinion of the fashions, forms and precedents, as Franklin calls them, of the British Government; they

* Maryland. See Constitutions of the United States.—Ed.

may be better or they may be worse than other governments; but be they what they may, they are nearly the same as your own, and they are the only ones ever adopted by any nation on earth to which yours bear the most distant resemblance; therefore, admitting, for a moment, what Franklin says to be true, "that you should make treaties with no nation whose fashions and forms are different from your own," it follows of course, that, if you ought not on this account to make treaties with Great Britain, you ought to do it with no nation in the world.

But this would not suit the purpose of Franklin, who, at the same time that he reprobates the idea of making a treaty with Great Britain, inculcates the propriety and even necessity of making one with France. "If foreign connections are to be formed," says he, "they ought to be made with nations whose influence and example would not poison the fountain of liberty, and circulate the deleterious streams to the destruction of the rich harvest of our revolution—tell me your company, and I will tell you who you are." And then he tells us, that "there is not a nation in Europe, with an established government, whose example should be our imitation, but that France is our natural ally; that she has a government congenial with our own, and that there can be no hazard of introducing from her, principles and practices repugnant to freedom." Take care what you are about, Mr. Franklin! If there be none of the established governments in Europe congenial to your own, the inevitable conclusion is, that neither you nor your sister republic have an established government! Do you begin to perceive the fatal effects of your want of memory?

But, are you governed by an assembly of ignorant caballing legislators? An assembly of Neros, whose pastime is murder, who have defied the God of Heaven, and, in idea, have snatched the thunder from his hand to hurl it on a crouching people? And do you resemble the republican French? Have you cast off the very semblance of virtue and religion? Do you indeed resemble those men of blood, those profligate infidels, who, uniting the frivolity of the monkey to the ferocity of the tiger, can go dancing to the gallows, or butchering their relations to the air of *ah! ca ira?* If you do, you have not much to fear from the introduction of the fashions, forms, and precedents of other nations.

Another source of danger, that Franklin has had the sagacity to discover in treating with Great Britain, is, that she "meditates your subjugation, and a treaty will give her a footing amongst you which she had not before, and facilitate her plans." The executive council of France ordered citizen Genet to tell you something of this sort, in order to induce you to embark in the war for the liberty and happiness of mankind. "In this situation of affairs," says the executive council, "when the military preparations in Great Britain become every day more serious, we ought to excite, by all possible means, the zeal of the Americans, who are as much interested as ourselves in disconcerting the destructive projects of George III., in which they are probably an object." I beseech you to pay attention to this passage of the instructions. When military preparations were making against France, she wanted your aid, and so the good citizen was ordered to tell you that you were the object of those preparations. The citizen was ordered to tell you a falsehood; for the war has now continued three years, and George III. has not made the least attempt against your independence.

You have the surest of all guarantees that Great Britain will never at-

tempt any thing against your independence, her interest. I agree with Franklin, that "her interest is the main-spring of all her actions, and that, had not her interest been implicated, the commercial relation between you and her would long since have been destroyed." Her interest will ever dictate to her to keep up that relation, and certainly making an attempt on your independence is not the way to do that; for, as to her succeeding in such an attempt, I think every American will look on that as impossible. The idea of your "again becoming colonies of Great Britain," may be excused in Franklin and the other stipendiaries of the French republic; but an American, who holds the good of his country in higher estimation than a bundle of assignats, and who entertains such a disgraceful belief, must have the head of an idiot and the heart of a coward.

Besides, has not our demagogue himself given a very good reason for your having nothing to apprehend from Great Britain? "Happily for this country," says he, "the days of that corrupt monarchy are numbered; for already has the impetuous valour of our insulted French brethren rushed like a torrent upon the Dutch Provinces, and swept away the dykes of aristocracy. Perhaps Heaven will direct their next steps to Great Britain itself, and by one decisive stroke, relieve the world from the miseries which that corrupt government has too long entailed upon mankind." I shall not stop here to prove, that it was not an act of a corrupt government to frame such laws, as the people of these states have bound their rulers never to depart from; nor have I time to prove, that peopling the United States, changing an uncouth wilderness into an extensive and flourishing empire, in little more than a century, was not entailing miseries upon mankind. I hasten to my subject; and, I think, I need take no great deal of pains to prove to you, that, if Great Britain be in the situation in which Franklin has described her, you have very little to fear from her. A nation whose "days are numbered," and particularly who is in continual expectation of a domiciliary visit from the French, is rather to be pitied than feared.

And yet this same Franklin, who tells you that the "days of Great Britain are numbered, that she is upon the point of annihilation, and that nothing can save her but repentance in sackcloth and ashes;" this same Franklin who says all this, and much more to the same purpose; this same Franklin winds up almost every one of his letters in declaring, that you have every thing to fear from her, and that nothing on earth can save you but France! "That gallant nation, whose proffers we have neglected, is the sheet-anchor who sustains our hopes, and should her glorious exertions be incompetent to the great object she has in view, we have little to flatter ourselves with from the faith, honour, or justice of Great Britain. The nation on whom our political existence depends we have treated with indifference bordering on contempt.—Citizens, your only security depends upon France, and by the conduct of your government, that security has become precarious." Now before I go any further, I shall bring another sentence from Franklin, which will certainly give you a favourable idea of the veracity and consistency of that demagogue. "Insulated as we are, not an enemy near to excite apprehension, and our products such as are indispensable, we need neither the countenance of other countries, nor their support!" What, no enemy near to excite apprehension, no need of support, and yet "France is the sheet-anchor of your hopes!" and yet "your political existence

depends upon her," and yet, because your government has refused to make a common cause with her, "your security has become precarious:" To a hireling writer nothing is so necessary as memory.

If Great Britain had really been so foolish as to form a design upon your independence, and your political existence had depended upon France, it would, I believe, have been at an end long before this time. Citizen Genet was ordered to promise you, that his country would "send to the American ports a sufficient force to put them beyond insult;" but, if they had defended your possessions no better than they have their own, they would have brought you into a poor plight. If the fleet, they were so good as to offer you, had been no more successful than the others they have sent out, it might as well have remained at home, blocked up, as their fleets now are, and left you to the defence of your own privateers. They have given but a poor sample of their protecting talents, either at home or abroad. Letting two-thirds of their colonies be taken from them, and making war upon the rest themselves, is not the way to convince me that you would have been safe under their protection. Nobody but a madman would ever commit his house to the care of a notorious incendiary.

Franklin proceeds exactly in the manner of citizen Genet (of whom he is a pupil, as we shall see by-and-by) : First, he tells you that "Great Britain has contemplated either your misery or subjugation, and that armaments were made to this end." Then he tells you that "France alone has saved you; that she is now fighting your battles; that you owe her much; that she gave you independence, and that she alone is able to preserve it to you." After this, fearing that these weighty considerations may not have the desired effect, he has recourse to the last trick in the budget of a political mountebank, menaces. He tells you dreadful tales about the resentment of France, and this he makes a third source of danger in treating with Great Britain.

"The conduct of the French republic," says he, "towards us has been truly magnanimous, and, in all probability, she would have made many sacrifices to preserve us in a state of peace, if we had demeaned ourselves towards her with becoming propriety; but can we calculate upon her attachment, when we have not only slighted but insulted her? To enter into a treaty with Great Britain at this moment, when we have evaded a treaty with France; to treat with an enemy against whom France feels an implacable hatred, an enemy who has neglected no means to desolate that country, and crimson it with blood, is certainly insult." Then on he goes to terrify you to death. "Citizens of America," says he, "sovereigns of a free country, your hostility to the French republic (in making a treaty with Great Britain, he means) has lately been spoken of in the National Convention, and a motion for an inquiry into it has been only suspended from prudential motives.—The book of account may soon be opened against you—what then, alas! will be your prospects?—To have your friendship questioned by that nation, is, indeed, alarming!"—There spoke the Frenchman! there broke forth the vanity of that vaunting republic!

The above are certainly the most unfortunate expressions that ever poor demagogue launched forth. What he has here said, completely destroys the position he meant it to support. If you must be so cautious in your demeanour towards the French republic, if you dare treat with no nation against whom she feels an implacable hatred, if to treat with a

nation that has endeavoured to desolate that country, is to expose your conduct to an inquiry in the National Convention; if to have your friendship questioned by that nation is an alarming circumstance; if to refuse treating with her, when and how she pleases, is to open the doomsday-book of account against you; if all this be so, I can see no reason for apprehensions on account of your independence, for you are no more than mere colonies of France. Your boasted revolution is no more than a change of masters.

The fact is, as you stand in no need of the protection of France, so you have no cause to fear her resentment. She may grumble curses against you, but speak out she will not. She dares not, she dares not make a second attempt to overturn your Federal Government, by appealing from "the President to the Sovereign People." You are "the sheet-anchor" of her hopes, and not she of yours. To you she clings in her shipwrecked condition, to you her famished legions look for food, and to you her little pop-gun fleets fly for shelter from the thundering foe. What have you then to expect, what to fear from a nation like this? Nothing, alas! but her insidious friendship.

4th. Franklin asserts that it is dishonourable to treat with Great Britain; "because," says he, "her king is a tyrant that invaded our territory, and carried on war against us." He seems to have made a small mistake here; for, at the time the king of Great Britain invaded *your* territory, it was *his* territory, and you his loving subjects; at least, you all declared so. However, without recalling circumstances, that can be of no use in the present discussion, admitting all that has been said on this subject to be true; that the fault was entirely on the side of Great Britain, that all her conduct was marked with duplicity and cruelty, and all yours with frankness and humanity; admitting all this, and that is admitting a great deal, yet, how long has it become a principle in politics, that a nation, who has once done an injury to another, is never after to be treated with upon a friendly footing? Is this a maxim with any other State in the world? How many times have you seen France and England, after the most bloody contests, enter into an amicable treaty of commerce, for their mutual advantage? Have they not done so since the American war? and will they not do so again as soon as the present war is over? Nay, has not France very lately, unmindful of her promises and oaths, entered into a treaty of amity, and almost alliance, with his Royal Majesty of Prussia, who had invaded her territory, without having the least shadow of excuse for so doing? Is it for you alone, then, to sacrifice your interest to your vengeance, or rather to the vengeance of France? Are you to make everlasting hatred an article of your political creed because she wills it?

To this old grudge, Franklin adds some injuries recently received from Great Britain. The first of these is her depredations on your commerce. To urge the depredations on your commerce as a reason against treating, is to find fault with a thing for being calculated to accomplish its object; by treating, you have guarded against such depredations for the future, and have obtained a compensation for the past. I shall enter more fully into this subject when I come to speak of the terms of the treaty; at present it is necessary to speak of the depredations, only as they render a treaty with Great Britain dishonourable.

In the first place, the injury does not appear to me to be of so outrageous a nature as Franklin would persuade you it is. It was possible, at least, that the orders of the British Court might be misunderstood or

misconstrued. It is also possible that great part of the vessels seized were really employed in a commerce that would justify their seizure by the law of nations. Admitting, however, that the British cruisers and Courts of Admiralty have done no more than fulfil the intention of their king, and that none of your captured vessels were employed in a contraband trade, yet I cannot allow that the depredations committed on your trade is a sufficient reason, or, indeed, any reason at all, for your not treating with the nation who has committed them. To maintain the contrary, is to adopt that system of eternal irreconciliation which I shall ever deprecate, and which militates against every principle of justice and sound policy. The partisans of France, and Franklin among the rest, were for demanding satisfaction in such a manner, that Great Britain, consistent with her honour (for I must be excused for thinking she has some left), could not grant it; but must not a treaty have been the consequence at last? Suppose they had succeeded in plunging you into a war, that war itself must have ended in a treaty, and a treaty much more dishonourable, perhaps, than the one now negotiated; unless, indeed, their intention was to wage a *bellum eternum*, side by side with their French brethren, till there should be no government left to treat with. These people are always for violent measures; they wanted a commercial treaty with Great Britain, but then she was to be "forced" into it; and now again they wanted satisfaction, but it is not worth a farthing, because no violence has been used to obtain it. They are of the taste of Swift's "true English dean that was hanged for a rape;" though they have all their hearts can wish for, their depraved appetites render it loathsome, because it has been yielded to them without a struggle.

But it is, or ought to be, the opinion of Franklin himself, that depredations on your commerce ought to be no bar to your treating with the nation who has committed them; for he has exhausted himself to persuade you that a treaty ought to have been made with France, and yet it is notorious that her depredations have very far outstripped those of the British. Within the last five or six months the French have seized upwards of two hundred of your vessels; some they have confiscated, others they have released, after having taken their cargoes, and others are yet in suspense. Many of these vessels have been seized in their own ports, where they went in full confidence, and with the most upright intentions. The mariners have been thrown into prison, where many of them now are; the masters have been robbed, stripped, and beaten, by some of the vilest wretches that ever existed. They have the insolence to call the American masters, the caned captains, "*les capitaines à coup de bâton.*" Let Franklin find you, if he can, an instance of an American ship being seized at sea by the English, and burnt without further ceremony. These things the French have done, and yet he would not think it dishonourable to enter into a treaty with them.

I know I shall be told that the depredations of the French here mentioned have taken place since the departure of Mr. Jay for Great Britain; we will then confine ourselves to the depredations committed by the two nations at that epoch. And here, luckily, we have not to depend upon rumour and newspaper report; we have a sure guide, the report of the Secretary of the State to the President, which was communicated to the Senate and House of Representatives on the 5th of March, 1795.

"Against the French it is urged: 1st, that their privateers harass our trade no less than those of the British, 2nd, that two of their ships of

“ war have committed enormities on our vessels. 3rd, that their Courts of Admiralty are guilty of equal oppression. 4th, that these points of accusation, which are common to the French and British, the French have infringed the treaties between the United States and them, by subjecting to seizure and condemnation our vessels trading with their enemies in merchandise, which that treaty declares not to be contraband, and under circumstances not forbidden by the law of nations. 5th, that a very detrimental embargo has been laid on our vessels in French ports. 6th, that a contract with the French government for coin has been discharged in depreciated assignats.”

If, then, the French privateers had harassed your trade no less than those of the British, if their ships of war also had committed enormities on your vessels, if their Courts of Admiralty had been guilty of equal oppression, and if they had, besides, infringed the treaty already existing between you, had embargoed your vessels, and cheated your merchants by discharging a contract for cash in depreciated assignats, what could you see in their conduct to invite you to a treaty with them, whilst a treaty with Great Britain would, on account of the depredations committed by her, be dishonourable?

On this subject, Franklin takes occasion to introduce one of his conventional threats. “ As long,” says he, “ as we kept up the farce, that the negotiation was designed to produce an indemnity for the past and security for the future, so long did France not complain; but now we have abandoned it to the same uncertainty as before, and have favoured Great Britain at her expense, she cannot, she will not be passive;” and then he says, “ If France should act as our conduct merits, she will not seize our vessels.” Without inquiring here what reason France can have to complain about your not having obtained an indemnity for your losses; without inquiring how your conduct merits her resentment, because you have abandoned your commerce to the same uncertainty as before; without inquiring what she ought to do, you have only to look at what she has done, and you have no reason to fear that the treaty will increase her depredations. In short, ever since the French found that your government was determined not to join them in the war, they have neglected no opportunity of doing you mischief wherever they could and dared to do it; and perhaps it is owing to the British Freebooter (as Franklin calls Admiral Murray), that you are now blockaded up in your ports. I know nothing of the British Admiral’s instructions; perhaps they were no more favourable to you than those of the French Minister; but I think you ought to feel a considerable obligation to him for having rid your coasts and towns of the swarthy red-capped citizens that infested them.

With respect to the charge against Great Britain and the Algerines, it is the most whimpering, babyish complaint that ever disgraced the lips of manhood, and when a member of the House of Representatives made mention of it, he deserved to have his backside whipped. Great Britain, for her convenience, has, it seems, employed her mediation, and prevailed on the Dey of Algiers to make an arrangement with the court of Lisbon, which arrangement gives the Algerines an opening into the Atlantic, where they take your vessels. This is unfortunate for you; but how is it hostile towards you, on the part of Great Britain? How is it letting the Algerines loose upon you? It is, indeed, letting them loose upon the great ocean, where they may do what they can; but to call it

letting them loose on you, is mere childishness. One would think, to hear Franklin, that Great Britain held the Algerines in a string, ready to let loose on whomsoever she pleases. A clear proof that this is not the case is, she has not yet let the Algerines loose on the French; a thing that she most certainly would have done, if she could.

But, it seems, Great Britain is not only to refrain from every act and deed that may give the Algerines an opportunity of incommoding you; she is not only to sacrifice her interest, and that of her allies, to yours; but she ought to take an active part in your protection. A writer against the treaty expresses himself thus: "Our negotiator has omitted to make any stipulation for the protection and security of the commerce of the United States to Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean, against the depredations of the Algerine and Barbary corsairs, although he knew that this forms one of the most beneficial branches of our trade."* This writer certainly forgot that you were independent. He talks about Mr. Jay's making this stipulation, just as if it depended upon him alone. When he was about it, he might as well have stipulated for Great Britain to protect you against all the nations in the world, as she used to do formerly. And do you then stand in need of Great Britain to protect you? Do you stand in need of the protection of this "ruined nation?" This nation whom "nothing will save but repentance in sackcloth and ashes?" This "insular Bastile of slaves?" Do you stand in need of them to protect you, "the sovereigns of a free country?" Is it dishonourable to treat with Great Britain, and yet is it honourable to accept of her protection? Prevaricating demagogues! You accuse the envoy extraordinary of having made a humiliating treaty, while you blame him for not having made you drink off the cup of humility to the very dregs.

The truth is, these depredations on your commerce by all the belligerent nations, and by the Algerines, is what ought to surprise nobody; it is one of those little rubs to which your situation naturally exposes you: independence, for some years at least, is not a rose without a thorn. All that ought to surprise you in contemplating this subject is, that France, to whom alone you give shelter, for whose cause your good citizens have ever felt the most unbounded enthusiasm, and for whose successes they have toasted themselves drunk and sung themselves hoarse a thousand times, should stand foremost on the list of the spoilers; and that notwithstanding this your patriots should insist upon a close alliance with her, while they reprobate the treating with Great Britain as an act at once unnecessary, impolitic, dangerous, and dishonourable.

Having now gone through Franklin's reasons for not treating with Great Britain, I proceed to examine his objections to the terms of the treaty itself.

II. Franklin asserts, that if forming a treaty with Great Britain were consistent with sound policy, the terms of the present treaty are disadvantageous, humiliating, and disgraceful to the United States.

This is the place to observe, that the letters of Franklin were written before the contents of the treaty were known. He introduces his subject in the following words: "The treaty is said to be arrived, and as it will be of serious consequence to us and to our posterity, we should analyze it before it becomes the supreme law of the land." That is to say, before it be known. "It will be said," continues he, "to be a hasty

* See the *Aurora* of 21st July, 1795.

“ opinion which shall be advanced before the treaty itself shall be before us ; but when it shall be promulgated for our consideration, it will have all the force of law about it, and it will then be too late to detect its baneful effects.” Certainly no mortal ever heard reasoning like this before ; what a lame apology for an inflammatory publication, intended to prepossess the rabble against the treaty !

It is not my design to dwell upon every objection that has been started, either by Franklin or the town-meeting ; I shall content myself with answering those only in which they discover an extraordinary degree of patriotic presumption or dishonesty.

Art. I. Says that there shall be peace and friendship between the two countries.

As nobody but the French can have anything to say against this article, and as I have already answered all that their emissary Franklin has said on the subject, I look upon it as unexceptionable.

Art. II. Stipulates, that the western posts shall be evacuated in June next ; that in the mean time the United States may extend their settlements to any part within the boundary line as fixed at the peace, except within the precincts and jurisdiction of the posts ; that the settlers now within those precincts shall continue to enjoy their property, and that they shall be at full liberty to remain there, or remove ; that such of them as shall continue to reside within said boundary lines, shall not be compelled to become citizens of the United States, but that they may do so if they think proper, and that they shall declare their choice in one year after the evacuation of the forts, and that all those who do not declare their choice during that time, are to be looked upon as citizens of the United States.

The citizens of the Boston-town meeting object to “ this article, because it makes no provision to indemnify the United States for the commercial and other losses they have sustained, and the heavy expenses to which they have been subjected in consequence of being kept out of possession for twelve years, in direct violation of a treaty of peace.”

The good citizens, before they talked about indemnity, should have been certain that Great Britain was not justifiable in her detention of the western posts ; because, if it should appear that she was, to make a claim for indemnity would be ridiculous.

By a treaty of peace, Great Britain was to give up these posts, and by the same treaty, the United States were to remove certain legal impediments to the payment of British debts, that is to say, debts due to British merchants before the war. These debts were to a heavy amount, and Great Britain had no other guarantee for their payment than the posts. Your credit, at that time, was not in the most flourishing state ; and that the precaution of having a security was prudent, on the part of Great Britain, the event has fully proved. Nobody pretends that the impediments, above mentioned, are removed ; nay, some of the States, and even their members in Congress, aver that they ought not to be removed ; what right have you, then, to complain of the British for not giving up the posts ? Was the treaty to be binding on them only ? If this be the case, your language to Great Britain resembles that of Rousseau’s tyrant : “ I make a covenant with you, entirely at your expense and to my profit, which you shall observe as long as it pleases me, and which I will observe as long as it pleases myself.” This is not the way treaties are made now-a-days.

It is said that the federal government has done all in its power to effect the removal of the impediments, according to stipulation; but to this I answer, that all in its power is not enough, if the impediments are not removed. Are they removed, or are they not? is the only question Great Britain has to ask. The States from which the debts are due, having enacted laws that counteract those made by the general government, may be pleaded in justification of the latter, in a domestic point of view; but every one must perceive, that it would be childish in the extreme to urge it as an excuse for a failure towards foreign nations. The very nature of a treaty implies a power in the contracting parties to fulfil the stipulations therein contained, and, therefore, to fail from inability is the same thing as to fail from inclination, and renders retaliation, at least, just and necessary. Upon this principle, founded on reason and the law of nations, Great Britain was certainly justifiable in her detention of the western posts.

Another objection, though not to be found in the resolutions of the Boston citizens, deserves notice, "That the leaving British subjects in possession of their lands &c. in the precincts of the forts, will be to establish a British colony in the territory of the United States, &c."* This is an objection that I never should have expected from the true republicans. The treaty says that the settlers in those precincts shall have full liberty to choose between being subjects of the King of Great Britain and citizens of the United States: and can these republicans doubt which they will choose? Can they possibly suppose that the inhabitants near the forts will not rejoice to exchange the humiliating title of subject for the glorious one of citizen? Can they, indeed, imagine that these degraded satellites of the tyrant George will not be ready to expire with joy at the thought of becoming "sovereigns of a free country?" Each individual of them will become a "prince and legislator" by taking the oath of allegiance to the United States; is it not, then, sacrilege, is it not to be a libticide to imagine that they can hesitate in their choice? How came these enlightened citizens to commit such a blunder? How came they to suppose, that the people in the precincts of the forts were more capable of distinguishing between sound and sense, between the shadow and the substance, than they themselves are. Thousands of times have you been told that the poor Canadians were terribly oppressed, that they were ripe for revolt, that the militia had refused to do their duty, and, in short, that the United States had nothing to do but to receive them. And now, when a handful of them are likely to be left amongst you, you are afraid they will choose to remain subjects to the king of Great Britain?

Art. III. Stipulates for a free intercourse and commerce between the two parties, as far as regards their territories in America. This commerce is to be carried on upon principles perfectly reciprocal; but it is not to extend to commerce carried on by water, below the highest ports of entry. The only reservation in this article, is, the King of Great Britain does not admit the United States to trade to the possessions belonging to the Hudson's Bay Company.

To this the citizens of Boston object: "because it admits British subjects to an equal participation with our own citizens of the interior traffic of the United States with the neighbouring Indians, through our

* See the Aurora, 21st July.

“whole territorial dominion; while the advantages ostensibly reciprocated to our citizens, are limited both in their nature and extent.”

The word ostensibly is the only one of any weight in this objection. They could not say that the advantages were not reciprocal, as stipulated for; they therefore found out the word ostensible to supply the place of contradiction. The article provides for advantages perfectly reciprocal, and to say that they are only ostensibly so, is to say; the treaty says so, to be sure, but it does not mean so. The fault then naturally falls upon the words, which say one thing and mean another.

Art. IV. Relates to a survey of a part of the Mississippi.

Art. V. Relates to a survey of the River St. Croix.

It would have been extremely hard, indeed, if these articles had not escaped censure. I cannot, indeed, say that they have escaped it altogether; for, I have been informed that the democratic society of Pennsylvania have declared that the United States should be bounded by nothing but the sea. This, we may presume, is in consequence of the intimation of the Executive Council of France, who ordered citizen Genet to assure the Americans, that with their help, nothing was easier than to finish the emancipation of the New World.

Art. VI. Relates to debts due by citizens of the United States to British subjects, and provides, “that by the operation of various lawful impediments since the peace, not only the full recovery of the said debts has been delayed, but also the value and security thereof have been, in several instances, impaired and lessened, so that by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the British creditors cannot now obtain, and actually have not received full and adequate compensation for the losses and damages which they have thereby sustained: It is agreed, that in all such cases where full compensation for such losses and damages cannot, for whatever reason, be actually obtained, had and received, by the said creditors in the ordinary course of justice, the United States will make full and complete compensation for the same to the said creditors.” Then the article provides for the appointment of commissioners, who are to be invested with full power to determine finally on the several claims. Two commissioners are to be appointed by each party, and these four are to appoint a fifth.—“Eighteen months from the day on which the commissioners shall form a board, shall be assigned for receiving complaints and applications. And the United States undertake to cause the sums so awarded to be paid in specie, &c.”

Art. VII. Relates to the spoliations on your commerce by British subjects, and provides, “that during the course of the war, in which his Majesty is now engaged, certain citizens of the United States have sustained considerable loss and damage by reason of irregular, or illegal captures, or condemnation of their vessels and other property, under colour of authority or commissions from his Majesty; and that from various circumstances belonging to the said cases, adequate compensation for the losses so sustained cannot now be actually obtained, had and received by the ordinary course of judiciary proceedings; it is agreed that in all cases where adequate compensation cannot, for whatever reason, be now actually obtained, had and received by the said merchants and others in the ordinary course of justice, full and complete compensation for the same will be made by the British Government to the said complainants—and for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of such losses and damages five commissioners shall be appointed, and authorized to act in London, exactly in the manner directed with respect to those mentioned in the preceding article.”—“The same term of eighteen months is also assigned for the reception of claims, and they are in like manner authorized to extend the same.”—“And his Britannic Majesty undertakes to cause the same to be paid to such claimant in specie, &c.”

I have placed these two articles opposite to each other to give the reader an opportunity of comparing them ; because the citizens of Boston town-meeting seem to found their objection to both on the dissimilarity between them. "The capture," say they, "of vessels and property of the citizens of the United States, made under the authority of the government of Great Britain, is a national concern, and claims arising from such captures ought not to have been submitted to the decision of their Admiralty Courts, as the United States are thereby precluded from having a voice in the final determination in such cases. Besides, the indemnification proposed to be made, is to be sought by a process tedious and expensive, in which justice may be delayed to an unreasonable time, and eventually lost to many of the sufferers from their inability to pursue it ; and this mode of indemnification bears no proportion to the summary method adopted for the satisfaction of British claims."

You will not be able to account for this, till you are told, that the town-meeting citizens never read the treaty, before they had sanctioned these resolutions. You see by the 6th and 7th articles, that the mode of indemnification to the British subjects and American citizens is one and the same, that both are to be finally determined by commissioners, and both paid punctually in specie ; and yet the citizens of the Boston town-meeting see a difference in every part of it. They complain that the decision of American claims is left to the English Courts of Admiralty, when the treaty says it shall be left, in cases where satisfaction cannot be obtained in the ordinary course of justice, to commissioners, with full power to determine finally. They oppose things to each other which are not only the same in substance, but almost word for word. What must the President think of the town-meeting, when he received from them a senseless memorial, or rather ordinance, like this ?

What do they mean by the mode of indemnification bearing no proportion to the summary method, adopted for the satisfaction of British claims ? Can any method be too summary in the payment of debts, that have been due for twenty years ? I think not. However, as I have already observed, summary or not summary, the method is exactly the same as that adopted for the satisfaction of American claims, and, therefore, if you have reason to complain, so have the British, and this would be singular, indeed.

Art. VIII. Provides for the payment &c. of the above-mentioned commissioners.

This article has had the good fortune to escape censure.

Art. IX. Stipulates, that the subjects of Great Britain holding lands in the United States, and the citizens of the United States now holding lands in the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, shall continue to hold them, and, in what respects those lands shall not be regarded as aliens.

Art. X. stipulates, that neither the debts due from individuals of the other, nor shares, nor money which they may have in the public funds, or in the public or private banks, shall ever, in any event of war, or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated.

That people who disapprove of paying debts that have been due twenty years, should also disapprove of this article is not at all surprising ; accordingly the citizens of the Boston town-meeting highly disapprove of it ; "because," say they, "the exercise of this right may contribute to preserve the peace of the country, and protect the right and property of the citizens."

It is well known that, before Mr. Jay's departure for England, a resolution was entered into by the House of Representatives, on the motion of Mr. Dayton, to sequester all debts and funds, the property of British subjects: The article before us guards against this, and as there was not an honest man in the Union (a majority of the House of Representatives excepted), who did not execrate Mr. Dayton's plundering motion, as it was called; so, I believe there is not one of that description, who does not most cordially approve of the article which will, for the future, render such motions abortive.

Credit is with nations as with individuals; while unimpaired it is almost unbounded, it can perform any thing; but one single retrograde step, and it is blasted, it is nothing. Your credit has suffered much from the motion of Mr. Dayton, and had the sequestration become a law, or had the mercantile world been left in doubt concerning what might happen in future, one half of the great capitals that now give wings to your commerce, would have found their way to other countries. Riches seek security, as rivers seek the sea.

"The capture" (say the town-meeting in another of their resolutions), "the capture of the vessels and property was a national concern."

Here, then, there is a good reason for deprecating Mr. Dayton's motion, in place of approving of it. But, Franklin has something so very striking on this subject, that it must not be passed over in silence. In one place he blames the President for preventing the adoption of Mr. Dayton's resolution, which he calls a dignified measure; and in another place, speaking of the indemnity obtained by the treaty, he says,

"The aggression was an offence against the nation, and therefore no private compensation ought to be deemed competent. As the depredations on our commerce, and the indignities offered to our flag, were a national outrage, nothing short of national satisfaction ought to be admitted. The piracies of Great Britain were committed under the authority of the Government, the Government therefore ought to be answerable for them."

And yet, the same man that has made this plain, unequivocal declaration, has also declared, that it was a dignified measure, to seize the property of innocent individuals lodged in the banks, and the funds of this country, or in the hands of their friends! He has declared it to be a dignified measure, to rifle the bureau of the merchant, pry into the secrets of the friend, sanction the proceedings of the villain, and forbid the honest man to pay his debts.

One thing, above all, ought to be considered on this subject; that an act of sequestration or confiscation must ever fail in its operation, or establish the most consummate tyranny. Do these humane citizens think, that I, for example, would give up what had been intrusted to me by a friend, or what I owed to a correspondent? No; I should look upon the oaths they might impose on me, as taken with a dagger at my breast. In short, their plundering law could never be put in execution, except under the government of a French Convention.

Art. XI. Is only an introduction to the following ones.

Art. XII. Is to be the subject of a future negotiation, and therefore, is not a part of the treaty as approved of by the Senate.

Art. XIII. Consents, that the citizens of the United States may carry on a free trade to and from the British territories in India, but they must carry the merchandise shipped in the said territories, to some part of the United States, and that the citizens of the United States can-

not settle in the said territories, or go into the interior of the country, without express permission from the government there.

To this the town-meeting object ;

“ Because the commerce we have hitherto enjoyed in India, in common with other nations, is so restricted by this article, that, in future, it will be of little or no benefit to our citizens.”

This objection seems to have been founded on a mistake (perhaps a wilful one), which has been propagated with a good deal of industry : “ that this article prevents you from re-exporting the merchandise brought from the British territories in India.” It was excusable in the citizens to follow up this error, because they either did not, or could not, read the treaty ; but I hope, they will now take my word, and assure themselves, that if ever any of them should acquire property enough to be concerned in mercantile affairs, and should receive a cargo from India, they may ship it off again as soon as they please.

Art. XIV. and XV. Stipulate for a free intercourse between the British dominions in Europe and the United States. The advantages are perfectly reciprocal, as far as they can be rendered so by treaty. The two parties agree that no higher duties shall be paid by the ships or merchandise of the one party in the ports of the other, than such as are paid by the like vessels and merchandise of all other nations. This is the principal object of these articles ; but there are some particular stipulations respecting the equalization of duties &c. in which Great Britain appears to have reserved to itself a trifling advantage.

To these articles the town-meeting have some particular objections ; but as these are founded upon an opinion, expressed afterwards in a general objection, it will be sufficient to answer the general objection only.

“ Because the nature and extent of the exports of the United States are such, that in all their stipulations with foreign nations they have it in their power to secure a perfect reciprocity of intercourse, not only with the home dominions of such nations, but with all their colonial possessions.”

It is first necessary to observe, that, what these citizens mean by reciprocity, goes a little beyond the common acceptation of that term. They do not mean, an advantage for an advantage, they mean all the advantage on their side, and none on the other ; they mean, that all the ports of all the nations with whom they trade ought to be as free for them as for the subjects of those nations ; they mean, that other nations should maintain fleets and armies to keep up colonial possessions, and that they should reap the profit of them ; in short, they mean, that all the poor subjects in the world are made for the citizens of the United States to domineer over.

Before I go any further, I must notice what Franklin says on the subject.

“ The articles of commerce in the United States are generally the necessities of life ; few of its luxuries are borne or cultivated among us ; does it appear, then, that a commercial treaty is necessary to afford an outlet to things of the first requisition ? It is a fact well ascertained, that the West India Islands are in a state of dependence among us, and by means of this dependence we are enabled to make such regulations with respect to our commerce with Great Britain wholly superfluous. It is equally ascertained, that in our commerce with Great Britain herself the balance of trade is considerably in her favour ; and from this circumstance, likewise, she would be induced to reciprocate interests, without a commercial treaty, were those means pursued which are in our power.”

Now to know the real value of the term reciprocity, take the following sentences.

“If we cede an advantage for an advantage ceded to us, whence the boast of a treaty? She (Great Britain) can grant us no commercial privileges that our situation does not enable us to exact; why, then, waive the most important demands to obtain a grant of commercial advantages which we could compel?”

This is the language of all the patriots of the present day.

If what the patriots say be true, then you have it in your power to exact from Great Britain what conditions you please; 1st, because your articles of exportation are, in great part, necessaries of life; 2nd, because the British West Indies are in a state of dependence on you; 3rd, because the balance of trade with Great Britain is greatly in her favour.

1. Because your articles of exportation are, in great part, necessaries of life. This idea is originally of the populace, who look upon every barrel of provision shipped off to the West Indies, or elsewhere, as so much loss to themselves, and as a kind of alms to keep the poor foreign devils from starving: and, in return for this generosity on their part, they imagine they have the power to compel the beggars to do just what they please. From the populace it found its way into Congress, under the auspices of a member of that body, who made it the ground-work of his famous resolutions, intended to force Great Britain to yield you commercial advantages. No wonder, then, that it should now be taken up by Franklin, and all the opposers of the treaty. They cannot conceive how a nation, to whom you throw a morsel of bread when you please, should dare refuse you any thing.

That your exports being, in great part, necessaries of life (that is eatables), ought to give you a preference in commercial relations, is an error, and not the less so for being a popular one. Commodities being eatables may give the seller a preference in a town during the time of a siege, but not in the great world of commerce. It is as necessary for you to sell your produce as for a toy-man to sell his toys. If they rot in your stores, their being necessaries of life will not diminish the loss. If the land is obliged to lie fallow, the mill stand still, and the vessels rot at the wharfs, little satisfaction will it be to the farmer, the miller and the merchant, that they all used to be employed in cultivating and distributing the necessaries of life. When a man is reduced to beggary for want of a vent of his goods, it signifies not a farthing to him, whether these goods were necessaries of life, or luxuries. No; it is the pecuniary gains, arising from trading with a nation, which ought to give, or which can give, that nation a right, or a power, to exact commercial advantages; and not the nature of the merchandise she has to export.

2. Because the British West Indies are in a state of dependence upon you. For my part, I cannot conceive how they make out this state of dependence. The exportation of your articles being as necessary to you, as the importation of them is to the islands, you depend upon them as much as they depend upon you. You receive sugar, molasses, coffee and rum, from the islands; these, too, are necessaries of life; and such as you could not possibly do without. I cannot pretend to say what proportion your imports from the islands bear to your exports to them; but there must be a balance of trade either for or against you. If you receive more of the necessaries of life from the islands than you carry to them, they cannot be in a state of dependence, on that account: if the balance be in your favour, then the trade is an advantageous one for you, and,

if it makes a dependence on either side, it makes you dependent on the islands. Observe here, that the patriots suppose you have the power of compelling Great Britain to do what you please, because, in her trade with you, the balance is greatly in her favour, and because, in your trade with the West Indies, the balance is in your favour. Thus the West India Islands are in a state of dependence on you, because you gain by them; and Great Britain is in the same state, because she gains by you! No wonder the citizens of the United States should think themselves sovereigns.

3. Because the balance of trade with Great Britain is greatly in her favour. This balance of trade, assert the patriots, is to give you what terms you please to exact, "if you pursue the means that are in your power." These means are prohibiting the importation of British merchandise; and this, they assert, would do her much more harm than it would you. A better reason of action than this might perhaps be found; but as it seems to be a favourite one with them, and indeed the only one by which they are actuated, I shall take them up upon it, and endeavour to convince you that they are mistaken.

I will suppose, with the patriots, that the manufactures you receive from Great Britain are not necessary to you. I will suppose that you have the capitals and raw materials for establishing manufactories of your own; I will suppose one-third of your peasants and sailors changed by a presto into weavers, combers, fullers, whitesmiths, &c. &c.; I will suppose the manufactories going on, and all of you inspired with patriotism enough to be happy, dressed in the work of their hands; I will suppose, in short, that you no longer stand in need of British manufactures. This is allowing my adversaries every thing they can ask, and all I ask of them in return, is to allow me, that Great Britain stands in no need of your manufactures. If they do not refuse me this, as I think they cannot, I have not the least doubt but I shall prove, that cutting off all communication between the countries, would injure you more than Great Britain.

The imports being prohibited on each side, and both being able to do without them, the injury must arise from the stoppage being put to the exports; and as Great Britain sells you much more than you sell her, the patriots maintain that this stoppage would do her more harm than it would you. This was the shield and buckler of Mr. Madison. He compared the United States to a country gentleman, and Great Britain to a pedlar; and declared that you might do without her, but that she could not do without you.

How illusive this is we shall see in a minute. It is a maxim of commerce, that the exports of a nation are the source of her riches, and that, in proportion as you take from that source, she is injured and enfeebled; hence it follows, that cutting off the communication between Great Britain and you, would injure her more than you, in proportion to the balance now in her favour; that is to say, if the total of her exports and the total of your exports were to the same amount. But this is far from being the case: your exports amount to no more than twenty millions of dollars, or thereabouts, nine millions of which go to Great Britain and her dominions, while the exports of Great Britain amount to one hundred millions of dollars, no more than fifteen millions of which come to the United States. Suppose, then, all communication cut off at once; you would lose nine-twentieths of your exports, while Great Britain would

lose only fifteen-hundredths of hers: so that, if there be any truth in arithmetic, you would injure yourselves three times as much as you would her.

If what I have advanced on the subject be correct, "the nature and extent of your exports" do not give you a power "to demand, to exact, to compel," what conditions you please in your commercial relations with Great Britain; and it follows, of course, that Franklin and the citizens of the Boston town-meeting are mistaken.

Art. XVI. Relates to consuls.

This article has not been meddled with as yet.

Art. XVII. Permits, or rather expressly stipulates, for what is allowed by the law of nations, the seizing of an enemy's property on board the vessels of either party.

Art. XVIII. Specifies what are contraband articles, and settles an honourable and equitable system of seizure.

As these two articles have been objected to by nobody but the agents of France, as they seem to affect the French more than anybody else, and as that august diet, the Convention, may be at this time debating on the subject, it would be presumption in the extreme for me to hazard an opinion on it.

Art. XIX. Provides for the protection of the vessels and property of the subjects and citizens of the contracting parties.

I have heard nothing urged against this article.

Art. XX. Stipulates that the two contracting parties will not only refuse to receive pirates into their ports &c., but that they will do the utmost in their power to bring them to punishment.

Without objection, for any thing I have heard.

Art. XXI. Stipulates that the subjects and citizens of each of the contracting parties shall not commit violence on those of the other party, nor serve in the fleets or armies, or accept of commissions from its enemies.

Some of the friends of neutrality object to this, as it prevents them from assisting the French, and from making war upon Great Britain for the future, under the cloak of neutrality.

Art. XXII. Stipulates that no act of reprisal shall take place between the parties, unless justice has first been demanded and refused, or unreasonably delayed.

This is opposed by the friends of sequestration and confiscation, as it would give people time to shelter their property from the claws of the patriots.

Art. XXIII, XXIV, and XXV, Provide certain regulations concerning ships of war, privateers, and prizes taken from the enemies of the contracting parties.

Much was said about these articles, till it was proved that they were copied from the treaty of commerce made between France and England since the American war, since your treaty with France. This was a circumstance that the patriots, who are none of the best read in such things, were not aware of.

Art. XXVI. Provides for the security and tranquillity of the subjects and citizens of the two parties living in the territory of each other at the breaking out of a war.

This article has escaped censure.

Art. XXVII. Stipulates for the giving up of murderers and forgers.

From the description of the persons who have hitherto opposed the treaty, and from the futility of the reasons they have given for their opposition, there is every reason to imagine that great part of them object (in the bottom of their hearts) to this article only. If this be the case, it is pity the article was introduced. Forgers and murderers, if left to themselves for a time after their flight, would not fail to meet the fate which the article was made to ensure to them, and it is little matter in what country they suffer.

Art. XXVIII. Relates to the duration of the foregoing ones, and the ratification of the treaty.

This article, which ends the treaty, is of such a nature as to admit of no objection.

Now, you will observe that it is not my intention to render this treaty palatable to you; I shall not insist, therefore, that the terms of it are as advantageous as you might wish or expect them to be; but I insist that they are as advantageous as you ought to have expected. Great Britain grants you favours she has never granted to any other nation; and that no other nation, not even your sister republic, has granted you. Nor can it be said that in return, you grant her favours which you have not granted to other nations; several favours granted to France you have still withheld from Great Britain, even if the present treaty goes into effect. Great Britain does not, then, receive favours, as it has been absurdly asserted, but she grants them.

I cannot dismiss this part of my subject without observing, that Charles Fox made in the British Parliament exactly the same objections to the treaty as the patriots in this country have made. It was humiliating to Great Britain, he said. Unfortunate, indeed, must be the negotiators who have made a treaty humiliating to both the contracting parties! Mr. Fox's censure is the best comment in the world on that of the American patriots, and theirs on his.

I now come to the third object of the censure of Franklin: the conduct of the President relative to the treaty.

III. That, supposing the terms of the treaty to be what every good American ought to approve, yet the conduct of the President, relative to the negotiation and promulgation of it, has been highly improper and even monarchical, and for which he deserves to be impeached.

Franklin has not obliged the world with articles of impeachment regularly drawn up; but, as far as can be gathered from his letters, he would have the chief magistrate of the union impeached: 1st, for having appointed Mr. Jay as Envoy Extraordinary; 2nd, for having appointed an Envoy Extraordinary on this occasion contrary to the opinion of the House of Representatives and of the democratic society; 3rd, for his reserve towards the Senate, previous to Mr. Jay's departure; 4th, for his reserve towards the people; and 5th, for having evaded a new treaty with France, while he courted one with Great Britain.

The first of these, the appointing of Mr. Jay as Envoy Extraordinary, is declared to be unconstitutional.

"The man of the people," says Franklin, "it was believed, would not have consented to, much less have originated a mission, hostile to the constitution, unfriendly to the functions of the legislature, and insulting to a great people struggling against tyrants. The appointment of the Chief Justice of the United States as Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of Great Britain put to defiance the compact under which we have associated, and made the will of the executive paramount to the general will of the people. The principle laid down by this

"appointment, strikes at the root of our civil security; nay, it aims a deadly blow at liberty itself."

The word unconstitutional is with the opposers of the government a word of vast import: it means any thing they please to have it mean. In their acceptation of the word, therefore, I cannot pretend to say that the conduct of the President, in appointing Mr. Jay, was not unconstitutional; but if unconstitutional be allowed to mean something contrary to the constitution, I think it would be very difficult to prove that the appointment was unconstitutional; for certain it is there is no article in the Constitution that forbids, either literally or by implication, the employing of a Chief Justice of the United States on an extraordinary embassy.

"The constitution," says Franklin, "has provided that the different departments of government should be kept distinct, and, consequently, to unite them is a violation of it, and an encroachment on the liberties of the people, guaranteed by that instrument.—The appointment of John Jay, Chief Justice of the United States, as Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of Great Britain, is contrary to the spirit and meaning of the constitution; as it unites in the same person judicial and legislative functions."

If, as it is here asserted, the President had united the judicial with the legislative functions, it must be confessed that he would have departed from the spirit and meaning of the constitution; but has the mere negotiation of a treaty anything to do with the legislative functions? It appears to me not. Treaties are the supreme law of the land, and therefore the sanctioning of them, the making of them laws, is a legislative act; but the mere drawing of them up, the preparing of them for the discussion of the legislature, is no legislative act at all.

If negotiating be a legislative act, it naturally follows that nobody but the legislature, or some member or members of it, could be employed in a negotiation; and the constitution expressly provides that

"No member of Congress shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office, under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created during such time."

Thus, then, if the spirit of the constitution makes negotiating a legislative act, and consequently requires a legislator to negotiate a treaty, and the letter positively forbids it, the whole clause respecting treaties is superfluous, for there ought never to be any such thing as treaties.

When the secretary of either department brings forward a plan for the consideration of Congress, does he act in a legislative capacity? And what more is an unratified treaty? In short, if a negotiator acts in a legislative capacity, so does every petitioner; nay, every clerk and printer employed by Congress.

The Chief Justice is further objected to as an Envoy Extraordinary on this occasion, because

"Treaties being the supreme law of the land, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to expound and apply them; and therefore, to permit an officer in that department to share in their formation, is to unite distinct functions, tends to level the barriers of our freedom, and to establish precedents pregnant with danger."

If the mere formation of laws by gentlemen of the bar tends to level the barriers of your freedom, I am afraid the barriers of your freedom are already levelled; for I believe there are very few laws that do not pass through their hands, or concerning which their advice is not asked, before they are sanctioned. Franklin (perhaps through ignorance) con-

finds the formation with the making of a law; how essentially they differ I leave you to determine.

If it be unsafe to trust the expounding and applying of a law to him who has assisted in framing it, must it not be much more unsafe to trust the expounding and application of it to those who have assisted in making it? And, is it not, then, unsafe to admit gentlemen of the law into Congress, without incapacitating them from pleading at the bar, or, at least, from becoming judges for ever after? Suppose, for instance, that one of the present senators were to be appointed Chief Justice in the room of Mr. Jay, would he not have to expound and apply the treaty which he has just assisted in making? And should some of the gentlemen of the other House be, at a future period, appointed judges of the supreme court, would they not have to apply the laws, which, as legislators, they have assisted in making?

But, at any rate, had this objection been well founded; had there been cause to fear the consequences of leaving the treaty to be expounded and applied by him who had assisted in framing it, the danger is now over: Mr. Jay is no more Chief Justice; * the freemen of the State of New York knew how to estimate his merit rather better than Franklin. Fortune seems to have lent a hand in depriving the enemies of the government of all grounds of complaint, and yet they make a shift to keep the union in an uproar.

Another objection to sending the Chief Justice on this mission, is, that a President might thereby escape from the hands of justice, or, at least, elude a trial.

"From the nature," says Franklin, "and terms of an impeachment against a President of the United States, it is not only necessary that the Chief Justice of the United States should preside in the Senate, but that he should be above the bias which the honour and emolument in the gift of the Executive might create."

Tis true, the Constitution says, that,

"When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside."

But, waiving the insolence and most patriotic ingratitude of this insinuation; admitting your President to be what Franklin would make you believe he is, and that the necessity of impeaching him was a thing to be expected, I cannot perceive any great inconvenience that could arise from the absence of the Chief Justice. The President could not be impeached before the opening of Congress, and by that time it was reasonable to suppose, that the object of the extraordinary mission would be accomplished, and the Envoy ready to return. An impeachment against the President could hardly be hurried on in such a manner as not to leave an interval of four months between his accusation and trial, a space quite sufficient for recalling the Chief Justice.

Franklin, conscious that Mr. Jay's character for wisdom and integrity was unimpeachable, has conjured up against him an opinion, which he gave some time ago, concerning the Western Posts. He says:—

"After the declaration made by John Jay, that Great Britain was justifiable in her detention of the Western Posts, it was a sacrifice of the interest and peace of the United States to commit a negotiation to him in which the evacuation of those posts ought to form an essential part."

* He was elected Governor of New York.—Ed.

This unqualified declaration,

“That Great Britain was justifiable in her detention of the Western Posts,”

is a most shameful misrepresentation of Mr. Jay’s opinion on the subject. By this declaration Franklin insinuates, that Mr. Jay had given it as his opinion that Great Britain would be justifiable in her detention of the Western Posts for ever; whereas his opinion was, that she was justifiable in detaining those Posts, only till the stipulation of the treaty of peace with respect to debts, due to British subjects from some of the States, should be fulfilled.

Must not those people, who so boldly assured you, that John Jay would betray your interests, that he would sell the Western Posts, &c., have blushed when they saw that a surrender of these Posts was the first thing he had stipulated for? No; a patriot’s skin is like the shield of a Grecian hero; blood cannot penetrate through “ten bull hides.”

The following anecdote will at once prove the injustice of charging Mr. Jay with a wish to abandon the Western Posts to the British, and confirm the prudence of the President’s choice.

“At the time of laying the foundation of the peace of 1783,* M. de Vergennes, actuated by secret motives, wished to engage the ambassadors of Congress to confine their demands to the fisheries, and to renounce the Western Territory. The minister required particularly, that the independence of America should not be considered as the basis of the peace, but, simply, that it should be conditional. To succeed in this project, it was necessary to gain over Jay and Adams. Mr. Jay declared to M. de Vergennes, that he would sooner lose his life than sign such a treaty; that the Americans fought for independence; that they would never lay down their arms till it should be fully consecrated; that the Court of France had recognised it; and that there would be a contradiction in her conduct, if she deviated from that point. It was not difficult for Mr. Jay to bring Mr. Adams to his determination; and M. de Vergennes could never shake his firmness.”

This is the man whom the patriots accuse of intentions of rendering the United States dependent on Great Britain, and of abandoning the Western Posts! This is the man, who, after twenty years spent in the service of his country, after having a second time ensured its happiness and prosperity, is called “a slave, a coward, a traitor,” and is burnt in effigy for having “bartered its liberty for British gold!”

2. Franklin would have the President impeached, for having appointed an Envoy Extraordinary to Great Britain contrary to the opinion of the majority of the House of Representatives.

“A majority of that House,” says Franklin, “were in favour of dignified and energetic measures; they spurned the idea of a patient and ignominious submission to robbery and outrage. The different propositions of Messrs. Madison, Clarke, and Dayton, substantiate this assertion. And yet the Executive nominated an Envoy Extraordinary in coincidence with the minority, apparently to defeat the intentions of the representatives of the people. This fact is serious and alarming.”

That the President did nominate, and, by and with the advice of the Senate, appoint, the Envoy Extraordinary, contrary to the opinion of the majority of the House of Representatives, is, at least, doubtful, because no such question could be agitated in that House; but that he would have been justifiable in so doing is not doubtful at all. Your Constitution, which this demagogue affects to call the palladium of your liberty, says,

* See Brissot’s Travels in the United States.—ED.

that the President, with the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors &c., and not a word about the House of Representatives.

Besides, as to the fact, how did the appointment of the Envoy interfere with the dignified and energetic measures? They were adopted by the House of Representatives, and presented to the Senate, who rejected them, and who would have rejected them, whether the Envoy had been previously appointed or not. This is evident, because had they intended to sanction the dignified and energetic measures, they would not have appointed the Envoy; and therefore, by delaying the appointment, till these measures were rejected by the Senate, nothing could have been gained but a loss of time.

Franklin seems to triumph in proving, that the President acted contrary to the opinion of the House of Representatives. I have already observed that that House had nothing to do in the appointment in question; but, even suppose they had, is the Senate nothing? What is the use of three branches in the Constitution, if two of them must ever yield to the will of a third, or the whim of a faction? To what end has a power been given to the Senate to reject bills sent to them by the other House, if they are never to exercise it, unless it should happen to be agreeable to the democratic clubs? In short, why is there a Senate and President at all?

If the immediate representatives of the people, as Franklin is pleased to call them, were permitted to decide upon treaties, there is no one act of authority that they would not soon exercise exclusively. Very soon would the whole power of the state be consecrated into one heterogeneous assembly split up into committees of confiscation, war, and murder. Very soon would your legislature resemble that of your sister republic, where every crude idea that comes athwart the brain of a harlequin legislator, becomes a law in the space of five minutes, and issues forth amidst the acclamations of the sovereign people, bearing terror and devastation through the land. You may thank God that your Constitution has provided against a legislative scourge like this. It is this prudent provision alone that has saved you from the dreadful consequences, which the dignified and energetic measures of the triumvirate, Madison, Clarke, and Dayton would most inevitably have produced.

After having censured the President for not acting in coincidence with the sentiment of the majority of the House of Representatives, Franklin returns to the charge by censuring him for acting in coincidence with the sentiment of the minority of the same House; this he calls "a serious and an alarming fact," just as if it was not an unavoidable consequence of the other. But, is it not a little extraordinary to hear him censure the President for acting in coincidence with the minority of the House of Representatives, when a few pages before, he censures him for not acting in coincidence with the sentiment of the respectable minority of the Senate? Perhaps the epithet respectable, which Franklin has bestowed on his minority of the Senate, renders them superior to the majority, and if so, their opinion certainly ought to have been followed. But, the truth is, I believe, this respectable minority of the Senate were in favour of those dignified and energetic or dragooning, plundering, measures, which the President did not approve of, and so were the majority of the House of Representatives; and this is the reason why Franklin, who is a sort of war trumpet, would have had him guided by the minority of one house and the majority of the other.

The President's having acted in coincidence with the minority of the House of Representatives ought to be looked upon as a mere matter of accident; for, on the appointment of an Envoy, it was not necessary for him to take cognizance of what was passing amongst them; but as to his acting in coincidence with the majority of the Senate, it was a duty that the Constitution imposed on him. According to the wish of Franklin, the President should have rejected the advice of that branch of the legislature which the Constitution has associated with him in the appointment of an Envoy, to adhere to the advice of another branch, to which the Constitution has allotted no participation in such appointments. This is what the patriots would have called acting constitutionally.

There was no person of the least discernment who was not well assured that the object of your patriotic members of Congress, was to reduce you to the necessity of making a common cause with the French. I know they pretended, that they wished to preserve peace. With this desirable object in view, one proposed laying such duties on British merchandise and ships, as would go nearly to a prohibition; another proposed an entire prohibition; and a third, in order to preserve peace with Great Britain, proposed seizing all debts and funds, the property of British subjects!

I am totally at a loss to account for these gentlemen's motives in endeavouring to plunge this country into a war with Great Britain. I will not affect to believe, that they were under the influence of foreign gold, though I believe them to be as corruptible, at least, as Mr. Jay. Interested considerations could have no weight with them; for, they appear to have lost all idea of private as well as public interest. But whatever might be their motives, the measures they proposed were fraught with beggary, ruin, and dishonour, and if the President, by his nomination of the Envoy to Great Britain, contributed to their being rejected, though supported by the majority of the House of Representatives, he is entitled to the blessing of every lover of this country.

3. Franklin would have the President impeached, for his reserve towards the Senate previous to Mr. Jay's departure. Franklin says,

"The advice of the Senate was not taken in the treaty with Great Britain."

By this, he ought to mean, that the Senate was not informed of the particular objects to be obtained by Mr. Jay's mission; for, if he means (which is possible) that their advice was not taken on the subject of the mission itself, and of the person to be employed on it, he wishes to impose on the unwary what he knows to be untrue. On these subjects their advice was taken, and any further it was not necessary, either in a constitutional or prudential point of view.

"By the Constitution," says Franklin, "all treaties are to be made by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The term advice has a natural and obvious reference to the negotiation; that no negotiation shall be entered into but with the advice of the Senate."

Before I take the liberty of contradicting here, give me leave to make Franklin contradict himself.

"The President," says he, in another place, "has power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to conclude treaties; that is, the Senate has the power to accept or reject any treaty negotiated by the President; but this power has not gone to prevent him from opening a negotiation with any nation he thought proper."

This patriot was determined no one should triumph in confuting him. A disputant that thus contradicts himself point blank without any kind of ceremony or apology, sets his adversary at defiance.

Reserving myself till by-and-by to account for these contradictory expositions of the same text, I am ready to allow, that the latter of them exactly meets my sentiments : that is, that the share of power, in making treaties, allotted to the Senate, does not go to prevent the President from opening a negotiation with any nation he may think proper. This is so clearly pointed out by the Constitution, that one is astonished to hear it controverted by persons capable of reading.

“He shall,” says that instrument, “have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur : and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors,” &c.

And yet Franklin, in one place, insists that the term advice has a natural and obvious reference to the negotiation only ;

“For,” says he, “it would be the extremity of absurdity to say, that advice was necessary after the thing was done.”

The natural and obvious sense, and, indeed, the only sense of the clause of the Constitution just quoted, is, in my opinion, that the Senate is to be consulted in making treaties, but not in opening negotiations.

Franklin has had the ingenuity to give to the words advice and consent an application, that most certainly never entered into the thoughts of those who framed the Constitution. Can he be serious in confining advice to what precedes the negotiation, and consent to what follows it ? If this were correct, the Senate ought never to give their consent to a negotiation, nor their advice concerning a ratification.

To me the sense of the Constitution is extremely clear, as to this point. The words advice and consent have both a reference to what follows the negotiation ; and this will fully appear, if their import in the latter part of the above clause be well weighed. “The President shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint ambassadors,” &c. Now, if advice in the making of treaties, has a natural and obvious reference to negotiation, so, in the appointment of ambassadors, it must have reference to nomination. I leave any one to judge how nonsensical it would have been to authorize the Senate to consent to the appointment of a person, whose nomination they had before advised ; and yet it would not be more so than to give them the power of consenting to the terms of a treaty formed by their advice.

Indeed, it would be slandering the Constitution, to suppose that it contained any thing approaching so near to the anarchical, as to subject the particular objects of a negotiation to an assembly, not obliged to secrecy, before the negotiation is opened. Were this ever to be the case, it is easy to foresee that it would be impossible to conclude any treaty of moment, or, at least, to conclude it with advantage. Suppose, for instance, that the threatened rupture with Great Britain had rendered it necessary for you to form a close alliance with some power in Europe, and that the President had been obliged to make known every stipulation to be made on your part, before the departure of the Envoy ; can you believe that the affair would have been kept secret till concluded ? or even till it was begun ? No ; I’ll be hanged if it would. It would have been known in London long before the Envoy’s arrival in Europe, and you would have

had an English fleet upon your coast, before he could possibly have fulfilled his mission.

4. The President ought to be impeached, according to Franklin, for his reserve towards the people.

When ignorance or factiousness, or both together, have led a man beyond the bounds of truth and candour, they never let him go, till they have plunged him into an abyss of absurdity. Thus has it happened to Franklin. After having persuaded himself that the President ought to withhold nothing from the knowledge of the other branches of the legislature, it was natural for him to pursue the error, till he found, that,

“To withhold the contents of a treaty from the people, till it was ratified, indicated a contempt for public opinion, and a monarchical supremacy.”

“In the compact,” says Franklin, “entered into by the citizens of the United States, certain concessions were made by them, and these concessions are specified in the Constitution; but have they conceded a right to an acquaintance with their own affairs?”

Yes, if his question applies, as it evidently does, to the terms of an unratified treaty, the people have conceded a right to an acquaintance with their own affairs; for, in the right of making treaties is necessarily included the right of observing a prudent secrecy concerning them, and, as the former is expressly conceded to the President and the Senate, so is the latter. The people have conceded the right of making treaties, and the concession is unconditional; they have made it without reserving to themselves the right of demanding their promulgation, before they become the law of the land; without reserving to themselves the right of advising, disputing, and caballing about their contents, before they are known, or of tormenting and reviling the Executive, and burning the negotiators in effigy, when their contents are known.

5. Franklin would advise the impeachment of the President, for having evaded a new treaty with France, while he courted one with Great Britain.

This is the great offence; to bring this home to the President seems to have been the chief object of Franklin, who is affected by nothing that does not concern the French Republic.

“We have,” says Franklin, “treated the overtures of France for a treaty with neglect. The nation that has barbarously insulted us, and plundered us, we have courted, meanly courted, and the nation on whom our political existence depends, and who has treated us with affection, we have treated with indifference bordering on contempt. Citizen Genet was empowered to propose a treaty with us on liberal principles, such as might strengthen the bonds of good-will which unite the two nations.”

How your government has courted Great Britain, how your political existence depends on France, and how she has treated you with affection, we have already seen; it only remains for us to see what were the “liberal principles” which citizen Genet was authorized to treat upon, and whether it was prudent on your part to refuse to treat upon those “liberal principles,” or not.

But previously it is necessary to observe, that let these “liberal principles” be what they might, the President’s conduct in refusing or evading to treat on them could amount to no more than imprudence. The President, I agree, has power to open negotiations with any nation he thinks proper, and then, says Franklin, “Why did he not treat with citizen Genet?” To which I answer, that the Constitution, in authorizing the President to open negotiations with any nation whom he thinks

proper to treat with, has not obliged him to open negotiations with every nation that thinks proper to treat with him. It has not obliged him to open negotiations with a nation so circumstanced as not to be depended on for the value of a cargo of flour, with a nation in jeopardy, with an assembly who had declared themselves a committee of insurrection against every government on earth not founded on their principles, with an Executive Council composed of half a dozen unhappy wretches, who were all either publicly executed or outlawed before the treaty with them could have been ratified: no; the Constitution has obliged him to nothing of this sort—if it had, I am sure he never would have accepted the post of President. The Constitution has left it entirely to his own prudence to make or to avoid treaties; whether he has on the present occasion made a good use of the trust reposed in him, or not, we shall now see.

Soon after the citizen's arrival at Philadelphia, he announced to the President, through the Secretary of State, that he was authorized to open a negotiation with the government of the United States. I have not room to give you his letter at length here:—

“SIR,—Single against innumerable hordes of tyrants and slaves, who menace her rising liberty, the French nation would have a right to reclaim the obligations imposed on the United States by the treaties she has contracted with them, and which she has cemented with her blood; but, strong in the greatness of her means, and of the power of her principles, not less redoubtable to her enemies, than the victorious arm which she opposes to their rage, she comes, in the very time when the emissaries of our common enemies are making useless efforts to neutralize the gratitude, to damp the zeal, to weaken or cloud the view of your fellow citizens; she comes, I say, that generous nation, that faithful friend, to labour still to increase the prosperity and add to the happiness which she is pleased to see them enjoy.”

“The obstacles raised, with intentions hostile to liberty, by the perfidious ministers of despotism; the obstacles whose object was to stop the rapid progress of the commerce of the Americans, and the extension of their principles, exist no more. The French Republic, seeing in them brothers, has opened to them by the decrees now enclosed, all her ports in the two worlds; has granted them all the favours her own citizens enjoy in her vast possessions; has invited them to participate in the benefits of her navigation, in granting to their vessels the same rights as to her own; and has charged me to propose to your government to establish a true family compact, that is, in a national compact, the liberal and fraternal basis on which she wishes to see raised the commercial and political system of two people, all whose interests are confounded.

“I am invested, Sir, with the power necessary to undertake this important negotiation, of which the sad annals of humanity offered no example before the brilliant era at length opening on it.”

This letter admits of half-a-dozen interpretations. One would imagine by its outset that the French convention was graciously pleased to suffer you to remain in peace,

“Notwithstanding she had a right to reclaim the obligations imposed on the United States, and which she had cemented with her blood.”

But what follows seems to overturn this supposition, for the Citizen declares that

“The emissaries of your common enemies were making useless efforts to neutralize the gratitude and to damp the zeal of your fellow citizens,” &c.

Citizen Genet arrived soon after the proclamation of neutrality* was issued, and he took the earliest opportunity of declaring that useless

* When the war between England and France broke out in 1793, WASHINGTON, desirous of peace for America, issued a proclamation of neutrality.—ED.

efforts had been made to neutralize the gratitude of the citizens of America; and yet Franklin and all the other stipendiaries of France assert, that

“ France, with a magnanimity which she alone seems susceptible of, has not urged the fulfilment of her treaty with you; but that she has expressed her wish, and her conduct has proved it, that you should remain in peace.”

At the same time that the Citizen came forward with his republican fanfaronnade to propose negotiations, he carried in his pocket certain instructions according to which the proposed treaty was to be formed, and from which he could not depart. By the extracts that I am going to make from those instructions, it will appear to every one of you who is not so prepossessed in favour of the French as to be incapable of conviction, that the new treaty was to accord you no advantages of which your participation in the war was not to be the price, and that citizen Genet was to plunge you into a war, with or without the consent of your government, to make a diversion in favour of France at the expense of your prosperity, and even your very existence as a nation.

Citizen Genet, though abundantly assuming and insolent, though uniting the levity of a Frenchman to the boorishness of a Calmuc, though deserving of much censure from your government, has, however, been loaded with a great deal of unmerited odium by the people of the United States. The man acted in full conformity to his instructions in all his attacks on your independence, and therefore his conduct is to be attributed to the Government of France, or the sovereign people of that happy Republic, and not to the poor Citizen himself. He was a mere machine in the business, and his not being ordered home to answer for his conduct is a strong presumptive proof that the sovereigns of France approved of it, without daring to avow it openly. I say without daring to avow it; because, though you could not have directly chastised them, yet they wanted your flour, and it is well known that empty cupboards are no less formidable than great guns.

Now for the Citizen's instructions:—

“ Struck with the grandeur and importance of this negotiation, the Executive Council prescribed to citizen Genet, to exert himself to strengthen the Americans in the principles which led them to unite themselves to France: The Executive Council are disposed to set on foot a negotiation upon those foundations, and they do not know but that such a treaty admits a latitude still more extensive in becoming a national agreement, in which two great people shall suspend their commercial and political interests, to befriend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced, and punish those powers who still keep up an exclusive colonial and commercial system, by declaring that their vessels shall not be received in the ports of the contracting parties.* Such a pact, which the people of France will support with all the energy which distinguishes them, will quickly contribute to the general emancipation of the New World. It is to convince the Americans of the practicability of this that citizen Genet must direct all his attention: for, besides the advantages which humanity (humanity!!) will draw from the success of such a negotiation, we have at this moment a particular interest in taking steps to act efficaciously against England and Spain, if, as every thing announces, these powers attack us. And in this situation of affairs we ought to excite, by all possible means, the zeal of the Americans.† The Executive Council has room to believe that the consideration of their own independence depending on our success, added to the great commercial advantages

* Here we see the ground-work of the resolutions of citizen Madison and Clarke.

† The Citizen was to excite the Americans, and convince the Americans, and not the American Government.

“ which we are disposed to concede to the United States, will determine their government to adhere to all that citizen Genet shall propose to them on our part. As it is possible, however, that they may adopt a timid and wavering conduct, the Executive Council charges him, in expectation that the American government will finally determine to make a common cause with us, to take such steps as will appear to him exigencies may require, to serve the cause of liberty and the freedom of the people. Citizen Genet is to prevent all equipments in the American ports, unless upon account of the French nation. He will take care to explain himself upon this object with the dignity and energy of the representative of a great people, who in faithfully fulfilling their engagements know how to make (ah! make!) their rights respected. The guarantee of the West India islands is to form an essential clause in the new treaty. Citizen Genet will sound early the disposition of the American government, and make this a condition, *sine qua non*, of their free commerce to the West Indies, so essential to the United States. The minister of the marine department will transmit to him a certain number of blank letters of marque, which he will deliver to such French and American owners as shall apply for the same. The minister at war shall likewise deliver to citizen Genet officers’ commissions in blank for several grades (ranks) in the army.”

Now, was your taking part in the war that your sister is carrying on for the good of the human race to be the price of a treaty with her, or was it not?—The President, then, has not only acted consistently with his duty in avoiding it, but consistently also with your sentiments, already decidedly expressed by your approbation of his proclamation of neutrality.

But, say the patriots, we could forgive him for not treating with France, if he had not treated with Great Britain. He treated with her while he refused to treat with our French brethren. But, for this accusation to have any weight with even the friends of France, it ought to be proved that the treaty negotiated with Great Britain bears some resemblance at least to the one proposed by Citizen Genet. Can this be done? Has the President stipulated with Great Britain to suspend your “ commercial and political interests in order to befriend the empire of liberty, wherever it can be embraced?” Has he promised that you shall “ contribute to the general emancipation of the New World?” Has Great Britain asked you to assist her in the war? Are you to make a “ common cause with her?” Has she made your “ guarantee of her islands an essential clause in the treaty, and a *sine qua non* of your free commerce with them?” Where, then, is the likeness between the two treaties? And if there be none, by what sort of patriotic reasoning do they prove that the President, because he had refused to treat with France, ought not to have treated with Great Britain? This, however, appears to be the heaviest charge against him.

“ So bold an attack,” says your demagogue Franklin, “ upon the palladium of our rights deserves a serious inquiry. However meritorious a motion for such an inquiry might be, if suggested in the Senate, yet it could not be considered in place; for inquiries of this sort belong to the House of Representatives, as the Senate are the constitutional judges to try impeachments. If the grand inquest of the nation, the House of Representatives, will suffer so flagrant a breach of the Constitution to pass unnoticed, we may conclude that virtue and patriotism have abandoned our country.”

Hence you are to conclude, then, that General Washington must be impeached, or virtue and patriotism have abandoned your country.

It is not for an Englishman to determine whether this be true or not; but, if it be true, you will excuse him for saying, The Lord have mercy upon your country!

The only fair way for you to judge of the President's conduct relative to the treaty negotiated with Great Britain, and the one proposed by France, is, to draw a comparison between your present situation, and the situation in which you would have now been, had he followed a different conduct. As the tree is known by its fruit, so are the measures of the statesman by their effects. Look round you, and observe well the spectacle that the United States present at this moment. Imagine its reverse, and you have an idea of what would have been your situation, had the President yielded to the proposals of citizen Genet, or those of the war party in Congress. The produce of the country would have been at about one-third of its present price, while every imported article would have risen in a like proportion. The farmer must have sold his wheat at four shillings a bushel in place of fourteen, and in place of giving four dollars a yard for cloth, he must have given ten or twelve. Houses and lands, instead of being risen to triple their former value, as they now are, would have fallen to one-third of that value, and must, at the same time, have been taxed to nearly half their rent. In short, you would have been in the same situation as you were in 1777, and without the same means of extricating yourself from it. However, such a situation might, perhaps, be a desirable one to you. Habit does great things. People who were revolution mad, might look back with regret to the epoch just mentioned, and might even view with envy the effects of the French Revolution. If so, it is by no means too late yet; the President has only to refuse his ratification of the treaty with Great Britain, and adopt the measures proposed by the honest and incorruptible friends of the French Republic, and you may soon have your fill of what you desire. If you have wished to enjoy once more the charms of change, and taste the sweets of war and anarchy (for I look upon them as inseparable in this country), then the President may merit an impeachment at your hands; but, if you have desired to live in peace and plenty, while the rest of the world has been ravaged and desolated, to accuse the President now, is to resemble the crew of ungrateful buccaniers, who, having safely arrived in port, cut the throat of their pilot.

A NEW-YEAR'S GIFT TO THE DEMOCRATS;

*Or, Observations on a Pamphlet entitled, "A Vindication of
Mr. Randolph's Resignation."*

"For gold defiles by frequent touch;
 "There's nothing fouls the hand so much.
 "But as his paws he strove to scower,
 "He washed away the chemic power;
 "And Midas now neglected stands,
 "With ass's ears and dirty hands."

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—THE pamphlet now before us relates to the detection of a corrupt Secretary of State, to whom we have alluded in the Preface, and also in the note preceding the "Little Plain English;" but there is a circumstance connected with it that we must explain to the reader.

He will see a constant reference to the "Western Insurrection," and, as that does not explain itself, we must do it here. Late in 1794, four of the western counties of Pennsylvania broke out into open revolt in consequence of an excise on spirits which was levied within them. It became so alarming that an army was raised to quell it; but WASHINGTON's Government was foiled in its attempts to raise the militia for the purpose. They would not come out. MIFFLIN, the Governor of Pennsylvania, and DALLAS, his Secretary, were thought to be supine in their duties; but it remained for the discovery on which "the New Year's Gift" is a commentary to show precisely why they were so. The insurrection was quelled without fighting; but, at the outbreak of it, the secretary of state, RANDOLPH, made overtures to the French Minister, which amounted to a treasonable conspiracy to overthrow the Government; it involved others as well as himself, and it was discovered by one of those miracles which bring treachery to light, and was made known to WASHINGTON on the 11th August 1795. The discovery was made just in the heat of the conflict of parties concerning the British Treaty. It gave a blow to the French party, and great strength to the President and the friends of England, and, indeed, the adoption of the Treaty was attributed to this affair. RANDOLPH retired instantly on the discovery, but was suffered to go unpunished into retirement. The "New-Year's Gift" is an answer to a pamphlet in which he attempted a vindication of himself. It is so clear and convincing an exposure of fallacies, and is so good a picture of the difficulties which surrounded WASHINGTON's Government; it is so clear a proof that its author was not, as is represented by foolish and malignant men, an insane "Royalist, libelling the Federal Government and its founders," but, rather, that he supported that Government and upheld its founders against a band of traitors; this is so clear, that we place it in our Selections. At the time of writing it, Mr. Cobbett was still unknown, but he says (*Porc.* vol. 4, p. 122), "Bradford (his publisher) told me he had read 'some pages of the 'New Year's Gift' to two of the *Senators*, who were mightily 'pleased with it and laughed heartily; and he related a conversation that had 'taken place between him and Mr. WOLCOT, the present Secretary of the Treasury, who assured him, that some of the officers of Government did intend to 'write an answer to *Randolph's Vindication*, but that my New-Year's Gift had 'done its business so completely that nothing further was necessary. He added 'that they were all exceedingly delighted with my productions.'" In our note to "Plain English," we said that RANDOLPH was suggested to the President for the Secretaryship by JEFFERSON. This we gather from the *Anas*, in the fourth volume of the *Life of Jefferson*, p. 506, where he gives a conversation between the President and himself, upon his retiring from the office of Secretary, in these words: "I asked him whether some person could not take my office *par interim*, 'till he should make an appointment; as Mr. RANDOLPH for instance. 'Yes,' says he, 'but there you would raise an expectation of keeping it, and I 'do not know that he is fit for it, nor what is thought of Mr. Randolph.' I 'avoided noticing the last observation, and he put the question to me directly. "Then I told him, I went into society so little as to be unable to answer it: "I knew that the embarrassment in his private affairs had obliged him "to use expedients which had injured him with the merchants and shopkeepers, and affected his character of independence." JEFFERSON remained some time after in office and then retired, when RANDOLPH was appointed. The surprising thing is, that JEFFERSON could not think of a fitter man in all America to succeed him than RANDOLPH appears to have been; but it is very evident that he bore ill-will towards WASHINGTON. In a letter to Mr. GILES (*Life &c.* vol. 3, p. 325), he observes on the address and answer at the opening of Congress in 1795, "I remark, in the reply of the President, a small "travestie of the sentiment contained in the answer of the representatives. "They acknowledge that he has *contributed* a great share to the national happiness by his services. He thanks them for ascribing to his *agency* a great "share of those benefits. The former keeps in view the co-operation of others "towards the public good. The latter presents to view his sole agency:" a piece of hypercriticism that shows what jealousies were at work within him; for really, if one examines it, WASHINGTON's answer was a modest echo of the address. It says he had *contributed* a great share (by-the-by, JEFFERSON is guilty of worse than travestie, for the words of the address are "contributed a very great share"); that is, he had been a great *contributor*, whereas he only

assumes to have been an *agent* in the work of bestowing benefits on his country. The general meaning of the word *agency* is, acting in behalf of another; so that WASHINGTON assumed a lower station than the address ascribed to him. In the same letter, which is dated 31st December 1795, he speaks of RANDOLPH, and of his pamphlet, which he had just received from his correspondent, in these extraordinary terms: "I thank you much for the pamphlet. His narrative is so straight and plain, that even those who did not know him will acquit him of the charge of bribery. Those who knew him had done it from the first." No man who reads the following pamphlet can think as Mr. JEFFERSON did of this offender, and indeed it is hardly to be believed that RANDOLPH's pamphlet could have imposed any such belief upon his mind. It is curious, too, to observe the discrepancy between the passage just quoted and that which we take from the *Anas*. In the latter, it is clear that WASHINGTON suspected RANDOLPH, and that he sounded JEFFERSON to find if he did not. JEFFERSON says that he avoided the question; and on being pressed more home upon it, he goes "so little into society as to be unable to answer it;" and yet only about a twelvemonth afterwards, on receiving RANDOLPH's pamphlet, he vouches that "those who knew him had acquitted him from the first," leaving his correspondent to suppose, that, if he did not know RANDOLPH himself, he at any rate knew all those who did, and could rely upon their opinions.

AMONG the means employed by the anarchical assemblies of France, in the propagation of their detestable principles, that of corruption may be regarded as one of the most powerful, and, accordingly, it has ever shared a principal part of their attention. If we take a survey of their confiscations, proscriptions and assassinations, from the seizure of the property of the ecclesiastics, by the constituent assembly, down to the horrid butcheries of Carrier, we shall find that this has often been a leading motive for the perpetrating of those deeds, which will blacken the French name as long as honesty and humanity shall be esteemed amongst men. It is, at least, an object of which they have never lost sight, and which they have spared nothing to accomplish. They have ransacked the coffers of the rich, stripped poverty of its very rags, robbed the infant of its birth-right, wrenched the crutch from the hand of tottering old age, and, joining sacrilege to burglary, have plundered even the altars of God, in order to possess themselves of the means of corrupting degenerate foreigners.

That their plans of seduction have been but too successful they themselves avow. Like the gang of highwaymen in the subterraneous cave, each mounts the polluted tribune in his turn, and tells his tale of corruption. According to their own acknowledgments, they have expended millions upon millions in this commerce of consciences, since they have called their country a Republic; and, which is well worthy of remark, these immense sums have all been expended, with a trifling exception, in the Republican States that have condescended to fraternize with them. The patriots of Geneva and Holland, of Genoa and Switzerland, have been bought with the treasures extorted from the unhappy French. The two former states are, in every political point of view, annihilated, and the two latter exist as a proof, that states, as well as individuals may sometimes triumph in successful baseness and vanity.*

The people of the United States of America had not the mortification to see their country included in the dark catalogue; and though it was

* This was written before the revolutions either in Genoa or in Switzerland were heard of in America.

evident to every discerning man, that some such influence began to prevail, in different parts of the Union, soon after the arrival of citizen Genet; though it was impossible to account for the foundation of the democratic clubs, and for the countenance they received from many persons of weight and authority (particularly in the State of Pennsylvania, where the Secretary of the State was at the head of the mother club) upon any other principle; though people were daily seen acting in direct opposition to their apparent interests; and though the partisans of France did not hesitate openly to declare their enmity to the President of the United States and to the Government he had been chosen to administer; notwithstanding all these striking and well-known facts, the great body of the people would have regarded any one as a slanderer of their national character, who should have insinuated, that the secrets of their Government, and their most important interests, were the price of that sudden exaltation that every where appeared among the persons devoted to the will of the French Minister. The people might have remained in this delusive confidence, till their constitution had been subverted, and till they had been plunged into a calamitous foreign war, or driven to the dire necessity of shedding each other's blood, had it not been for the accidental interception of the letter, that has led to the *vindication* on which I have here undertaken to make a few observations.

Before I enter on the vindication itself, two circumstances present themselves as subjects of preliminary observation: the *time* and the *manner* of its being introduced to the public.

Mr. Randolph informs us that he gave in his resignation on the 19th of August, in consequence of his having been interrogated on the contents of an intercepted letter of the French minister, citizen Fauchet; and we all know that his Vindication, if vindication it must be, did not appear till the 18th of December, a space of exactly four months, wanting one day. When he had given in his resignation, he did not remain at Philadelphia to court the inquiry that he talks so much of, but flew away to Rhode-Island, in order to overtake Mr. Fauchet, by whose very letter he stood accused, and to obtain from him a certificate of his *innocence* and *morality*. We shall see by-and-by how he was employed during his stay at Rhode-Island; at present we must follow him back to Philadelphia, where we find him arrived on the 21st of September, thirty-three days after his departure, and writing to the President of the United States, to inform him that he is preparing his vindication with all imaginable dispatch; and of this he had taken care to inform the public several days before. After this notification, it was impossible that the people should not hourly expect to see in the *public papers* an elucidation of the whole affair. What then must be their astonishment, when after having waited with the utmost impatience for three long weeks, they were given to understand that the boasting vindicator could not close his laborious performance without having access to certain other papers of a confidential nature? The request for these papers, all evasive and malicious as it was, was at once granted by the President. Hence the idle tales of a British faction.

It was probable, too, that by delaying the publication till after the meeting of Congress, it might be brought out at a moment when some decision of that body respecting the treaty might irritate the feelings of the people against the President's conduct; and by directing their attention to that part of the vindication intended to criminate him, might turn the shaft of their censure from the vindicator himself.

Nor shall we find that the *manner* of his introducing his vindication to the public speaks more in his favour.

In this letter of resignation, he says to the President :—

“ I am satisfied, sir, that you will acknowledge one piece of justice on this occasion, which is, that until an inquiry can be made, *the affair shall continue in secrecy under your injunction.*”

But after his return from Rhode-Island, knowing that the President could not lay an injunction for the time past, and knowing also that a copy of the dreadful dispatch was in the hands of Mr. Bond,* on whom the President could lay no injunction at all, he suspected the affair had got abroad, which was indeed the case; it was then, and not before, that, making a virtue of necessity, he informed the public, by publishing a letter he had written to the President, that he would prepare a vindication of his conduct.

After this he suffered the matter to rest for some time, and then published an extract from another letter to the President, dated the 8th of October, in the following words :—

“ You must be sensible, sir, that I am inevitably driven into the discussion of many confidential and delicate points. I could with safety immediately appeal to the people of the United States, who can be of no party. But I shall wait for your answer to this letter, so far as it respects the paper desired, before I forward to you my general letter, which is delayed for no other cause. I shall also rely that you will consent to the whole of this affair, howsoever confidential and delicate, being exhibited to the world. At the same time, I prescribe to myself this condition, not to mingle any thing which I do not sincerely conceive to belong to the subject.”

By this stroke, our vindicator imagined he had reduced the President to a dilemma from which he would be unable to extricate him. He thought that the President's circumspect disposition would lead him to refuse the communication of the paper demanded; and in that case he would have impressed on the public mind an idea of its containing something at once capable of acquitting himself, and of criminating the President. And should the paper be granted, he hoped that he should be able to make such comments on it as would at least render the chief of the executive as odious as himself.

The President did not balance a moment on the course he should take.

“ It is not difficult,” says he in the answer, “ to perceive what your objects are; but that you may have no cause to complain of the withholding any paper (howsoever private and confidential) which you shall think necessary in a case of so serious a nature, I have directed that you should have the inspection of my letter of the 22nd of July, agreeably to your request; and you are at full liberty to publish, without reserve, *any and every* private and confidential letter I ever wrote you; nay, more, every word I ever uttered to or in your presence, from whence you can derive any advantage in your justification.”

I am sorry that the bounds within which I propose to confine myself do not permit me to give the reader the whole of this noble letter; here, however, is sufficient to prove the generous deportment of the writer. These extracts most eminently depict the minds of the parties: in one we hear the bold, the undaunted language of conscious integrity, and in the other the faltering accents of guilt.

Baffled in this project of recrimination, the vindicator had recourse to others, if possible, still more unmanly. A paragraph appeared in the

* One of the English legation at Philadelphia.

public papers, as extracted from a Carolina gazette, telling us a shocking tale about Mr. Randolph having been ill-treated by the President, who had been worked up by a wicked British faction to accuse him of *having his price*, and that in consequence poor Mr. Randolph had been *sacrificed*, merely because he had advised the President not to sign the treaty with Great Britain.

After an infinity of other subterfuges and precautions, the Vindication itself comes forth ; not in the face of the day, like the honest, innocent man from his peaceful dwelling, but like the thief from his hiding-place, preceded by his skulking precursors. These numerous tricks and artifices have, however, all failed : the public has had the candour to pre-judge nothing : the thunder has been reserved for the day of judgment.

Should the vindicator be able to find some quibble to excuse these preliminary manœuvres, how will he justify the *sale* of his pretended Vindication ? If it be not necessary to the justification of his conduct while in the service of the public, why is it published ? and if it be, how dares he attempt to make them pay for it ? He every where boasts of his pure republicanism, and fawningly courts the favour of the people by calling on them to judge between him and his patron, the President. He pretends to have held his office from them, though every one knows that he held it from the President, at whose pleasure he was removeable, and to whom alone he was in this case accountable. But allow him to hold his office from the people, it is to them he owes an account of his behaviour therein, and that *gratis* too.

Having dismissed these circumstances, which, though but trifles, if compared with many others that we shall meet with, were too glaring to pass unnoticed, I now come to the Vindication itself.

Mr. Randolph begins by a "statement of facts," and in this I shall imitate him ; but as to the manner of doing this we shall differ widely. He has endeavoured to lose us in a maze of letters and answers, and extracts and conversations, and notes and memorials and certificates ; but as it is not my intention to render what I have to say unintelligible, not to weary my readers' patience with a roundabout story, I shall endeavour to be as concise as possible consistent with perspicuity.

On the 31st of October, 1794, citizen Fauchet, the then French minister at Philadelphia, dispatched a letter to the committee of the government in France, informing them, among other things, of the rise and progress of the insurrection in the Western counties of Pennsylvania. This letter was put on board the *Jean Bart*, a French corvette, which sailed directly afterwards for France, and on her passage took an English merchant vessel. When the corvette arrived in the British channel, she was brought to by a frigate of the enemy. As soon as the commander of the former saw that it was impossible to escape, he brought the dispatches, and citizen Fauchet's letter among the rest, upon the deck, and threw them overboard. But unfortunately for Mr. Randolph and some other patriots that we shall see mentioned by-and-by, there was a man on board who had the presence of mind and the courage to jump into the sea and save them. The reader will not be astonished at this heroic act, at this proof of unfeigned and *unbought* patriotism, when I tell him that the man was no *sans-culotte citizen*, but a British tar. It was indeed no other than the captain of the English vessel that the corvette had taken on her passage. This good fellow and the dispatches he had so gallantly preserved were taken up by the frigate's boat ; the dispatches were, of course, sent to

the British government, by whom citizen Fauchet's letter was, through Mr. Hammond, communicated to the President of the United States. The President showed it to Mr. Randolph, desiring him to make such explanations as he chose; and Mr. Randolph tells us that it was in consequence of what passed at this interview that he gave in the resignation, of which he has since published a vindication.

Although this extraordinary performance is called "A Vindication of Mr. Randolph's *Resignation*," people naturally look upon it as an attempt to vindicate his *conduct* previous to that resignation. The people had heard about corruption, about thousands of dollars, and about the pretended patriots of America having their prices; these were the points the people wanted to see cleared up. They could not conceive that exposing to the whole world, and consequently to the enemies of this country, their President's private letters of July 1795, relative to the treaty, could possibly tend to invalidate the charges of treason contained in the French minister's letter, written in the month of October, 1794. But Mr. Randolph, it appears, saw the matter in another light. He has thought proper to attempt to balance the crime laid to his charge against another supposed crime which he imputes to the President, concerning the ratification of the treaty.

Hence it follows that the Vindicator labours at two principal objects: to wash away the stain on his own reputation, and to represent the President of the United States as ratifying the treaty under the influence of a British faction. That the latter of these can, as I have already observed, have no sort of relation to the great and important point towards which the public mind has been so long directed, it is very manifest; nevertheless since it has been forced upon us, it would look like flinching from the inquiry to pass it over in silence. I shall therefore, after having observed on that part of the Vindication which comprehends what ought to have been its only object, endeavour to place in as fair a light as possible the indirect charge that is brought against the President.

From citizen Fauchet's intercepted letter it appears that Mr. Randolph did betray to him the secrets of the American government, and make him overtures for money, to be applied to some purpose relative to the insurrection in the Western counties of Pennsylvania.

The first of these is fully set forth in the very first paragraph of the letter, which runs thus:—

"The measures which prudence prescribes to me to take with respect to my colleagues, have still presided in the digesting of the dispatches signed by them, which treat of the insurrection of the western counties, and of the repressive means adopted by the Government. I have allowed them to be confined to the giving of a faithful, but naked recital of events; the reflections therein contained scarcely exceed the conclusions easily deducible from the character assumed by the public prints. I have reserved myself to give you, as far as I am able, a key to the facts detailed in our reports. When it comes in question to explain, either by conjectures or by certain data, *the secret views of a foreign government*, it would be imprudent to run the risk of indiscretions, and to give oneself up to men, whose known *partiality for that government*, and similitude of passions and interests with its chiefs, might lead to confidences, the issue of which is incalculable. Besides, the *precious confessions of Mr. Randolph* alone throw a satisfactory light on every thing that comes to pass. These I have not yet communicated to my colleagues. The motives already mentioned lead to this reserve, and still less permit me to open myself to them at the present moment. I shall then endeavour, citizen, to give you a clue to all the measures of which the common dispatches give you an account, and to discover the true

"causes of the explosion,* which it is obstinately resolved to repress with great means, although the state of things has no longer any thing alarming."

Notwithstanding the unequivocal expressions contained in this paragraph, the vindicator has endeavoured at a satisfactory explanation of it, and so confident does he pretend to be of having succeeded, that he says:—

"I hesitate not to pronounce, that he who feels a due abhorrence of party manoeuvres will form a conclusion honourable to myself."

Let us see, then, how he has extricated himself; what proof or what argument he has produced to wipe away the stigma, and to warrant the confidence with which he expresses himself of the people's forming a conclusion to his honour.

The phrase of the first paragraph of citizen Fauchet's letter which more immediately attracts our attention, is the "*precious confessions* of Mr. Randolph." These words the vindicator has taken a deal of pains to explain away, and with his usual success. He begins by saying, that

"This observation upon the *precious confessions* of Mr. Randolph involves the *judicious management of the office*. It implies no deliberate impropriety, and *cannot be particularly answered*, until particular instances are cited."

I see nothing here from which we are to form a conclusion to his honour; nor did he, it seems, for he immediately throws the task on citizen Fauchet's *certificate*. This extra diplomatic instrument was obtained by the famous journey to Rhode-Island, under what circumstances we shall see by-and-by; at present let us hear what citizen Fauchet says in it:—

"As to the communications which he (Mr. Randolph) has made to me at different times, they were only of *opinions*, the greater part, if not the whole of which, I have heard *circulated as opinions*. I will observe here, that none of his conversations with me concluded without his giving me the idea that the President was a man of integrity, and a sincere friend to France. This explains in *part* (well put in) what I meant by the terms, his *precious confessions*. When I speak in the same paragraph in these words: 'Besides the precious confessions of Mr. Randolph alone cast upon all which happens a satisfactory light,' I have still in view only the explanations of which I have spoken above; and I must confess, that very often I have taken for *confessions*, what he *might have* communicated to me by virtue of a secret authority. And many things which I had, at the first instant, considered as *confessions*, were the *subject* of public conversation."

Without admitting, even for a single moment, the validity of the evidence of this certificate, we may be permitted to admire its effrontery. *Precious confessions* are here explained to signify *opinions*, and opinions, too, that were the *subject of public conversation!* Oh! monstrous! Oh! front of tenfold brass! Were we to give credit to what citizen Fauchet has endeavoured to palm upon us in this certificate, we must conclude him to be either drunk or mad at the time of writing the paragraph which he thus explains, and the rest of his letter by no means authorizes such a conclusion. What idea do the words *precious confessions* convey to our minds? What is a confession? An *acknowledgment* which some one is *prevailed on* to make. And in what sense do we ever apply the epithet *precious*, but in that of *valuable, rare, costly* or *dear*? Would any man, that knows the meaning of these words, apply them to designate the common chat of a town, mere newspaper topics? We say, for instance, *precious stones*; but do we mean by these the rocks

* The Western insurrection.

that we see cover the lands, or the flints and pebbles that we kick along the road? If some impudent quack were to tell us, that the pavement of Philadelphia is composed of *precious stones*, should we not hurl them at his head; should we not lapidate him?

But, let us see in what sense citizen Fauchet employs the same word *precious*, in another place, even in the very certificate where he endeavours to explain it to mean nothing. After speaking of the *secret* machinations of Mr. Hammond, the conspirations of the English, and their being at the bottom of the Western insurrection, he comes to the means that Mr. Randolph had proposed to get at their *secrets*, and says,

“I was astonished that the Government itself did not procure for itself *information so precious.*”

Here, then, *precious* signifies *secret*. This *information so precious*, was *rare* information; information *not to be come at without a bribe*. This phrase fallen from the pen of citizen Fauchet, while his invention was upon the rack, to explain away another charge against the moral Mr. Randolph, fully proves in what sense he had ever used the word *precious*.

However, we should be very far from doing justice to these “*precious confessions of Mr. Randolph,*” by considering them in their naked, independent sense. It is very rarely that the true meaning of any phrase, or even of a complete sentence, is to be come at without taking in the context. That these *precious confessions* were neither so trifling nor of so public a nature as the citizen would make us believe, is clear from the tenor of the whole first paragraph above transcribed, which Mr. Randolph forgot to beg his friend to explain. After having mentioned the *precious confessions of Mr. Randolph*, “*these,*” says he, “I have not yet communicated to my colleagues.” And why?—“Because,” adds he, “*the motives, already mentioned, lead to this reserve, and still less permit me to open myself to them at the present moment.*” How is this, then? Why was this cautious *reserve* necessary, even towards his colleagues of the legation, if there was nothing to communicate but mere “*opinions,*” that were “*the subject of public conversation?*” What an over-and-above close man this must have been! Would to God, Mr. Randolph had been as close! But what were these “*motives already mentioned?*” We must consult the paragraph again here. The citizen, after stating that he allowed the dispatches, signed by his colleagues, to be confined to a naked recital of events, *scarcely exceeding* what might be gathered from the newspapers, observes, that he has reserved to himself the task of giving a key to these joint reports, and adds: when it comes in

“question to explain the *secret views* of a foreign government, it would be imprudent to give oneself up to men, whose known *partiality for that government*, and *similitude of passions and interests with its chiefs*, might lead to *confidences*, the issue of which is incalculable.”

Here we have the motives that prevented citizen Fauchet from communicating the *precious confessions* to his colleagues. Ordinary information, *hardly exceeding* what was to be learnt from the gazettes, he suffered them to participate; but as to the *secret views* of the Government, and the *precious confessions of Mr. Randolph*, he kept them in his own breast; because his colleagues were men

“who had a known *partiality for the Government*, and a *similitude of passions and interests with its chiefs!*”

This reason for not trusting the colleagues of citizen Fauchet, is corroborated by a sentence of Mr. Randolph himself, who certainly forgot what he was about when he wrote it.

"Two persons," says he, "were in commission with Mr. Fauchet, and it was suspected, from a quarter in which I confided, that these persons were in a political intimacy with members of our Government, not friendly to me."

I am sure the reader will agree with me, that this was a reason, and a substantial one too, for not communicating to them the precious confessions of Mr. Randolph, if those confessions went to expose the secret views of the Government; but, if, on the contrary, they went no further than "*opinions*," that were "*the subject of public conversation*," the precaution was perfectly ridiculous. It was like the secret of the idiot, who, whispering a by-stander, told him the sun shined, but begged him to let it go no further.

In short all the parts of this account correspond so exactly, that they only want to amount to a proof of innocence instead of guilt, to render them a subject of pleasing contemplation. Citizen Fauchet receives certain *precious confessions* from Mr. Randolph, which he keeps from his colleagues, because they have a *partiality for the Government*, and because, from their intimacy with some of the members of it, they might make dangerous discoveries. The inevitable conclusion then is, that these *precious confessions* were *not of opinions*, that were *the subject of public conversation*, and that they were of a nature *hostile to the Government*; and whether this be "a conclusion honourable" to Mr. Randolph, or not, I leave the reader to determine.

Citizen Fauchet, in that part of his certificate which I have above quoted, makes an indirect attempt to establish a belief, that Mr. Randolph, in his confessions, never uttered any thing to the prejudice of the character of the President of the United States. This is his aim, when he says that,

"None of his conversations concluded without giving the idea that the President was a man of integrity."

But, we are to observe, that the certificate was originally intended for the perusal of the President. Who could tell how far such a declaration, if it should be believed, might go towards making Mr. Randolph's peace? It has never yet appeared, that he was in earnest about a *public vindication*, till after his return from Rhode-Island; that is, till he saw that it was absolutely impossible to smother the affair. To have brought this declaration into the certificate with any other view than that of softening the President, would have been pure folly. The President being a man of incorruptible integrity, was surely no precious confession; on the contrary, I am mistaken if it was not among the most disagreeable information that citizen Fauchet ever received from his friend, the Secretary. If this certificate had, then, been intended for the public, to what purpose was the declaration concerning the President thrust into it? Did the framer, or rather framers of it, imagine; nay, could they possibly imagine, that Mr. Randolph would acquire favour with the people for having declared that the man he now attempts to blacken, the man he now represents as under the guidance of a British faction, is a man of incorruptible integrity? The President's character stood in no need of the eulogy of Mr. Randolph, or the certificate of a mushroom French minister.

The desperate Vindicator makes one struggle more. He endeavours to back the evidence of citizen Fauchet's certificate with a protestation of his own, in which he denies ever having received a farthing for the communication of state-secrets; says that he never communicated any such secrets; that he never uttered a syllable which violated the duties of office; all which, adds he,

"I assert, and to the assertion I am ready to superadd the most solemn sanction."

I shall not throw away my time in attempting to invalidate this kind of testimony. There was a time when the *solemn sanction*, or even bare *assertion*, of Mr. Randolph, might have been formidable; but that time is, alas! no more.

We now come to the *overtures for money*, to be applied to some purpose relative to the insurrection in the Western counties of Pennsylvania.

Citizen Fauchet, in the 15th paragraph of the fatal letter, had been speaking of the assembling of the insurgents at Braddock's Field, and of the preparations of the Federal government to reduce them to order and obedience. Then, in the 16th paragraph, he comes to speak of the conduct of certain persons in power at this momentous crisis.

"In the meantime," says he, "although there was a certainty of having an army, yet it was necessary to assure themselves of co-operators among the men whose patriotic reputation might influence their party, and whose lukewarmness or want of energy in the existing conjunctures might compromise the success of the plans. Of all the governors whose duty it was to appear at the head of the requisitions, the *Governor of Pennsylvania** alone enjoyed the name of *Republican*; his opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury,† and of his systems, was known to be unfavourable. The *Secretary of this State*‡ possessed great influence in the *popular society of Philadelphia*, which in its turn influenced those of other States; of course he merited attention. It appears, therefore, that *these men*, with others unknown to me, all having, without doubt, Randolph at their head, were *balancing to decide on their party*. Two or three days before the proclamation was published,§ and of course before the cabinet had resolved on its measures, Mr. Randolph came to me with an air of great eagerness, and made me *the overtures* of which I have given you an account in No. 6. Thus, *with some thousands of dollars*, the Republic could have decided on *civil war or on peace*! Thus, the consciences of the pretended patriots of America have already their prices! It is very true, that the certainty of these conclusions, painful to be drawn, will for ever exist in our archives! What will be the old age of this government, if it is thus early decrepid!"

From this paragraph we learn that certain men of weight and influence were balancing as to the side they should take, at the time of the insurrection; that two or three days before the issuing of the proclamation for the assembling of a military force to march against the insurgents, Mr. Randolph went to citizen Fauchet, and made to him certain overtures; and that from the nature of these overtures, citizen Fauchet concluded that if he had had some thousands of dollars at his disposal, he could have decided on civil war or on peace. From this latter circumstance it is evident that the overtures were for money, to be applied to some purpose relative to the insurrection; and, therefore, our inquiries (if, indeed, inquiries are at all necessary) are naturally confined to two questions: *who* was to receive this money? and for *what purpose*?

* Mifflin.

† Hamilton.

‡ Dallas.

§ Washington's proclamation against the insurgents.

The shortest way of determining the first of these questions is, to resort to the fair and unequivocal meaning of the paragraph itself. Suppose the following passage of it alone had come to light :—

“ *These men*, with others unknown to me, all having, without doubt, Randolph at their head, *were balancing* to decide on their party. Two or three days before the proclamation was published, Mr. Randolph came to me with an air of great eagerness, and made to me the overtures, of which I have given you an account in No. 6. Thus, with some thousands of dollars, the Republic could have determined on civil war, or on peace.”

Suppose, I say, that of all the letter, this passage alone had been found, what should we have wanted to know further?—Why, certainly, *who these men were*. This is what we should have cursed our stars for having kept from us. Randolph, we should have said, is at the head of them; but who are *these men*? To whom do these important words refer?—Luckily, citizen Fauchet’s letter leaves us nothing to wish for on this head; these words are relative to “ *the Governor of Pennsylvania*,” the “ *Secretary of this State*,”* and other persons unknown to the writer. *These men*, according to citizen Fauchet’s letter, were, with Randolph at their head, balancing to decide on their party; and while they were thus balancing, Mr. Randolph, being the leader, went to citizen Fauchet and made him such overtures as would have enabled him, had he had “ some thousands of dollars,” to decide on civil war or on peace.

I shall not amuse myself with drawing conclusions here, as I am fully persuaded that no one who shall do me the honour of reading these sheets will find any difficulty in doing it for himself. It is, however, necessary to notice what has been advanced with an intention of doing away the impression that this part of citizen Fauchet’s letter must inevitably leave on our minds, with respect to the persons in whose behalf the money overtures were made.

The reader has observed that citizen Fauchet mentions a dispatch, which he calls his No. 6, and to which he refers his government for the particulars of Mr. Randolph’s overtures. An *extract* from this No. 6 the Vindicator has obtained from citizen Adet, the present French minister, which he has published in his Vindication, and which I here insert :—

“ Scarce was the commotion known, when the Secretary of State came to my house. All his countenance was grief. He requested of me a private conversation. It is all over, he said to me. A civil war is about to ravage our unhappy country. *Four men*, by their *talents*, their *influence*, and their *energy*, may save it. But, debtors of English merchants, they will be deprived of their liberty if they take the smallest step. Could you lend them instantaneously funds sufficient to shelter them from English persecution? This inquiry *astonished* me much. It was impossible for me to make a satisfactory answer. You know *my want of power*, and my defect of *pecuniary means*. I shall draw myself off from the affair by some common-place remarks, and by throwing myself on the *pure* and unalterable principles of the Republic.”

God of Heaven! what must be the situation of a man who publishes such a piece as this, in order to weaken the evidence against him!

We should certainly be at full liberty to reject the testimony contained in this extract; not on account of the person who signs it (though his *not being a Christian* might with some weak-minded people be a weighty objection), but on account of its being but a *part* of the No. 6 referred to.

* I keep to the very words of the letter; but that by “ *this State* ” is meant the State of Pennsylvania cannot be doubted, especially when we see that the letter is dated at Philadelphia.

I do not, however, wish to derive any advantage from this circumstance : I admit the validity of the testimony contained in the extract, and well I may, for the greatest enemy of Mr. Randolph and of those who are involved with him, could wish for no better confirmation of the 16th paragraph of citizen Fauchet's letter.

The only circumstance in which the extract from No. 6 appears to differ from the letter is, that in the extract mention is made of *four* men, and in the letter of only *three*. But let it be observed, that though only three persons are named in the letter, yet citizen Fauchet adds to them, "others unknown to me."

The next piece of exculpatory evidence produced is the *certificate* of citizen Fauchet. But before we quote this paper again, it is necessary to see how it was obtained.

When citizen Fauchet's letter was first shown to Mr. Randolph in the council-chamber, and he was asked to explain it, he hesitated ; desired time to commit his remarks to writing ; went to his office, locked up his own apartment there, and gave the key to the messenger ; then went home, from whence he wrote to the President, requesting a copy of the letter, and informing him that if citizen Fauchet had not quitted the continent he would go after him, *to prepare himself for an inquiry*. Was this the behaviour of a man grossly calumniated ? Such a man would have said : I see, sir, by this letter that I am charged with crimes which my heart abhors ; I declare the writer to be an infamous slanderer ; but as appearances are against me, here are the keys of my office and even of my private papers : examine them all, and I will remain here till the examination is ended. Send also for citizen Fauchet, if he be yet in the country : bring him here, and let him avow this to my face, if he dares.— I appeal to the reader's breast whether there is any thing that a man, strong in his integrity, would have so ardently desired as to be confronted with his accuser ; or any thing he would have so obstinately refused as to be the messenger to seek him ? Allowing, however, that a man falsely accused of such heinous crimes had, in a paroxysm of rage, quitted the council-chamber to pursue the assassin of his reputation, would he not have instantly departed ? Would he have closed his eyes till he came up with him ? Would any mortal means of conveyance have been swift enough for his pursuit ? And, once arrived, would he not have rushed into his presence ? Would not the sight of the perfidious miscreant have almost driven him to madness ? Had he found him in the arms of his harlot, or grovelling at the altar of his pagan gods, would he not have dragged him forth to chastisement ? The heart that swells with injured innocence is deaf to the voice of discretion !

How different from all this was the cool and gentle, and genteel deportment of the Vindicator ! He stays very quietly two days at Philadelphia, before his departure for Rhode-Island, and loiters away no less than *ten days* in performing a journey that the common stages perform in *five*. When he arrives, he goes and has a *tête-à-tête* with citizen Fauchet, and so mild and so complaisant is he, and so little malice does he bear on account of the wound given to his honour, that he afterwards writes the citizen a note, in which he styles himself his *humble servant*.

I pass by the *certificates* of a *tipstaff* and a *pilot*, which were brought in as auxiliaries to that of citizen Fauchet, and come to the questions that *were to be put*, but which *were not put*, to citizen Fauchet, before Mr. Marchant, a judge of the district of Rhode-Island, and Mr. Malbone, a

member of the House of Representatives. This play at question and answer must have been fine sport for Messrs. Marchant and Malbone, who would have had the *dramatis personæ* before their eyes; but when committed to paper, a perusal of it would have been quite flat and insipid to us. No question, I am positive, would on this occasion have drawn truth from the lips of citizen Fauchet; except, perhaps, the question formerly employed in the Inquisition: for as to oaths upon the Holy Evangelists, what power could they have had upon the conscience of a man whose creed declares the Bible to be a lie, and who alternately adores the goat, the hog, the dog, the cat, and the jack-ass?*

After these remarks on the manner in which this certificate, which we are called upon to give credit to, was procured, we may venture to quote it, without running the risk of being misled by its protestations. Let us then hear what it says with respect to the persons in whose behalf the overtures for money were made:—

“About the month of July or August, in the last year, he (Mr. Randolph) came to see me (citizen Fauchet), at my house. We had a private conversation of about twenty minutes. His countenance bespoke distress. He said to me that he was afraid a civil war would soon ravage America. I inquired of him what new information was procured. He said that he began to believe that, in fact, the English were fomenting the insurrection, and that he did not doubt that Mr. Hammond † and his Congress would push some measures with respect to the insurrection, with an intention of giving embarrassment to the United States. He demanded of me if, as my Republic was itself interested in these manœuvres, I could not, by the means of some correspondents, procure some information of what was passing. I answered him, that I believed I could. He replied upon this, that having formed many connections, by the means of flour contracts, *three or four* persons, among the different *contractors*, might, by *talents, energy, and some influence*, procure the necessary information, and save America from a civil war, by proving that England interfered in the troubles of the West.”

After this the certificate says that Mr. Randolph stated a doubt as to the pecuniary affairs of these contractors, and observed that those whom citizen Fauchet

“*might be able to employ, might perhaps* be debtors of English merchants; and that, in that case, *might perhaps* be exposed to be harassed and arrested; and, therefore, he asked if the payment of the sums *due them*, by virtue of the existing contracts, would not be sufficiently early to render them independent of British persecution.”

So! here are all “*these men who were balancing to decide on their party*; these men, who, by their *talents, influence, and energy*, might save the country!” these men *who could have decided on civil war or on peace* are, by this barefaced certificate, turned into industrious, peaceable flour-merchants.

* If the reader has never seen one of the Calendars of the enlightened and regenerated French, it may not be amiss to inform him here, that in lieu of the Saints whom they placed in their calendar formerly, and to whom they addressed their prayers no longer than four years ago, they have now filled it with brutes, trees, and plants. Each day of the Republican year is consecrated to some one of these their animal and vegetable saints, and it is a circumstance truly singular, that the day on which citizen Fauchet was to be cross-examined is consecrated to *Hemp*. There is something like fatality in this. Should any one wish to satisfy himself of the fact, he has only to look in one of the Calendars, printed in France, for the month of *Vendémiaire*, a copy of which I have now before me.

† English Minister at Philadelphia.

This explanation exceeds even the impudence of Lord Peter, who swore that the words *gold lace* meant a *broom-stick*.

Mr. Randolph pretends that, so far from having made overtures for himself and company, he rejects with horror the idea of giving a pair of gloves even to these honest flour-men. Citizen Fauchet, it is true, did understand Mr. Randolph as advising him to obtain intelligence, by assisting with *loans* those who had contracted with him for flour; but now calling to mind all the circumstances, he has an *intimate conviction* that he was mistaken in the propositions of Mr. Randolph, who only asked if these good people could not be accommodated with the "sums *due them* on their contracts!" Hence, then, they wish to infer that all was fair and honest; that no such thing as corruption was ever dreamt of. Admit them this, for a moment, and then let them account for the following expressions, which come immediately after the money overtures, mentioned in the dispatch, No. 6:—

"This inquiry *astonished me much*. It was impossible for me to make a *satisfactory answer*. You know my *want of power*, and my *defect of pecuniary means*. I shall *draw myself off from the affair* by some common-place remarks, and by throwing myself on the *pure and unalterable principles* of the Republic."

Now, why *pure*? Why throw himself on the *pure principles* of his Republic? How could the *pure principles* of his Republic forbid him to yield to a proposal that had nothing *impure* in it? And why does he talk of his want of *power*, and of *pecuniary means*? Would it not be the height of stupidity for a man to talk this way, if he was required to do nothing but to pay three or four flour-men "the sums *due them* on their contracts?"

Nor was such a trifling proposal better calculated to awaken in citizen Fauchet these reflections!

"Thus, with some thousands of dollars, the Republic could have decided on civil war, or on peace! Thus, the *consciences* of the *pretended patriots* of America have already *their prices*! It is very true that the certainty of these conclusions, *painful to be drawn*, will for ever exist in *our archives*! What will be the old age of *this government*, if it is thus early *decrepid*!"

Would any man, except a madman or a fool, have made these reflections on a proposal to pay certain merchants "sums *due them*," and particularly when those sums were to enable them to *serve their country*, by exploring the secret machinations of an hostile power? Mr. Randolph's proposing to come at the secrets of the English minister, by prevailing on citizen Fauchet to pay the sums due to his contractors, would certainly have excited a laugh in Fauchet: and if he had thought such a silly proposition worth a mention in his dispatches, he would naturally have said—
 "What a loggerheaded fellow they have chosen for Secretary of State here! Would you imagine that he has proposed to me to pay my flour-contractors what I *owe them*, as a mean of inducing them to penetrate into the designs of the English government! The man must certainly be out of his wits, or he never would be foolish enough to suppose that these people, in gratitude for having received *no more than their due* from me, would be induced to undertake a dangerous and expensive service *for him*. However, the poor man, though a little crack-brained, is a good patriot, and has no other motive in all this than to serve his country." These would have been the remarks of citizen Fauchet had the overtures been of the nature he now pretends they were. He would

have had all the reason in the world to accuse the Secretary of folly, but none to accuse him of guilt ; none to authorize those bitter reflections on the *saleableness* of the *consciences* of the *pretended* patriots of America, or on the *decrepitude* of the *Government*.

This is not all. If the overtures for money were in behalf of citizen Fauchet's flour-men, there remains a very important passage of his intercepted letter which both he and the Vindicator have left unexplained. It is this :—

“ *As soon as it was decided that the French Republic purchased no men to do their duty, there were to be seen individuals about whose conduct the Government could at least form uneasy conjectures, giving themselves up with a scandalous ostentation to its views, and even seconding its declarations.** The popular societies soon emitted resolutions stamped with the same spirit ; and who, although they may have been advised by love of order, might nevertheless have omitted or uttered them with less solemnity. Then were seen coming from the *very men whom we had been accustomed to regard as having little friendship for the system of the Treasurer, harangues without end, in order to give a new direction to the public mind. The militia, however, manifest some repugnance, particularly in Pennsylvania ; at last, by excursions or harangues, incomplete requisitions are obtained. How much more interesting than the changeable men I have painted above were those plain citizens !*” &c.

That citizen Fauchet understood the money overtures to be made on the part of these *changeable men* is evident ; for the passage here transcribed follows immediately after the paragraph in which those overtures are mentioned. And the passage itself is too unequivocal to be misunderstood. All this scandalous ostentation, he says, these second-hand declarations, and harangues without end, *in favour* of the Government, took place among these *changeable men* as soon as it was known (and not before) that the French Republic purchased no men to do their duty. Now then, let Mr. Randolph, or any one of these *changeable men*, twist this passage till it applies to his flour-merchants, if he can. What ! did the flour-merchants give themselves up *to the views of the Government* with a *scandalous ostentation* ? What harangues did these poor devils ever make, I wonder, to disguise their past views, and give a new direction to the public mind ? We all know that the democratic Societies and the good Governor of Pennsylvania issued *declarations seconding* that of the Government ; but the flour-merchants never issued any, or at least that I know of. And yet the citizen tells us, that all these harangues and declarations took place as soon as it was decided that the French Republic *purchased* no men to do their duty. How then, in the name of all that is vile and corrupt, could the money overtures be made in behalf of three or four flour-merchants ?

But I must not let these haranguers go off so.

“ *Then,*” says citizen Fauchet, “ *were seen coming from the very men whom we had been accustomed to regard as having little friendship for the system of the Treasurer, harangues without end.*”

Who, then, were the persons that citizen Fauchet had been accustomed to regard as having little friendship for the system of the Treasurer ?

“ *Of all the governors,*” says Citizen Fauchet, in the 16th paragraph, already quoted, “ *of all the governors whose duty it was to appear at the head of the requisitions, the Governor of Pennsylvania alone enjoyed the name of Republican : his opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and of his systems, was known*

* *Mifflin, Dallas, &c.* turned round, and wrote and harangued against the insurgents.—ED.

“to be unfavourable.” In another part of the letter, when speaking about the behaviour of several of the general officers on the Western expedition, he says, “The Governor of Pennsylvania, of whom it never would have been suspected, lived intimately and publicly with Hamilton.”

As to the fact concerning the harangues without end, those of my readers whose memories are not very faithful, have only to open the Philadelphia newspapers for the months of August and September, 1794. Let the reader, particularly if he be a Pennsylvanian, treasure up all these things in his mind.

I have but one more observation to add here, and that does not arise from any thing said in the Vindication, but from a paragraph which appeared in Mr. Bache’s Gazette of the 22nd December, signed *A. J. Dallas*, and which contained the following words:—

“The publication of Mr. Fauchet’s intercepted letter, renders any remark unnecessary on *my part*, or on the part of *the Governor*, upon the villanous insinuations of the libeller” [meaning Mr. Wilcocks, who had said that it was reported that citizen Fauchet’s letter charged the Governor of Pennsylvania, Mr. Randolph, and *Valerius* (by which name Mr. Dallas looks upon himself as designated) of bribery and corruption], “in relation to the contents of that letter; but we may expect to derive a *perfect triumph* on the occasion, from the candour of those who have incautiously circulated injurious conjectures, and from the mortification of those who have wilfully fabricated iniquitous falsehoods.”

It seems that this *A. J. Dallas* is the self-same “Secretary of this State,” and that this governor is the same “governor of Pennsylvania,” of whom citizen Fauchet has made such honourable mention, and of whom we have been talking all this time. For my part, I do not know the men, nor either of them, nor have I any ambition to know them, but if they can see any thing in citizen Fauchet’s intercepted letter from which they “expect to derive a *perfect triumph*,” I congratulate them on their penetration with all my heart. Should they triumph, their triumph will be *perfect*, indeed; for conscious I am, that it will be attended with this singular and happy circumstance, that it will excite envy in no living soul?*

As I am pretty confident that no further remark is necessary with respect to the *persons* who were to receive the product of Mr. Randolph’s overtures, I shall now speak to the second question: for what purpose were they to receive it?

I believe few people have read the intercepted letter without being fully convinced that the money, if obtained, was to be so employed as to

* Citizen Franklin Bache, too (willing to be in the fashion, I suppose), has thought proper to come forward with a voluntary vindication. He tells the public that, “another means of intimidating him into silence, has been the circulation of false and scandalous insinuations against *his integrity*, of his having received French money, &c. To all such he thus positively and explicitly gives “*the lie*.”—Fair and softly, good Master *Surgo ut Prosim*: if you rise for our good, do not, for mercy’s sake, flash our eyes out. If you have not touched French money, if they have wronged you out of your share, why, it is an agreeable surprise to us, and there is an end of the matter. But, let me tell you, that it was treating the good people of the United States a little cavalierly to give them the lie direct thus, and seems to be very incompatible with your interests, unless you had a sufficiency of *customers elsewhere*. You are not, it is true, named in citizen Fauchet’s intercepted letter, and of this lucky circumstance you were, I presume, acquainted before you gave the public the lie; but, as President *pro tem*. of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, you certainly come in for a share of his sarcasm on those changeable men. No more boasting, then, Master *Surgo*: for “the more you stir it.” you know the rest of the proverb.

enable the receivers openly to espouse the cause of the Western insurgents, and overturn the Federal government, or, at least, counteract its measures so far as to oblige those at the head of it to abandon it to the direction of those corrupt and profligate men who wished to prevent any accommodations taking place with Great Britain, and to plunge their devoted country into a war on the side of France. The passage of the letter where the overtures are mentioned authorizes this conclusion; and when we come to examine the other paragraphs, together with the extract from the dispatch No. 6, and to compare the whole of citizen Fauchet's account with the well-known conduct of those who are clearly designated as the persons in whose behalf the money overtures were made, the evidence becomes irresistible.

To weaken this evidence, nothing has been advanced, that does not, if possible, add to its force, by showing to what more than miserable shifts and subterfuges the Vindicator has been driven. Nevertheless as we profess to make observations on the Vindication, all that it contains, however false and absurd, claims some share of our attention; and, therefore, we must now take a view of what has been said concerning the application of the money to be obtained by the overtures of Mr. Randolph, beginning, as before, with the certificate of citizen Fauchet.

After telling us, that he had frequently had conversations with Mr. Randolph about the insurrection, and that he himself suspected the English of fomenting and supporting it, he says:—

“ I communicated my suspicions to Mr. Randolph. I had already communicated to him a Congress, which at this time was holden at New-York. I had communicated to him my fears, that this Congress would have for its object, some manœuvre against the Republic of France, and to render unpopular some virtuous men, who were at the head of affairs; to destroy the confidence which existed on one hand, between General Clinton (late governor of New-York) and his fellow-citizens, and on the other, that which united Mr. Randolph to the President.”

He then tells us the old story about the flour-merchants.

Now comes Mr. Randolph's turn:—

“ Our discourse,” says he, “ turned upon the insurrection and upon the expected machinations of Mr. Hammond and others at New-York, against the French Republic, Governor Clinton, and myself.—Fresh as the intelligence was upon my mind, that the British were fomenting the insurrection, I was strongly inclined to believe that Mr. Hammond's Congress would not forego the opportunity of furnishing, to the utmost of their abilities, employment to the United States, and of detaching their attention and power from the European war. I own, therefore, that I was extremely desirous of learning what was passing at New-York. I certainly thought that those men, who were on an intimate footing with Mr. Fauchet, and had some access to British connections, were the best fitted for obtaining this intelligence.”

And for this reason he recommended the flour-men. Oh, master Randolph! master Randolph, Oh!

Here, then, this worthy statesman was endeavouring to render a most important service to his country, His only object being to dive into the machinations that the English Minister and his Congress were hatching against the United States! A very laudable pursuit. This story has something in it so flattering to human nature, that it is a pity it should be the most abominable falsehood that ever issued from the procreant brain of a pettyfogging politician.

In the first place, nobody sincerely believed, that the English had even

the slightest correspondence or connection with the insurgents; nor did any body ever, from first to last, pretend to avow such a belief, that I know of, except Mr. Randolph and a certain Governor. These two gentlemen endeavoured to impress the idea of such a connection as well on the mind of the President as on that of the public; but neither of these yielded to the insidious suggestion. Both very naturally demanded proofs, and proofs were not to be found; unless the insurgents' howling out *liberty and equality*, their planting *liberty trees*, and their wearing *cockades à la tricolore*, were proofs of their attachment to the English. No one circumstance that has yet come to light is a stronger proof of a deep-laid plot against the Federal government than the efforts of these men to give a false direction to the public mind. While they were making overtures to the French Minister, while they were endeavouring to feed the insurrection from that source, they threw out, in order to disguise their views, insinuations that another nation was at the bottom of it.

And what was this pretended Congress of Mr. Hammond at New-York, that it should so alarm our Vindicator, and make his friend Fauchet fear, that something would be attempted by it to the prejudice of Mr. Randolph and the "virtuous", father-in-law* of citizen Genet? Who composed this Congress? Why, Mr. Hammond was the President, and his wife, a sick child, and a nurse, were the members! A pretty Congress this to form machinations against the Government of the country, and to stir up a rebellion in a quarter four or five hundred miles distant! This Congress, too, was assembled at New-York, or rather on Long-Island, where I do not believe that citizen Fauchet had *three or four*, nor even *one*, flour-contractors; and, if so, how came the wise Mr. Randolph to imagine that the contractors would have made a journey from Virginia, where the greatest part of them were, or even from this city, to New-York, in order to dive into Mrs. Hammond's and her maid's secrets? The fellows must necessarily have remained some time there to effect the object of their mission; they must have gone skulking about *incognito* like other spies, and must of course have run the risk of kickings and rib-roastings in abundance; and all this for what? why truly, for *nothing!* for it would have been nothing, if they were to receive no more than what was "*due them on their contracts,*" and both our certificate-makers declare that they were not to have another farthing.

If the overtures had been for money to be employed in the procuring of intelligence of what the English Minister was about, is it not natural to suppose, that citizen Fauchet would have mentioned this circumstance in his very confidential letter? Yet we see that he has not let fall a word about it, either in his letter or in his dispatch, No. 6. Again, what would his reflections on such overtures have been? He would probably have exclaimed: *Thus with some thousands of dollars, the Republic could have dived into all the machinations of the English!* Instead of: "*Thus with some thousands of dollars, the Republic could have decided on civil war or on peace!* Thus the consciences of the pretended patriots of America have already *their prices!*"—And, let me repeat, what could induce him to talk, in his dispatch No. 6, of throwing himself on the *pure principles* of his Republic, if nothing was in contemplation but the unravelling of the treacherous designs of the English?

But I do not rest upon this negative evidence to disprove all that the

* Genet remained in America, and married the daughter of General Clinton.—Ed.

certificate-makers have attempted to impose on us, on this subject. Citizen Fauchet has let fall a sentence in his intercepted letter that proves, that he did not look upon the money overtures as being made with an intention of coming at the secrets of the English; that he never thought the English at all concerned in fomenting the insurrection; that he was well persuaded that the insurgents never looked for support from them; and that he was fully convinced of the meanness and baseness of all those who attempted to propagate such an opinion. "But," says he in the 15th paragraph of the letter, "but, in order to obtain some-thing on the public opinion, it was necessary to magnify the danger, to disfigure the views of those people (insurgents), to attribute to them the design of uniting themselves with England.—This step succeeded, an army is raised, &c. &c." Here, then, he unequivocally gives the lie to every word that he has said on the subject in his certificate, and to every word that Mr. Randolph has been awkward enough to repeat after him. If he was so well informed that all these malicious tales about the interference of the English were invented and propagated merely in order to obtain something on the public opinion by magnifying the danger and disfiguring the views of the insurgents, all which, it is clear, he learnt from the precious confessions of Mr. Randolph; if he was so thoroughly convinced of all this, at the time of writing his letter, in October 1794, how comes he to recollect, in the month of August 1795, that both he and Mr. Randolph did "really suspect, that the English were fomenting the insurrection?" No; they never suspected any such thing; and they, and all others who pretended to suspect it, have only discovered to what pitiful tricks, what political quackery, they were reduced.

One closing observation on this subject. If money had been wanted to obtain intelligence concerning the pretended Congress of Mr. Hammond; if this object was so near Mr. Randolph's heart as he hypocritically declares it was, whom ought he to have applied to? Whom would he naturally have applied to for the necessary sums? Whom but the President of the United States, under whose authority alone he could have acted in so delicate a conjuncture? He would have laid before him his suspicions of the dreadful Congress, and proposed to him the means the most likely of unveiling its machinations; and, if money had been necessary, it would, of course, have been granted. But, instead of this, away he runs to a foreign minister, and unbosoms himself to him, as if the secret was of too much importance to be deposited in the breast of the President, or as if the French had more interest in quelling the insurrection than the United States had. He appears to have looked upon citizen Joseph Fauchet as his father confessor; and for that reason it was, I suppose, he reserved for his ear, like a pious and faithful penitent, those precious secrets that he had kept hidden from all the world besides. In the council chamber at Philadelphia he was troubled with a locked jaw; but the instant he entered the confessional on the banks of the Schuylkill, to which the citizen seems to have retired on purpose, the complaint was removed, and he said more in "twenty minutes" than he will be able to unsay in twenty years.

To the side of a stream, in a deep lonely dell,
 Father *Joseph* retir'd, as a hermit to dwell,
 His hermitage, crown'd with a cap tricolour,
 Brought a beggarly pilgrim his aid to implore.
 First the holy man promis'd, and, for his professions,
 The penitent made him most precious confessions.

Now tell me, dear son, said the hermit, your needs :—
 Give me, good Father *Joseph*, a string of gold beads.—
 A string of gold beads, says the hermit, *Parbleu!*
 Your request, my dear son, appears dev'lish new,
 He told him, in short, he was damnably poor,
 Kick'd him out of his den, and slam'd to the door.

It is a great pity we are obliged to quit this delightful theme to return to the dry mercenary overtures of Mr. Randolph.

As it appears that he cannot persuade us that the money was to be employed for the purpose of coming at the machinations of the English, let us now see to what purpose it is much more likely it was to have been applied.

From the intercepted letter we learn, that the complying with the overtures would have enabled the French Republic to decide, for this country, *on civil war or on peace*; and we are told, in the extract No. 6, which has been intruded on us purposely to give a favourable turn to this passage of the latter, that the money, if obtained, would have put it in the power of *four men to save the country*. Mr. Randolph, in handling these two passages, has gone rather beyond his usual degree of assurance. He has taken a phrase from one and a phrase from the other, and tacked them together to suit himself. This done, he boldly asks, "what were to be the functions of these men." And then comes out his triumphant answer—"To save the country from a civil war." This is Lord Peter again with his *totidem verbis*. By running over the two papers, or either of them, this way, culling a phrase here and a phrase there, he may make them say anything he pleases; and he may do the same thing with any other writing. In this manner he may make even the *New Year's Gift* say that he is an upright, worthy, incorruptible man; and God knows how far that is from the sentiments of the author. Is this phrase, which he compounded of ingredients taken from two different places, to be found in any part of citizen Fauchet's dispatches? Has this tattling father confessor any where said, that the overtures were for money to save the country from a civil war? Has he said anything that will countenance such an inference? No; his dispatches, in every rational construction they will bear, clearly lead to a contrary conclusion.

He could have *decided on civil war or on peace*. If we are to understand by civil war, a *successful opposition to the Federal government*, the whole of his letter, from one end to the other, proves that nothing was so near his heart. He everywhere exclaims against the ambitious views of the Government, and defends the cause of the insurgents. He speaks of them as an oppressed people, and of the laws which they were armed to oppose, as harsh and unnecessary. The anarchical assembly in the neighbourhood of Pittsburgh, those outrageous villains who insulted the officers of justice, plundered the mail, drove peaceable and orderly people from their dwellings, dragged others forth to endure every other cruelty short of death, and who, in a word, were daily committing robbery and murder; this assembly of ruffians he calls, "the *very pacific union* of the counties in Braddock's Field! a union which could not justify the raising of so great a force as fifteen thousand men.—Besides," added he, "the principles uttered in the declaration of these people, rather announced *ardent minds to be calmed, than anarchists to be subdued.*"

When he comes to speak of those who wished to enforce the excise law, he gives way to the most bitter invectives, and almost curses the officers of Government, who counselled the marching of the troops. But, at last, he is compelled to give an account of the triumph of the Federal army; and here we plainly perceive, by the chagrin he expresses at that event, what he would have desired. He laments that the Government will acquire stability from it "*for one complete session at least,*" the discredit it will throw on "*the insurgent principles of the patriots,*" and concludes with this, to him, melancholy reflection:

"Who knows what will be the limits of *this triumph*? Perhaps advantage will be taken by it to obtain some laws for *strengthening the Government*, and still more precipitating the propensity, already visible, that it has towards aristocracy!"

Who, then, can be stupid enough to believe that if this man had had "some thousands of dollars to advance," he would have advanced them to aid the Government, either directly or indirectly, *against the insurgents*, and to *save the country* from a civil war? And yet this we must believe, before we believe that Mr. Randolph, who was in all his secrets, would have made him overtures for that purpose.

As to the words in the dispatch No. 6, which are allowed to signify *save the country*, they must not be thus disjointed from what precedes them. The passage is this:

"*Scarce was the commotion known* when the Secretary of State came to my house. All his countenance was grief. He requested of me a *private conversation*. It is *all over*, said he to me. A civil war is about to ravage our unhappy country. *Four men*, by their talents, their influence, and their energy, may *save it.*"

Save it from what? Not from a civil war; it was, it seems, too late to do that; for it was *all over*. A civil war was to take place; that was a settled point, though the *commotion was scarcely known*; but *four men*, with the help of citizen Fauchet's dollars, might save the country. That is, bring it out of that civil war refined and regenerated, and unclogged with the Federal government, or, at least, with those men who thwarted the views of citizen Fauchet and his nation.

Of all the expressions to be found in the Babylonish vocabulary of the French Revolution, there is not one the value of which is so precisely fixed as that before us—to *save the country*. When their first Assembly, the fathers of all the miseries of their country, violating the powers with which they were invested, reduced their king to an automaton, laid their crooked fingers on the property of sixty or seventy thousand innocent persons, drove the faithful pastors from their flocks, and replaced them by a herd of vile apostates, they had the impudence to declare that they had *saved their country*! When their worthy successors hurled this degraded monarch from his throne; and, after a series of injustices, insults, and cruelties, as unmerited as unheard of, put an end to his sufferings on a scaffold, they, too, had *saved their country*! They have saved it, alas! again and again! Every signal act of their folly and tyranny, every one of their massacres, has ended with a declaration of their having *saved their country*. Even when they exchanged the Christian religion, the words of eternal life, for the impious and illiterate systems of a Paine and a Volney; when they declared the God of Heaven to be an impostor, and forbade his worship on pain of death; even then they pretended they had *saved their country*!—If Mr. Randolph meant to save his country in this

way, he is welcome for me to the exclusive possession of the honour due to his zeal. He might surely venture to make overtures to citizen Fauchet for operating a salvation of this kind, without the least fear of a rebuff. But, stopping short of French salvation, he might wish to save it from the *excise*; from the *Treasurer's plans of finance*; from a treaty with England; and, above all, from that "*strengthening the Government, which had so visible a propensity to aristocracy.*" Besides, when a man comes to ask for a bribe, he must have some excuse; for, base as he may be, and lost to shame, and well as he may be convinced that the person whom he addresses is as base as himself; yet there is something about the human form, though disfigured with a tricoloured cockade, which reminds the wretch that he has a soul.

As a convincing proof that the overtures mentioned by citizen Fauchet ought to be understood as made to obtain money for supporting, in some way or other, the insurrection in the West, and that the whole letter inevitably conveys this meaning, we need no other proof than that furnished by Mr. Randolph himself. It will certainly be supposed that he, above all others, would read this essay on bribery and corruption with an anxious and scrutinizing eye. We may fairly presume that he conned it over with more attention than ever school-boy did his lesson, or monk his breviary; and that, from the moment he was in his penitential weeds, he repeated the some-thousand-dollar sentence as often as a devotee Catholic repeats her Ave-Maria. Yet, notwithstanding all this; notwithstanding the interest he had in finding some other meaning for it; notwithstanding even his talent at warping, and twisting, and turning everything that falls in his way, we find him, on the 19th of August, writing to the President thus:

"For I here most solemnly deny, that any overture ever came from me which was to produce money to me [and not to flour-merchants], or any others for me; and that in any manner, directly or indirectly, was a shilling ever received by me; nor was it ever contemplated by me that one shilling should be applied by Mr. Fauchet to any purpose relative to the insurrection."

He understood, then, the letter to mean, that money was to be received by him, and that it was to be applied to some purpose relative to the insurrection. This was the charge that he at first thought the letter contained against him. And when did he begin to think otherwise?—After he had been to see citizen Fauchet at Rhode-Island, and not a moment before. It was after this edifying *tête-à-tête* with his old father Joseph, that he began to recollect all about the flour-merchants and Mr. Hammond's Congress; and so, with his memory thus refreshed, he comes back, and tells us in his Vindication:

"Mr. Fauchet's letter, indeed, made me suppose that No. 6 possibly alluded to some actual or proffered loan or expenditure, for the nourishment of the insurrection; and, therefore, I thought it necessary to deny, in my letter of the 19th of August, that one shilling was contemplated by me to be applied by Mr. Fauchet relative to the insurrection."

Citizen Fauchet's memory, too, was, it seems, furbished up by this *tête-à-tête*; for he tells us, in his certificate, that

"now, calling to mind all the circumstances to which the questions of Mr. Randolph call my attention, I have an intimate conviction that I was mistaken in the propositions which I supposed to have been made to me."

So here is a pretty story for you: Mr. Randolph forgets all about the flour-merchants, till he talks to citizen Fauchet; and citizen Fauchet for-

gets all about them, till he talks to Mr. Randolph ! Their memories, like a flint and steel, could bring forth no light but by friction with each other. If this do not prove a close connection, I do not know what does. Even " their minds," as the poet says, " in wedlock's bands were joined."

There is another singularity worth notice here. Citizen Fauchet's intercepted letter was written on the 31st of October 1794 ; and at that time (though it was just after the overtures were made), he did not recollect a word about the flour-men, nor about the machinations of the English : but, on the 27th of September 1795, that is to say, ten months and twenty-seven days afterwards, he has an *intimate conviction* of the whole matter ; and tells as good a tough story about it, as one can in conscience expect from a being that kneels down at the shrine of a jackass. Mr. Randolph, also, recollected nothing about it on the 19th of August ; but, in some thirty days after, it all came as pat into his head, as if it had but that moment happened.—Rhode-Island must be like the cave of the Dervise, where every one that entered saw, written in large characters, all the actions of his past life. If so, no wonder our adventurers made such haste to quit it.

I cannot dismiss this subject, without begging the reader once more to call to mind the sarcasms that citizen Fauchet pours out on the *changeable men*, who seconded the views of the Government with the most scandalous ostentation, who uttered resolutions and harangues without end, and who made excursions to collect troops, " as soon as it was decided that the French Republic purchased no men to do their *duty*." Mr. Randolph lays hold of this word *duty*, too, as a drowning man would of a straw, and to just as much purpose ; for if by this word citizen Fauchet meant the *real* duty of these haranguers, they were here in the performance of it. Their duty, their allegiance to the United States, required them to speak forcibly to the people, to second the declarations of the general Government, and, if ordered, to make excursions to collect troops ; and yet he tells us, or rather he tells the French government, that they did all this, " as soon as it was decided that the French Republic purchased no men to do their *duty*." Hence it is a clear case, that what he conceived to be their duty, and what he would have paid them to perform, if he had had money, was exactly the contrary of all this ; and exactly the contrary of this would have been an opposition to the general Government, its probable defeat and consequent destruction.

After all, to fix the blackest guilt on the conspirators, it is not necessary to prove what their precise intentions were. It is sufficient that we have the clearest evidence, that in consideration of some thousands of dollars, they would have enabled a foreign nation to decide *on civil war or on peace* for this country. After having, then, satisfied ourselves with respect to *who they are*, this is the crime we have to lay to their charge. All their asseverations, all their windings and subterfuges are vain : they will never wash away the stain as long as words shall retain their meaning, and as long as virtue shall hold her seat in our hearts, and reason in our minds.

I have already trespassed on the reader's patience much longer than I intended, and I fear longer than he will excuse ; but, as I have promised to take some notice of the Vindicator's attempt at recrimination, I must be as good as my word.

He has exerted his labyrinthian faculties to the utmost, in order to make it be believed, that the President of the United States ratified the

Treaty with Great Britain, under the influence of what he modestly terms, a British Faction. With this object in view, he says, as addressing himself to the President—

“ By my advice the United States would have been masters of all contingencies at the end of the campaign. To my unutterable astonishment, I soon discovered that you were receding from your *determination*. You had been reflecting upon your course from the 26th of June to the 16th of July: on the latter day you decided on it; a communication was made to the British Minister in conformity with it; letters were addressed to our own ministers in conformity to it; they were inspected by you before you rescinded your purpose: no imperious circumstances had arisen, except the strength of the popular voice, which would, according to ordinary calculation, corroborate, not reverse your former resolution; you assigned no new reasons for the new measures; and you disregarded the answer to Boston, although it had committed you upon a special fact, namely, a determination not to ratify during the existence of the provision-order. While I was searching for the cause of this singular revolution, and could not but remember that another opinion, which was always weighty with you, had advised you not to exchange ratifications until the provision-order should be abolished, or the American minister should receive further instructions, if it were not abolished; after duty had dictated to me an acquiescence in your *varied sentiments*, and I had prepared a memorial to Mr. Hammond adapted to them; after you had signed the ratification on the 18th of August; Mr. Fauchet's letter brought forth a solution of the whole affair; thence it was that *you were persuaded* to lay aside all *fear of a check* from the *friends of France*; thence it was that *myself and the French cause* were instantaneously abandoned.”

This appears to be the sum of Mr. Randolph's statement, the correctness of which is, at least, very doubtful; but, not to tire the reader with a discussion of little importance as to the main point, and in which I might possibly err, I shall take it for granted, that all that he has said and insinuated here is strictly true; and then his charge amounts to this: that the President, even after the decision of the Senate with respect to the treaty was known, hesitated, from the 26th of June to the 13th of July, as to what course he should pursue in regard to the ratification; that, on the day last mentioned, he came to a resolution not to ratify, until the order of his Britannic Majesty, for seizing provisions destined from this country to France, should be withdrawn; and that, notwithstanding this resolution, he did afterwards ratify, leaving the order in force, and that he was induced to this change of conduct from the discovery made by citizen Fauchet's intercepted letter.

Now, admitting all this to be so, it requires a greater degree of penetration than I am master of, to perceive how it proves the President to have ratified the treaty under the influence of a British faction, or any faction at all.

It would seem, that the Vindicator imagines, that, when a man has once taken a resolution, he can never change it, without incurring the censure of acting under some undue influence. How far such a maxim is from being founded in truth, the experience of every day will prove. A voluntary resolution must ever be supposed to be formed upon existing circumstances; and, of course, if any thing arises that totally alters those circumstances, it would be mere obstinacy to adhere to the resolution. If, for instance, a man determines on giving up a part of his income to a friend, and the next day finds that friend plotting against his life, must he, notwithstanding the discovery, put his determination in practice, or be subjected to the charge of acting under some undue influence? To maintain such a position appears to have been reserved for Mr. Ran-

dolph alone. The true question, therefore, is this : Was the discovery, made by citizen Fauchet's intercepted letter, sufficient to justify the President's altering his resolution, or not ?

The only objection that it is pretended the President ever had to ratify the treaty, as advised by the Senate, was, the existence of the order of the King of Great Britain for seizing provisions destined from this country to France ; because, he was given to understand, that ratifying while this order remained in force, might look like acknowledging the legality of the seizure, and might embroil the United States with the French Republic. That this was the suggestion of Mr. Randolph he now avows ; and he even owns, nay, boasts, that he never would have given his advice in favour of the ratification at all, if he had not remembered, " that " if the *people* were averse to the treaty, it was the constitutional right of " the House of Representatives to *refuse*, upon original grounds, *unsettled by the Senate and President*, to pass the laws *necessary for its " execution."*

He has been tempted to make this avowal in order to ingratiate himself with the opposition ; and the need they have of a man, able and willing to expose every secret of the Executive, may, perhaps, ensure him a momentary success ; but the avowal furnishes, at the same time, an irresistible proof of his double dealing. We plainly perceive from this, as well as from all the documents he has brought forward on the subject, that he was the great, if not the only cause, of the delaying of the ratification. First, he starts objections ; then proposes conferences between himself and the English Minister ; then he drafts memorials ; in short, he was taking his measures for undoing all that had been done, or, as Mr. Pickering well termed it, for " throwing the whole up in the wind."

The situation of the President was, at this time, truly critical. On the one hand, he saw an instrument ready for his signature, which completed the long-desired object, an amicable termination of all differences with Great Britain ; an object that twenty long years of war and disputation had not been able to accomplish : on the other hand, he was haunted with the feigned, but terrific forebodings of an artful Secretary of State, who lost no opportunity of representing the consummation of the act as a just cause of offence to France, the *faithful* ally of the United States, and the favourite of the people. At this embarrassing moment arrives the intercepted letter of citizen Fauchet. The charm, that held him in suspense, is at once dissolved. Here he sees that the hypocrite in whom he had confided, who first awakened doubts in his mind, who had been the cause of all the procrastination, and who had hitherto withheld his hand ; here he sees him at the head of a faction opposed to his government, unveiling all its most secret views to a foreign minister, and even making overtures for money, which, if acceded to, would have enabled that minister to decide on civil war or on peace for this country. Was it not natural to imagine, that he should now see the advice of this " pretended patriot " as a lure to lead him into a snare, to render the treaty abortive, and eventually plunge the United States into a war with Great Britain ? And was it not, then, I ask, as natural, that he should turn from it with indignation and horror ? " Hence it was," says the Vindicator, " that *myself* and the *French cause* were instantaneously abandoned." And, upon my soul, I think it was high time.

In this letter the President saw also, what it was he had to expect from the *friendship* of the regenerated French. Here he finds a foreign

minister writing a letter that breathes, from the first syllable of it to the last, the most treacherous hostility to the Federal government. He finds him caballing with some of the leading men in the state, reviling his administration; representing him as the head of an aristocracy; approving of an open rebellion; regretting its want of success, and that he had not the means of nourishing it. All this he sees addressed to the rulers of a nation professing the sincerest friendship for himself and the people of America. Was it possible that he should see any thing here to induce him to delay the ratification of an instrument, calculated to ensure peace and uninterrupted prosperity to his country, merely for the sake of obtaining an advantage for that nation? "Hence," says the Ex-Secretary, in his plaintive style, "hence it was that he was persuaded to lay aside all *fear of a check from the friends of France.*" And well he might; for, what more had he to fear from them? Open war with such people is as much preferable to their intrigues, as a drawn sword is preferable to a poisoned repast.

The Vindicator, pursuing his plan for opening to himself a welcome from the adverse party, insidiously brings forward the remonstrances against the Treaty as a reason that ought to have prevented its ratification. Few people, who consider how these remonstrances were obtained, ever looked upon them as a reason of any weight: but, whatever attention they might merit before the discovery made by the intercepted letter, they merited none at all afterwards; for, there was, and there is, all the reason in the world to believe, that they *originated* from the same all-powerful cause as did the suggestions, difficulties, and delays of the Vindicator. He would fain persuade us, indeed, that no money-overtures ever passed between him and citizen Fauchet, after the little affair of the flour-merchants; but the method he takes of doing this is rather calculated to produce admiration at his effrontery, than conviction of his repentance. Addressing himself to the President he says—

"Do you believe, Sir, that if money was pursued by the Secretary of State, he would have been rebuffed by an answer, which *implied no refusal*; and would not have renewed the proposition: which, however, Mr. Fauchet confesses, *he never heard of again?*"

I do not know what the President might believe of the Secretary of State; but one would imagine that even such a rebuff as the Vindicator met with would have prevented any man from returning to the charge; however, I shall not contradict him here, as he must understand these things better than I, or, perhaps, any other man living.

After this, it is diverting to hear citizen Fauchet solemnly declare [in his *certificate*, mind that], "that the *morals of his nation*, and the *candour of his government*, severely forbid the use of money in any circumstances, which could not be *publicly avowed.*"

Consummate impudence! The *morals* of a nation that do not now so much as know the meaning of the word! The *morals* of a nation that, one day in the year, have *hemp* for their God! And the *candour* of his government, too! A pretty sort of candour, truly, to profess the tenderest affection for the President and Congress, while they were preparing to blow them all up. While they were endeavouring to foster a nest of conspirators, who would have sent them all to the guillotine, like the magistrates of Geneva, or swung them up in the embraces of their elastic god: From the *morals* and *candour* of such people, God defend us!

When citizen Fauchet informed the Convention of the great bargains that were offered him here, when they found at what a low rate "the consciences of the pretended patrons of America" were selling off, it would be to contradict every maxim of trade, to suppose that the purity of their principles, and the morals of their nation, would prevent them from enabling him to make a purchase; and particularly at the important moment, when the Treaty with Great Britain was to be ratified or rejected. There was, indeed, one difficulty; and that was, the Treasury of the Convention was nearly as empty as father Joseph's purse, or the pouch of his mendicant pilgrim. And, as to assignats, besides their being a tell-tale currency, they never would, as we have no guillotine in the country, have been convertible into food and raiment; so that, of course, they would have been as despicable and despised waste paper, as the *Aurora* of Philadelphia, the *Argus* of New-York, or *Chronicle* of Boston. This difficulty, however, formidable as it was, appeared as nothing in competition with the object in view. We may well suppose that their indefatigable financiers would make a last effort; would give the nation another squeeze, to come at the means of defeating the Treaty. They have a greater variety of imposts than Mr. Hamilton or even Mr. Pitt; and in a pressing occasion like the one before us, they had only to set the national razor* at work for two or three days, upon the heads of the bankers and merchants, to collect the sum required: or, if these should be grown scarce, a drowning of four or five thousand women might bring them in ear-bobs and other trinkets † sufficient to stir up fifty town-meetings, and to cause two-thirds of the Federal Senators to be roasted in effigy.

Let any one look at the conduct of the leaders in this opposition to the treaty, and believe, if he can, that they were not actuated by some powerful motive which they dared not openly to avow. They began to emit their anathemas against it, long before it was even laid before the Senate. Mr. Randolph protests, that he never divulged its contents to any one. How he came to imagine this unasked-for declaration necessary in his Vindication, I know not; but this I know, that almost every article of it was attacked in the democratic papers, *immediately after it was received by the President*, and that too with such a confidence of its being what it has since appeared to be, that it requires something more than the protestation of Mr. Randolph, to persuade me that it was not divulged before its appearance from Mr. Bache's press.

And who has forgotten the diligence of the opposers, the moment the treaty was published? Did they give it time to circulate? Did they let it come before the people as public acts in general do, and leave them to form a fair and unprejudiced opinion on it? On the contrary, was not every spring put in motion to prepossess them; to fix in their minds a

* The guillotine was called the national razor.

† It appears from a relation of the transactions at Nantz, that, in that city only, more than three thousand women were either drowned or shot, in the space of a few months, merely for the sake of their rings, &c. Their murderers, as is often the case, quarrelled, when they came to divide the booty, published accusations against each other, and so the world has been informed of the "*pure principles of the Republic; the morals of the nation!*"

The American ladies will do well to be upon their guard with respect to French baubles; for it is very probable that their lovely persons may bear about them ornaments torn from the bleeding ears and fingers of those females, who were formerly beloved and respected like themselves.

hatred to the measure, that truth would not be able to remove? How can we account for individuals quitting their homes, neglecting their business, and sacrificing to *appearance*, their interests, to carry this instrument to the extremities of the Union, and there form combinations against it in order to intimidate the President from a ratification?

Will any one believe, then, that the President, with this on his mind, stood in need of British influence to determine on a ratification? What other determination could he possibly take? Was he, though he saw the pit open before his eyes, to plunge headlong into it? Was he, after having discovered the conspiracy, tamely to yield to its machinations, and assist in the ruin of his country? There was but one course for him to pursue to make the Government respected, and blast all the hopes of the conspirators, and that was to ratify the Treaty. By this act he preserved to us the inestimable blessings of peace, gave stability to the Constitution, not only for *one*, but for many *sessions*, by a legal and manly exercise of the powers it has vested in him, convinced the French that the interests of the Union are not to be sacrificed to her vengeance and caprice, and showed to the whole world, that we wish to live in friendship with all nations, but that we are determined to be the slaves of none. And yet this act, Mr. Randolph would persuade us, was the work of a British faction!

Thus has the Vindicator failed in all his attempts. On the article of corruption, of which we before doubted, we now doubt no longer; and as to his indirect accusation against the President, it only serves to show that one who, with unblushing front, can ask a bribe, will never be ashamed to publish his ingratitude and apostacy.

REMARKS ON THE BLUNDERBUSS.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—The “Remarks on the Blunderbuss,” is a paper contained in the sixth number of the “*Political Censor*,” and it consists of an answer to a long string of accusations against the President and Government of America by the French Minister ADET, in consequence of the Treaty with England. It closes that affair. We have seen that the French ministers, GENET and FAUCHET, attempted to enlist America on the side of France by divers means, and we have seen how they failed. We here see that their successor, ADET, attempted to move some internal strife by way of punishment to WASHINGTON’S Government for the course which it pursued with regard to the Treaty. ADET published his notes, in the American newspapers as a kind of appeal to the people; and Mr. COBBETT collected them in the fifth number of the “*Political Censor*,” giving them the title of the “*Gros Mousqueton Diplomatique*,” or, “*Diplomatic Blunderbuss*,” to which he prefixed the following Preface.

PREFACE.

WHEN we see an unprincipled, shameless bully, “A dog in forehead, and in heart a deer,” who endeavours, by means of a big look, a threatening aspect, and a thundering voice, to terrify peaceable men into a compliance with what he has neither a right to demand, nor power nor courage to enforce, and who, at the same time, acts in such a bungling, stupid manner, as to excite ridicule and contempt in place of fear; when we see such a gasconading, impudent bluff as this (and that we do every day), we call him a *Blunderbuss*. But, the reader will not, I hope, have conceived me so devoid of all decency and prudence, as to imagine, even for a moment, that it is in this degrading sense that the name of *Blunderbuss* has been given to the invaluable collection which I here present to

the public. Indeed, it is so evident that I could mean no such thing, that this declaration seems hardly necessary; but, as my poor old grandmother used to say, "A burnt child dreads the fire," and after the unrelenting severities of misconception and misconstruction, that a humane and commiserating public have so often seen me endure, they will think it very natural for me to fear, that what I really intended as a compliment, would, if left unexplained, be tortured into insult and abuse, if not into the horrid crime of lèze-republicanism, at the very idea of which my hair stands on end, and my heart dies within me.

"But," cry the democrats, "in what sense, then, do you apply the word *Blunderbuss*? Come, come, Mr. Peter, none of your shuffling."—Silence, you yelping devils; go, growl in your dark kennel; slink into your straw, and leave me to my reader: I'll warrant I explain myself to his satisfaction.

Writings of a hostile nature are often metaphorically expressed, in proportion to the noise they make, by different instruments that act by explosion. Thus it is, for instance, that an impotent lampoon is called a *Poppun*; and that a biting paragraph or epigram, confined to a small circle, is termed a *squib*; and thus it is, that, rising in due progression, the collection of CITIZEN ADËT'S Notes and Cockade Proclamation is denominated a *Blunderbuss*, a species of fire-arms that exceeds all others, manageable by a single hand, in the noise of its discharge.

If we pursue the metaphor, we shall find the application still more strikingly happy. The *first Note* is a kind of preparative for the *Cockade Proclamation*, and this latter adjusts matters for the *grand explosion*; or, in the military style,—

Make Ready!

Present!

Fire!

To be sure we are not dead, but this circumstance, instead of mutilating my metaphor, renders it complete; for of all the long list of fire-arms, none is so difficult to adjust, or makes so much noise and smoke, with so little execution, as a *Blunderbuss*.

This is the first time, I believe, that a Preface ever turned its eyes backwards, and talked about the title till there was no room left to say a word about the book. Indeed the book stands in little need of commendation, or of any thing else, except what I am determined shortly to bestow on it, in a manner worthy of its merits.

In the succeeding number, he answered the charges which it contains against the President and his Government. The paper contains the substance of ADËT'S charges, as well as the answer, so that we need not insert the official notes of the French Minister. As this paper closes the affair of the British Treaty, we have taken it a little out of its order in the original work, and shall give in our next number a paper written in answer to attacks on Mr. COBBETT, which, strictly following chronological order, should have come in before this one. The "Remarks" contain one argument which we think will of itself repay the reader; we mean that on the doctrine of allegiance, which is so correctly stated that it would do credit to the soundest lawyer or statesman, as is fully verified by the fact, that numerous decisions have been made by the courts of law in England and America since it was written, all of which agree in the principles here laid down. It is put to the reader in so plain, so forcible, and so eloquent a manner, that, if nothing more, it is a model of good writing, and therefore deserves to be preserved.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.—As nothing is more gratifying than the *applause*, or profitable than the *admonition*, of good men, I have reason to congratulate myself on an abundance of both; but as applause ought never to be purchased with money, and as admonition is a commodity that every one is ready to bestow *gratis*, I must request that future communications of this kind may come to me *post free*.—I also beg leave to hint to those who give me advice, which they wish I should follow, not to do it in too dictatorial a style; for, if I have any good qualities, docility, I am afraid, is not to be numbered amongst them.

The moment the Gallic usurpers had murdered their sovereign, and, from the vilest walks in life, mounted into his seat, they assumed the tone of masters to the Government of the United States. Their style has softened, it is true; but the general tenor of it has regularly approached towards that loftiest note, that *ne plus ultra* of insolence, which it attained in *Citizen Adet's* last communications.

In offering my sentiments on these arrogant effusions of upstart tyranny, I feel an unusual degree of diffidence: a diffidence that does not arise from any fear I entertain of the citizen or his factious adherents, or even of the "*terrible nation*," to use his own words, of which he was lately the worthy representative, but from a consciousness of my inability to do justice to the subject. The keenest satire, were I master of it, would fall blunted from such hardened impudence, such pure unadulterated brass as it would here have to encounter. Terms of reproach are not yet invented, capable of expressing the resentment that every man, who has the least respect for the Government, ought to feel on this occasion.

Thus voluntarily to interfere in a correspondence between a foreign minister and the officers of state, might, under other circumstances, appear rather a bold intrusion; but, the citizen's having communicated his papers *to the people*, at the same time, if not before, they reached the Secretary of State, happily precludes the necessity of an apology.

The notes on which I am about to remark, to which, collected together, I affixed the title of *Diplomatic Blunderbuss*, are intended chiefly to notify to the people of America, that the French rulers are angry with the Federal Government, and that, in consequence of this anger, they have ordered citizen Adet to suspend his functions as minister, till the Government shall alter its conduct, or, in the pedagogue style, mend its manners.

In the 44th page of the *Blunderbuss*, the citizen makes a recapitulation of the offences that have brought on us this dreadful chastisement, this political excommunication; and it will not appear a little surprising, that some of them have existed ever since the birth of the French Republic, notwithstanding the love and esteem this outlandish lady has ever expressed towards her sister America.

These offences, amounting to seven in number, are as follows:

1. The Federal Government *put in question*, whether it should execute the treaties, or receive the agents of the *rebel* and proscribed *princes*.
2. It made a proclamation of *insidious* neutrality.
3. By its *chicaneries*, it *abandoned* French privateers to its courts of justice.
4. It eluded the amicable mediation of the French Republic for breaking the chains of the American citizens in Algiers.
5. It *allowed* the French colonies to be declared in a state of blockade, and *allowed* the citizens of America to be interdicted the right of trading to them.
6. It eluded all the advances made by the French Republic for renewing the *treaties of commerce* upon a more favourable footing to both nations.
7. It anticipated Great Britain, by soliciting a treaty, in which treaty it prostituted its neutrality; it sacrificed France to her enemies, or rather, looking upon her as obliterated from the chart [map] of the world, it forgot the services she had rendered it, and threw aside the duty of gratitude, as if ingratitude was a governmental duty.

These are the heinous crimes of which the Federal Government stands charged by the sultans of France. Let us now, if they will permit us, examine these crimes, one by one, and see whether the President, and Messrs. Hamilton, Knox, Jay, Pickering and Walcot, really deserve to be guillotined, or not.

“1. *The Federal Government put in question, whether it should execute the treaties, or receive the agents of the rebel and proscribed princes.*”

The King of France was murdered on the 21st of January, 1793. Information of this event could not be received here much before the 18th of April, and it was on that day the President submitted to his council, the questions of which the above charge forms the substance.

The treaties here spoken of were made with Louis XVI., whose minister, at the time these questions were proposed for consideration, was resident at Philadelphia. The President knew, indeed, that the king was dead; but he, at the same time, knew that the treaties were binding on the United States in behalf of his lawful “*heirs and successors,*” and he certainly knew that Pétion, Danton, Roland, Clavière, Condorcet, Brissot, and the innumerable horde of bloody usurpers who have come after them, were not those “*heirs and successors!*” He also knew, that even the whole French nation could not, in the sense of the treaties, become the “*heirs and successors*” of Louis XVI., and, though treaties, made with a monarch, *may* remain in force with the nation under a new form of government, yet this is, as most assuredly it ought to be, entirely at the option of the other contracting party. The American government had, therefore, an indisputed right to refuse to execute, in behalf of the French nation, treaties made with their sovereign alone.

If we turn back a little, we shall find this very audacious and unprincipled Convention, whose minister was coming to Philadelphia, publicly deliberating, “*whether the treaties, made with the tyrant Louis, were binding on the regenerated nation, or not.*” This question was determined *in the negative*, and accordingly the treaty with Holland was immediately violated. And yet they will not permit the poor Government of America to debate about any such thing, nor even to talk of it in secret, though the result be in their own favour! Let it be remembered, too, that Genet came authorized to make *new treaties*, a pretty certain proof, that the Convention did not call in question the right of the Government to refuse to adhere to the old ones. It is a proof of more; it is a proof that they expected that it would make the refusal. Would to God their expectation had been realized!

I will not go so far as to say, that the Federal government was fully justified in its *decision* on this important subject;* but I insist that its conduct evinced the utmost partiality for the new *Republic*. When Genet arrived here, it was far from being ascertained that the whole, or even a majority, of the French nation, approved of the murder of their sovereign, or had abandoned the cause of his successors. The Government of America had, but a few months before, beheld them raising their hands to heaven, and swearing to die, if necessary, in defence of their king. Their constitution, establishing an *hereditary monarchy*, had been voluntarily formed, and solemnly sanctioned by the whole nation,

* See MARTENS'S *Law of Nations*, p. 56.—Ed.

amidst festivals and *Te Deums*, and had been officially communicated to the world. Each member of the Assembly, as well as every individual Frenchman, had repeatedly sworn "to maintain this constitution with all his might." Laws had been made, punishing with transportation all who refused to take the oath, and till then unheard-of cruelties had been exercised on the non-jurors. After all this, was it astonishing that the Federal government should, for a moment, hesitate to believe, that the nation was really become a Republic, and that this constitution, about which there had been so much noise, and rejoicing, and feasting, and singing, and swearing, should be so completely destroyed as to leave neither remnant nor rag visible?

The Government had the interests of America to attend to in this important decision, as well as those of France. A weighty debt was due from this country, not to the regenerated nation nor to its bloodthirsty tyrants, but to Louis XVI., *his heirs and successors*. A minister from the Republic once admitted, a claim of the interest of the debt could not be refused; and if the volatile and perjured nation had recalled the successor of their sovereign, would not that successor have demanded, and with justice, a second payment of such interest? This has not *yet* happened, but it does not follow that it might not have happened. In the common affairs of men, he who has been once convicted of perjury, is never after looked upon as credible; and the same rule is applicable to societies.

Republicanism is become, for what reason I know not, synonymous with *freedom and happiness*, and there are thousands among us who pretend to believe, notwithstanding the terrible example before their eyes, that men cannot be enslaved under a form of government that is called republican. Mr. Adams, in his *Defence of the American Constitutions*, vol. 1, p. 87, says:

"Our countrymen *will never run delirious after a word or a name*. The name "*Republic*" is given to things in their nature as different and contradictory as light and darkness, truth and falsehood, virtue and vice, happiness and misery. "*There are free republics, and republics as tyrannical as an oriental despotism.*"—

How fully is the truth of these observations exemplified in the republics of America and France! But even this wise and deep-sighted civilian could not imagine that his countrymen would ever run delirious after a name; much less could he imagine, that he should live to see many of them extolling, as the paragon of republics, a system of tyranny that has all the appearance of being an instrument of the wrath of Heaven.

I shall dismiss this first charge against the Government, with observing, that the meanness equals the impudence of making it.

"2. *The Government made a proclamation of insidious neutrality.*"

This charge is as false as it is rude. I would beg this well-informed and polite citizen, to name one single instance of the insincerity of the Federal government, in enforcing this proclamation. As applied to the conduct of some part of the people, indeed, the neutrality might be called *insidious*; but then, this insidiousness operated in favour of the French and not against them. There were many who highly approved of the proclamation, and who at the same time actually made war upon the enemies of France. An army of Americans, under the authority of Genet, invaded the Spanish territories, while privateers were fitted out to cruise on the British: cargoes of ammunition and arms were shipped off, and thanksgivings, and other public demonstrations of joy, were heard

from one end of the Union to the other. The bells of the good old Christian church, opposite me, fired rounds to celebrate the inundation of the atheistical barbarians into Holland; and the English flag was burnt at Philadelphia, on the public square, as a sacrifice to the goddess of French liberty. These latter circumstances are trifling in themselves, 'tis true, and certainly excited nothing but contempt and ridicule, in the minds of those whom they were intended to insult; but, the question is (and it is to ask this question that they are here mentioned), what would the French, that "terrible nation," have said, had these insults, these marks of an *insidious* neutrality, been offered to them? Every opprobrious term in their new-fangled vocabulary would have been heaped on our heads. How many *sacrés matins*, and *jean-f—tres*, and *f—tus chiens*, and *libertécides*, and *neutralitécides*, would they have called the poor *Anglo-Americans*, in the course of a *Decade*!

Where a breach of neutrality, cognizable by the laws, appeared, the Federal government always did its utmost to bring the offenders to justice, and it is for this very reason, that the late diplomatic Mounseer has dared to accuse it of an insidious neutrality. After the proclamation was issued, and Genet saw that there was no hope of setting it aside by inciting the people to rebellion, he feigned an acquiescence, and declared that the Convention did not wish the prosperity of their dear brethren of America to be interrupted by a participation in the war. It entered into his delirious brain, that the proclamation was to be a mere cloak, under which he thought to enlist as many soldiers and arm as many privateers as he could pay for. Such a neutrality would, indeed, have been more advantageous to France than an open declaration of war on the part of the United States; but when he found that the Government was resolved to enforce the proclamation; when he found that his pirates were not permitted to rob and plunder with impunity, and that the American harbours were not to serve them as hiding places, whence they might sally out upon poor old John Bull, as their great predecessor did upon the bevees of Hercules; then he began to foam and *sacré Dieu* against the *libertécide* government, for "neutralizing the zeal of the citizens and "punishing the generous children of liberty, for flying to the relief of "their mother, when she was upon the point of violation by a horde of "crowned monsters."

The only breach of neutrality with which the Federal government can possibly be charged, is, the liquidation of the French debt. This favour, as beneficial to France as it was apparently hazardous to the United States, would have been acknowledged by citizen Adet and his masters, had they not been as ignorant of the law of nations as of the laws of politeness and decency. Citizen Genet, when he opened the negotiation, promised that every farthing of the debt, if liquidated, should be *expended in the country*, and, for once, I believe, contrary to the German proverb, the Frenchman kept his word; for, except what was retained for the unavoidable daily hire of *Poor Richard*, and some few other items, I believe every single sous of it went among the *Flour Merchants*. What think you, Mr. Dallas? Come now, d—n it, tell the truth for once in your life. Be frank with your countrymen, and we'll make up all old grievances.—Well, you may be as sulky as you please; I believe it; or your friend Fauchet never would have stood, like a bilked cully, with his pocket turned inside out, when he could have purchased a delicious civil war with a few thousand dollars.

But, to return to my subject ; whether this liquidation were a breach of neutrality, in a rigorous sense, or not, every real friend of America must rejoice at its being effected. It was one effort towards shaking off a *dependence* that yet hangs about our necks like a millstone. One of our poets has called a *dun* "a horrid monster, hated of gods and men." Exactly such was Genet, when he first arrived, and such would have been his successors, had not the clamorous creditors (or rather claimants) been silenced by a discharge of the debt. This the Government undoubtedly foresaw, and therefore wisely resolved to relieve us from their importunities. But there is another debt of enormous magnitude, that still remains ; I mean the debt of *gratitude* due from this country to the regenerated French. This we shall never liquidate, while there is a Frenchman left to ask, or an American to give. It is incalculable in its amount, and eternal in its duration ; we will therefore leave it to pass down the stream of time along with the *insidious neutrality*.

"3. *The Government, by its chicaneries, abandoned French privateers to its courts of justice.*"

This is, I tremblingly presume, the "terrible" style, and is therefore looked upon as sufferable in a minister from a "terrible nation;" but I am pretty confident, it would be suffered with impunity in no other. Some writer on the *belles lettres*, I believe it is Burke, observes, that terror is a property of the sublime, and I am sure that insolence is a property of the terrible. I know not precisely what punishment the law of nations has awarded for such language, but I should imagine it can be nothing short of breaking of bones. A good Irish sheeley or Devonshire quarter-staff seems much better calculated for answering a charge like this than a pen.—*The chicaneries of the Government!—Abandoning privateers to courts of justice!*—If this does not deserve a rib-roasting, I do not know what does. If this goes off so, then I say there is no such thing as justice on this side the grave.

Does the general Government of America then act by *chicane*? Does General Washington, whose integrity, whose inflexible firmness and whose undaunted bravery have been acknowledged and admired as far as his name has reached, merit to be put on a level with a miserable pettifogger? And is a cause *abandoned*, because it is submitted to an *American court of judicature*? Are both judges and juries in this country so very, very corrupt, that no justice can be expected from their decisions? Are we so nearly like Sodom and Gomorrah that twelve honest men are not to be found among us?

An accusation may be so completely absurd and impudent, that no one can attempt to refute it, without sinking, in some degree, towards a level with the accuser; and as I have no inclination to do this, I leave the present one to be answered by the indignation of the reader.

"4. *The Government eluded the amicable mediation of the French Republic for breaking the chains of the American citizens in Algiers.*"

Every one who recollects the anxiety which the President has ever expressed on the subject of a treaty with Algiers, the innumerable obstacles he had to surmount, and the enormous expense by means of which it was at last effected, need not be told that this charge is as ill-founded as the preceding ones. But as it is intended to bring forward to the people a proof of the friendship of France, at the moment her hatred and hostility

are evident to every eye, in this point of view it may be worth while to hear what the citizen has to say in support of it.

He tells us that—

“ the French government, zealous of giving to the United States proofs of its attachment, had commenced negotiations with the regency of Algiers, in order to put an end to the war which that power was making on the commerce of the United States :”

That the Minister for Foreign Affairs instructed Fauchet (the very Fauchet who expressed his regret that the Western rebellion did not succeed) to communicate to the Federal government the steps which that of France had taken in this respect, which he did in the following terms, on the 4th of June 1794 :—

“ I have already had the pleasure, sir, to inform you, verbally, of *the interest* which the committee of public safety of the National Convention *had early taken* in the truly unhappy situation of your commerce in the Mediterranean. “ I now fulfil the duty imposed on me by the Government, by calling to your *recollection* in writing, the steps which are to be taken by our agent with the Dey of Algiers, for repressing this new manœuvre of the British administration, which has put the finishing stroke to its proofs of malevolence towards free people. The dispatch of the Minister *communicating this measure* to me, is dated the 5th January 1794, and did not come to my hands till fifteen days ago ; *I do not yet know by what route* ; I could have wished it had been less tardy in coming to me, that I might sooner have fulfilled the agreeable task of proving to you by facts, the protestations of friendship of which I have so often spoken in the name of the Republic of France.

“ The information which I shall receive from Europe in a little time, *will doubtless possess me of the success of those negotiations which were to have been opened* in January last. If the situation of your affairs is yet such with respect to that barbarous regency, as that our intervention may be of some utility, *I pray you to invite the President to cause to be communicated to me the means that he will join to those of the committee of public safety*, for the greatest success of *the measures already taken*. It is in virtue of the express request of the Minister that I solicit of the President *some communication on this subject* ; I shall be satisfied to be able to transmit it by a very early conveyance which I am now preparing for France.”

The Secretary of State replied to him on the 6th June 1794, by a letter of which the following is an extract :—

“ Your other letter of the 4th of June, is a powerful demonstration of the interest which the Republic of France takes in our welfare. I will frankly communicate to you our measures and expectations with regard to Algiers ; but *as you will so soon receive the detail of those measures*, which your Government has pursued in our behalf, it will be better perhaps to postpone our interview on this matter, *until the intelligence which you further expect shall arrive*.”

First, observe here, that Adet tells the people that somebody in France, no matter who, *had actually commenced negotiations* with the regency of Algiers in behalf of their countrymen. To prove this, he quotes a letter of Fauchet, in which this latter begs to call to the recollection of the Federal Government “ the steps which *are to be taken*,” and not the steps which are taken. Afterwards Fauchet, presuming on what has been done since his latest instructions came away, talks in the very same letter, about measures *already taken* ; but is unable to say any thing about the nature or success of them, until he receives *further information* from Europe, which he makes no doubt is upon the point of arriving.—Now, is it not very surprising that this further information never came to hand, from that day to this ? And is it not still more surprising, that no traces of

this friendly mediation, of these steps that *were to be* taken, and those measures that *were already* taken, should ever be discovered by the American Envoy to Algiers? When the French do what they can possibly construe into an act of generosity, they are not very apt to keep it hidden from the world, or to suffer the obliged party to remain unreminded of it.

But, let us hear how Master Adet accounts for his worthy predecessor's receiving no *further information* relative to this generous interference in our behalf. Fauchet told the Government he was in daily expectation of it, and yet it never came. How will citizen Adet get out of this? We have him fairly hemmed up in a corner here; and he has a devilish deal more wit than I take him to have if he gets himself decently out of it.—He tells us that the French government had taken measures for the relief of the captives, that the mediation was in a charming train, that Fauchet communicated this pleasing intelligence to the President, who waited with anxious expectation for further information, which Fauchet hourly expected to receive, and that

“ *then* Mr. Jay was charged to negotiate with the British government.”

Well, and what then?—Why,

“ *and then* citizen Fauchet did *not receive* any communication on the subject.”

What?—O, oh! and so *then*, it seems Mr. Jay's being appointed to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with King George, prevented the *agreeable information*, “ the facts proving the sincerity of the French protestations of friendship ” from being received! and did so completely do away all those steps which *were to be* taken, and which *were taking*, and which *had already been taken*, that they were never after heard of! Surprising, that the United States should have chilled, should have perished even, the zealous interest that France took in their distresses, merely because they wished to avoid still greater distresses by an amicable negotiation elsewhere!

Let us recur to him also. A lie that is bound down to *dates* is difficult to be successfully kept up.

The committee of public safety (it should have been called the committee of public misery) instructed citizen Fauchet on the 5th of January 1794, to inform the American government that they were about taking means for “ breaking the chains of our captive citizens in Algiers.” This “ proof of the protestations of their friendship ” did not come to Fauchet's hands till the 4th of the ensuing June, just five months to an hour; and when it did at last arrive, citizen Fauchet *could not tell by what route!*—A pretty story this, and a pretty sort of ambassador to receive dispatches of such importance, without knowing *by whom* or *by what route*. Let Citizen Adet and his worthy predecessor, Father Joseph, go and impose such humbug tales upon the poor stupid enslaved Hollanders and Genevese, they will find few such gulls here.

Again: how could the appointment of Mr. Jay prevent the reception of *further information*, if such information was daily expected? Robespierre and his bloody colleagues, who felt such a tender concern for the captives, could not hear of this appointment sooner than about two months after it took place; the information promised, as they say, on the 5th of January, must therefore have been on the way; and what then, I would be glad to know, prevented its coming to hand? That it *never* did come to hand Master Adet has confessed; and we must inevitably con-

clude therefrom, that it was never either promised on that side of the water, or expected on this.—These dates form a net in which the citizen has hampered himself. He had got the *Messidors* and the *Fructidors* into his brains, and could he have got them into ours also, could he have made us adopt the bestial calendar of *Poor Richard*, we might have lost our account too; but by sticking to the good old June and January we have caught him out.

The motive for advancing the charge at this time is, to instil into the minds of the people, that the President felt extremely indifferent as to the fate of the captives. This base, this calumnious, this insufferably insolent insinuation, I leave to the resentment of those for whose sake he has undergone every toil and every hardship, has a thousand times ventured his life, and, what is more, has patiently borne the viperous bite of ingratitude.

“5. *The Government allowed the French colonies to be declared in a state of blockade, and allowed the citizens of America to be interdicted the right of trading to them.*”

It is a wonder citizen Adet did not swell the list here. He might, with equal reason, have complained that the Federal government *allowed* the British to conquer the half of these colonies; that they *allowed* Lords Howe, Hood, and Bridport, to destroy their fleets; and that they *allowed* Prince Charles to beat and pursue their boasting army. He might have complained, that they are about to *allow* the sans-culotte General Moreau to be Burgoyned, and the ruffian Buonaparte and his wolfish comrades to leave their lank carcasses in Italy, which I hope and believe will be *allowed*. Had he complained that they *allowed* it to rain, to snow, and to thunder, his complaint would not have been more absurd than it now is.

But the Government also *allowed* “the American citizens to be interdicted the right of trading to these colonies.”—As to the *power* of preventing this, the same may be said as of the prohibitions above supposed; and as to the *right* of preventing it, if the power had existed, nothing can be said, unless we knew the exact state of the blockades to which the citizen alludes, but of which his *Blunderbuss* gives no particular account.

When a place or an island is actually invested in such a manner as to enable the besieger to prevent neutrals from entering, he has a right, according to the immemorially established law of nations, not only to exercise this power of prevention, but to seize on and confiscate both goods and vessels, and even to inflict corporal punishment on all those who transgress his prohibition.* That the British have sometimes declared places in a state of siege which were not really invested has often been asserted, but never proved; but it is well known, on the other hand, that they never went to the rigour of the law of nations with those who had the temerity to disregard their prohibitions, in attempting to enter places which were completely blockaded.

Numerous complaints of captures, made at the entrance of the ports of an island, amount to a pretty strong presumptive proof that the captor has formed an actual investiture. If he has done this, he certainly has a right to declare it; and it follows, of course, that no neutral power has a right to take offence at his declaration. When one of the neutral captains complained that the British *intercepted and seized on every vessel* that attempted to enter the port of St. Pierre’s, and, in the very same let-

ter, inveighed against the *illegality of their declaring the place in a state of blockade*, he talked like a good honest tar; and when we hear a public minister echoing the complaint we may pardon his ignorance, but we cannot help wishing, at the same time, that he had been sent to hand, reef and steer, stew up lobscons, or swab the deck, rather than to pester us with his boorish grumbling and tarpauling logic.

Where a merchant, or a mariner, through love to the besieged, or hatred to the besieger, through avarice or through indiscretion, has lost his property by an endeavour to elude the prohibition of trading to a blockaded place, it is very natural, and therefore perhaps excusable, in him to be vociferous in complaint against the injustice of the captor; but it is not quite so natural or excusable in his government to participate in his resentment, and plunge the nation into a war to avenge him. Were the harmony of nations to be disturbed by the passions of individuals, peace must take her flight to heaven, for she would never find a resting place on the face of the earth.

It is, however, certain that very many of the captures made by the British cruisers were contrary to the law of nations, and therefore called for the interposition of the general Government. And has not that Government interposed? Yes; and so effectually too, that a mode of indemnification, as equitable and as honourable as either party could wish for, has been firmly settled on. Supposing then, for a moment, that France had a right to make inquiries on the subject, what more does she want? Strange as it may seem to those who are inattentive to the intrigues of this at once volatile, ferocious, and artful republic, it is the success of the negotiation by which this very indemnification was obtained that has occasioned the charge now preferred by her minister! The French, or rather the French usurpers, rejoiced at the British depredations on the commerce of this country; nothing was farther from their wishes than to see the sufferers indemnified. They were in hopes of a rupture being produced between Britain and America, and they are now foaming at their disappointment.

To this charge respecting blockades and the seizure of American vessels may be added that which citizen Adet makes with regard to the impressment of seamen from on board of those and other vessels.

The complaint against British impressments has so often been the subject of public debate and private animadversion that it would seem unnecessary to dwell on it here; yet, as I do not recollect ever having seen it placed in a fair point of view, to attempt doing it at this time can be productive of no harm.

The impressed seamen were of two descriptions, *British subjects* and *American subjects*, or (if my readers like the term better) *American citizens*. This distinction is a very important one, because on it totally depends the legality or illegality of the impressment.

It is an established and universally acknowledged principle, that, to the lawful sovereign power of the state, or, in other words, the state itself in which a man is born, he owes allegiance to the day of his death, unless exempted therefrom by the consent of that sovereign power.* This

* We do not know where this important question of law has been argued with so much force as in these pages, nor where it is laid down with greater accuracy. The maxim of the English law has always been, "*Nemo potest exuere patriam*" [No one can cast off his country], and we refer the reader who would examine it further, to *HALE'S Pleas of the Crown*, vol. 1, p. 68; *FOSTER'S Crown Law*, pp. 60,

principle is laid down by nature herself, and is supported by justice and general policy. A man, who is not dead to every sentiment that distinguishes him from the brute, feels himself attached to his native land by ties but very little weaker than those which bind him to his parents, and he who can deny the one will make little scruple of denying the other. For the truth of the former remark I appeal to the heart of my reader, and for the truth of the latter to his daily observation.—Who would not regard as a monster the ungrateful wretch that should declare he was no longer the son of his father? And yet this is but one step from pretending to shake off his allegiance to his country. Such declarations may be made, but the debt of duty and allegiance remains undiminished.

And is it not *just* that the state which has bred, nourished, and protected you, should have a title to your allegiance? A fool might say, as I heard a philosophical fool lately say, with Godwin's *Political Justice* in his hand, "I could not avoid being born in your state." But, ungrateful fool, the state might have avoided sheltering you under its wings, and suffering you to grow up to manhood. It might have expelled you the society, cast you out to live among the beasts, or have thrown you into the sea, had it not been withheld by that law, that justice, which now sanctions its claim on your allegiance. To say that you "*never asked for protection,*" is the same thing as to say that you *never asked to be born.* Had your very first cry been a renunciation of protection, it would not have invalidated the claim of the state; for you were protected in your mother's womb. Should the state now withdraw its protection from you, and leave you to the mercy of the plunderer and assassin, or drive you out from its boundaries, without any forfeiture on your part, would you not exclaim against such a step as an act of brutal injustice? And yet this is no more unjust than for you to withdraw your allegiance, cast the state from you, and leave it to the mercy of its foes. The obligation here is perfectly reciprocal; as the state cannot, by its own arbitrary will, withhold that protection which is the birthright of every individual subject, so no subject can, by his arbitrary will, alienate that allegiance which is the right of the state.

The *general policy*, too, the mutual interest of nations in supporting this principle is so evident, that nothing but the influence of the wild and barbarian doctrines of the regenerated French can account for its having been disputed.—If men could alienate their allegiance at pleasure, they could also transfer it at pleasure; and then into what confusion would not mankind be plunged? Where should we look for the distinctive mark of nations, and where find the standard of right and of duty?

Let us illustrate the excellence of this policy by an example of what might result from its contrary, and at the same time bring the question home to America.—It is very natural that the people of this country should wish to draw the seamen from other countries and claim them as hers, but let us see how this doctrine would suit when brought into operation against herself.—Suppose a war (which God forbid!) should break out between America and Great Britain, and that some of the citizens or

184; COKE upon LITTLETON, 198; BLACKSTONE'S *Commentaries*, vol. 1, p. 370; REEVES, in CHALMERS'S *Opinions*, vol. 2, p. 455; KENT, *American Laws*, vol. 2, p. 43; and to the judgment of Mr. Justice BAYLEY, in the case of *Doe v. Acklam*, BARNEWELL and CRESWELL'S *Reports*, vol. 2, p. 779.—ED.

subjects of these states should be found on board the enemy's vessels making war upon their country; in this case America would have no right to punish them, according to the new doctrine, if they declared that they had transferred their allegiance to Britain. We may bring the evil still nearer to our doors, and assert that even deserters to an enemy, landed in the country, would also claim exemption from punishment. It will not do to say that this would be *treason*. If allegiance be transferrable, the transfer may take place for all purposes, at all times, and in all places; for war as well as for peace; in the hour of danger as well as in the hour of security; on this side of the sea as well as on the other; in the camp as well as in the city. This wild doctrine once established, *treason* would become a duty, or rather there could be no such thing as a *traitor* in the world. The barriers of society would be broken into shivers; the discontented of every community would be tempted, and would moreover have a right, to abandon, betray, and make war upon their country.

Applying what has been said to the complaint now before us, we shall find that the people residing in these States at the time their independence was acknowledged, and that those who have been born in them since that time, are not subjects of Great Britain; and that all who have emigrated from the dominions of Great Britain since that epoch are her subjects.* It is very certain that nearly all the impressed seamen were of this latter description, and were therefore still subject to the laws of their country and the regulations of their sovereign, when found in any part of his or his enemy's dominions, or upon the high seas. These regulations authorized his officers to impress them, and therefore they were impressed. That their impressment was frequently a very great loss to their employers might be subject of regret; but the Government of the United States had no more right to complain of it than that of Britain had to complain of their being employed.

The heathenish French are certainly the last people in the world to hold up as an example to Christian nations; but, where their practice is so exactly contrary to the principles they pretend to profess, it is worth noticing. Let it be observed, then, that they have taken thousands of *their* emigrants, *without the limits of their territory*, who had renounced their protection, yet every soul of them was put to the sword; not as Austrians, English, or Dutch, but as Frenchmen, who still owed allegiance, and as such were dealt with as *traitors*. Now, I humbly request the citizen minister of the "terrible" bloody nation to tell me, what claim France had to the allegiance of these emigrants, if Britain had none to her emigrated sailors?

But, to come still closer to the point; the French seized several of their emigrants *without arms in their hands*, on the high seas, pursuing their peaceable commerce, *on board of neutral vessels* too, yea even on board of *American vessels*. Every man of these they also put to death: some they dragged on shore to the guillotine, others they threw into the sea alive, and others they hewed down with their sabres. Therefore, unless citizen Adet will frankly declare, like a good full-blooded sans-culotte, that it is justifiable for a nation to claim the allegiance and seize on the persons of its emigrants only for the purpose of cutting their throats, I must insist that the practice of his nation gives the lie direct to the principle on which his charge is founded.

* *Doe v. Acklam*, 2 Barnewell and Creswell, p. 779; and *Achmuty v. Mulcaster*, 5 Barnewell and Creswell, p. 771.—ED.

I now come to the other description of impressed seamen: those who owed allegiance to America alone. And here I frankly declare, that I believe many acts of rudeness, insolence, and even tyranny, have been committed by particular officers; for there are some of them that would press their own mothers, if they were capable of standing before the mast. But I can never credit all the lamentable stories that the hirelings of France have so industriously propagated on this subject. After a most piteous and pitiful picture of the distresses of the impressed seamen, drawn by that able painter, the taper-limbed and golden-hued Adonis of New York, who has been aptly enough compared to a poplar tree in autumn; after as vigilant and spiteful an inquiry as ever was prosecuted by the spirit of faction, not more than *five* or *six* impressed seamen, of the description we are now speaking of, could be named; and with respect to these, the report of the Secretary of State proved that, where proper application had been made for their enlargement, it had always been immediately attended to, and had produced the desired effect.

It was in the course of this memorable investigation that the generous Mr. Livingston proposed to furnish the British seamen, on board American vessels, with certificates of naturalization. These were intended to operate as a charm on the paws and bludgeons of the English press-gangs, or at least it is difficult to conceive for what other purpose they were intended. Was there any man in Congress fool enough to imagine that the just claims of one nation could be annulled by the production of bits of sealed paper given to her subjects by another nation? The particular act, or the general law, by which foreigners are naturalized, may admit them to a participation in all the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the citizens of the state adopting them (which is, indeed, the sole end of naturalization), but can never weaken the claim of the parent state; otherwise *traitors* and *deserters*, by producing *certificates of naturalization*, might bid defiance to the just vengeance of their injured country.

As to the measures taken by the Federal government relative to the impressed seamen, they were such as the peculiar situation of America rendered wise. Mr. Jay endeavoured to obtain a stipulation, by which British seamen, found on board American vessels, would have been exempted from the operation of the impress orders. This Great Britain refused, for the same reason that nations, as well as individuals, generally refuse to make a gratuitous sacrifice of what belongs to them. Agents have since been appointed to attend to impressments, and when their interposition is warranted by the state of the case, there is every appearance that it will be productive of the end proposed, and that both parties will readily co-operate for the preservation of harmony.

Dismissing this charge respecting impressed seamen, the length of my observations on which I am afraid has wearied my reader, I proceed to the remaining ones, on which I promise to be more concise.

“6. *The Federal Government eluded all the advances made by the French Republic for renewing the treaties of commerce upon a more favourable footing to both nations.*”

What does this learned citizen mean by *treaties of commerce*? This country has but one treaty of *commerce* with France: the other is a treaty “*eventual and defensive.*” Perhaps, indeed, he may regard *war* as a species of commerce; and it must be allowed that this is the only commerce that can be carried on with this terrible republic at present. The kind of trucking commerce that she is carrying on in Italy, where

she purchases a statue or a picture with the lives of ten thousand soldiers, may, to her, be advantageous enough, because she is a *rich* lady and a virtuoso; but to America, who is a plain homely dame, and has but little taste for such fine things, this commerce has but few charms: to her, one live farmer is of higher estimation than all the heroes and gods of antiquity.

I rather think, however, that citizen Adet, ignorant as he may be, knows that a defensive treaty is not a treaty of commerce; and if so, he must know that there is but one treaty of commerce between the countries. But there were *two treaties* to be renewed, and, as it has always been held up to the people here, that their dear friends of France did not wish their prosperity to be interrupted by taking a part in the war, it would not do to talk about renewing a *defensive treaty*; that would have smelt of powder; yet he could not say, that the treaty of *commerce only* was proposed to be renewed, and so he has called them both treaties of commerce. The citizen was hemmed in between a lie and an absurdity, and, to the credit of his morality, he has chosen the latter.

That the ground-work of a new treaty, or a renewed treaty, with France, was to be our going to war with her enemies, has been so often and so incontestably proved, that the fact is now universally acknowledged, except by the stipendiaries of that pure-principled republic. But, were a proof yet wanting, citizen Adet has furnished it, in the last page of his *Diplomatic Blunderbuss*. Here he tells us, that both Genet and Fauchet used their utmost to draw the Government into a negotiation, but in vain; that it eluded all their friendly overtures. Yes, and so it did indeed; just as the sheep eludes the friendly overtures of the wolf, and for much about the same reason.

“On this subject the President authorized the Secretary of State, who explained to the undersigned the manner in which they could proceed in it. But at what time? *When the ratification of the treaty concluded between Lord Grenville and Mr. Jay no longer permitted the undersigned to pursue that negotiation.*”

And why not? Why not go on, man? If you had nothing to propose but “treaties of *commerce*, upon a footing *more favourable to both nations*,” how could the treaty with Great Britain prevent the pursuit of your negotiation? The reason is plain: this treaty had happily put an end to all the disputes between America and Britain, and left you no room to hope that your negotiation would rekindle the embers of discord.

The only question for the people to determine, then, is, not whether they wished the treaties to be renewed, but whether they wished for war or not; and this question they have already determined in the *negative*.

Thank God, we are at last come to the closing article of accusation.

“7. *The Federal Government anticipated Great Britain by soliciting a treaty, in which treaty it prostituted its neutrality; it sacrificed France to her enemies, or rather, looking upon her as obliterated from the chart [map] of the world, it forgot the services she had rendered it, and threw aside the duty of gratitude, as if ingratitude was a governmental duty.*”

This is a complicated charge, comprising the crimes of meanness, prostitution, treachery and ingratitude. The meanness of “*anticipating Great Britain by soliciting a treaty*,” shall not detain us long. When two nations form a treaty, it is clear that one or the other must make the first overtures, or the business could never be begun, and consequently never ended. I believe, therefore, that making the first proposition for a

treaty, and particularly a treaty of commerce, was never before construed into an act of meanness. As for *soliciting*, this word, by which the citizen wishes to convey an insinuation that Mr. Jay was haughtily received, at first rejected, and at last obliged to approach with humiliating condescension, nothing can be farther from the truth. His business was, to demand reparation of the wrongs sustained by America. When these were made known, Great Britain had her wrongs to oppose to them. Both parties were, as their interests dictated, equally desirous of an accommodation; and this desire was productive of a treaty, settling all old disputes, and making provisions for the avoiding of new ones. Now, I pray, in this simple and natural process, what is there to be discovered of meanness or humble solicitation?

The charge proceeds to assert, that the Government "*prostituted its neutrality, and sacrificed France to her enemies.*" This is too vague to be taken up as it lies before us; except, indeed, it be the word *prostituted*, which may be dismissed at once, by observing, that it must have been picked up in the purlieus of the Palais-Royal, a place of which the Irish-Town of Philadelphia is a picture in miniature. To avoid the indecency therefore of joining it with the American government, I shall supply its place by the words *gave up*.

What the polite citizen chiefly alludes to, then, in saying, that the Government gave up its neutrality and sacrificed France to her enemies, is, that article of the British treaty which contains the stipulation respecting an enemy's goods, found on board the vessels of the United States, when these latter are neutral, with respect to Great Britain.

The stipulation of the treaty which we are about to examine, in substance says, that an enemy's goods found on board the vessels of the contracting parties, shall be looked upon as lawful prize. This, says citizen Adet, is a violation of the *modern* law of nations; and this, says the Government, is no such thing. As here is a flat contradiction, somebody must tell a lie; who it is I know not, but I am sure it is not the Government at any rate.

Now, with respect to commerce with an enemy, whoever examines the best writers on the subject, will find that, long since these nations assumed nearly their present relative state, it was the *general practice* to prohibit *all trade whatever* with an enemy.*

As the nations grew more polished, and as their relations increased by means of maritime commerce, the rigour of this practice was gradually softened, till confiscation was at last confined to the vessels and property of enemies, to certain articles termed contraband of war, and to the *property of enemies found on board of neutral vessels*.

Thus far the relaxation became pretty general about the time of Queen Elizabeth. But some powers wished to extend the freedom of commerce still further; even so far as to *protect enemies' goods found on board of neutral vessels*; and to do this the Queen of England was one of the first to assert her right. The right was, however, disputed, and that too by the United Provinces, even before their independence was fully assured. They took some of her vessels laden with Spanish property, and condemned the cargoes, without paying freightage. The Queen at first resented this conduct in an infant state that was chiefly indebted to her for support; but, notwithstanding the well-known tenacity and imperious-

* MARTENS, p. 329.—ED.

ness of her disposition, her wisdom and justice prevailed, and she at last acquiesced in the legality of the captures. Here then we have an instance of the practice of a nation of *modern birth*, a *republic* also, and a *republic engaged in a revolutionary war*.

I have at least a hundred examples of this nature now before me. But let us descend to still more *modern* times, and that the example may be, if possible, yet more strikingly applicable, let us appeal to the practice of the French nation itself. The famous *Ordinance* of 1681, which might be called the navigation act of France, expressly declared to be good prize, not only the enemy's goods on board of a neutral vessel, but *the neutral vessel also*.

We are now got down to the close of the last century; but as that may not be quite *modern* enough for our *Decadery* Mounseer, let us continue to descend, still continuing our appeal to the practice of his own country. The *Ordinance* of 1681 was mitigated by successive treaties, in which France, according as her interest prescribed, refused, or granted, the permission which citizen Adet now sets up as a right: but, after these treaties, and even so late as 1757, she declared to the republic of Holland, that if any goods *belonging to her enemy* were found on board of Dutch vessels, such goods should be condemned as good prize, and to this declaration her practice was conformable, during the whole war which ended in 1763, only *thirty-three years ago*. So that, unless this man of the "New Style" will absolutely sans-culotte us, and insist upon it that our fathers were antediluvians, and that we ourselves were born in the ages of antiquity, we must insist, on our part, that the principle adhered to in the treaty between Great Britain and America, is a principle of the *modern law of nations*, and moreover is sanctioned by the practice of France.

The fact is, this principle is either adopted, or not adopted, according to the interests and situations of the contracting parties: as these vary, nations act differently at different times and towards different nations. It is a matter merely conventional, and solely dependent on circumstances, as much as any other stipulation of a treaty.

The citizen has one more fetch; which I think is the most impudent piece of sophistry that ever was attempted to be palmed upon a nation. A nation, did I say! Why, a nation of Indians would have tomahawked him, and we should now see his skin hanging up in the shops for sale, had he offered to chouse them in such a barefaced manner.—I allude to that part of his *Blunderbuss*, where he says, that America violated her treaty with France, by *granting* to Britain the *favour* of seizure, which she had not *granted* to France, though she was to be treated in the same manner as "*the most favoured nation*."

The sophistry of this consists in confounding *favour* with *right*, terms almost as opposite in signification as *right* and *wrong*.—America conferred *no favour*, when, by treaty, she declared that Great Britain should seize enemies' goods on board of her vessels: she only acknowledged the existence of Great Britain's right so to do. Nor was this acknowledgment absolutely necessary: but, some nations having retained the exercise of the right, and others having relinquished it; it was a prudent precaution against future disputes, to declare, by express stipulation, whether it was retained or relinquished in the present instance.

The stipulation for *equal favour* then, which is to be found in most treaties of commerce now existing in the world, extends to the effects of

the municipal laws and regulations of the contracting parties. It implies an *equality in duties*, in *tonnage*, in the permission *to have consuls*; all which, and many others, may properly be called *favours*: but, it can never be construed to extend to any one of the great rights of national sovereignty. If this were the case, all the advantageous stipulations of a treaty made with one power, would be applicable to every other power, in a treaty with which this usual stipulation for equal favour was found: and of this we shall see the monstrous absurdity in a minute.—America, for instance, has treaties with Spain, Great Britain, and France, in all which the stipulation for equal favour exists. In the treaty with Spain, America allows to that nation a free navigation on the American part of the Mississippi; but does she allow this to Britain and France? In that with Great Britain, America allows her a free navigation and trade on her rivers, lakes, &c. and Britain allows the same freedom to America on hers; but does either of them extend this permission to France or Spain, or any other nation? Yet they are obliged to do this, if the stipulation for *equal favour* admits of the construction, which the maritime Goths wish to impose on us, in support of their attack on the commerce of America.

Thus have I had patience to go through the mock charges, which the despots of France have dared to prefer against the free, equitable, and beneficent Government of America. I shall take the liberty of adding a few miscellaneous observations, which would be dispensed with, fearing the reader is already too much fatigued, did not the crisis of affairs seem to demand them now, or never.

The first thing that calls, and most loudly calls, for reprobation, is, the contemptuous manner in which the Frenchman treated the Government, by communicating his *Notes to the people*, at the same time, or before, they were received by the President.

The sole right of making communications of this nature to the people of a state, so evidently belongs to its government, and is so essential to the very existence of every government, that it is not surprising that the first violation of it should have been reserved for the heathenish French. Former barbarians ever respected this right: the laws of decency had some influence on their uncultivated minds; but the barbarians, or rather the savages, of Paris, have set those and all other laws human and divine, at defiance. They seem to look upon themselves as the children of the devil, and to have assumed, in virtue of their father, the right of prowling about the earth, disturbing the peace of mankind, by scattering the seeds of rebellion and bloodshed.

Their agents have long been practising their fiend-like temptations on the people of this country. They have proceeded from one degree of malice to another, till at last their late minister Adet (for whom I wish I could find a name worse than his own) makes a direct attempt to inflame the people against the Government. After telling them, that the Convention has ordered their vessels to be seized (contrary to treaty), he proceeds:

“And now, if the execution of these measures *gives rise to complaints* in the United States, it is not against France they should be directed, but *against those men*, who have entered into negotiations contrary to the interests of *their country*.”

Just as if he had said, pointing to the President, the Senate, and Officers of State: ‘There they are; rise on them, cut their throats, and choose others more pliant to our will.’—His words do not amount to this, ’tis

true ; but in his country a hint far less intelligible would have been perfectly understood, and would not have failed of the desired effect. Happily he was not haranguing a Parisian mob. Whatever foolish partiality some of us may have had, and may yet have for France, nature has been so kind as not to make us Frenchmen.

In the reign of *Queen Anne*, when a Tory Ministry, aided by an intriguing Frenchman, were treating for a separate peace with Louis XIV., the Imperial Minister, *Count Gallas*, in order to prepossess the people of England against the peace, caused the transaction to be published, as an *article of news*, in one of the daily papers. This step, though it could not be looked upon as an appeal to the people, was so much resented by the Queen, that she ordered him to quit the kingdom immediately ; and in this she was supported by the unanimous voice of the nation ; who, notwithstanding they disapproved of a peace which was to sacrifice the great advantages obtained by their arms under the immortal Duke of Marlborough, justly and manfully resented the attempt of a foreign minister to step in between them and their own sovereign, however blamable her measures might be.

Such is the situation of America with respect to the insidious, unprincipled, insolent, and perfidious Republic of France ; and it only remains for the virtue and public spirit of the people to determine what sort of answer ought to be given to her presumptuous and domineering minister. Let it be well remembered, that the notes containing his calumnious accusations, his contemptuous defiance and hectoring threats, are not the effusions of a paragraphist or a pamphleteer : they are the official communications of a public minister, thrown in the teeth of the nation. In less than two months they will be read and commented on by half the civilized world. Those who know the American character will not be deceived ; but far the greater part will set us down as a nation of sharpers or poltroons, who have either not honesty to support our reputation, or not courage to defend it. If there be a man who, with this reflection on his mind, can wish the Government to stoop, and cringe, and sue and beg for peace, to court a repetition of the buffet that yet tingles in our cheek, he may boast about *independence*, he may even call himself a *patriot*, but his independence is an empty sound ; and he knows no more of the animating glow of patriotism, where affection, duty, and honour unite, than the slave knows of the charms of liberty, or the eunuch of the sweets of love. No ; the answer of every man who loves his country, and feels the insult it has received, yet prefers the blessings of honourable peace to the inevitable calamities of war, is, in the words of a good old English king that conquered France and all that France contained ;

- “ The sum of all our answer is but this :
- “ We would not seek a battle as we are ;
- “ Yet, as we are, we say we will not shun it :
- “ And so go tell your masters, *Frenchman*.”

END OF REMARKS ON THE BLUNDERBUSS.

REMARKS ON THE PAMPHLETS

LATELY PUBLISHED AGAINST

PETER PORCUPINE.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—We have now given selections from the principal tracts written by Mr. COBBETT on the subject most important to England, during his stay in America. Those which we shall give now will show what abuse his conduct brought down upon his head; how he repelled it, and how he came to be led by degrees into discussions on topics purely American; and this will lead us to the affair of Dr. Rush, which concluded his career in America. Two numbers will contain the whole of what remains for us to give from the "Porcupine," and then we shall begin with the English writings.

"DEAR FATHER,—When you used to set me off to work in the morning, dressed in my blue smock-frock and woollen spatterdashes, with my bag of bread and cheese and bottle of small-beer swung over my shoulder on the little crook that my old godfather Boxall gave me, little did you imagine that I should one day become so great a man as to have my picture stuck in the windows, and have four whole books published about me in the course of one week."—Thus begins a letter which I wrote to my father yesterday morning, and which, if it reaches him, will make the old man drink an extraordinary pot of ale to my health. Heaven bless him! I think I see him now, by his old-fashioned fire-side, reading the letter to his neighbours. "Ay, ay," says he, "Will will stand his ground wherever he goes."—And so I will, father, in spite of all the hell of democracy.

When I had the honour to serve King George, I was elated enough at the putting on of my worsted shoulder-knot, and, afterwards, my silver-laced coat; what must my feelings be then, upon seeing half-a-dozen authors, all *Doctors* or the devil knows what, writing about me at one time, and ten times that number of printers, bookbinders, and booksellers, bustling, running, and flying about in all directions, to announce my fame to the impatient public? What must I feel upon seeing the newspapers filled from top to bottom, and the windows and corners of the houses placarded, with, a *Blue Shop for Peter Porcupine*, a *Pill for Peter Porcupine*, *Peter Porcupine detected*, a *Roaster for Peter Porcupine*, a *History of Peter Porcupine*, a *Picture of Peter Porcupine*? The public will certainly excuse me, if after all this, I should begin to think myself a person of some importance.

It is true, my heroic adversaries do all set out with telling their readers, that I am a contemptible wretch *not worth notice*. They should have said, not worth the notice of *any honest man*, and, as they would all naturally have excluded themselves by such an addition, they would have preserved consistency at least: but, to sit down hammering their brains for a fortnight or three weeks, and at last publish each of them a pamphlet about me and my performances, and then tell the public that *I am not worth notice*, is such a gross insult to common sense that nothing but democratic stupidity can be a sufficient excuse for.

At the very moment that I am writing, these sorry fellows are hugging themselves in the thought that they have silenced me, *cut me up*, as they call it. It would require other pens than theirs to silence me. I shall keep plodding on in my old way, as I used to do at plough; and I think it will not be looked upon as any very extraordinary trait of vanity to say, that the *Political Censor* will be read, when the very names of their bungling pamphlets will be forgotten.

I must now beg the reader to accompany me in some few remarks that I think it necessary to make on each of their productions, following the order in which they appeared.

“ A ROASTER FOR PETER PORCUPINE.”

What can I say worse of this blustering performance, than that it bears all the internal evidence of being written by the blunderbuss author who disgusted the city with *Rub from Snub* ?

“ THE BLUE SHOP ; or *Humorous Observations, &c.*”

The inoffensive and unmeaning title of this pamphlet is fully expressive of the matter it is prefixed to, excepting that the word *humorous* was, perhaps, never before so unfortunately applied. Every one who has been taken in with this quarter-dollar's worth, whether a friend or an enemy of Peter Porcupine, curses it for the most senseless and vapid piece of stuff that ever issued from the press. The author, I hear, retorts, and swears the Americans are a set of stupid jackasses, who know not what true humour is. 'Tis pity he had not perceived this before, he might then have accommodated his *humour* to their understandings. It is now too late to rail against their ignorance or want of taste, for, in spite of his railing and fretting, *James Quicksilver* will, by them, ever be looked upon as a most leaden-headed fellow.

“ PORCUPINE, A PRINT.”

This is a caricature, in which I am represented as urged on to write by my old master King George (under the form of a crowned lion), who, of course, comes accompanied with the devil. The *Jay*, with the treaty in his beak, is mounted on the lion's back, though, by-the-by, it has ever been said, by the democrats, that the lion rode the *Jay*. His Satanic Majesty holds me out a bag of money, as an encouragement to destroy the idol, Liberty, to which he points. The American Eagle is represented as drooping his wings in consequence of my hostility, and America herself, on the same account, weeps over the bust of Franklin. This is almost the only part of the print of which I find fault; for, if by America the people of America be to be understood, I believe most of those who have read my essays will do me the justice to say, that I have endeavoured to make America laugh instead of weep.

Perhaps I ought to take some notice of the quarter whence this *caricature* and the *Blue Shop* issued, as it furnishes an instance, among thousands, of that degradation which the first movers in the French revolution have long been, and still are exhibiting to the world. These poor miserable catch-penny pictures and pamphlets are published by a man of the name of *Moreau*, who was one of those whom Tom Paine and his comrades Price and Priestley called, “ the great illuminated and illuminating National Assembly of France.”—Goddess of Liberty! and dost

thou permit this thy "great illuminated and illuminating" knocker-down of Bastiles to wage a puny *underhand* war with one of King George's red-coats? Dost thou permit one of those aspiring "legislators of the universe!" who commanded the folding doors of the *Louvre* to fly open at their approach, and who scorned to yield the precedence to Princes and Emperors, to dwindle down into a miserable *marchand d'estampes*? If these be thy tricks, Goddess of *French Liberty*, may the devil take Peter, if ever thy bloody cap and pike entice him to enlist under thy banners.

Mr. Moreau, to his other misfortunes, adds that most calamitous one of thinking he can write. He is cursed with the scribbling itch, without knowing how to scratch himself with a good grace. As this is torment enough in itself, I do not wish to add to it by mentioning particular instances of his want of taste and talents. The greatest punishment I wish my enemies, is, that *Moreau* may be obliged to write all his lifetime, and that the rest may be obliged to read his productions.

"THE HISTORY OF A PORCUPINE."

This pamphlet is, I am told, copied, *verbatim*, from a chap-book, containing the lives of several men who were executed in Ireland some years ago, names and dates only are changed, to give the thing an air of plausibility. It is said to be published by two Scotch lads, lately arrived in the country, and who now live in some of the alleys about Dock-street, no matter which. One of their acquaintances called on me some days after the publication appeared, and offered to furnish me with the book from which it is taken. This offer I declined accepting of. I shall only add here, as a caution to my readers, that these are the men who are seen hawking about a work in numbers, which they are pleased to call a *History of France*, and who are proposing to publish a *Monthly Magazine*.

"A PILL FOR PORCUPINE."

It is a rule with book-makers, that a title should, as briefly as possible, express the nature of the work to which it is prefixed. According to this rule, *Pill* is a most excellent title to the performance now before me. A *Pill* is usually a compound of several nauseous, and sometimes poisonous, drugs, and such is the *Pill for Porcupine*.

Various have been the conjectures as to the author of this abusive piece. Be he who he may, he has certainly done me a favour in grouping me along with Messrs. Hamilton, Belknap, Morse, &c. I would cheerfully swallow my part of his pill, and even think it an honour to be poisoned, in such company as this.

Since the *sentimental* dastard, who has thus aimed a stab at the reputation of a woman, published his Pill, I have shown my marriage certificate to *Mr. Abercrombie*, the minister of the church opposite me.—All you who emigrate to the United States of America, to enjoy this unrestrained liberty of the press that they make such a fuss about, take care (if you mean to say a word in favour of your country) to bring your vouchers and certificates with you, or they'll stigmatize you for thieves; your wives will be called whores, and your children bastards!—Blessed liberty of the press!

" THE IMPOSTOR DETECTED."

This pamphlet ought, on every account, to come last: we have seen the rest rising above each other progressively; this of *Bradford's* crowns the whole, caps the climax of falsehood and villany.

The former part of it bears the assumed name of *Tickletoby*, the latter, that of *Samuel F. Bradford*. It is evident, however, that both are by the same author; who he is, is not of much consequence: it is clear that he acted under the directions of Bradford, and Bradford must and shall answer for the whole.

What every one recoils at the bare idea of, is Bradford's* writing a pamphlet *against the works* of Peter Porcupine. Had he confined his attack to my private character and opinions, he would not have so completely exposed himself; but this, I suppose, his author would not consent to; I do not know any other way of accounting for his conduct.

Every one perceives that the letter which Bradford inserts in *Tickletoby's* part of the pamphlet, is nothing but a poor and vain attempt to preserve consistency. However, to leave no room for dispute on this score, and to convict the shuffling Bradford on his own words, I am willing to allow him to be neuter with respect to *Tickletoby's* part, and will take him up on the contents of the letter which he signs. "That I have made use," says he, "of the British Corporal for a good purpose, I have little doubt—*Dirty water* will quench fire."

Of his *making use* of me I shall speak by-and-by; at present I shall confine myself to the *dirty water*, which is the name he gives my writings.—Now, how will he reconcile this with his zeal to spread them abroad, and with the awkward flattery he and his family used to bore my ears with? Had I believed the half of what they told me, I should have long ago expired in an ecstasy of self-conceit. When the *Observations on Priestley's Emigration* were published, Bradford and his wife took great care to inform me of the praises bestowed on them by several gentlemen, *Doctor Green* in particular, and to point out to me the passages that gave the most pleasure. The *first Bone to Gnaw* gave universal satisfaction, they told me: it was read in all companies, by the young and by the old; and I remember that the sons told me, on this occasion, how delighted their uncle, the late worthy attorney-general, was with it; and that he said he should have loved me for ever, if I had not been so severe upon the French. Before the *New Year's Gift* appeared in public, Bradford told me he had read some pages of it to two of the *Senators*, who were mightily pleased with it, and laughed very heartily. While the father was plying me with his *Senators*, the sons played upon me from the *lower house*. Several of the members, *their intimate friends*, wanted to be blessed with a sight of me: one wanted to treat me to a supper, another wanted to shake hands with me, and a third wanted to embrace me. I shall name no names here; but I would advise the members of both houses to be cautious how they keep company with shop-boys and printers' devils.

One more, however, I must not omit. Bradford, in endeavouring to prevail on me to continue the *Congress Gallery*, related a conversation that had taken place between him and Mr. Wolcot, the present Secretary of the Treasury (and thereby hangs another tale which I will tell by-and-by),

* Bradford was Mr. Cobbett's first publisher.—ED.

who assured him that some of the officers of Government did intend to write an answer to *Randolph's Vindication*, but that my New Year's Gift had done its business so completely, that nothing further was necessary. He added, that they were all exceedingly delighted with my productions.

Again, if he thought my works *dirty water*, how came he to beg and pray for a continuation of them? When I gave his son William a final refusal, he urged, with *tears in his eyes* he urged, the loss his father's credit would sustain by it, and often repeated, that it was not for the sake of the *profit* but the *honour* of publishing my works, that made him so anxious to continue. My wife was present at this interview, and can, with me, make oath of the truth of what I have here asserted.

Nay, if my works were *dirty water*, why did he threaten to prosecute me for *not continuing them*? Dirty water is not a thing to go to law about. Did ever any body hear of a man's prosecuting another, because he refused to bring him dirty water to throw on the public?

After all this praising, and flattering, and menacing, my poor labours are good for nothing. The writings which had given so much pleasure to Dr. Green, that the Attorney-General would have loved me for ever for, that charmed all sexes and all ages, that made grave senators shake their sides with laughter, and Congress-men want to treat and hug me; that were so highly approved of by the officers of Government that it was an *honour* to publish, and that I was threatened with a prosecution for not continuing; these writings are now become *dirty water*!—Say rather, *sour grapes*.

I must, however, do the Bradfords the justice to say, that they very candidly told me, that every body could perceive a falling-off, *after the Congress Gallery*. How singular it was, that I should begin to sink the instant I quitted them! Was this because they did no longer *amend my works* for me, or because they no longer pocketed the cash they produced! The Bradfords are booksellers dyed in grain. Heaven is with them worth nothing, unless they can get something by it.

With respect to the motives that gave rise to my pamphlets, I have already stated them, and as to their literary merit, though I have no great opinion of it, yet, after having heard them ascribed to Mr. Bond, Mr. Thornton (not the *language-maker*, but the secretary to the English ambassador), Dr. Andrews, the Rev. Mr. Bisset, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Sedgewick, Dr. Smith, and, in short, to almost every gentleman of distinguished talents among the friends of the Federal government, it would be mere grimace for me to pretend, that they have no merit at all. It is something singular, that the democrats never pitched upon any low fellow as the author; their suspicions always alighted among gentlemen of family, and gentlemen of learning. It is therefore too late to decry my performances as tasteless and illiterate, now it is discovered that the author was brought up at the plough tail, and was a few years ago a private soldier in the British army.

To return to my friend Bradford. Though I am ready to admit him as a neutral in all that is said by *Ticketoby*, I cannot do this with regard to what is ushered into the world as the performance of Samuel F. Bradford. This *hatter-turned-printer*, this sooty-fisted son of ink and urine, whose heart is as black and as foul as the liquid in which he dabbles, must have written, if he did write, at the special instance and request of his father; for, the Lampblack says, "a father's wish is a law with me."

After having premised this, making Bradford responsible for what is

contained in his letter and his son's, I shall proceed to remark on such parts of both as I think worthy my notice.

And first, on the grand discovery of the letter to the *Aurora-man*.— This is a letter which I wrote to the Gazette, under the signature of A Correspondent, against the second part of the Bone to Gnaw. The letter as now printed by Bradford, may, for aught I know, be a very correct copy. I remember the time and all the circumstances well. Bradford, who is as eager to get money into his hands as he is unwilling to let it out again, repeatedly asked me for a *Puff* to this pamphlet. This very son came to me for it as many as half-a-dozen times. I at last complied; not that I was unwilling to do it at first (for I had bored the cunning grandchild of the cunning almanack-maker several times before), but I could with difficulty spare time to write it.

Puffs are of several sorts. I believe the one now before us, is what is called a *Puff indirect*, which means, a piece written by an author, or by his desire, against his own performances, thereby to excite opposition, awaken the attention of the public, and so advance the renown or sale of his labours. A *Puff indirect* is, then, what I stand accused of, and as I have no argument at hand to prove the moral fitness of the thing, I must, as pleaders do in all knotty points, appeal to precedents. My authorities are very high, being no other than Addison, Phillips, and Pope.

No one that has read the Spectator (and who has not done that?) can have failed to observe, that he published many letters against his own writings, imitating the style and manner of his adversaries, and containing weak arguments, which he immediately overturns in his answer.— Dr. Johnson tells us that, before the acting of Phillips's *Distressed Mother*, a whole Spectator was devoted to its praise, and on the first night a select audience was called together to applaud it. The epilogue to this play was written by Addison, who inserted a letter against it in the Spectator, for the sake of giving it a triumphant answer. But, Pope's famous puff is a case exactly in point:—

“He drew a comparison,” says Dr. Johnson, “of Phillips's performance with his own, in which with an unexampled and unequalled artifice of irony, though he has himself always the advantage, he gives the preference to Phillips. The design of aggrandizing himself he disguised with such dexterity, that, though Addison discovered it, Steele was deceived, and was afraid of displeasing Pope by publishing his paper.”

Now what censure does Lord Chief-Justice Johnson (who, God knows, was far from being over lenient) pass on all this? None at all. He calls neither of these authors “*an imposter* :” nor can I think he would have done so, had their puffs been written *at his request*, and for his *benefit*.

If a puff can ever be construed as an act of meanness, it must be, when its motive is self-interest. This cannot be attributed to me, as I could get nothing by promoting the sale of the work. I had a note of hand for it in my possession; which the number of copies sold could not augment the value of.

What impudence must a man be blessed with, who can usher to the world a puff, which he wishes should be looked upon as something horribly villanous, when he himself requested it to be written, transcribed it himself, and carried it himself for publication! But here the Bradfords play a double game. “It was not I *transcribed* it,” says old Goosy Tom; and “A *father's wish* is a law with me,” returns the young Gosling. But,

you hissing, web-footed animals, is it not between you? The puffing for fame belongs to me; but the transcribing and carrying to the press; all the interested part of the business, all the dirty work, lies among yourselves, and so I leave you to waddle about and dabble in it.

Having dismissed the *Puff*, we now come to the *breach of confidence* in publishing it. There are many transactions which we do not look upon as criminal, which, nevertheless, we do not wish to have made public. A lady, in love with a handsome young fellow, may make indirect advances, by the aid of a third person. This is certainly no crime; but should the confidant preserve one of her letters, and afterwards publish it, I presume such confidant would meet with general detestation. This is a parallel case so far; but when to this we add the aggravating circumstance of the confidant being the original adviser of the correspondence, we are at a loss for words to express our abhorrence. Yet we must go still further with respect to Bradford. He has not only divulged what was communicated to him under this pledged secrecy, and at his pressing request, to serve him; but he has been guilty of this scandalous breach of confidence towards a man to whom he owes, perhaps, that he is not now in jail for debt.

It is easy to perceive what drove him to this act of treachery. Revenge for the statement I had published concerning the *one shilling and sevenpence-halfpenny* pamphlet.* He could not help fearing that people would resent this by avoiding his shop. He was right enough; for, though I am an Englishman, and of course a sort of lawful prey to the democrats, yet they, even they, cannot help saying that he is an abominable sharper. To be revenged on me for this, he published the letter, and has thus done what all impotent vindictive men do, injured himself without injuring his adversary. I hinted that he had taken me in, and in return he betrays me: to the reputation of a sharper, he adds that of a villain.

After this, will any one say that I am to blame, if I expose this stupid, this mean, this shabby, this treacherous family? Do they deserve any quarter from me? Every one says, No, Peter, no.

They say I lived in a garret when first they knew me. They found me sole tenant and occupier of a very good house, No. 81, Callowhill. They say I was poor; and that lump of walking tallow streaked with lamp-black, that calls itself *Samuel F. Bradford*, has the impudence to say that my wardrobe consisted of my old regimentals, &c.—At the time the Bradfords first knew me I earned about 140 dollars per month, and which I continued to do for about two years and a half. I taught English to the most respectable Frenchmen in the city, who did not shuffle me off with notes as Bradford did. With such an income I leave the reader to guess whether I had any occasion to go shabbily dressed.

The Bradfords have seen others attack me upon my sudden *exaltation*, as they call it; upon my having a book-shop, and all this without any visible means of acquiring it; whence they wish to make people believe that I am paid by the British government. It is excessively base in the Bradfords to endeavour to strengthen this opinion, because they know that I came by my money fairly and honestly. They were never out of my debt from the moment they published the first pamphlet, which was in August 1794, till the latter end of May last † They used to put off the

* Bradford made the author's share of the "Remarks on Priestley's Emigration" amount to the sum of 1s. 7½d.—Ed.

† At this time they owed me 18 dollars, which had been due for near six months, and which I was at last obliged to *take out in books*.

payment of their notes from time to time, and they always had at their tongue's end, "We know you don't want money." And these rascals have now the impudence to say that I was their needy hireling.—'Tis pity, as Tom Jones's host says, but there should be a hell for such fellows.

It is hinted, and indeed said, in this vile pamphlet, that I have been encouraged by the American government also. I promised the reader I would tell him a story about Bradford's patriotism, and I will now be as good as my word. In order to induce me to continue the Congress Gallery, he informed me that Mr. *Wolcot* had promised to procure him the printing of the Reports to Congress: "So," added he, "I will print off enough copies for the members, and so many besides as will be sufficient to place at the end of each of your numbers, and *Congress will pay for printing the whole!*" He told me he had asked Mr. *Wolcot* for this job, which I looked upon as an indirect way of asking for a bribe, being assured that he built his hopes of succeeding upon being the publisher of my works.—Now, here's a dog for you, that goes and asks for a government job, presuming solely upon the merit of being the vender of what he, nine months after, calls *dirty water*, and who adds to this an attempt to fix the character of government tool on another man. If I would have continued the Numbers, it is probable he might have printed the Reports; but this I would not do. I wanted no Reports tacked on to the end of my pamphlets; that would have been renewing the punishment of coupling the living to the dead.

Sooty Sam, the Gosling, tells the public that I used to call him a *sans-culotte* and his father a *rebel*. If this be true, I am sure I can call them nothing worse, and therefore I am by no means anxious to contradict him. But, pray, wise Mister Bradford, of the "political book-store," is not this avowal of yours rather calculated to destroy what you say about my being *an artful and subtle hypocrite*? I take it that my calling you *rebels* and *sans-culottes* to your faces is no proof of my hypocrisy; nor will the public think it any proof of your *putting a coat upon my back*. Men are generally mean when they are dependent; they do not, indeed they do not, call their patrons *sans-culottes* and *rebels*; nor do people suffer themselves to be so called, unless some weighty motive induces them to put up with it. This acknowledgment of Bradford's is conclusive: it shows at once on what footing we stood with relation to each other.

He says that I abused many of the most *respectable characters*, by calling them *speculators, land-jobbers, &c.*, who were continually seeking to *entrap and deceive foreigners*.—If I did call those men *speculators* and *land-jobbers*, who are continually seeking to *entrap foreigners*; if I confined myself to such mild terms, I must have been in an extremely good humour. But, young Mister Lampblack, be candid for once, and allow me that your father is a sharper. Oh! don't go to deny that now: what everybody says must be true.

"How grossly," says the son, "did you frequently abuse the *people of America*, by asserting that, for the greater part, they were *aristocrats* and *royalists* in their hearts, and only wore the mask of hypocrisy to answer their own purposes!" If young Urine will but agree to leave out *people of America*, and supply its place with *family of Goosy Tom*, I will own the sentence for mine; and I will tell the public, into the bargain, how I came to make use of it.—I entered Bradford's one day, and

found him poring over an old book on *heraldry*. I looked at it, and we made some remarks on the orthography. In a few minutes afterwards he asked me if I knew anything of the *great Bradford family* in England. I replied, no. He then told me that he had just seen a list of new peers (*English* peers, reader!), among which was a *Lord Bradford*; and that he suspected that he was a branch of their family! As the old women say, you might have knocked me down with a feather. I did not know which way to look. The blush that warmed my cheek for him then renews itself as I write.—He did not drop it here. He dunned my ears about it half a dozen times; and even went so far as to request me to make inquiries about it when I wrote home.—It was on this most ludicrous occasion that I burst out, “Ah, d—n you, I see you are *aristocrats* and *royalists* in your hearts yet. Your republicanism is nothing but “hypocrisy.” And I dare say the reader will think I was half right.—I wonder what are the armorial signs of Bradford’s family. The crest must be a *Goose*, of course. Instead of scollops and gules, he may take a couple of printers’ balls, a keg of lampblack, and a jorden. His two great bears of sons (I except William) may serve as supporters; and his motto may be, “*One shilling and seven-pence half-penny for a pamphlet.*” All this will form a pretty good republican coat of arms.

Let it be remembered here, too, that my calling the Bradfords *aristocrats* and hypocrites does not prove me to be a *hypocrite*, a *needy hireling*, or a *coward*. As to this last term which young Lampblack has conferred on me, it is the blustering noise of a poor timid trembling cock, crowing upon his own dunghill. I hurl his *coward* back to his teeth, with the addition of *fool* and *scoundrel*. I think that is interest enough for one fortnight. The father has served the silly son as the monkey served the cat when he took her paw to rake the chesnuts out of the fire with.

They accuse me of being given to *scandal*.—If I had published, or made use of, one hundredth part of the anecdotes they supplied me with, I should have set the whole city together by the ears. The governor’s share alone would fill a volume.—I’ll just mention one or two, which will prove that I am not the first old acquaintance that Bradford has betrayed.—He told me of a judge who, when he presented him an old account, refused to pay it, as it was *setting a bad example*.—“Ah, righteous judge! A second Daniel!”—He told me, that he went once to breakfast with Mr. Dallas, now Secretary of the State of Pennsylvania, and that Dallas said to him, “By G—d, Tom, we have *no sugar*, and I have not a farthing in the world.”—“So,” says my Lord Bradford, “I put my hand in my pocket, and tossed the girl a *quarter of a dollar*, and she went out and got some.”—Another time he said, Mr. Dallas’s hair-dresser was going to sue him for a few shillings, when he, like a generous friend, stepped in and put a stop to further proceedings, by *buying the debt at a great discount*.—I forget whether he said he was repaid, or not.

These anecdotes he wanted me to make use of; but these, as well as all the others he furnished me with, appeared to me to be brought forth by private malice, and therefore I never made use of any of them; though I must confess that, in one instance in particular, this was a very great act of self-denial.

From Secretaries of State, Judges, and Governors, let us come to Presidents.—Don’t start, reader; my bookseller knew nothing against Gene-

ral Washington, or he would have told it.—No; we are now going to see a trait of Bradford's republicanism of another kind.—*Martens's Law of Nations*, a work that I translated from the French for Bradford, is dedicated, *by him*, to the President of the United States. The dedication was written by me, notwithstanding the Bradfords were obliged to *amend* my writings. When a proof of it was taken off, old Bradford proposed a fulsome addition to it; "Give the old boy a *little more oil*," said he. This greasing I refused to have any hand in; and notwithstanding I did not *know how to write*, and was a *needy hireling*, my Lord and Master, Bradford, did not think proper to make any alteration, though I could have no reasonable objection, as it was signed with his name.

While the old man was attempting to wheedle the President and the officers of the Federal government, the son *Samuel* was wheedling the French Minister: the Bradfords love a double game dearly. He spent whole evenings with him, or at least he told me so. According to his account they were like two brothers. I cannot blame Mr. Adet, who undoubtedly must have a curiosity to know all the secrets of Bradford's press. For my part, as soon as I heard of this intimacy, I looked upon myself as being as well known to the French Minister as I was to Bradford.

But, there is a tale connected with this which must be told, because it will give the lie to all that young Lampblack has said about correcting and altering my works. His design is to make people believe that I was obliged to submit to his prunings. We shall see how this was in a moment. In the *New Year's Gift*, speaking of the French Minister, I make use of the following words: "Not that I doubt his veracity; though his "not being a *Christian* might be a trifling objection with some weak-minded people."—The old Goosy wanted me to change the word *Christian* for *Protestant*, as he was a good friend, and might be useful to his son. He came himself with the proof sheet to prevail on me to do this: but if the reader looks into the *New Year's Gift*, he will see that I did not yield.

Bradford never prevailed on me to leave out a single word in his life, except a passage in the *Congress Gallery*. "Remember," (says the son in a triumphant manner) "Remember what was erased from the *Congress Gallery*."—I do remember it, thou compost of dye-stuff, lampblack, and urine, I do remember it well; and since you have not told all about it, I will.—The passage erased contained some remarks on the indecent and every-way-unbecoming expression of Mr. Lewis, on the trial of Randall, when he said, that gentlemen would have served *his client* right if they had *kicked him out of the room*. Bradford told me he had a *very particular reason* for wishing this left out; and as it was not a passage to which I attached much importance, left out it was: but, had I known that his *very particular reason* was, that he had engaged Mr. Lewis as his counsellor in a suit which he had just then commenced against his deceased brother's widow and his own sisters, the passage should not have been left out for him nor for Mr. Lewis neither. I fear no lawyers.—From this fact we may form a pretty correct idea of the *independence* of Bradford's press when left to his own conducting.

I shall conclude with observing, that though Bradford's publication was principally intended to do away the charge of having duped me in the one and seven-pence-halfpenny job, he has left it just as it was. His son has, indeed, attempted to bewilder the reader by a comparison between the prices of the ensuing pamphlets; but what has this to do

with the matter? His father took the *Observations*, was to publish them, and give me half the profits. Long after, many months after, every copy of the work was sold, I asked him for an account of it, which he brought me in *writing*, and in which my half of the profits was stated at *one shilling and seven pence halfpenny*, or about *twenty-one cents*. Now, nothing posterior to this could possibly diminish the barefacedness of the transaction. I did not actually receive the *twenty-one cents*; I threw the paper from me with disdain; nor did I ever receive a farthing for the publication in question from that day to this.

I now take leave of the Bradfords, and of all those who have written against me. People's opinions must now be made up concerning them and me. Those who still believe the lies that have been vomited forth against me are either too stupid or too perverse to merit further attention. I will, therefore, never write another word in reply to any thing that is published about myself. Bark away, hell-hounds, till you are suffocated in your own foam. Your labours are preserved, bound up together in a piece of bear-skin, with the hair on, and nailed up to a post in my shop, where whoever pleases may read them gratis.

FROM "PORCUPINE'S GAZETTE,"

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—We shall give a few selections from the articles contained in this Gazette; but we need give but few, as they relate to matters of local interest, or to persons of whom no recollection remains, at any rate in England. The author, having done his work upon the question of the Treaty, might have retired from the scene, and claimed everlasting credit from his country for efforts made under such disadvantageous circumstances, but so completely successful. It was not his way, however, to leave anything undone; and when the French Ambassadors were frustrated, one after another, and the President was successful in allying America with England, he still pursued the remains of the "French faction" with as much ardour as he had pursued its chiefs; and this pursuit led him, by degrees, into matters purely American. MIFFLIN, who figures in the affair of Randolph, was still Governor of Pennsylvania; and M'KEAN was the Chief Justice, aiming to be Governor. In 1797 the yellow fever broke out in Philadelphia, and MIFFLIN issued a proclamation, the second article of which ran thus: "That every person infected with a contagious fever (whose case will admit of removal) shall be removed by the friends of the diseased, or by the health-officer, to a proper situation, distant from the city." Under this proclamation, and in the consternation which it and the fever occasioned, great hardships fell upon the poorer people, as we find from the address of "a poor Citizen" to the Governor: "Sir, if you were seized with this disease, would you peaceably submit to have a negro forcibly drag you from your house into a common cart, from thence conveyed to the place which you term the *hospital*, but which I and the world term a slaughter-house, there to live in torture for want of proper attendance, and die for a draught of water?" &c. Mr. COBBETT attacked MIFFLIN's proclamation; and Dr. RUSH, who was a physician at Philadelphia, having begun his practice of bleeding in fever cases, and the most eminent doctors having thought it necessary to warn the public against him, Mr. COBBETT published their warnings, and added to them some strong and sarcastic paragraphs of his own; but in all this he was urged on by the physicians of Philadelphia, from whose writings we shall give one extract. RUSH prosecuted him for libel in 1797, but the trial was delayed till December 1799, when it came on before M'KEAN. The jury found for the plaintiff, and gave 5000 dollars damage; which was no sooner known than the money was paid by the people of Canada, and would have been paid by the English residents of

Philadelphia and New York, aided by Americans in the former place, had not the Canadians been so prompt as to render it unnecessary. This and the next number of the "Selections" will consist of those short articles that we find to have any lasting interest in them; and the author's own remarks on the affair of Dr. RUSH, being a justification of his attacks on the Doctor's practice.

REMARKS ON MIFFLIN'S PROCLAMATION.

Yellow Fever.—We have not been able to learn that a single death from this disorder has taken place since yesterday. The number of deaths in the city for the last fortnight have been much fewer than those during the same season for several years past. Where, then, shall we look for the cause of such an alarm as has prevailed for some days past?

The Governor's proclamation will cut a considerable figure in the records of *liberty and equality*. Matched I am certain it cannot be by the decrees or edicts of any despots on earth, excepting only those of *republican* France. Were a member of the British Parliament to propose anything resembling it, his brains would be knocked out before he got a hundred yards from the House.—What! forcibly enter my house, and drag from thence my wife or my child, for no other offence than that of being sick! and if I dare to defend my "castle," or insist upon protecting those who are all that is dear to me, to *fine* me and *transport* me to State Island! O ye gods of republicanism, we beseech you to shelter us! Pray, good Mr. Thomas Mifflin, do tell us what *tyranny* is, if you please; for very many of us really begin to fear that it is fast growing upon us. You may probably muster up force enough to drive me out into the fields, or trundle me along against my will to a stinking and infected hospital; but you shall never make me say that this is *liberty*. You may toast and boast about your *republican liberty* as long as you please; but suffer me to tell you that the bubble will very soon burst.—The candle is now lighted, and, if it please the Almighty to preserve me from the clutches of the heroes of the yellow flag, it shall not be kept under a bushel.

EFFECTS OF MIFFLIN'S TYRANNICAL PROCLAMATION.

I yesterday informed my readers that, in consequence of the *inhuman proclamation*, none of the physicians would any longer make reports to the Board of Health, and that, therefore, all information from that quarter respecting the number of new cases or deaths was at an end.

Another evil of the proclamation is, the relations and friends of diseased persons take special care to conceal their malady from their neighbours, and, in many instances, even from the physicians. The consequence of which is, infection, in its most deadly degree, is deposited in a neighbourhood before any one is aware of it, and physicians are not called in till the moment that their aid is useless. Two awful instances of this nature are mentioned in Brown's paper of last evening by *Doctor Caldwell*; and it is now well known, that from No. 13, Chesnut-street, a person was last night carried to the grave in secret, who died with the yellow fever, though the people of the house had constantly denied that the disorder was there. Thus, unless the dreadful proclamation be *immediately revoked*, and that in the most public and unequivocal manner, will the contagion spread over every quarter of the city. Who, does Thomas

Mifflin think, will run to his inquisitors, and denounce their parents or their children, when they are sure that will be immediately followed by their transportation to an infected hospital, where all communication will be instantly cut off between them and the physician they have called in to save their lives, and in whom alone, perhaps, they can have any confidence? The shocking, the cruel example of *Mr. Fleetwood*, has spread consternation among all those who cannot rely upon the discretion or *courage* of the persons by whom they are surrounded. The fear occasioned by the proclamation extends its fatal influence to every other disease also. If a man is taken with a bilious fever, or any other disorder, however dangerous delay may be, he, not knowing the nature of it, puts off the sending for a physician, *for fear of being hauled off to the infected hospital*. Let Thomas Mifflin beware what he is about. I am certain his proclamation is *unconstitutional*; and if satisfaction cannot be obtained for any act of force that may be committed in obedience to it, the constitution of Pennsylvania is a farce. Were I the heir or successors of Mr. Fleetwood, I would bring an action immediately against those who forced him from his lodgings. It is said that he remonstrated with all the eloquence of dread and distress. With the full assurance that he never should survive the cruel removal, he offered *five hundred guineas* to be suffered to remain in his own chamber, from which no one, no not even the proprietor of the house, could *lawfully* remove him.—Poor man! he very probably, like myself, came to Pennsylvania *to seek liberty*!!

GREAT CONSTERNATION IN PHILADELPHIA.

There is now no getting anything like a correct statement of the progress of the fever, or of the deaths it occasions; but the returns collected from the sextons prove that the deaths *are not more numerous now than they were last year at the same season*. Thousands of persons are, however, flying from the city. Upwards of one hundred loads of trunks and other goods were met yesterday morning between the city and Shoemaker-town; that is, in the space of *nine miles*: and I myself, on Sunday morning, met about a dozen families between the middle ferry and the upper end of Market-street. The *Clergy*, who certainly ought never to stir while there is a soul to be saved, or a mind to be soothed by their ministry, are, I am afraid, preparing to join in the flight.

Admitting (which I am far from doing) that nothing is so valuable as *life*, and that it is right for all who can afford it to fly, what are the *poor* to do?—They cannot remove; and they will expire in their beds one by one, rather than expose themselves to the dangers of the cart and the hospital. Why does not the proclamation *invite* them to remove *while well*, and *promise them support* in the tents on the commons? When this is neglected, let us hear no more about "*the prosperous state of our finances*." If the *treasury be full*, as it is said to be, let it be emptied instantly, that the poor may have the same chance of living as the rich. This would be something like *equality*.

Private acts of inhumanity are already spoken of. I hope they will be rare: but I take this opportunity of declaring my fixed resolution of holding all those who are guilty of them up to the abhorrence of mankind,

MEDICAL PUFFING.

"The times are ominous indeed,
 "When quack to quack cries, *Purge and bleed.*"

Those who are in the habit of looking over the Gazettes which come in from the different parts of the country must have observed, and with no small degree of indignation, the arts which our remorseless *bleeder* is making use of to puff off his preposterous practice. He has, unfortunately, his partisans in every quarter of the country. To these he writes letters, and in return gets letters from them: he extols their practice, and they extol his; and there is scarcely a page of any newspaper that I see which has the good fortune to escape the poison of their prescriptions. Blood, blood! still they cry, More blood! In every sentence they menace our poor veins. Their language is as frightful to the ears of the alarmed multitude as is the raven's croak to those of the sickly flock.

Among all these puffs I do not recollect a more shameless one than the following from *Dr. Tilton*:

Extract of a letter from Dr. Tilton, of Wilmington, to Dr. Rush, dated September 12.—"We have had repeated instances of *your fever* at this place. The infection has generally been taken in Philadelphia. I am not acquainted with any instances where the contagion has been received at Wilmington; but at Newcastle and Newport there are unequivocal examples of the contagion being received from those who brought it from the city.

"In the treatment of the fever we use *copious* blood-letting in the beginning, and active *mercurial purges*. I have conceived, however, that mercury is useful not merely as a cathartic, but as a *specific against all kinds of contagion*. There is no contagious disease in which its use is not acknowledged; not only small-pox, measles, dysentery, &c., but scarlatina and influenza yield to its specific virtues. You probably remember, as well as I, that it was given with advantage in the hospital and camp fever. In short, I have established it as a maxim to give mercury as soon as I know a disease to be contagious."

The mercurial purges, too, *Dr. Tilton* must break forth in praise of! Mercury is good for everything that is contagious! Is it good for sansculottism, Doctor? If it be, in the name of goodness, take a double dose of it twice a day, till it has wrought a cure.—*Dr. Rush*, in that emphatical style which is peculiar to himself, calls *mercury* the "*Samson* of medicine." In his hands, and in those of his partisans, it may, indeed, be justly compared to *Samson*; for I verily believe they have slain more Americans with it than ever *Samson* slew of the Philistines. The Israelite slew his thousands, but the Rushites have slain their tens of thousands.*

 DR. CURRIE'S ACCOUNT OF RUSH'S CONDUCT IN 1793.

"*Dr. Rush* having tried the effects of mercurial purges, which he acknowledged to the College of Physicians on the 26th of August, had been recommended to him by Doctors Hodge and Carson, the latter of whom had experienced their good effects upon himself on a former occasion, in a dose containing twenty grains of calomel, made trial of them, and was so highly pleased with them, that he assumed the credit of the discovery, though they had been frequently employed, both by the East

* This paragraph was one of the libels for which *Dr. Rush* brought his action.—*Ed.*

and West India physicians, long before 1793, as may be seen in the publications of Lind, Blaney, Clark, Balfour, and others.

" He appears to have read Dr. Moseley's Directions for treating the Yellow Fever of the West Indies about the 10th of September, for the first time. In that treatise very profuse and frequent bleeding is recommended, from a persuasion that the disease was always attended with inflammatory symptoms in the beginning, which in that climate was probably the case, as the subjects that came under Moseley's care were strong, vigorous, plethoric English sailors.

" Dr. Rush, with that precipitation for which he has always been noted, instantly adopted the practice in its utmost latitude, without reflecting that difference of climate and constitution made a difference in the disease.

" On the 12th of September he published in the Federal Gazette the following directions to the citizens :—

' Dr. Rush, regretting that he is unable to comply with all the calls of his fellow-citizens indisposed with the prevailing fever, recommends to them to take his mercurial purges, which may now be had with suitable directions at most of the apothecaries; and to lose ten or twelve ounces of blood as soon as convenient after taking the purges,* if the headache and fever continue. When the purges do not operate speedily, bleeding may now be used before they are taken. The almost universal success with which it has pleased God to bless the remedies of strong mercurial purges and bleeding in this disorder, enables Dr. Rush to assure his fellow-citizens that there is no more danger to be apprehended from it, when these remedies have been used in its early stage, than there is from the measles or influenza. Dr. Rush assures his fellow-citizens farther, that the risk from visiting and attending the sick at present is not greater than from walking the streets. While the disease was so generally mortal, or the successful mode of treating it only partially adopted, he advised his friends to leave the city; at present he conceives this advice unnecessary, not only because the disease is under the power of medicine, but because the citizens who now wish to fly into the country cannot avoid carrying the infection with them: they had better remain near to *medical aid*, and avoid exciting the infection into action.'

" How far the assertions contained in the address correspond with facts let the obituary of that month determine, and the deaths in his own family.

" Those acquainted with the causes and laws of contagion thought him insane.

" At other times he promised a removal of the infectious effluvia, with which he asserted the whole atmosphere was loaded, as soon as a heavy rain should fall :—an opinion as groundless as any that ever was generated in a whimsical brain.

" Immediately after one of his addresses to the citizens, the following advertisements were published at his request in all the newspapers :—

" Dr. Rush's celebrated mercurial purging and sweating powders for preventing and curing the prevailing *putrid fever*, may be had, carefully prepared, with proper directions, at Betton and Harrison's, No. 10, South Second-street.

* These purges contained ten grains of calomel, and fifteen of jalap.

“ ‘ Dr. Rush’s *mercurial sweating purge* for the yellow fever may be had, carefully prepared, with the Doctor’s directions, and sold by William Delany, druggist and chemist, &c.

“ ‘ Dr. Rush’s *mercurial sweating powder* for the yellow fever, with printed directions, prepared and sold by permission, by Goldthwait and Baldwin, chemists and druggists, &c.’

“ In speaking of his exploits in a letter addressed to Dr. Rodgers, dated October 3rd, after accusing most of the physicians of the city of ignorance and obstinacy, he adds, ‘ By means of the remedies before mentioned, I think I have been the unworthy instrument in the hands of a kind Providence of recovering more than ninety-nine out of one hundred of my patients, before my late indisposition from the want of bleeding and purging. Since the 10th of September I have found bleeding, in addition to the mercurial purges, necessary in nineteen cases out of twenty. At first I found the loss of ten or twelve ounces sufficient to subdue the pulse; but I have been obliged gradually, as the season advanced, to increase the quantity to sixty, seventy, and eighty ounces.’

“ So much was the Doctor about this period possessed with the notion that he was the only man of common sense existing, that he not only refused to consult with any but his former pupils who submitted to obey his dictates, but rudely intruded his advice upon other people’s patients. He also appointed two illiterate negro men, and sent them into all the alleys and by-places in the city, with orders to bleed and give his sweating purges, as he empirically called them, to all they should find sick, without regard to age, sex, or constitution; and bloody and dirty work they made among the poor miserable creatures that fell in their way.

“ That his mind was elevated to a state of enthusiasm bordering on frenzy, I had frequent opportunity of observing; and I have heard from popular report, that in passing through Kensington one day, with his black man on the seat of his chaise alongside of him, he cried out with vociferation, ‘ Bleed and purge all Kensington! drive on, boy!’

“ The contemplation of his own self-created consequence, the hurry of business, the novelty and solemn aspect of the surrounding scenes, had certainly a very extraordinary effect upon his imagination, and impaired his judgment.

“ I knew several that he terrified into chilly fits, some into relapses, and some into convulsions, by stopping them in the street, and declaring they had the fever—‘ You’ve got it! you’ve got it!’ was his usual salutation upon seeing any one with a pale countenance. I have been assured that he pronounced to Dr. Glentworth, that he would be a dead man if he would not submit to more bleeding, after he had reduced him almost to death’s door by the violence of his remedies.* Two other physicians being called in, thought otherwise, and the Doctor recovered without any more loss of the vital fluid, notwithstanding this alarming and positive prognostication.

“ His pronouncing Mr. Michael Connor to be infected with the yellow fever, when just recovered from the ague and fever, occasioned a relapse. The same gentleman ascribes the loss of his amiable daughter to the drastic operation of his mercurial purges.

“ When applied to by Mr. Chancellor to visit a patient with Dr.

* “ If you will not submit to my voice,” says he, “ settle your affairs, for you have a dropsy of the brain, and will soon be a dead man.”

Hodge, he advised him to dismiss Dr. H. ; for he was a bark-and-wine doctor, and would do him more harm than good.

" Dr. W. he said was an assassin, because he expressed some doubts of the superior efficacy of mercurial purges to those of a less drastic kind.

" In his letter to Dr. Rodgers, after treating the opinions of all his fellow-practitioners with the most insulting contempt, and declaring that he believes himself the unworthy instrument in the hands of a kind Providence of recovering more than ninety-nine of a hundred of his patients, he adds, " it was extremely unfortunate that the new *remedies* were ever connected with my name," and that he claimed no other merit than that of having early adopted and extended a mode of treating the disorder which he had learned from his first preceptor in medicine Dr. Redman, and which is strongly recommended by Hilary, Moseley, Mitchel, Kirby, and many other writers on the fever.

" The Doctor certainly intended to write a romance ; for there is no mention in any of the authors he refers to of mercurial purges, or of resting the cure of the disease on copious bleeding and purging, or that God had blessed copious bleeding and purging in their hands, as any person that can read may satisfy himself. Moseley indeed depends much on copious bleeding, in cases where the inflammatory symptoms are manifest ; but all the rest inculcate sparing bleeding, and the most mild purges. The recollection of these things was not to his purpose ; hence the convenience of having a good memory at forgetting things that would prove obstacles to our schemes—all *good* democrats acquire this kind of memory.

" The Doctor here remembered to forget the information he formerly acknowledged he had received from Doctors Hodge and Carson, respecting the efficacy of mercurial purges in bilious cases. He also remembered to forget having seen the good effects produced by bleeding a fat cook in Water-street, the day after he had threatened to prosecute Doctor Barnwell for a design upon the life of Mrs. Ross in Walnut-street, because he bled her in the very same kind of fever that he now applauds it in, and employs as a cordial and anodyne, and in desperate cases, to make the patient die easy. He also remembered to forget to mention, that he adopted his sanguinary code, not from Draco, but from Moseley, who was a mere empiric that practised in Jamaica some years ago.

" He also, in a most extraordinary manner, remembered to forget the victims that were falling by the hands of his apostles, at the very time that he was boasting of recovering *more than ninety-nine* of a hundred.

" To crown all his extravagancies, he has lately threatened to prosecute Dr. Hodge for telling Dr. Way, on the second day of his fever, that he thought he might recover without any more bleeding. The case of Dr. Way is briefly this :—He was attacked on Sunday with the usual symptoms of the prevailing fever ; bled himself in the night, about twelve ounces ; next day was bled by advice of Dr. Rush three times ; took mercurial purges, which operated very copiously ; on Tuesday had an intermission ; was again bled once, and purged several times. On Wednesday he took without advice eight grains of *mercurius dulcis* ; had all along since the attack observed the most abstemious and cooling regimen. By whose direction he was bled on Wednesday I do not know, for Dr. Rush did not visit him after dinner that day. The mercury that he took of his own accord on Wednesday morning, brought on pain, sickness, and spasms in his bowels, and occasioned such extreme debility, that he sunk

under it, and expired on Friday evening. The account of the treatment till Wednesday morning, the writer had from Dr. Way himself.

“From this statement, I think Dr. Rush exempt from blame in the case of Dr. Way; and that there are cases of high inflammation in which the patient sometimes recovers, under the most Herculean discipline, his most inveterate enemies must acknowledge.”*

FRANKLIN AND GIBBON.

Anecdote extracted from the *New York Daily Advertiser*:—When Franklin was on his mission to France previous to the alliance, he put up one night at an inn near the frontiers. Gibbon, the celebrated historian, happening to be in the same house, Franklin sent his compliments, requesting the pleasure of spending the evening with Gibbon. In answer he received a card, importing that “notwithstanding Mr. Gibbon’s regard for the character of Dr. Franklin, as a man and a philosopher, he could not reconcile it with his duty to his King, to have any conversation with a *revolted subject!*” Franklin in reply wrote a note, declaring that “though Mr. Gibbon’s principles had compelled him to withhold the pleasure of his conversation, Dr. Franklin still had such a respect for the character of Mr. Gibbon, as a gentleman and an historian, that “when, in the course of his writing the history of the *decline and fall* of “empires, the *decline and fall* of the British empire should come to be “his subject, as he expected it soon would, Dr. Franklin would be happy “to furnish him with *ample materials* which were in his possession.”

Whether this anecdote record a truth or not, I shall not pretend to say; but it must be confessed that the expressions imputed to the two personages were strictly in character. In Gibbon we see the faithful subject, and the man of candour and honour; in Franklin, the treacherous and malicious “old Zanga of Boston.”

THE HERMIT AND JEFFERSON.

PROPHECY—true,

Of the Hermit to Alfred.

“Go forth! lead on the radiant years
“to thee revealed in vision. Lo, they
“rise! Lo! patriots, heroes, sages

PROPHECY—false,

Of the malicious Philosopher Jefferson.

“BRITAIN.—The sun of her glory
“is fast declining to the horizon. Her
“*philosophy* has crossed the Channel;

* These extracts concerning the affair of Dr. RUSH we have republished, in order to show what was the ground of his action against Mr. COBBETT, and to show that, in writing against his practice, Mr. COBBETT was moved by the medical practitioners of Philadelphia, who questioned its soundness; and also, we find it necessary to republish them, in order to pave the way for Mr. COBBETT’S own defence of his conduct with regard to the Doctor. The next number will contain the conclusion of the affair, and it will be seen that the disgust occasioned in Mr. COBBETT’S mind by these proceedings against him, and the conduct of the Chief Justice, M’KEAN, during their progress, were the immediate cause of his quitting America sooner, perhaps, than he would otherwise have done.—ED.

PROPHECY—true,

Of the Hermit to Alfred.

"crowd to birth, and bards to sing
 "them in immortal verse. I see thy
 "commerce grasp the world: all nations
 "serve thee; every flood sub-
 "jected pays its tribute to the *Thames*.

"Britons, proceed; the subject *deep*
 command:

"Awe with your navies ev'ry hostile
 land.

"*Vain are their threats, their armies*
 all are vain;

"They rule the balanc'd world who
 rule the main."

THOMSON'S *Alfred*.

PROPHECY—false,

Of the malicious Philosopher Jefferson

"her *freedom* has crossed the *Atlantic*;
 "and herself seems passing to that
 "awful dissolution, whose issue is not
 "given human foresight to scan."—
Notes on Virginia, by THOMAS JEF-
 FERSON.

Pray, Monsieur Jefferson, if the *freedom* of Britain has *crossed the Atlantic*, whither is it gone? You will not pretend, I suppose, that it has taken up its abode among Americans; unless, indeed, you have the impudence to assert, that to be *chained, drudged, kicked, flogged, and thumb-screwed* by the French, are the distinctive marks of *freedom*; unless you have the impudence to assert, that men are *free* in a country where a governor can order them *to be seized* without a *warrant*, and *transported for a month* without a *trial*, or even a *hearing*. Unless, I say, you are prepared to make these assertions, you will not pretend that the *freedom of Britain* has taken its flight *this way*; and, above all, you will not *now* dare to assert this of her LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.

No, Monsieur Thomas; the sun of Britain will shine; her philosophy will illuminate an admiring world, and her freedom (her *real* freedom) will continue to be "the charter of the land," when thy head will be rotting cheek by jowl with that of some toil-killed negro slave. She will flourish in commerce, in arts, and in arms, when thy *pivot-chair* shall be crumbled into dust; when thy French-spun theories, thy flimsy philosophy, thy shallow shifting politics, and thy envious vindictive predictions, shall all be damned to eternal oblivion; and when nought shall be remembered of thee or thine, save thy cool, unprovoked, and viperous slander on the *family of Cresap*.

TALLEYRAND.

THE following is taken from the Boston Mercury, and is said to be derived from an authentic source:—

"The Bishop of Autun, who resided some time in this country under the name of Talleyrand Perigord, has informed the Directory of France, that they need not regard the United States any more than the State of Genoa or Geneva; as our divisions have weakened us down to nothing in point of strength and exertion as a nation; and that there would probably soon be a revolution here, which would tend to throw us entirely into the French scale; as the partisans of France were increasing, and would soon turn out of the Government all the Washingtonian party, all of whom were in the British pay.

"In this information he was joined by almost all the Americans who were before in France, or have since gone to that country.

“In the mean time, the French party on this side of the Atlantic are continually exciting the French government to acts of hostility against the United States; and are so desperately determined to destroy the British treaty, as to be willing, for the accomplishment of that purpose, to risk our independence, and even our national existence.”

That the apostate Talleyrand was a spy in this country is evident from his being afterwards received with open arms by the very men who had proscribed him. But I have a word or two to say about this bishop. First he set up as a *merchant and dealer* at New York, till he had acquired what knowledge he thought was to be come at among persons engaged in mercantile affairs; then he assumed the character of a *gentleman*, at the same time removing to Philadelphia, where he got access to persons of the first rank, and all those who were connected with, or in the confidence of, the Government. Some months after his arrival in this city, he left a message with a friend of his, requesting me to meet him at that friend's house. Several days passed away before the meeting took place: I had no business to call me that way, and therefore I did not go. At last this modern Judas and I got seated by the same fire-side. I expected that he wanted to expostulate with me on the severe treatment he had met with at my hands: I had called him an apostate, a hypocrite, and every other name of which he was deserving; I therefore leave the reader to imagine my astonishment, when I heard him begin with complimenting me on my *wit and learning*. He praised several of my pamphlets, the New Year's Gift in particular, and still spoke of them as mine. I did not acknowledge myself the author, of course; but yet he would insist that I was; or, at any rate, they reflected, he said, *infinite honour* on the author, let him be who he might. Having carried this species of flattery as far as he judged it safe, he asked me, with a vast deal of apparent seriousness, whether I had received my education at *Oxford* or at *Cambridge*! Hitherto I had kept my countenance pretty well; but this abominable stretch of hypocrisy, and the placid mien and silver accent with which it was pronounced, would have forced a laugh from a Quaker in the midst of a meeting. I don't recollect what reply I made him; but this I recollect well, I gave him to understand that I was no trout, and consequently was not to be caught by tickling.

This information led him to something more solid. He began to talk about *business*. I was no *flour-merchant*, but I taught English; and, as luck would have it, this was the very commodity that Bishop Perigord wanted. If I had taught Thornton's* or Webster's language, or sold sand or ashes, or pepper-pot, it would have been just the same to him. He knew the English language as well as I did; but he wanted to have dealings with me in some way or other.

I knew that, notwithstanding his being *proscribed* at Paris, he was extremely intimate with Adet; and this circumstance led me to suspect his real business in the United States; I therefore did not care to take him as a scholar. I told him that, being engaged in a translation for the press, I could not possibly quit home. This difficulty the lame fiend hopped over in a moment. He would very gladly come to my house. I cannot say but it

* Thornton proposed to make an American language by turning the letters upside down, and by writing the words as they are pronounced.—Ed.

would have been a great satisfaction to me to have seen the *ci-devant* Bishop of Autun, the guardian of the holy oil that anointed the heads of the descendants of St. Louis, come trudging through the dirt to receive a lesson from me; but, on the other hand, I did not want a Frenchman to take a survey either of my desk or my house. My price for teaching was six dollars a month; he offered me *twenty*, but I refused; and before I left him I gave him clearly to understand that I was not to be purchased.

I verily believe that, had I had any *flour* or *precious confessions** for sale, I might have disposed of them to good account; and even my pamphlets, though Bradford calls them *dirty water*, I think I could have sold to Bishop Judas for more than *one shilling and seven-pence-halfpenny* apiece.

There is no doubt of there being at this moment hundreds of honest missionaries among us, whose sole business is that of spies. They are flying about the country in every direction; not a corner of it will they leave unexplored. They are now much better acquainted with the sentiments of the people of the Union, and know more exactly those who are to be counted upon in case of a war, than either the Federal government or State governments.

FRANKLIN DEFENDED.

For the Gazette of the United States.

"Mr. FENNO, While I profess myself one of the warmest admirers of the political pamphlets of Mr. Cobbett, I cannot but express my concern at some of the sentiments of this editor, in the late numbers of his Gazette—sentiments, which, with whatever view declared, *seem calculated to degrade the American character*, and to cast an odium upon *the principles of our revolution*. I shall only instance his comment upon the anecdote of Mr. Gibbon and Dr. Franklin, in his Gazette of the 18th instant. Now, whatever antipathy he may have to the character of the Doctor (which, upon the score of generosity and political integrity, far be it from me to undertake to defend), he cannot but be aware, that his *indiscriminate observation will equally apply to a Washington, an Adams, a Jay, and a Hamilton*—characters, which, if I mistake not, he has more than once professed to hold in high estimation. What then shall we say of the conduct of Mr. Cobbett? Is it consistent, liberal, or wise? He is an Englishman, nor does he wish to conceal his attachment to the land that gave him birth, its government, and laws; nor will any generous American blame him for this partiality. But why *introduce comparisons*, which can have no other tendency than to *revive animosities, which all good men desire to bury in oblivion*, and to widen a breach, which, in the present distracted state of the world, I presume, the real friends of both countries wish to see closed?

"If he thinks the interest of his country requires nothing less than the destruction of the republican system, he has certainly too much *delicacy and understanding to attempt writing it down, under our noses*. If loyalty, in his opinion, can never be misplaced, he need not, however, take the trouble of telling us of it. If monarchy be his favourite form of

* See the New Year's Gift.

government, let it exist, say I, where it is established, and where the state of society may perhaps render it eligible; but, in God's name, let us quietly enjoy, and make the most of the institution we have framed for ourselves.

“ While Mr. Cobbett directs his artillery against *Jacobinic hypocrisy, and its detestable cant*, he is engaged in a cause which every honest and enlightened man must approve: and I shall be sincerely pleased, if I find that his rash and indiscriminate censures (he must excuse me from calling them so) are to be ascribed to petulance of temper, or an indiscreet zeal for the honour of his country, and not to a deliberate plan of discrediting the principles and consequences of our revolution here, whatever may be its effects in other parts of the world. For even upon the supposition of its being an evil, we are to look for its authors to the other side of the water: and let him remember, that its principles were advocated by Mr. Burke, the man for whom he justly expresses such enthusiastic admiration.

A COUNTRY SUBSCRIBER.”

ANSWER.

Mr. Fenno's Subscriber hints at other passages in my Gazette, “ calculated to *degrade the American character, &c.*” besides the one he has noticed; but, as I cannot even guess at these, I shall be excused for confining myself, on the present occasion, to the particular instance which he has cited.

He objects to my “ *reviving animosities, which all good men desire to bury in oblivion.*” How unjust this charge is must be perceived at once, by every one who casts his eye over the above. The anecdote was not of *my selection*; it was published in a New-York paper, and republished in all those of this city. The publication of it at the time was a sort of dunghill-cock triumph over Great Britain, and could be intended for no other purpose than that of “ *reviving animosities.*”

The observations on this spiteful paragraph are such as were naturally called for: the reprobation of the malicious old hypocrite, who is represented as *the hero of the anecdote*; and they do not contain the least reflection on the *American character* or the *principles of the revolution*.

Old Franklin is held up to the admiration of the people, for having wantonly and maliciously predicted, that the empire of Britain *would soon fall to the ground*; and, because I call him an old ZANGA for this prediction, I am charged with *degrading the American character*; as if every American were admitted to be *of the same disposition*, and to entertain *the same vengeful sentiments*, as this remorseless old deist. Nay, Mr. Fenno's correspondent carries the thing still farther, and observes, that the observation on Franklin necessarily applies itself to Messrs. Washington, Adams, Jay, and Hamilton. But, if this curious logician expects to be believed here, he must first prove each of these gentlemen to have uttered sentiments equally insulting, vindictive, and sanguinary, with those of Franklin; a thing, I believe, which it would be very difficult for him to do: however, this I have nothing to do with. When I am convinced that either of them, not content with obtaining the independence of the colonies, was savage enough to *hug himself in the hope that the parent state would perish in the conflict*, I will call him a ZANGA. Nor shall I be afraid, in so doing, of exposing myself to the charge of inconsistency. I have thought highly, and I have spoken highly, of these gentlemen; but did any one even suppose that I ap-

plauded them merely as *revolutionists*, much less as *bitter, inexorable, and brutal enemies of Great Britain?*

This Subscriber of *Mr. Fenno's* has fallen into the cant of the day. The *press is free*; but you must not lash the baseness or malice of an American for the world, because that *degrades the American character*. You must not censure or ridicule certain political vagaries, such as sovereign people, rights of man, committees of safety, universal suffrage, confiscations, &c. &c. &c.: all these little feaks must pass uncensured, in whatever part of the world, and under whatever circumstances they may take place, because they tend to *degrade the principles of the American revolution*. A pretty reason, upon my word, and I make no doubt may be very satisfactory with some people, though it is not so with me.

One thing, however, I must allow, that while the printers are thus strictly forbidden to degrade the *American character*, &c. they have ample room left for whatever talent they may possess at degrading. They are allowed to attack, without mercy and without remorse, without truth and without decency, all the other individuals and nations of the world, *revolutionary France* excepted. Great Britain, and all her subjects, in the mass and individually, have long been consigned over to them as lawful prey. This is the light in which *Fenno's* Subscriber sees the matter. He, good soul! wishes to *bury all animosities*; but he by no means disapproved of the malicious *anecdote*, because it was a *stroke at Great Britain*.

The officious defender of the honour of America ought to recollect, that animosities *are not buried* by continually keeping them in view *on one side*; and if he be really in earnest with respect to his wishes for healing the breach between the people of the two nations, I beg of him to be assured, that reconciliation and harmony with the ignorant or the rancorous, was never yet effected *by mildness and forbearance*.

I well know the opinion that prevails respecting newspaper printers. I know that it is a general notion, that a man of this profession should have no sentiment of his own; that he should be a mere puppet, such as little Brown, and many others that I could mention; and that, at the awful name of SUBSCRIBER, his knees should begin knocking together like those of Nebuchadnezzar.—This does not suit me.—I have no idea of being a subject of the *sovereign people*, or of any *portion thereof*.

Let this serve as an answer to *Fenno's Subscriber* and to all those who think like him: that whenever, and wherever, I meet with any *malicious aspersions* on Britain, her King, or her subjects, the bitterest drop in my pen shall be employed in retaliation, whatever interpretation may be given to it, or whomsoever it may displease. And, if *Fenno's* Subscriber should be inclined to call this *inconsistency*, let him recollect, that I declared, in one of the pamphlets which he is pleased highly to approve of, that to the enemies of my country I had always "*rendered hatred for hatred, and scorn for scorn.*"

Threatening Letter.—I yesterday received the following cut-throat letter through the penny-post; and I lay it before the world, that they may judge of the temper and character of my enemies.

"*A Friend to America, but an Enemy to bloody England.*

"PORCUPINE,

"You infernal ruffian, it is my full intention, when or wherever I meet you, to give you one of the greatest lambastings ever you got. My reason for doing

“ so, you vagabond, is for writing and speaking in such a disgraceful manner as you do against the *greatest* and *chief heads* of our city.—How dare you, you corporal, or any other British subject or slave, have the impudence to speak to a freeman! I think it's too great an honour conferred on you to be permitted to tread on this *blessed ground*, for fear of contaminating it, as you have in a great measure done already by your hell-fire paper, and the blackguard scurrilous pieces it contains.

“ Believe me, you infernal ruffian, it is my full intention to give you a damned whipping when I meet you.

“ When you publish this, take care of the streets and alleys you walk in.”

This is to inform this infamously *free man*, that I know he is a base scoundrel, and that he no more dares attack me, than he dares to go to any country where there is a gallows.

New York, January 24, 1798.—“ Sir,—I thank you for the compliments addressed to me in your paper of the 20th instant. However polite they may be, and however thankful I may be on account of them, I do not know why, they flatter me but little. Should it arise from your being an anti-Frenchman? That is very possible; for although my country has been subverted, I still love her. She has been torn by every species of faction these nine years. I equally detest them all; and as you blow the trumpet of the British faction here—a faction which has given activity to every other—I am not more disposed to fraternize with you than with Stewart the traveller.

“ Your wit would be extremely agreeable if it was less dangerous. You not only bite, but you take out the piece; and I never read one of your paragraphs without remarking some attempt to stimulate the worst of passions. Edmund Burke had a very correct idea when, in 1790, he said that the French revolutionists, instead of promoting, had counteracted the cause of liberty. The same reproach is applicable to you in an opposite sense; for, certainly, if you desire the restoration of monarchy in France, your measures are extremely ill-judged—you shoot beyond the mark.

“ Extremes are always wrong; and jacobinism is not less opposed to the return of order in France, than declamations tending to *anglify* whatever is not partial to the French revolution—*Timeo Danaos, donaque ferentes*.

“ In hopes of a better order of things, and without lessening the esteem I feel for your talents, permit me, therefore, Sir, still to continue

“ A FRENCHMAN.”

ANSWER.

To the Frenchman of New York.

Sir,—I made you an offer of my pamphlets and Gazette, with the full persuasion that they neither were nor would be thought worthy of your acceptance. It was intended as nothing more than a forcible mode of expressing my approbation of your sentiments, and the very shrewd manner in which they were expressed. However, I must confess that I do not attribute your refusal altogether to the worthlessness of the present. You were anxious to convince me that you were a *true Frenchman*; and as you were apprized that I knew something of your nation, you justly apprehended that this little trait of *capriciousness* would infallibly produce such conviction. Be this as it may, so strongly is the *amor patriæ* implanted in my breast; and so honourable do I esteem the avowal of it on

all occasions, that I am ready not only to excuse, but to applaud the motive, whether real or pretended, from which you politely decline accepting my offer.

Your saying that I "not only bite, but *take out the piece*," rather flatters than displeases me. These are not days, my dear Sir, to be wasted in barking and snapping. The hell-hounds are let loose upon us; and if we give quarter, we shall most assuredly receive none. Besides, I am surrounded with such a numerous pack, that I have no time to bestow more than one bite on each. I am absolutely compelled to "*take out the piece*" every time I bite, or to expire beneath their accumulated mumbings; a species of martyrdom which, be assured, I am by no means prepared to undergo.

You censure me for the violent measures I am pursuing, and insist that they are not calculated to promote the "*restoration of monarchy in France*." How you came to fall upon this I know not, unless I suppose, which is very natural, that that restoration is ever uppermost in your mind. You must know, Sir, that I never presumed to have such an object in view; for though it is an event which I most sincerely desire to see take place, not only for your sake, in common with all the valuable part of your countrymen, but for the good of mankind in general; yet I have other cares that come nearer home, which absorb more time than I can command, and require infinitely greater talents than I possess. However, had I been born a Frenchman, I trust I should, in the early stages of your dreadful revolution, have pursued just the same measures you now see me pursuing; and certain I am, that if the vast mass of information and talents possessed by the royalists had been employed in the same way, Louis would now be a king and Barras a barber. You played with the little infant sans-culottes; you nursed and fed them, as the hedge-sparrows did the unfledged cuckoos, till by-and-by they gathered strength, pecked out your eyes, and swallowed you at a single repast. This tragiforce of the poor hedge-sparrow I do not want to see played on the theatre of America.

There is one subject which I am exceedingly sorry you have touched on, because I cannot pass it over in silence, and because I cannot say any thing in reply which must not reflect on the Government, the loss of which you have but too much reason to deplore.

You will at once perceive that I allude to the part of your letter which speaks of a *British faction in this country*, and of *its having given activity to every other*. I will not suppose that you have been the dupe of *Bache* and the *M'Langs*, and that you look upon me as a hireling of King George; I will not suppose you tainted with sans-culotte principles, and therefore I will not reproach you with the intrigues of Genet, Fauchet, Adet, and their *affiliated clubs*. I will not call upon you to point out to me a single instance in which a British Minister has incorporated himself with the enemies of the Federal government, or has appealed to the people from that Government's decisions. This, and such-like conduct, applies to the sans-culottes. But, Sir, I will call upon you for a fair and impartial comparison between the conduct of the *old Court* of France, and that of the Court of Great Britain.

From the moment France took up arms in favour of these States, she was unremitted in her endeavours to form a faction here, devoted to her interest, and *to that alone*. She, in part, succeeded, by gaining over old Franklin and some others, as evidently appeared from the detestable

mancœuvres at the making of the peace. She was foiled at that time; but want of perseverance was never her fault; and the moment the present Government began its operation, it was discovered that she had not been idle.

One of the first motions made in the Congress assembled at New York was, to give her a preference in trade with this country; and though it was evident that the proposition was preposterous, unnatural, and to the last degree impolitic, I believe the House of Representatives had a majority in her favour. *Madison* was at the head of the phalanx; *Jefferson* was then at Paris; these men's principles have been since fully exposed, and universally exploded.

No one here has forgotten the inveigling mountebank tricks of all her ambassadors, from the first to the last; and nothing more is wanted to prove that France ever had a devoted faction here, and that her object; with respect to America, has ever been the same, than this one fact,—*the very men who were the partisans of the monarch, have steadily continued the partisans of his murderers.*

When did you ever hear of a member of Congress proposing to make regulations intended solely to favour Great Britain? Never; nor can you bring a single instance of any itinerant vagabond, like *Brissot*, being sent to explore the country and the hearts of the people. France is very *humble* or very *haughty*, just as it suits her interest. She had blinded many persons; but the *Quakers* were yet without the pale of her politics; and the scoundrel hypocrite *Brissot* was (by the old Government) sent to convert them. He wrote a book. Yes, the rascal actually wrote a book under the directions of that Government. It was the fruit of his journey, and its object was, to persuade the Americans that *France was the only nation on earth with whom they need or ought to trade.*

In a *fair race* for preference in this trade, France well knows, and always has known, that she cannot vie with Great Britain. If her means were convertible into this channel, the good old English prejudices and habits would impede her. She must change the nature of this people, before she can engross their trade. Well apprized of this, and always governed by her inordinate ambition, she has continually endeavoured to effect by political fraud, what by honest means she could not. Hence it is, that she has always had a faction, and always will have one, as long as she has *l'argent* to maintain it.

Great Britain, on the contrary, neither has nor wants any. She has no object to effect by it. All she wants is a *fair trade*, and in that she is sure she can never have a rival. Her men of science and genius; her industrious mechanics and manufacturers; her punctual, honest, and generous merchants—these are the *British faction*; and I trust that the plain habits, sound sense, and upright politics of America, will never give her cause to seek for any other.

I have not here entered much into detail. My time does not allow of it. But every thing I have advanced in general terms, I can prove by facts, while I call upon you, in this public manner, to establish, by the semblance of proof, your assertion respecting a faction under the influence of Great Britain.

After apologizing for the length of this letter, I shall conclude, by assuring you, that no one more than I desires to see a termination of the abominable tyranny which now disgraces your once happy and amiable nation. And, as to yourself, Sir, I beg you to believe me sincere, when

I declare, that, though formerly a soldier, I am not now on the recruiting service, and have not the least design to kidnap you from your country; but am, sincerely, your friend, and most obedient, humble servant,

Philadelphia, Jan. 27.

P. PORCUPINE.

P. S. As this is, as far as I recollect, the first civil letter (and I am much afraid it will be the last) that ever my opponents have given me an opportunity of writing, I trust that any want of formality that may appear in the winding-up will be readily excused. The letters I have to answer, generally end with a curse, in place of *your humble servant, Sir*. I often wonder how I make shift to get through the world as I do.

THE CENTURY.*—In the *Norfolk Herald*, appears the following advertisement:—

“ MESSRS. WILLETT and O’CONNOR, *Princess Anne, Dec. 18, 1798.*

“ SIRs,—I am a poor widow woman, whose great uncle by her father’s side died lately, and by his will he hath left me a legacy of 100*l.*, to be paid me in the 19th century; that is, he says, “*Item, I give to my niece Deborah Violet 100*l.*, to be paid to her in the 19th century.*” Now, Sirs, as I am a poor woman, and I am told you have a great many *law gentlemen* in Norfolk, you will render a great service if you will get their opinion when, and at what time, I have really a right to demand the same. In so doing you will oblige, yours at command, DEBORAH VIOLET.”

P. Porcupine to Mrs. Violet.

DEAR MADAM,—Having a singular affection for widows of the *Violet* race (especially those who are in full bloom), and observing you in some little distress for advice, you will not be surprised, that, without further ceremony, I proceed to offer you the best which it is in my power to bestow.

And, first, my sweet *Violet*, I think you have applied to the wrong source; for one principal part of a lawyer’s professional skill consists in knowing how to procure *delay*; and, I assure you, that all the gentlemen of the bench and the bar, whose opinions I have heard on the subject, have decided the point against you. I resided, some time ago, near a small village, which was honoured by being the summer’s retreat of a *lawyer* and a *judge*. The former of these might not, indeed, have been much accustomed to the *Christian* calendar; but be that as it may, they both said (and I believe they swore), that the eighteenth century should not end till 1801. Preposterous as this assertion certainly is, you may be assured that they were prepared to maintain it, even against one who should have risen from the dead to convince them of the contrary.

You may look upon it as a settled point, that whoever has got your 100*l.* will keep it as long as they can. You will find it difficult, even twenty years hence, to persuade *them* that the nineteenth century is arrived. Sued they therefore must be for the money, and, according to an established maxim in the law, the sooner you begin the sooner you will have done.

I would advise you to plead your own cause; no eloquence is so convincing as that which flows from female lips. Your adversary, conscious of the badness of his cause, will have plenty of lawyers to oppose you.

* The question of the Century caused great literary disputes in England and America in 1799. This clear explanation, therefore, we think worth preserving.—ED.

They will insist that the 18th century cannot be ended till the year 1800 is ended; they will tell you that this is the 1798th and not the 1799th year, and so forth, and so forth, and so forth, to the end of the chapter. In return to all which, you will say:—"Pray, what century are we now in?" They will answer, the "18th to be sure." You will then ask them, how it happens that we have continued to date 17 hundred during all the 18th century? If there should be a man of sense amongst them, he will laugh in his sleeve; but you will see the young babblers stare like so many stuck pigs. Before they have had time to recover, you must follow up your blow, and put to them the following questions:—"When did we *begin* to date 17 hundred, at the *beginning* or the *end* of the 17th century?" They will immediately answer, "At the *end* of the 17th century." "Well, then," say you, "did we not also *begin* to date 1798 at the *end* of the 1798th year? If we began (as you say we did) to date 1798 at the *beginning* of the 1798th year, why did we not begin to date 18 hundred at the *beginning* of the 18th century?"—At this they will stand as mute as fishes. You will get *no answer* from them. They will, however, find their tongues after a time, and then they will go on again with their *said*s and so forths, and again insist that 1800 years must expire before 1800 years are expired; and that 99 cannot make a hundred, and consequently, and of course, 1799 cannot make 1800, and hence and from thence they will draw a conclusion as clear as day-light that, to attain 1800 years we must arrive at 1800. With about nine-tenths of the jury the force of this *reasoning* will be irresistible; but, if there be amongst them any man of a sound understanding and a clear conscience, he will remain locked up till he has gnawed off his hands, before he will give a verdict against you.

With the best wishes for the success of your cause, I remain, my dear Violet, your most obedient, and most humble servant,

P. PORCUPINE.

A Toad-Eater.—A "COUNTRYMAN" asks me the meaning of the appellation *Toad-eater*. I am not at all surprised that a *countryman*, who generally lives upon the fruit of his labour, and breathes the sweet air of real independence, should not understand what a *Toad-eater* means; I shall, therefore, endeavour to explain its meaning to him. A *Toad-eater*, odd as it may seem, is an animal that walks upon two legs. His chief business in life is to seek his *food*; and, provided he can obtain the end, he is not delicate about the means; but the quality from which he derives his name, is standing in the gap, and *swallowing the satire* that would otherwise be forced down the throat of a *rich knave* or *fool*, rather than do which there is no man of spirit who would not swallow that most loathsome of all creatures, a *toad*. Hence the name of *Toad-eater*. *Toad-eaters* are seldom found, either in Europe or America, any where but in and about great cities. They are of degrees as different as the services they have to perform. *Fools and rogues of great wealth* generally look for them amongst the refuse of the three learned professions, where they can rarely make a bad choice. Cashiered officers, and players hissed from the stage, are also a most excellent kind. But all these are above the reach of the small game of satire, who are, therefore, obliged to seek toad-eaters elsewhere. If a pettifogger, a poetaster, a quack, or a spurious envoy, stands in need of a toad-eater, he looks for him among the printers of newspapers. Here he is sure to

suit himself; here, for a subscription, or the insertion of an advertisement, he finds mouths of all sizes, and gullets of all dimensions, distended to receive his *toad*, with as much joy and gratitude as the young ones of the crow receives the carrion from her bill.

Judges.—There is something singularly favourable to *civil liberty* and *free elections* in the eligibility of judges to other offices, *before they cease to be judges*; for, a man cannot distinguish his friends from his opponents, while he is on the bench, *any better* than if he were not there; and, on the other hand, his office of judge enables him to prevent, in a great measure, all improper or unpleasant publications, either against the other candidate or *himself*. I say, therefore, that the *office of judge*, and the quality of *candidate for that of Governor*, are united in the same person with singular propriety.* Be it remembered, moreover, that if a judge fail in his election, he is *still a judge*; and every one must perceive, that a hard political struggle furnishes an excellent opportunity for a judge to make himself thoroughly acquainted with the *faults* and the *virtues* of all and every of the *citizens*; a very valuable sort of knowledge, and which, I presume, cannot fail to contribute greatly to the *impartial administration of justice*.—"VIVAT REPUBLICA!"

Dallas is pretty sure that he shall not be Secretary of State, under any Federal Governor, and for that reason, amongst others, he wishes to thrust in M'Kean. To be sure, he may be disappointed, even if MAC should get in; but he has a chance, and a bad chance is better than none. "What does he care," said a fool the other day, "he has *very good practice at the bar*." But this fool did not perceive, that he might lose that *good practice* with his office of Secretary of State! The poor fool did not recollect, that it is often very convenient to have one's cause in the hands of a man who has, *ex officio*, the *ear of the Governor*. If I were in danger of being hanged, in England, and the Minister were also a pleading lawyer, I should certainly employ the Minister, and give him a thumping fee. But this is not the case in England; neither Mr. Pitt, nor the Duke of Portland, nor Lord Grenville, is a pleading lawyer; and here we have complete proof of the super-excellence of Republican government, the simple manners of which permit its officers to follow their private and public occupations at one and the same time, by which means the service of the State is performed for little or nothing. Some persons may, indeed, suggest, that this economy may be attended with evil consequences; for, that a man's private occupation may be made the medium through which to obtain his influence, in his public capacity; but

* The offices of Sheriff and Governor are frequently the cause of great corruptions in America, and Mr. COBBETT frequently exposed them in his Gazette and other writings. If the reader will turn to Mr. JEFFERSON'S memoirs, page 69, he will find that these remarks are fully borne out by the head of the democratic party; for he says, "We have seen that, contrary to all correct example, they (the judges) are in the habit of going out of the question before them, to throw an anchor ahead, and grapple further hold for future advances of power. They are, then, in fact, the corps of sappers and miners, steadily working to undermine the independent rights of the States, and to consolidate all in the hands of that Government in which they have so important a freehold estate." M'KEAN became Governor of Pennsylvania after being many years Chief Justice, and, in his capacity of judge, admitted to the right of voting, those who were to be his electors.—Ed.

those who talk thus, do not recollect the maxim of the sapient Montesquieu, that "VIRTUE is the basis of Republican government."

Tench Coxe keeps harping away upon Mr. Ross, who, he says, is recommended by me. This is a small mistake; I never presumed to recommend Mr. Ross; I know nothing of him; but I see him recommended by gentlemen of high reputation, for honesty, as well as for understanding; and I see him opposed by Leib, Tench Coxe, Dallas, &c., and, therefore, I am pretty sure, he must be a worthy gentleman, and a firm friend to his country. I must, however, say that I have somewhat more knowledge of the other candidate; I know Tench Coxe's man; I know M'Kean, and I know that it is my duty, my bounden duty, to my subscribers in this State, to use all my feeble efforts to preserve them from the power of such a man. From private considerations, there is no man who need care less about the issue of the election than myself. It is out of M'Kean's power to hurt me. *I will never live six months under his sovereign sway.* As soon as he is safe in his saddle, I shall begin to look out for a horse. Nor will a migration of this sort give me a moment's uneasiness. It would be a durable source of satisfaction to me, that I had scorned to live amongst a set of beings who could voluntarily and deliberately choose such a man to reign over them. As I said before, I look upon it as my duty to the public to assist in opposing M'Kean's election; but, as it may concern myself, I view it with the most perfect indifference; and, above all things, Coxe ought to avoid accusing me with acting from motives of *enmity to the people*; for, if I wished them evil, if I desired to see their humiliation, their misery, their ruin, *I should join with Coxe instead of opposing him.*

JANUARY, 1800.

*To the Subscribers to this Gazette.**

Gentlemen,—Agreeably to my notification, made by advertisement, on the 11th ultimo, I now address to you the *farewell number* of PORCUPINE'S GAZETTE.

Remembering, as you must, my solemn promise to quit Pennsylvania, in case my old democratic Judge, MAC KEAN, should be elected Governor; and knowing, as you now do, that he is elected to that office, there are, I trust, very few of you who will be surprised to find that I am no longer in that degraded and degrading State.

My removal from Philadelphia to New York would certainly be sufficient apology for the suspension of my paper from the 26th of October (when the last number was published) to this time; and, were I inclined to resume and continue it, I am persuaded it would, by the far greater part of you, be honoured with a welcome appropriate to the return of an absent friend; but, the renewal of this intercourse between us, pleasing as it would be to me also, under other circumstances, cannot take place either now or at any future time.

My Gazette, Gentlemen, instead of being a mine of gold to me, as it has generally been supposed, has never yielded me a farthing of clear profit; and, therefore, in laying it down I lose nothing but a most troublesome and weighty burden. I must confess, however, that this consi-

* This was published at New York.

deration was no inducement to the step I have taken. *Gain* was never, in any situation of life, a primary object with me. The other branches of my business enabled me to support the loss incurred by the publication of my paper; and it was my intention, even after I had fully ascertained and sensibly felt the unproductiveness of it, to continue it till the month of March 1801; but, as this intention was founded entirely on my persuasion of the *public utility* of the continuation, it fell, of course, the moment that persuasion was removed from my mind.

I began my editorial career with the *presidency of Mr. Adams*; and my principal object was to render his administration all the assistance in my power. I looked upon him as a stately, well-armed vessel, sailing on an expedition to combat and destroy the fatal influence of French intrigue and French principles; and I flattered myself with the hope of accompanying him through the voyage, and of partaking, in a trifling degree, of the glory of the enterprise; but he suddenly tacked about, and I could follow him no longer.

For a *first-rater*, like Mr. Adams, to beat up in the very teeth of former maxims, professions, and declarations, might, for aught I knew, be not only safe and prudent, but magnanimous also in the sublimest degree; but, for a poor little cock-boat like me, rigged only for a right-forward course, to attempt to imitate the adventurous manœuvre, would have been the very extreme of vanity and presumption; while, on the other hand, to continue my course *alone* would have been dangerous, useless, and absurd; I therefore waited for the first fair opportunity to haul down my sails, to lie-to, and contemplate the retreating commodore, surrounded with my more versatile companions, whose happy construction enabled them to yield obedience to every signal and to trim to every breeze.

While, however, I most heartily congratulate my brethren on the pliability of their principles, and the consequent respectability of their situation; while I, admiring, behold with what speed and address they retrace their route, and congratulate them on the approach of the time when they are to receive a pardon from the much-abused Talleyrand and the other rulers of the yet dear sister republic; while I thus cordially bestow on them my congratulations, there are some few things on which I humbly presume I may be permitted to congratulate myself. Yes, I must congratulate myself on having established a paper, carried it to a circulation unparalleled in extent, and preserved this circulation to the last number, without the aid of any of those base and parasitical arts by which patronage to American newspapers is generally obtained and preserved;—I congratulate myself on having, in the progress of this paper, uniformly supported, with all my feeble powers, the cause of true religion, sound morality, good government, and *real* liberty;—I congratulate myself on never having, in a single instance, been the sycophant of the Sovereign People; and on having persisted, in spite of calumny, threats, prosecutions, and violence, from the one side, and of praises, promises, and caresses, from the other—in spite of the *savage howlings* of the *SANS-CULOTTES*, and the *soothing serenades* of the *FEDERALISTS* (for I have heard both under my window);—I congratulate myself on having, in spite of all these, persisted in openly and unequivocally avowing my attachment to my native country and my allegiance to my king;—and, with still greater pride I congratulate myself on being the first, and perhaps the only man, who, since the revolution, has, in open court, refused to take

shelter under the title of *citizen*, and demanded justice as *a subject of King George*;—finally, I congratulate myself on having the entire approbation of every man of sense, candour, and integrity, the disapprobation of every fool, the hatred of every *malignant Whig*, and the curse of every villain.

I am, Gentlemen,

Your most obliged and most obedient servant,

WM. COBBETT.

THE RUSH-LIGHT.

The Rushite System of Depletion, with a Statement of Porcupine's Reasons for opposing it.

"The fever began to ravage the city and suburbs; so that we had abundance of work, and it may easily be conceived what a quantity of *innocent blood was spilt*. But, I know not how it happened, *all our sick died*."

GIL BLAS.

THE novel system, adopted by Rush, is most aptly denominated the system of *depletion*; for the merit of it entirely consists in *emptying* the veins and the intestines with an expedition heretofore unknown and unheard of. Of the effects of this system the people of America have heard and *felt* enough, but of its origin many of them are totally ignorant. For most of the great discoveries, especially those which have contributed to the depopulation of the earth, we are indebted to what appears to have been mere accident; which was, also, in some sort, the mother of the system of depletion.

RUSH had constantly endeavoured to place himself *at the head* of something or other; and, as is common with persons possessed of vanity too great to suffer them to remain quiet in obscurity, and of talents too contemptible, or tempers too fickle, to enable them to attain superiority by the ordinary course of advancement, he had ever been upon the search for some discovery, some captivating novelty, to which he might prefix *his name*; and thus reach, at a single leap, the goal at which men seldom arrive but by slow, cautious, and painful approaches. To a determination to become a great man, in defiance of niggardly Nature, might be fairly attributed all the solemn fooleries of this versatile doctor, who, in his impatient pursuit after fame, had chopped and changed from science to science, till at last, like the straggling hound, he had the mortification to see himself outstripped in the chase by the slow-motioned companions whom he formerly despised.

Various were the tricks that he tried; Religion, Morals, Jurisprudence, Literature, Economy, Politics, and Philosophy, all became, at times, the subject of his plans and his projects. Still, however, fame fled from his grasp. His "*Original Essays*," though aided by puffs in abundance, excited a laugh, and that was all. The learned languages were still taught in the schools; little girls still played with dolls; and parents still kept sharp knives and pointed scissors from the hands of their children; men

still used tobacco, and women continued to sweeten their tea with West-India sugar. Thus baffled, thus first despised, and then forgotten, as an author, the doctor saw no hope of rendering himself distinguished but as a *physician*. On this, therefore, he appears to have resolved, much about the time that the Yellow Fever of 1793 offered an opportunity favourable to the enterprise. He had, by those arts which men of his stamp never fail to employ, obtained some trifling marks of respect amongst certain philosophical bodies in Europe; he had thrust himself into many of the public institutions in America; he read chemical lectures to the young "ladies" in the Philadelphia Academy, and clinical lectures to the young "doctors" in the University of Pennsylvania; but all this did not make him a first-rate medical man. His practice was still confined to that class of people who are not the best qualified to judge of, or the most able to reward, scientific merit.

To recover his lost ground, to relieve himself from this humiliating situation, and to tower over the heads of his envied brethren, he seized, with uncommon alacrity and address, the occasion presented by the Yellow Fever, the fearful ravages of which were peculiarly calculated to dispose the minds of the panic-struck people to the tolerance, and even to the admiration of experiments, which, at any other time, they would have rejected with disdain. Besides this debilitated state of the public mind, Rush had several other circumstances in his favour: the only newspaper (that of Brown), which continued to circulate in the city, was almost entirely under his control; his clamorous professions of republicanism had gained him numerous partisans amongst the class of citizens who could not flee to the country; and the physicians whose opinions he had to encounter, though highly respected by all classes, were men of too peaceable a turn to enter the field with a person who scrupled not, at the very opening of the campaign, to carry the war into the public prints; and though many of them were by no means deficient in point of spirit, they probably thought it beneath the dignity of their characters to engage in a contest of any sort with a *discoverer of nostrums*.

At the first breaking out of the Yellow Fever, he made use of "*gentle purges*;" these he laid aside, and had recourse to "*a gentle vomit of ipecacuanha*;" next he "*gave bark in all its usual forms of infusion, powder, and tincture, and joined wine, brandy, and aromatics, with it*:" this was followed by "*the application of blisters to the limbs, neck, and head*;" these torments were succeeded by "*an attempt to rouse the system by wrapping the whole body in blankets dipped in warm vinegar*;" he next "*rubbed the right side with mercurial ointment, with a view of exciting the action of the vessels through the medium of the liver*;" after this he again returned to bark, which he gave in large quantities; and, in one case, ordered it to be injected into the bowels once in four hours; and, at last, having found that wrapping his patients in blankets dipped in warm vinegar did no good, he "*directed buckets full of cold water to be thrown frequently upon them*!"

Surprising as it may seem, his patients died! Thus baffled, as he tells us, in every attempt to stop the ravages of the fever, he anticipated all the numerous and complicated distresses attendant on pestilential diseases. "Heaven alone," says he, "bore witness to the anguish of my soul! But," proceeds he, in the same strain of disgusting egotism, "I did not abandon a hope that the disease might yet be cured. I had long believed that good was commensurate with evil, and that there does not

“exist a disease for which the goodness of Providence *has** not provided a “remedy.” And modestly presuming that he was (as he afterwards boasted in print) the instrument chosen by Providence for discovering the remedy which it had in this case provided, he tells us that he applied himself with fresh ardour to the investigation of the Yellow Fever, and for a long time in vain. “But,” says he, “before I desisted I *recollected* that “I had, *among some old papers*, a manuscript account of the Yellow “Fever, as it prevailed in Virginia in the year 1741, which had been put “into my hands by Dr. Franklin a short time before his death.” This present, which was not the only one Franklin bestowed on Philadelphia, proved to be, in its qualities, something like that which poor Hercules received from Dejanira.

Rush tells us (A. of Yellow F. of 1793, p. 197), that he was much struck with certain passages of this old manuscript, but particularly with one, in which the writer observed, that “an ill-timed *scrupulousness* “*about the weakness of the body* was of bad consequence,” and he declared that he had “given a purge *when the pulse was so low that it could hardly be felt.*” Reading on, Rush says he came to the following words:— “This evacuation must be procured by *lenitive chologogue purges.*”

“Here,” says he, “I paused. A new train of ideas *suddenly* broke in upon my mind.” He then mentions his former *scruples*; “but,” adds he, “Dr. Mitchill” [the man of the old manuscript] “*in a moment* dissipated my ignorance and my *fears*. I adopted his theory and practice,” and [without any trial] “*resolved* to follow them!!”

Having, “in a moment,” formed this resolution, he very soon proceeded to put it in practice. The “*chologogue purge*” that he fixed upon was composed of ten grains of calomel and fifteen of jalap. To this purge, which the inventor sometimes called the *Sampson* of medicine, was added *copious blood-letting*,—a most powerful co-operator!

With these *remedies* the Pennsylvanian “Hippocrates” set to work in the beginning of September. This practice gained no partisans, except amongst the ignorant beings who were about his person, or who had recently been his pupils. But, what with the public rage for wonder-working medicines, the noisy boasting of the Rushites, and the delicacy which imposed silence on such men as Drs. Khun and Wistar, the mercurial purges became popular, and the discoverer so elated that he thought it no longer necessary to suppress the suggestions of his vanity; accordingly, on the 12th of September, he actually came out in the newspapers with an exulting recommendation of the use of *his* specifics, as the only means of saving the lives of the sick.

Various were the publications that he now sent through the papers, in the form of paragraphs, cards, letters, &c.; in one of which he asserted that, in consequence of his discovery there was no occasion for fleeing to the country, for that the Yellow Fever was no longer a dangerous disease, but was *now* perfectly under the power of medicine. He concluded this card to the people, which was published on the 12th of September, by saying that, with *his* remedies, “there was no more danger to be apprehended from the Yellow Fever than from the *measles* or the *influenza.*” On the 17th of the same month he concluded a letter to the College of Physicians (who entirely disapproved of his practice) by positively declaring that, could *he* visit all the sick, and be assisted with proper nurses, the

* Reader, I beg you to pay attention to the *grammar* of this sentence; and to recollect that the writer of it has published what he calls “*Literary Essays.*”

disease would soon be reduced, in point of danger and mortality, to a *common cold* ! Still rising in audacity, he wrote to Dr. Rodgers of New York, on the 3rd of October, a letter, which was immediately published, and in which, after speaking of the practice of the other physicians in terms the most contemptuous, he asserted that *he recovered ninety-nine patients in a hundred* !

The practice was, as he said, very simple and very efficacious ; for it consisted merely of bleeding upon bleeding, sometimes to one hundred and fifty ounces, and of purge upon purge, sometimes to sixty grains of mercury and to ninety grains of jalap ! It would be highly presumptuous in me to pretend to give *my own* objections to this or to any other mode of treating a disease : and, therefore, though such unmerciful bleeding and purging seem to be synonymous with death itself, I shall state the objections which were made by those gentlemen who were, who are, and who will remain, at the head of the medical profession in America.

These gentlemen insisted that *the purges* were of too drastic a nature ; they compared them to *arsenic*, and said it was a dose for a horse. They said that the mercury excited salivation, even to loosening the teeth.* They said that it inflamed and lacerated the stomach and the bowels ; and, in proof, they cited a dissection made at Bush-hill, wherein were exhibited the horrid effects of the mercurial purges. They further said, and, as far as I was able to learn, with great truth, that this violent and dangerous purge, though it must inevitably be destructive in weak habits, was prescribed indiscriminately in all cases, to persons of both sexes, and of all ages. Finally, when the calls of humanity compelled them, after long forbearance, publicly to protest against these dreadful doses, they reprobated the use of them in the strongest terms. Doctor Currie, who was one of the College of Physicians, earnestly besought the poor deluded Philadelphians to open their eyes, to beware of the new remedies ; for, said he, "*the mode of treatment advised by Dr. Rush cannot, in the Yellow Fever, fail of being CERTAIN DEATH.*"

As to the *bleeding* part of the practice, the same learned and experienced gentleman said, and, I believe, most truly, that it was *dangerously copious*, and that many persons had been destroyed by it. They said, that if the patient happened to survive such copious discharges of the vital fluid, they produced weakness, and that their consequences often terminated in the total ruin of the constitution. Here also they justly complained of the want of discrimination, and asserted that blood-letting was prescribed in all cases, without any regard to the habit, the age, or the force of the diseased.

To each of these objections Rush replied by producing patients *who had survived* the treatment objected to : that is to say, by proving, to the satisfaction of the most incredulous, that *every one* he touched did not die ! Nobody ever contradicted him ; for it was never doubted that there were constitutions capable of resisting even his prescriptions.

I shall now speak of the irregular brethren and sisterhood, who were called in to assist in administering the potent mysteries, and whom the High Priest very properly calls the "undisciplined sect of practitioners." Of this sect, which was tolerably numerous, Rush records the exploits of

* Rush replied to this objection by saying that he "met with but two cases in which there was a *loss* of teeth from this medicine." But, my dear "Hippocrates," there is some little difference between *loosening* and *losing* one's teeth. You think it is nothing, I suppose, unless your patient's teeth drop into his porridge

a few of the most eminent ; these were, a *Popish Priest*, a *German Apothecary*, an *Auctioneer*, two *Old Women*, and a brace of *Negro Parsons*, the REVEREND ABSALOM JONES, and the REVEREND RICHARD ALLEN !

Of this motley squad, the two Reverend Negroes seem to have been his favourites ; “ for,” says he, “ they spent all the intervals in which “ they were not employed in burying the dead, in visiting the poor who “ were sick, *and in bleeding and purging them*, agreeably to the directions” [his directions] “ which had been published in all the newspapers.” He has the impudence to add, that the success of these fellows “ was unparalleled by what is called *regular practice*.” But ask any man, who had the mortification to be a spectator of their operations, and he will tell you what bloody and dirty work they made amongst the infatuated creatures who submitted to their treatment.

When the reader casts his eye on the wretched city ; when he sees Rush’s *sister*, his pupils, and, perhaps, twenty apothecaries’ apprentices besides, all making packets of mercury ; and when he sees the swift poison (for such mercury is, when improperly used) committed to the hands of old women and negroes, he will not be surprised at the fatal consequences : instead of astonishment at the vast increase of the bills of mortality, he will find ample occasion for thanksgiving that a single man was left alive.

But Rush, on the contrary, blessed God for the discovery he had made, and for the success of his practice. In his above-mentioned letter to Dr. Rodgers of New York, he modestly observed that he had been “ the unworthy instrument in the hands of a kind Providence of recovering more than *ninety-nine out of a hundred* of his patients ;” and he had before, with not less modesty, publicly proclaimed in Philadelphia that, with the aid of *his* remedies, the Fever was, “ in point of danger and mortality, reduced to a level with the *measles*, the *influenza*, or a *common cold*.” In his Account of the Yellow Fever of 1793, a work written after he had time to reflect, and to retract these assertions, he repeats them with additional effrontery, and thus deprives himself of all claim to an exemption from the charge of *intentional falsehood*. He gives no list of his patients ; an omission not to be accounted for otherwise than by this assurance, that such a list would give the lie to his assertions, and of course withdraw the only prop by which the virtue of his famous discovery was supported. The evasion by which he attempts to account for this omission, is the most pitiful that ever suggested itself. “ I regret,” says he, “ that it is not in my power to furnish a list of them, for a *majority* of them were poor people, whose names are still *unknown* to me.”—Can you believe this, reader ? Can you imagine that this man, who was labouring with might and main to establish his reputation on the success of a discovery to which he had prefixed his name, would omit to note down the names of those he cured ? Recollect, too, that his system was opposed by other physicians ; that the public had been cautioned against his practice, as against “ *certain death*.” Under such circumstances, had he cured more than *ninety-nine out of a hundred* ; nay, had he cured but *ninety-nine out of a thousand*, can you believe that he would have omitted to note down the *survivors* ? He says a *majority* of his patients were poor people. But this did not prevent him from recording the names of the *minority* : and, besides, poverty does not deprive men of their *names* ; nor are the names of the poor any longer, or more difficult to write down, than those of the rich. The Grand Discoverer had several

underlings in his house, and though they did, indeed, die off pretty fast, in spite of the specific powders, there was one at least, I believe, left alive to take down the names of the patients. When I was in the army I frequently wrote from eight to ten regimental muster-rolls in one day, amounting in all to about four thousand names : Rush must have had a fearful trade, if his register would have had more work than this. Moreover, suppose that, contrary to the dictates of common prudence as well as to the laudable example of Dr. Perkins and all other great discoverers, the registering of the names had actually been neglected, till the very hour when the Doctor *regretted* that he could not furnish a list ; how easily might he have repaired the loss by an advertisement in the newspapers, calling on all those who had been cured by him to send their names to his house ? He was not very delicate, God knows, in thrusting his remedies into vogue ; and why he should be more delicate in obtaining proofs of their wonderful effects is, I think, hard to be satisfactorily accounted for. No doubt can be entertained that his patients (I mean the *live* ones) would have rejoiced in an opportunity of bearing testimony to the virtue of those means by which they had been rescued from the jaws of death. Never did a healing discovery fail of success for want of certificates of its efficacy ; on the contrary, wonder-working nostrums are always indebted for a great portion of celebrity to the importance which each lucky patient attaches to its existence, and to the vanity which almost every one has of appearing in print. I repeat, therefore, that a notification in the papers would have received immediate attention ; and that the patients, whom the discovery had left alive, would have vied with each other in a speedy communication of their names ; unless, indeed, they were *all* in the state of the unfortunate woman who was described to Rush by Dr. Woodhouse, and “ who *after* her recovery *could not recollect her name !*” Poor souls ! If the Doctor had advertised, few of them would, I am afraid, have recollected their names !

Fortunately, however, for Philadelphia, and unfortunately for Rush and his discovery, a bill of *mortality* was kept by the officers of the city. This bill of mortality, compared with the vaunts of the Doctor, will enable any one to form a tolerably accurate judgment, not only of the truth of his statements, but of the saving effects of his remedies, as applied by himself and his numerous assistants.

The Yellow Fever of 1793 broke out on the first of August, and from that day to the eighth of September the number of deaths had been various, once as low as three and once as high as forty-two. Now it was that mercury and the lancet began to be put in motion, and I beseech you, reader, to mark their progress. “ List ! list ! O list !”

On September the twelfth Rush began to recommend his powders by public advertisement. He, at the same time, told the people not to leave the city ; that there was no longer any danger, for that his discovery had put the Fever upon a level with the *measles*, the *influenza*, or a *common cold*. For some days previous to this, the ravages of the Fever had become less alarming, the bill of mortality had fallen from forty-two to twenty-three per day ; and as Rush had reduced the disease, in point of danger, to a level with a *common cold*, the poor Philadelphians, who were carried away by his noisy impudence, began to hail him as their deliverer from a calamity which they now looked upon as nearly at an end. But *Death*, who seems always to have had an implacable grudge against the Pennsylvanian “ Hippocrates,” persecuted him, in the present instance, with more severity than

ever; for from the day on which Rush declared that his discovery had reduced the Fever to a level with a *common cold*; from the day on which he promulgated the infallibility of his nostrum; from that day did the bill of mortality begin to increase in a fearful degree, as will be seen by the following extract:—

	DAYS.	DEATHS.		DAYS.	DEATHS.
September	11th	23	September	27th	60
	12th	33		28th	51
	13th	37		29th	57
	14th	48		30th	63
	15th	56	October	1st	74
	16th	67		2nd	66
	17th	81		3rd	78
	18th	69		4th	58
	19th	61		5th	71
	20th	67		6th	76
	21st	57		7th	82
	22nd	76		8th	90
	23rd	68		9th	102
	24th	96		10th	93
	25th	87		11th	119
	26th	52			

Thus you see that though the Fever was, on the 12th of September, reduced to a level with a common cold; though the lancet was continually unsheathed; though Rush and his subalterns were ready at every call, the deaths did actually increase; and, incredible as it may seem, this increase grew with that of the very practice which saved more than ninety-nine patients out of a hundred! Astonishing obstinacy! Perverse Philadelphians! Notwithstanding there was a man in your city, who could have healed you at a touch, you continued to die! Notwithstanding the precious purges were advertised at every corner, and were brought even to your doors and bed-sides by Old Women and Negroes; notwithstanding life was offered you on terms the most reasonable and accommodating, still you persisted in dying! Nor did barely dying content you. It was not enough for you to reject the means of prolonging your existence, but you must begin to drop off the faster from the moment that those means were presented to you; and this for no earthly purpose, that I can see, but the malicious one of injuring the reputation of the "saving Angel," whom "a kind Providence had sent to your assistance!"

But it was not only amongst the people in general that the Doctor met with this mortifying perverseness, even the members of his own household, those who dipped in the same dish with him, and who were to share in his honours, seem, in like manner, to have conspired against the fame of his discovery; for, of his sister and five pupils, all of whom were attacked with the Fever, *four* had the ingratitude to seal, with their death, the condemnation of his practice.

Such, reader, was the origin, and such were the first blessed fruits, of the far-famed *system of depletion*. It remains for me to give my reasons for endeavouring to explode it, and to justify the means I made use of for that purpose.

In the dispute of 1793 Rush was fairly defeated, notwithstanding he wrote more in the several newspapers than all the other physicians put to-

gether, and notwithstanding he plied his "dear Philadelphians," his "dear fellow-citizens," with more than *quantum sufficit* of that oily lingo, for which he has long been renowned. His "dear fellow-citizens" loved coaxing well enough, but they loved life better. Still resolved, however, not to acknowledge himself in an error, but to support his practice, if possible, he stopped until the fever was over, and then, like the famous physician of Valladolid, he *wrote a book*; that book to which this pamphlet is so largely indebted, and which produced an effect precisely the contrary of the one intended. Men could not be persuaded, even by the smooth tongue of Rush, that bleeding *almost to death* was likely to save life.

When, therefore, the yellow fever again broke out in 1797, "Hippocrates" and his pupils (who were the only persons that followed the practice) found very little to do. The "saving angel" recommenced writing in the newspapers, but with somewhat less confidence and more caution than formerly. He did not (except in a few instances) address himself *directly* to his "dear fellow-citizens," but published letters, sent to him by his brethren of the lancet practice, giving accounts of the great cures wrought by bleeding and mercurial purges. Sometimes a letter from Rush to some other of the learned tribe would appear, preceded by a letter requesting information respecting his mode of practice. On these occasions the discoverer seldom failed to expatiate largely on the virtues of his remedies, and on the success of their application, always taking care to throw in a due portion of compliment to the skill of his correspondent, and of tender solicitude for the welfare of his "dear countrymen" and "dear fellow-citizens." These systematic endeavours for reviving the practice were carried to such a shameless length, that there sometimes appeared in print letters written to, and answers received from, physicians dwelling in the same city of Philadelphia, men with whom Rush was most intimate, and with whom he conversed, probably, ten times a day. What necessity was there for such men to *write* to each other? What could they write for, but the express purpose of publishing their letters in the papers? And what object could they have in view, in these indirect addresses to the public, but that of extolling their own practice, of advancing their own fame, and increasing their own profits?

These tricks did not, however, pass unperceived. Many gentlemen of Philadelphia (not physicians) expressed to me their dread of the practice, and their indignation at the arts that were made use of to render it prevalent. They thought, and not without reason, that it was lawful, just, and fair to employ a newspaper in decrying what other newspapers had been employed to extol. In fact, I wanted very little persuasion to induce me to endeavour to prevent a revival of that which I had always looked upon as the scourge to the city, in 1793, and which now, I was fully persuaded, menaced the lives of my friends, my neighbours, my workmen, my customers, and, in short, of the people in general amongst whom I dwelt. Every thing seemed to threaten a return of the former consternation and calamity. The chariot of the mighty "Hippocrates" began again to rattle along the lanes and alleys; the sect of "undisciplined practitioners" were again taking the field; the Rev. Negroes had tucked up the sleeves of their gabardine, were preparing to draw the lancet and throw away the scabbard. Purge and bleed! purge and bleed! resounded through the half-deserted city, while the responsive howlings of the dogs "gave dreadful note of preparation."

Frigid indeed must have been my feelings, or cowardly must have been my heart, if, with a public print, such as I held in my hand, I had, in a scene like this, remained a silent spectator. Far was it from me to think of a course so dishonourable. I thought I saw approaching all the horrors of 1793, and both my interest and my duty commanded me to endeavour to avert them.

For writing *medical* essays; for controverting *scientifically* the wild positions of Rush and his adherents, I acknowledged myself then, as I do now, totally unqualified. To the charges of ignorance in medicine, brought against me by the great "Hippocrates," I might indeed have found a triumphant reply in his own book on the yellow fever; I might have produced himself as a witness against himself; I might have quoted the passages where he asserts, that the success of the two negroes, in curing the yellow fever, was unparalleled by what was called regular practice; "that a hundred things are taught in the common schools, less useful, "and many things more difficult than the knowledge that would "be necessary to cure a yellow fever or the plague; and that "all the "knowledge necessary to discover when blood-letting is proper, *might be "taught to a boy or a girl of twelve years old in a few hours!* I "taught it," adds he, "*in less time* to several persons during our late "epidemic!" "It is time," exclaims he in another place, "to take the "cure of pestilential fevers *out of the hands of physicians,* and to place it "*in the hands of the people!*" I might have shown that he very highly applauded the conduct of the Popish priest, who exhorted the *other* physicians "to renounce the pride of science, and *adopt the new remedies.*" I might, in short, have proved most satisfactorily, that, according to the written assertions of this impudent innovator, I was duly and amply qualified to approve of, or to condemn, any mode of treating the yellow fever; and, indeed, had I been fool or knave enough to join his troop of mock-doctors, I could probably have talked very learnedly about "*bleeding as white as Jersey real,*" about "*washing the guts,*" and "*shaking the gall-bladder;*" nay, it is possible, that I could have equalled even the Pennsylvanian "Hippocrates" in that butcher-like dialect, which is so admirably calculated to vulgarize the medical profession, and to brutalize the human frame; but I felt no inclination to imitate, in any way whatever, the "undisciplined sect of practitioners," and, therefore, while I admitted the sober refutations of those medical gentlemen, who thought Rush worth their notice, I confined myself to squibs, puns, epigrams, and quotations from Gil Blas. In this *petite guerre* I had an excellent auxiliary in Mr. Fenno, jun., or rather Fenno was the principal and I the auxiliary. Never was a paper war carried on with greater activity and perseverance, or crowned with more complete success. It began about the middle of September, and before October was nearly ended, the system of depletion was the standing jest of the town. Rush suppressed his mortification for a good while; he seemed to say that it was beneath a great physician, and a member of the *learned* philosophical society of Philadelphia, to be ruffled at what a couple of low newsmongers could say; but, at last, having been coupled, in a ludicrous way, with his dear friend Samuel Coats, a Quaker philanthropist, brother Broadbrim and he, after a *secret attempt* had been made to silence our presses, laid their heads together, and "sent for a sinful man in the flesh, called an attorney, to prepare a parchment, and carry us unto judgment."

*Observations on the Medical Treatment of General Washington, in his last illness; addressed to his Physicians, Messrs. Craik and Dick.**

The life of this illustrious personage has been so eminently beneficial and ornamental to the world, that every man who has a just value for virtue, talents, or an attachment to civil liberty, must lament his death.

The loss to his country, at this critical period, is incalculable; it is irreparable: we shall never look upon his like again!

I have perused the account published by his physicians, of their medical treatment, and differ from them so entirely in my opinion of its propriety, that, with all due respect for their good intentions, I think it my duty to point out what appears to me a most fatal error in their plan: and although it is not in the power of science to restore his precious life, yet a discussion of this case may be productive of benefit to mankind.

I suppose myself addressing men of science, whose minds are so highly cultivated, as to comprehend my reasoning on this subject; which I shall make as short and clear as possible.

When we examine the human blood by optical glasses, by chemistry, and by experimental philosophy, we find it full of nourishment in young people; but effete and poor in the aged.

When we examine by anatomical injections the state of the vascular system, we find innumerable ramifications in the arteries through which the blood flows freely in young people; while many of their anastomoses are obliterated in the aged.

The blood of old people, therefore, being poorer, and the channels for conveying its nourishment fewer, is the reason that old people cannot bear bleeding so well as the young, and it likewise explains (what every man of science and experience must know) why a small bleeding has the same effect on an aged person, that a large bleeding has upon the young and robust.

These observations, founded on well-established facts, demonstrate how guarded and circumspect we ought to be in the use of the lancet, when our patient is far advanced in life; and how actively we ought to employ our thoughts in devising other methods than profuse blood-letting in such a case.

From what the physicians have published, and other documents, we have data sufficient to ascertain how far the maxims derivable from science, experience, and judgment, have governed in the present instance.

The duration of this illness was 20 hours; from 3 a. m. till after 10 p. m.

A bleeder being sent for at the unusual hour of 3 a. m. we may suppose the operation was not performed until four o'clock; before eleven hours elapsed, he was bled again twice profusely, which must have been about eighteen ounces each time; and soon afterwards he was bled again to the amount of thirty-two ounces.

Thus we see, by their own statement, that they drew from a man in the sixty-ninth year of his age, the enormous quantity of eighty-two ounces, or about two quarts and a half of blood in about thirteen hours.

Very few of the most robust young men in the world could survive such a loss of blood; but the body of an aged person must be so ex-

* This paper is not noticed by Marshall in his life of General WASHINGTON, where the circumstances attending the General's death are given very briefly. — ED.

hausted, and all his powers so weakened by it, as to make his death speedy and inevitable.

Here the effect followed the cause precisely: the physicians soon observed the powers of life yielding; a loss of speech; and that he expired without a struggle! The excessive bleeding *had left him no strength to struggle!!*

After what has been said, it may be expected that I should point out my plan:—I will speak generally, without descending to criticise on the minor parts of the treatment, which, however, I do not admire.

They ought to have attacked the disease as near its seat as possible: the vein under the tongue might have been opened; the tonsils might have been scarified; the scarificator and cup might have been applied on or near the thyroid cartilage. One ounce of blood drawn in this way would relieve more than a quart drawn from the arm, and would not exhaust and enfeeble the body; in the same manner that an ounce of blood drawn at the temple, relieves an inflamed eye more than a quart drawn from the arm.

The neck might have been rubbed with warm laudanum and camphor, and a bag of warm fine salt laid on; but the unseasonable application of a blister would prevent this.

He ought to have been put into one, two, or three flannels; and instead of calomel, it would have been better to give him small draughts of hot whey, with a little laudanum, camphor, spirituous volatilis aromaticus, or spiritus nitri dulcis, occasionally, to remove the spasm which caused the dyspnea, and produce perspiration, which would relieve the lungs by turning the course of the fluids towards the skin.

JOHN BRICKELL.

Savannah, 23d Jan. 1800.

THE RUSHLIGHT.

A Defence of the Publications on which the Action of Rush was grounded.

“Hear ye my defence, which I now make unto you.”

ACTS, c. xxii. v. 1.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—This Rushlight was written by Mr. COBBETT in March 1800, at New York, whither he had moved on M'KEAN being elected Governor of the State of Pennsylvania, and it is his defence of himself against the action of RUSH. We are no judges of the merit or demerit of Dr. RUSH's “system of depletion;” but any one who reads the following paper must see that the Doctor was, to say the least of him, a very “bold experimenter,” and that the comparison drawn by Mr. COBBETT between RUSH and SANGRADO was by no means an unjust one. The *depleting* system had been disapproved by the College of Physicians of Philadelphia, and the city had been cautioned against it. RUSH took his revenge on one of his brethren by saying that he had slain more by his remedies than had ever been slain by the sword; and, therefore, whatever the law allowed, he came into court with an ill grace to sue for damages the man who had turned one of his puffs against himself, in saying that *his* mercurial Sampson had slain more than ever were slain by the jaw-bone of an ass. In short, the prosecution was political. Mr. COBBETT had exposed the Governor (MIFFLIN), the Chief Justice (M'KEAN), and the Secretary (DALLAS), all of

them powerful in the State of Pennsylvania; he had completely destroyed their friend RANDOLPH; and they were only waiting their opportunity to put him down or drive him away, and the libels on RUSH gave them what they wanted. He had done all in America that duty to his own country required of him, and this event may be looked on as one of those which seem untoward for the time, but which bring good in their train. In 1794 he had determined on going to the West Indies; but the discussions on the treaty arose, and his success as a writer in those discussions diverted him from this purpose. He afterwards seems to have thought seriously of remaining permanently in America, though always as an alien; for though he, in one place, speaks of it as his *adopted country*, we find him abused in a Philadelphia paper for professing himself a subject of the King of England, in an affidavit before the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, seeing that he had lived long enough in the country to entitle him to the privileges of a citizen of the United States. When he removed to New York, he there entered into business again as a bookseller; but, on finding the result of this trial, and that a suit was entered against him by the State of Pennsylvania for forfeited recognizances, he yielded to the invitations of his English correspondents, and came home.

THAT a low-bred fellow, like *Rush*, whom the troubled motions of rebellion had brought bubbling up from the mud of society; that a fellow, who had extolled his drugs in newspapers, pamphlets, and books, without number, and who had, in these various publications, not only ridiculed, decried, and abused both the practice and the persons of the first medical gentlemen in the country, but had contemptuously placed them beneath his herd of "undisciplined practitioners," his auctioneers, his negroes, and his old women; that such a mushroom being, such a notorious despoiler of the medical character, should have the assurance to appeal to the law, the moment his own practice was assailed, would have excited universal indignation amongst any people but the poor, tame, trodden-down citizens of Philadelphia, and must appear totally unaccountable to every foreign reader, till I have, by-and-by, explained the circumstances under which the action was commenced, and under which it was foreseen it would, first or last, be decided.

The commencing of the action proves, however, that the practice of the impudent innovator had received a mortal blow; it proves that the publications, for which I was sued, were *efficacious*; and, that they were not *unlawful*, I trust, notwithstanding the decision of a Philadelphian court and jury, I shall find but little difficulty in making appear to the satisfaction of every man who is not an idiot or a prostituted knave.

In making this defence, I shall suppose myself in court, and having heard the evidence and the pleadings, replying to the whole that was urged against me. As I shall use the words, "*Gentlemen of the Jury*," I beg leave to premise, that the word *gentlemen* will be admitted, on this occasion, for form's sake only.

Gentlemen of the Jury,

I rise to defend a man, remarkable for his frankness, against the underhand machinations of hypocrisy; I rise to defend, against a charge of slander, a man who has been slandered without measure and without mercy; I rise to defend an honest, loyal, and public-spirited Briton against the false and calumnious suggestions of private malice, political prejudice, and national antipathy.

Mr. Cobbett stands charged with having, during the prevalence of the Yellow Fever of 1797, published certain false and malicious slanders against Dr. Rush. The *printing* and *publishing* the defendant would ra-

ther cut his hand off than disown, but the *falsehood* and *malice* imputed to him he utterly denies.

Much might be said as to the extent of the words cited in the declaration. It would, I believe, be very difficult to make out such an application as would, according to the strict letter of the law, establish any one of the charges preferred by the plaintiff; but the defendant scorns to take shelter under a subterfuge: it is for his enemies to have recourse to the perversion of the law. He is proud to acknowledge, that all the censorious expressions, which he is on this occasion accused of having published, were not only published by him, but were pointed at Doctor Benjamin Rush; and, moreover, that they were not only pointed at Rush, but were so pointed for the express purpose of destroying his practice, so far as that practice corresponded with the well-known and justly-abhorred System of Depletion.

The defendant stands charged,

1. With calling Doctor Rush a *vain boaster*.
2. With calling him a *quack*.
3. With calling him *Sangrado*.
4. With saying that he *slew his patients*.

Not to hamper you with a string of definitions and nice distinctions, I shall observe, generally, that to justify a jury in awarding damages, on any charge of slander, they must be clearly convinced of four things; to wit: 1. That the defendant uttered or published the words laid to his charge; 2. That those words were meant to apply to the plaintiff; 3. That the words are false; and, 4. That they were uttered or published with a malicious or criminal intent.

I shall examine the charges in the order in which they stand. 1. *The Defendant has called Doctor Rush a VAIN BOASTER.* I aver this to be true, and prove it by Rush's own publications, respecting his practice in 1793. On the 12th of September he published in all the papers, that, with his new-discovered remedies, there was no more danger to be apprehended from the Yellow Fever, than from the measles or influenza. On the 17th of the same month, he wrote to the College of Physicians, that his discovery, as far as it went, reduced the Yellow Fever, in point of danger and mortality, to a level with a common cold. On the 3rd of October he wrote to Dr. Rodgers at New-York (publishing his letter, as well as that to the College, in the newspapers), declaring, that he had been made the instrument in the hands of a kind Providence of curing MORE than ninety-nine patients out of a hundred. This was certainly boasting, and that it was vain boasting is notorious; for, at the very time that he wrote and published these boastings, his remedies were making dreadful havock; from the date of the first, the 12th of September, to that of the 3rd, wherein he brags of curing more than ninety-nine out of a hundred, the daily bills of mortality rose from 23 to 78! And, just after the last-mentioned most impudent boast was made, four patients out of six died in his own house!

Upon your oaths now I ask you, is this fellow a *vain boaster*, or is he not?

2. The defendant called Doctor Rush a *quack*.—And here, in order to make out the justification, it would be my duty to examine the meaning of the term; but the good-natured advocates of the bleeding Doctor have kindly saved me that trouble: they have most unfortunately taken the definition of Addison, and have stated a quack to be, “*a boastful pretender*

“ to *physic* ; one who proclaims his own medical abilities and nostrums in public places.”

Now, then, let us see, whether or not the Doctor's conduct brings him up to this definition.

During the whole of the Fever of 1793, and from that time to the Fever of 1797, he made no scruple to declare, that none of the physicians, who did not follow his practice, ought to be trusted with the life of a patient. His lectures abound with his insolent pretensions to superiority in medicine. Notorious is it that he has, all his life, been a proclaimer of his own medical abilities ; but to come to something more specific : on the 12th of September 1793, he published the following advertisement :

“ DOCTOR RUSH,

“ Regretting that he is unable to comply with all the calls of his fellow-citizens “ indisposed with the prevailing fever, recommends to them to take *his mercurial purges*, which may now be had with suitable directions at most of the apothecaries, and to lose ten or twelve ounces of blood as soon as convenient after taking the purges, if the headache and fever continue. When the purges do not operate speedily, bleeding may now be used before they are taken. *The almost universal success with which it has pleased God to bless the remedies of strong mercurial purges and bleeding in this disorder*, enables Doctor Rush to assure his fellow-citizens that there is no more danger to be apprehended from it when these remedies have been used in its early stage, than there is from the measles or influenza. Doctor Rush assures his fellow-citizens farther, that the risk from visiting and attending the sick at present, is not greater than from walking the streets. While the disease was so generally mortal, or the successful mode of treating it only partially adopted, he advised his friends to leave the city ; at present he conceives this advice unnecessary, not only because the disease is under the power of medicine, but because the citizens who now wish to fly into the country cannot avoid carrying the infection with them ; they had better remain near to *medical aid*, and avoid exciting the infection into action.”

“ Near to *medical aid* ;” that is, near to *him*.—It was safer to remain near him, though in the midst of pestilence, than be near any other physician, though in the sweet air of the country ! This advertisement is assuredly the most impudent that ever was published ; no Leicester-square quack ever equalled it. At the very time that Rush had the impudence thus to tell the people, that there was no longer any danger, if they used his remedies ; at the very time that he was thus advising them not to leave the city, but to remain near to *medical aid* ; at the very time that he was blessing God for the almost universal success of his remedies ; the bills of mortality were daily increasing in a dreadful degree. On the day before the above advertisement appeared, the number of deaths was twenty-three ; and from that day they began to increase, and they went on increasing, until, at the end of one month after the infallible remedies had been in vogue, they had arisen from twenty-three to one hundred and nineteen.

But it is the quackish language of the advertisement which is at present the object of our examination. It is absolutely impossible to read the Doctor's puff without observing the strict resemblance that it bears to what the Cockneys call the “ Doctor's Bills.” The defendant has compared Rush's puffs to the puff of *Spilsbury* ; and this has been made a charge against him. But hear Doctor *Spilsbury*, and then say, if you can, that the comparison is not just.

“ We congratulate our fellow-creatures, in having it in their power to get relieved from the most unpleasant complaints incident to human nature, such

“ as the scurvy, gont, rheumatism, evil, ulcers, and other disorders arising from
 “ *impurities of the blood*, indigestion, &c., by taking Spilsbury’s Antiscorbutic
 “ Drops, a medicine well known upwards of twenty-six years for having per-
 “ formed more extraordinary cures than any other ever invented, and whose
 “ repute has reached the remotest corners of the universe, every nation bearing
 “ grateful testimony of its eminent virtues: how happy therefore is it for the
 “ inhabitants of this island, that they can supply themselves with a medicine
 “ which, should they travel to any part of the globe, will secure them from the
 “ fatal consequences that too often attend the above complaints !”

The defendant has called this a puff *equal* to Dr. Rush’s, and if there be any *untruth* in his words, it is because Spilsbury’s puff is *inferior* to that of Rush; for surpass it, it certainly does not.

Still, however, clearly to establish the *quackery*, the man must not only boast about his medical abilities and the virtue of his nostrums, but he must do this in *public places*. That Rush’s boastings were heard in all the streets of Philadelphia is notorious, and it is also notorious, that the above boasting advertisement, as well as several others of a like nature, were published in all the *newspapers*. It is notorious that they were besides printed on handbills, given away in the apothecaries’ shops, handed about the streets, and stuck upon the walls, houses, and public pumps !

Is not this man “ a boastful pretender to physic, one who proclaims his own medical abilities and nostrums in *public places* ?” And, if this be quackery, I ask you upon your consciences, if you have any, whether Rush is or is not a *quack* ?*

3. Mr. Cobbett is charged with calling Dr. Rush *Sangrado*.—To call a man *Sangrado* is nothing; but, Gentlemen, you have been told by the *learned* Harper and the more *learned* Ingersol, who, it would seem, have both studied Gil Blas, “ that this *Sangrado* was a *quack* damned to everlasting fame,” and that, therefore, to call Dr. Rush *Sangrado*, is to call him a *quack*. Were this correct, the charge would be already answered, but it is not so. Poor *Sangrado* was, according to the definition of Rush’s advocates, no quack; for he did not “ proclaim his own medical abilities and nostrums in public places;” and, therefore, the word *Sangrado*, as applied to Rush, was no slander.

But, Gentlemen of the Jury, the defendant is a candid satirist; he will, in no case, seek for safety under the leeward side of the law. Whether the word *Sangrado* be slanderous or not, he will allow you to assess damages against him for the application of it, if he cannot prove to you that that application was *just*.

Eminent men are frequently called by the names of other eminent men, who have lived in former times, or in other nations. It is a figure of rhetoric, which every one is at liberty to make use of. Thus *Tom Paine* is

* The advertisements of the *retailers* of his nostrum must not be forgotten.

“ Dr. Rush’s *celebrated* mercurial purging and sweating powders for preventing and curing the prevailing putrid fever, may be had carefully prepared, with proper directions, at Betton and Harrison’s, No. 10, South Second-street.”

“ Dr. Rush’s mercurial sweating purge for the yellow fever, may be had carefully prepared, with the *Doctor’s directions*, and sold by William Delany, druggist and chemist, &c.”

“ Dr. Rush’s mercurial sweating powder for the yellow fever, with *printed directions*, prepared and sold by *permission*, by Goldthwait and Baldwin, chemists and druggists, &c.”

Now, reader, if you had met with these advertisements in a newspaper, without having any previous knowledge of the parties concerned, should you not have set this Rush down for a potent quack? I am sure you would.

called the *Wat Tyler* of the present age; *Franklin* is called the *Zanga* of Boston; and *Dr. Rush* is called the *American Sangrado*. All that a writer has to do, to justify, either in a court of criticism or a court of law, the use of such a figure, is, to prove that the great man, whom he has designated by the name of another, bears such a resemblance to that other as the tenour of the words does evidently imply.

What sort of resemblance, then, do Mr. Cobbett's words imply between Dr. Rush and Dr. Sangrado? Do they tend to produce a belief that the American resembles the Spaniard in his *person*, in his *general character*, or in his *medical opinions, practice, and fame*? Most assuredly the resemblance was meant to exist in the latter respect only; for Dr. Sangrado is described as "a *tall, meagre, pale man*, who had kept the shears of Clotho "employed during forty years at least, and who was, in spite of all his "vanity and presumption, a downright ninny."*

It being evident, then, that the defendant meant a resemblance in the medical opinions, practice, and fame of these two celebrated physicians, it only remains for me to prove to you, gentlemen, that the words, expressing such a resemblance, were founded in *truth*. Here are the two pictures; examine them yourselves.

DOCTOR SANGRADO.

(Extracts from *Gil Blas*.)

1. "His opinions were *extremely singular*."

2. "Sangrado sent me for a surgeon, whom he ordered to take from my master *six good porringers of blood*! When this was done he ordered the surgeon to return in three hours and take as *much more*, and to repeat the same evacuation the next day!"

3. "This bleeding, Sangrado said, was to supply the want of perspiration. So when I came to practise, says *Gil Blas*, being asked by an old woman what was the matter with her daughter, I told her, with great gravity, that the illness proceeded from the patient's want of perspiration,

DOCTOR RUSH.

1. *Singularity of opinion*, in every thing, is his boast; for instance, his plan of a *peace-office* to supply the place of a *war-office*; and his taking the cure of diseases out of the hands of *physicians* to put it into those of the people.

2. "I bled my patients twice, and a few *three times a day*! I preferred frequent and small, to large bleedings in the beginning of September; but towards the height and close of the epidemic, I saw no inconvenience from the loss of a *pint*, and even *twenty ounces of blood at a time*!"

RUSH ON YEL. FEB. 93.

3. "From the influence of early purging and *bleeding in promoting sweat* in the yellow fever, there can be little doubt but the efforts of nature to unload the system in the plague through the pores, might be accelerated by the use of the same remedies. A profuse sweat cannot fail of wasting *many*

* If Rush had sitten for this picture, it could not have been drawn more like him.

DOCTOR SANGRADO.

“ and that, of consequence, she
 “ must be speedily blooded, that
 “ evacuation being the only substi-
 “ tute for perspiration.”

4. “ Not bleed in a dropsy !”
 said he ; “ the patient in a dropsy
 “ should be blooded every day.”

5. “ Sangrado said, it is a *gross*
 “ error, Master Martin Onez, to
 “ think that blood is necessary for
 “ the preservation of life : a patient
 “ cannot be blooded too much !”

6. “ Dr. Sangrado said to me, I
 “ have a regard for thee, Gil Blas
 “ [a footboy], and will immediately
 “ disclose to thee the whole extent
 “ of that salutary art which I have
 “ professed for so many years.
 “ Other physicians make this consist
 “ in the knowledge of a thousand
 “ different sciences ; but I
 “ intend to go a shorter way to
 “ work, and spare thee the trouble
 “ of studying pharmacy, anatomy,
 “ botany, and physic. Know, my
 “ friend, all that is required is to
 “ bleed the patients, and make
 “ them drink warm water. This
 “ is the secret of curing all the
 “ distempers incident to man.—
 “ Yes ! that wonderful secret which
 “ I reveal to thee, and which na-
 “ ture, impenetrable to my bre-
 “ thren, hath not been able to hide
 “ from my researches, is contained
 “ in these two points, of plentiful
 “ bleeding and frequent draughts
 “ of water. I have nothing more
 “ to impart ; thou knowest physic
 “ to the very bottom.”

7. “ I have published a book,
 “ said Sangrado, in which I have
 “ extolled the use of bleeding, and

DOCTOR RUSH.

“ pounds of the fluids of the body:
 “ To correspond in quantity with
 “ the discharge from the skin, blood-
 “ letting should be copious.”

RUSH ON YEL. FEV.

4. Rush has frequently astounded
 the physicians of Philadelphia by
 recommending *bleeding in the*
dropsy.

5. “ You should bleed your pa-
 “ tients almost to death, at least to
 “ fainting.” This is an extract
 which Rush gives from a letter of
 poor old Shippen, and calls it “ the
 “ triumph of reason over the for-
 “ malities of medicine.”

6. Dr. Rush says :—“ All the
 “ knowledge that is necessary to
 “ discover when blood-letting is
 “ proper, might be taught to a boy
 “ or girl of twelve years old, in a
 “ few hours. I taught it in less
 “ time to several persons [the two
 “ negroes for instance] during the
 “ prevalence of our late epidemic.
 “ We teach a hundred things in
 “ our schools less useful, and many
 “ things more difficult, than the
 “ knowledge that would be necessary
 “ to cure the yellow fever or the
 “ plague. For a long while the ele-
 “ ments themselves were dealt out
 “ by physicians with a sparing hand.
 “ They possessed a monopoly of many
 “ artificial remedies ; but a new
 “ order of things is rising in medi-
 “ cine as well as in government.
 “ The time must and will come,
 “ when the general use of calomel,
 “ jalap, and the lancet, shall be
 “ considered amongst the most
 “ essential articles of the know-
 “ ledge and rights of man.”

7. Rush also has published a
 book, and in that book he has said :
 “ I was part of a little circle of phy-

DOCTOR SANGRADO.

DOCTOR RUSH.

“ would you have me decry my
 “ own work ? Oh, no ! replied I,
 “ you must not give your enemies
 “ such a triumph over you ; it
 “ would ruin your reputation ; pe-
 “ rish rather the nobility, clergy,
 “ and people ! ”

“ sicians, who had *associated them-*
 “ selves in *support of the new reme-*
 “ dies. This circle would have been
 “ broken by my quitting the city.
 “ Under these circumstances, it
 “ pleased God to enable me to re-
 “ ply to one of the letters that
 “ urged my retreat from the city,
 “ that I had resolved to *stick to my*
 “ principles, my practice, and my
 “ patients, to the last extremity ! ”

8. “ My master had recourse to
 “ physicians, and sent for Dr. San-
 “ grado, whom all Valladolid looked
 “ upon as *another Hippocrates.* ”

8. “ Look at the conduct of Dr.
 “ Rush,” said pleader Hopkinson,
 “ and say if it did not *resemble that*
 “ *of Hippocrates.* ”

Now, Gentlemen, what think you of the resemblance ? Dr. Sangrado is a man of *singular opinions* ; so is Dr. Rush. Dr. Sangrado draws blood *porringer after porringer* ; Dr. Rush, *pint after pint*. Dr. Sangrado employs copious bleedings to *supply the want of perspiration* ; so does Dr. Rush. They both recommend *bleeding in the dropsy*. Dr. Sangrado says that it is a gross error to think *that blood is necessary to the preservation of life* ; Dr. Rush calls it the triumph of *reason* to prescribe *bleeding almost to death*. Dr. Sangrado sends a *footboy, a lacquey*, to bleed and drench the citizens of Valladolid ; Dr. Rush qualifies *negroes and old women* to bleed and purge those of Philadelphia. Dr. Sangrado has written a book ; so has Dr. Rush ; and they both resolve to *stick to their principles and practice to the last extremity*. Dr. Sangrado is called, by his contemporaries, the *Hippocrates of Spain*. Dr. Rush's contemporaries call him the *Hippocrates of Pennsylvania*. The only shade of difference is in their practice ; the American employs doses of mercury and jalap, while the Spaniard contents himself with draughts of warm water ; and I believe you will confess that the latter is, at least, as innocent as the former.

But, Gentlemen of the Jury, there needed no such laboured comparison, to prove to you that the name of Sangrado was fairly applicable to the plaintiff. You know, Gentlemen, that Dr. Rush has erected his *bleeding system* upon the opinions of *Botallus*, a French physician, whose name he mentions with great applause in page 330 of his *Account of the Yellow Fever*. This *Botallus* endeavoured to introduce the practice of *excessive bleeding*, which was condemned by the Faculty of Medicine at Paris ; and you well know that the practice of his American follower was honoured with something very much like condemnation by the College of Physicians at Philadelphia. But the most curious fact is, that Le Sage introduced the character of *Sangrado* into the novel of *Gil Blas* for the express purpose of ridiculing this very *Botallus* ! I have carefully examined the biography of Le Sage, and I can no where find that he was sued or prosecuted by bleeder *Botallus* : so that the master in blood must have been of a more meek and forbearing disposition than the disciple, or the liberty of the press in the “ dark ages,” under a French monarch,

must have been greater than it is, even in "these enlightened days," under the sovereign people of America.

The fourth and last charge preferred against the defendant is, *that he has said that Dr. Rush SLEW HIS PATIENTS*. The passage from Porcupine's Gazette, on which this charge is founded, runs: "Dr. Rush, in that emphatical style which is peculiar to himself, calls mercury the *Sampson* of medicine. In his hands, and in those of his partisans, it may, indeed, be compared to Sampson; for I verily believe they have slain more Americans with it than ever Sampson slew of the Philistines. The Israelite slew his thousands, but the Rushites have slain their tens of thousands."

The pleaders for Rush have told you that this is accusing him of *murder*. How unfair this construction is; what a shameful perversion it is of the defendant's meaning, must be evident to every man of common understanding. I can hardly believe that it can ever be the duty of advocates to *lie* in this impudent manner (for wilful misconstruction is lying); and when they do, I am certain that jurors ought not to give any weight to what they say; much less ought they to *affect* to look upon such barefaced falsehoods as truths. Jurors should recollect that they are sworn to decide according to the conviction which is produced in their own minds; and when they do not act up to the spirit of this oath, they will in vain seek for a justification in the *assertions* from the bar, or even from the bench.

Unwilling to trust to *one interpretation* of the words on which this charge is founded, the Rushite counsel have asserted, 1. That these words accuse Dr. Rush of *killing people with deadly weapons*; and, 2. That they accuse him of *killing people with his physic*. I shall consider them separately.

Take the passage above quoted from Porcupine's Gazette, strip it of its figurative quality, insist upon its being literally understood, make it positive instead of doubtful, and then cut it up into simple sentences, considering each as having been made use of detached from all the rest; after having thus strained, twisted, garbled, and gutted the writing of the defendant, I will allow that something like an accusation of *killing people with deadly weapons* may be made out. But it is not thus that a man's words are to be treated; his person and estate are not to be brought into jeopardy by such miserable pettifogging interpretations: pitiful, indeed, would be the liberty of speech and of the press, were every sentence liable to a judicial criticism of this sort. No, no; the *Common Law of England* (which is, in this case, the law of America) encourages no such candid, no such litigious proceeding. That law, I had almost said that *holy law*, which is the result of the researches of wisdom actuated by the spirit of justice; that law which, while it has clad *good* character in a coat of mail, has thrown a shield before the body of the critic, the satirist, and the public censor; that law tells you, that the words on which an action of slander is grounded shall be understood neither in their *best sense* nor their *worst sense*, but "that the words shall be taken in the same sense as they would be understood by those who hear or read them; and for that purpose all the words ought to be taken together."—See *Buller's Nisi Prius*, p. 4.

Now, Gentlemen of the Jury, casting behind you the base misconstructions by which you have been led astray, and taking the law for your guide, go once more over the words of Mr. Cobbett, "Dr. Rush," says

he, "in that emphatical style which is peculiar to himself, calls mercury "the Sampson of medicine. In his hands, and in those of his partisans, it may, indeed, be justly compared to Sampson; for I verily believe that they have slain more Americans with it than ever Sampson slew of the Philistines. The Israelite slew his thousands, but the Rushites have slain their tens of thousands."

What, on your oaths I ask you, do you, upon hearing these words, understand the writer to mean? Should you, had you read this passage in a foreign newspaper, have concluded that this Dr. Rush was in the habit of *killing people with deadly weapons*? No, no, Gentlemen; you would have drawn no such conclusion; you would have thought he was a man who, with his disciples, followed a very bold and dangerous system of medicine, and you would have thought nothing more. You would have looked upon him as a deceived, an ignorant, and perhaps an obstinate man, but you would have attached to his actions no idea of *criminality*; and I beg you to observe well, that it is for accusing him with *criminal killing* that you are, on this count of the declaration, called upon to give a verdict against the defendant: should you comply with the request, the future fate of *your* characters need not be foretold.

But, Gentlemen, I will, for a moment, suppose the words to imply *killing with deadly weapons*; and even upon that supposition, I maintain that they are not actionable; and, of course, that they ought to make nothing against the defendant.

In the first place, they are too indefinite with respect to the persons: Dr. Rush is confounded with a numerous class, called the Rushites; and the persons killed are neither named nor described. The law is extremely scrupulous on these points, and positively rejects every thing that has only an imaginary existence. For an action of slander to lie on account of an accusation of *killing*, the words must not only evidently apply to the plaintiff as the killer, but, in a case like the present, it must also appear that the persons said to be killed *are actually dead*; for instance, if I say to either of you, "Thou hast poisoned A. B., and it shall cost me 100*l.* but I will hang thee: no action will lie for these words, *without proof being produced by the plaintiff that A. B. is actually dead.*"—See *Rolle's Abridgment*, vol. 1, p. 77. Thus, you see, though the killer and the killed are clearly designated, the law rejects the action, because *the death is not proved*.

But, Gentlemen, suppose the Doctor were to pull out a list of his patients for some years past; suppose he were to point to the populous grave-yards of this unfortunate city, and say, *These* are the people that the defendant has accused me of killing with deadly weapons; and suppose you should be convinced of the truth of his assertion, still the action will not lie; unless it be evident that Mr. Cobbett meant, that these people were killed *criminally*, and to ascertain this, *all* the words must be taken together. For instance, if I say, "*Mr. Harper is a thief*;" and if I stop there, an action will lie against me; but, if I say, "*Mr. Harper is a thief, for he has stolen the thoughts, the words, the expressions, the sentences, and even whole paragraphs, from Monsieur Mallet du Pan, and dressed them up into a speech for Congress*;" no action will lie for these words, 1. Because the latter part of the words are satisfactorily explanatory of the former; and, 2. Because the words taken all together do not accuse Mr. Harper of any *crime*, but merely of a little of what the law calls *trover and conversion*, and what, in the critic's court, is

called *plagiarism*. A case more in point, however, is to be found in *Rolle's Abridgment*, vol. 1, p. 72, where it is said: "If a man says of J. S., 'As soon as Bushe had killed Smith, he came to J. S. and told him how he had killed Smith, and J. S. gave Bushe money to ship him away,' the law says, Gentlemen, that no action will lie for this accusation, though Smith be proved to be dead; "For," says the learned Reporter, "the word *kill* is too general, and a man may *kill* another in his own defence &c. without committing any crime." And if the word *kill* does not imply criminality in the act, how much less does the word *slay*, which is, now-a-days, exclusively appropriated to narratives of battles, and is *never* employed as a substitute for *murder* or *assassination*, whereas, to *kill* sometimes is.

This is, however, only a waste of time: for you never can have believed that the defendant meant to accuse Dr. Rush of *criminally* putting thousands and tens of thousands of Americans to death. The suggestion is an insult to common sense, and a disgrace to the Judges who have suffered you to listen to it.

The other construction put upon the words of the defendant is more reasonable; to wit: *That he has accused Dr. Rush of killing his patients with his remedies*. The words, taken altogether, do not warrant this construction; but, admit that they do, still they are not actionable, notwithstanding the assertion of the learned Ingersol. This man has told you, that he has "an authority" for this assertion. I wish he had told you *what* authority it was. Perhaps it was Governor (sometime Chief Justice) M'Kean! If so, I applaud his prudence in keeping the name to himself. The authority to which I shall appeal, is of a different stamp.—"A man says of a physician, *He hath killed J. S. in the Old Jewry with physic, which physic was a pill, and Dr. Atkins and Dr. Pady found the vomit in his mouth.*"—This is no vague charge; the meaning of the words is by no means dubious; the defendant does not, like Mr. Cobbett, speak in figurative language, and qualify his assertion with a phrase expressive of uncertainty; the accusation is to be literally understood; it is clear, direct, with the circumstances of manner, time, and place. Yes, says my authority, "no action will lie for these words; for if a physician gives medicines or drugs to his patient, with an intent to recover him from his sickness, though the patient die after having taken them, still the physician is not punishable, so long as it does not appear that he gave the medicines, knowing them to be contrary to the nature of the disease. If the man had said, *that the physician killed J. S. with medicines, which he administered, knowing them to be contrary to the nature of the disease*, an action would have lain for these words."—See *Rolle's Abridgment*, vol. 1, p. 71.

This, Gentlemen of the Jury, is the language of the common law of England, and give me leave to say, that it is also the language of reason; for it would be absurd to suppose that an action of slander is to be avoided by circumlocutory phrases, by saying in many words what might be said in few. And if no speech and no writing is to be made use of, which can be fairly construed to mean that a physician has *killed* his patient by his remedies, then I say, that all controversy about modes of cure must from henceforth cease; for it is absolutely impossible to speak with *disapprobation* of a physician's practice, without making use of such words as will, directly or indirectly, imply, that *he has killed his patients with his remedies*. Dr. Brickell, for instance, in remonstrating against the treat-

ment of General Washington by Doctors Craik and Dick, has these words: " Thus do we see, by their own statement, that they drew from a " man in the sixty-ninth year of his age, the enormous quantity of eighty- " two ounces, or above two quarts and a half of blood, in about thirteen " hours. Very few of the most robust young men in the world could " survive such a loss of blood; but the body of an aged person *must* be " so exhausted, and all his powers so weakened *by it*, as to *make his death* " *speedy and inevitable*. Here *the effect followed the cause precisely* : " the physicians soon observed the powers of life yielding; a loss of " speech; and that he expired without a struggle! The *excessive bleeding* " *had left him no strength to struggle!*"

Now, Gentlemen, follow the rule laid down by the law, take all Dr. Brickell's words together, and you will, at once, perceive, that he charges these physicians with killing General Washington with their remedies. He tells them, that the blood they took from their patient *rendered his death inevitable*; he says that their bleeding was *the cause of his death*; and that the *excessive* bleeding left him *no strength to struggle with*. But, are these not *truths*? And shall this, or any other man, be prevented from speaking and publishing these salutary truths? Shall he be harassed and prosecuted; shall he be muzzled, gagged, or fined to his ruin, because he has had public spirit enough to promulgate truths so necessary to the preservation of even the lives of the people? and all this merely because the promulgation tends to diminish the practice and profits of a second Sangrado and his bleeding disciples? The law says, No! Reason turns with disgust from the absurdity; Justice grasps her sword, and Liberty revolts, at the presumptuous, the tyrannical position!

Having now, Gentlemen of the Jury, completely justified the words of the defendant, by establishing the *truth* of those which are, in themselves, actionable, and by proving that those, the truth of which does not admit of positive proof, are, in no sense, actionable, it is not a duty incumbent on me to show, that none of them were published with a *malicious intent*: the charge of *falsehood* being disproved, that of *malice* falls of course. But, Gentlemen, witnesses have been produced to make you believe that private malice, and not public good, was the basis of the publications; and the defendant, strong in the purity of his motives, and indignant at the reproach with which he has been assailed, instructs me to repel the ungrateful insinuation.

The three witnesses, to whom you have been listening, are all physicians of the school of Rush; two of them were his *pupils*, and, I trust, no one of the three would have been admitted to give evidence, in a similar case, in any other court in the world; seeing that each of them, in proportion to the extent of his practice, is as deeply interested in the result of this trial, as the plaintiff himself. Observe, Gentlemen, that, when Mr. Cobbett speaks of the deadly effects of the system of depletion, he does not say, that *Rush* has slain " his thousands and tens of thousands," but that the "*Rushites*" (that is, all those who follow this fatal system) " have slain *their* thousands and tens of thousands;" so that the persons who have been admitted to give evidence, are, virtually, joint plaintiffs in the cause! It was lately decided by the Judges in this very court, that no inhabitant of Philadelphia should be admitted to give evidence against persons charged with the transgression of the law prohibiting the erection of wooden buildings; because, living in the same city where the building had been erected, he might *possibly* be interested in

the result of the trial. And if this was good ground for exception, how much better is the ground for excepting to the evidence of "Rushites" in the present case! And yet this evidence is admitted! Is this your impartiality? Blush, Americans, for your tranquil submission!

The first of these witnesses is *James Mease*. He has told you, that, about six months *after* this action was commenced, he heard the defendant say, speaking of Dr. Rush: "*Damn him; he had better withdraw his suit, or I will persecute him while living and his memory after his death.*" The plain truth of the matter is this: Mr Cobbett went to the Island, where Mease was king Robinson Crusoe, along with an English captain, who had some business with a sick sailor. While the captain was gone to the hospital, Mease asked Mr. Cobbett into his apartment, brought out a bottle of wine, and gave him a pressing invitation to dinner. The invitation was declined, but two or three glasses of wine were drunk, and a conversation, of the rallying bantering kind, took place; and, as it is impossible to be with a Rushite for a quarter of an hour, without being pestered with an eulogium on the fraternity and the abominable remedies they employ, Rush and his lawsuit soon became the topic. Mr. Cobbett certainly did, on this occasion, as on many others, make use of words strongly expressive of his resentment at Rush's insolent and vexatious appeal to the law, and he well remembers threatening *to make him repent of it*; but, as to *damm*ing him, he utterly denies it; for, though he has to atone for too many sins of this sort, he is certain that he never so far degraded a curse as to bestow it on Rush. And, with respect to his saying, that he would persecute *his memory after his death*, the thing is absolutely incredible: he might as reasonably have threatened to persecute the *memory* of a butterfly or maggot. "Can *the Rush,*" says Job, "grow up without mire? Whilst it is yet in his greenness, and not cut down, it withereth before any other herb." Upon reading these words, one is tempted to believe, that the holy seer really had the Pennsylvanian Hippocrates in his eye; for, though he is yet in his greenness, though he is still alive, his fame has perished of itself; it is withered and dead.

However, Gentlemen, what degree of credit soever you may be inclined to give to the testimony of *Physician Mease*, though you should believe that the defendant uttered the words precisely as the witness has stated; you must remember, that these words were uttered eight months *after* the suit was commenced; and that they cannot tend to establish the *malice* imputed to the publications, for which this action is brought, because they express resentment against Rush *for his conduct subsequent to those publications*.

The next of the volunteer witnesses is *John Redman Coxe*. He tells you, Gentlemen, that, on the 2nd of October 1797, which was some weeks after this action was commenced, he was in Mr. Cobbett's house,* and that he there heard him say, that "he did not *believe* he should have

* Yes, this subaltern Sangrado did really come to my house about this time, and did very earnestly intercede with me in behalf of his preceptor; and, by the same token, I remember that he presented me a list of the physicians of Philadelphia, whom he very strenuously persuaded me to *lampoon*! Upon this list were the names of Khun, Wistar, Parke, and several others; and the base accusation, which he wished me to prefer against these respectable gentlemen and truly eminent physicians, was, that they had *deserted the poor in the hour of distress*, than which nothing would have been more false and malicious, or would have produced against the parties more public odium and reproach.

“ said *so much* on bleeding or mercurials, if Dr. Rush had not been the “ founder of the system.” By the little cunning sniveller’s noting down the very day of his visit, it would appear that he attached great importance to these words ; but, Gentlemen, you assuredly cannot believe, that they have the least tendency to establish the *malice*, which is imputed to the publications of the defendant. Mr. Cobbett said, “ he *believed*, that he “ should not have said *so much* about bleeding and mercurials, if *Dr. Rush* had not been the founder of the system.” What is the meaning of these words ? Do they imply malice against the *man*, as the babblers on the other side have asserted ? No such thing, Mr. Cobbett having always entertained that opinion of Rush, which his conduct in the fever of 1793 was so well calculated to confirm ; having always looked upon him as a wild and persevering experimenter, and having seen him publish, that he was “ *resolved to stick to his principles and his practice to the last extremity,*” was it not very natural, that the character of the *man* should increase his zeal against the system ? And, was it not as natural that he should say, that he *believed* he should not have said *so much* against it, if Rush had not been its founder ? Permit me to put a case to you, Gentlemen. Suppose Jefferson were to propose to you a new alliance with France : should you listen to it with the same patience as you would to a similar proposition from Mr. Adams ? And would you not be justified in declaring, that you *believed* you should not have said *so much* about it, if Jefferson had not been the proposer ? Should you not, if this your declaration were brought forward as a proof of your *malice* against Jefferson, spurn at the promoters of the charge and the wretched spies they had employed ? Were you free men, nay, were you vassals, were you slaves, were you any thing but Americans, you certainly would.

The last of this goodly trio of betrayers of private conversation is *William Dewees*.*

And here, Gentlemen, I shall, for the first time, take the liberty to deviate, for one moment, from my subject, in order to give you some idea of the character of the *father* of this witness. This is fully warranted by the manner in which the action has been attempted to be supported by the Rushite pleaders, who have not only loaded the character of the defendant himself with every species of calumny, but have most shamefully slandered his honest parents, by asserting that he is “ a wretch cast up from the *slime* of mankind.” That this is false you well know, and that it merits that retaliation which truth can inflict you cannot deny.

* I have shown that the other two witnesses had a private grudge against me, and that *Dewees* had also the reader will be convinced, when he is told that the following article appeared in Porcupine’s Gazette :—

“ ANOTHER PUFF.”

(From the New York Gazette.)

“ MESSRS. M’KEAN AND LANG,

“ A Philadelphian now in New York was yesterday sorry to see the *able* and “ *useful* Physician, *Doctor Dewees*, in this city, knowing that his absence from “ Philadelphia will prove a *serious loss* to the afflicted of that place.”

“ *Sunday Morning, Sept. 17, 1797.*”

This article, which was most probably sent to the New York Gazette by the “ *able and useful* physician himself,” was inserted in my paper immediately after my comments on one of Rush’s most impudent puffs. This is the way they have gone on all over the country. There is not a single member of the fraternity who is not a *puffer*.

The modesty of this "able and useful physician" never suffered him, I dare say, to suppose that the fame of his ancestor was recorded in *history*; and I have no doubt that he will feel himself obliged to me for acquainting him with the fact. *Mr. Smyth*, who was a British officer, confined as a prisoner of war in the jail of Philadelphia, during the revolution, and who afterwards published an account of his treatment, speaks thus of the father of the witness :

"All this time the jailer charged us at an extravagant rate for diet, fire, and candle, besides an allowance that he received from the Congress for that purpose; by which means he extorted every farthing of money from us, as far as our credit then would go. But being determined not to run in debt, I at length refused to pay him any more than the Congress allowed, and was obliged after this to subsist upon bread and water alone during seven weeks. This jailer's name was *Thomas Dewees*, as tyrannical, cruel, infamous a villain as ever disgraced human nature."

After *Mr. Smyth* joined the Royal Army, he came with it from the Head of Elk to Philadelphia.

"On the morning," says he, "of the day that a detachment of the British army first entered Philadelphia, a number of the Americans fell into my hands, and amongst the rest *Thomas Dewees*, the cruel, tyrannical jailer, under whose iron talons I had suffered so long and severely. As soon as this wretch found that I was the officer commanding the party, his terror is not to be described, as he expected nothing less than immediate death; falling on his knees, he begged for his life, and for mercy: I desired him to consider what he merited from me. He acknowledged he deserved neither favour nor compassion; said that his orders respecting me had been more rigorous than against any other, and owned that he had executed them in their full severity; but still most earnestly entreated forgiveness. I told him that for the sake of his innocent wife and *children* (for he had a large family), I would forgive him, as he promised sincere contrition, and proposed to take the *oaths of allegiance to his Majesty*: this he readily performed; and had the audacity afterwards of applying to *Earl Cornwallis* to be appointed Deputy Provost Marshal over the rebel prisoners in Philadelphia, in the accomplishment of which pursuit, however, he very justly failed.*"

Such is the account which history gives of the father. Now let us judge of the son, by the evidence which in this trial he has given with the intent of establishing the charge of *malice* against the defendant.—The witness relates to you that, being at the defendant's house in the month of *January 1797* (nine months previous to the date of the publications on which the action is grounded), he heard him reprobate the "Eulogium on Rittenhouse," which *Rush* had just then delivered; and that on this occasion he heard the defendant say, that the "Eulogium" was "too republican," adding, "Damn him, I will attack him for it." Hence, gentlemen, you are requested to believe, that the publications of *September* were no more than a fulfilment of the threat of *January*; and that *Rush's* system of bleeding was attacked from *political* motives, and not from any opinion that the defendant entertained of its dangerous effects. *Levi* has told you, that *Mr. Cobbett* never attacked the Doctor's politics: "Not a word," says he, "was ever seen upon that head: his attack was designed to be on a part more injurious to the man; he threatens in *January* and executes in *September*. The arrow was stuck in his side, he did not attempt to draw it out at the moment, but he let it remain till a fit period for making it felt."

* See *Smyth's "Tour in the United States."* These extracts are taken from vol. 2, p. 293 and 422. The work has long been in the Philadelphia library, and has been sold in every city in the United States.

When a small lawyer gets hold of a figure of rhetoric, he uses it as awkwardly as a baby does a knife, sometimes seizing it by the handle and sometimes by the blade, while the compassionate jury sit trembling with anxiety for the consequences. Such, gentlemen, must have been your feelings whilst listening to the illustration of Levi. But the nonsense of my little Moses's figure, palpable as it is, is not quite so palpable as its falsehood. It is false, *notoriously* false, to say that Mr. Cobbett never attacked the Doctor's "Eulogium on Rittenhouse." He did attack it. Nor did the *arrow*, as the Israelite calls it, remain long to rankle in his side. He threatened in January 1797, and there is not a man amongst you who does not know that in his "Censor" for *the very same month of January* he put his threat into execution.

The latter part of this man's evidence is, like the former, merely *presumptive*, and upon examination it will be found to be equally destitute of weight. But, gentlemen, there is *something else*, of which, take it altogether, it is also destitute.

He has told you, that, notwithstanding he is of the school of the American Sangrado, *Mr. Cobbett employed him as a physician in his family, and moreover recommended him to his friends.* As a conclusive refutation of the former part of this statement, as an unquestionable proof that Dewees was never Mr. Cobbett's physician, I might remind you that Mr. Cobbett is *yet alive.* He might reply to this impudent assertion of the witness, in the language of Boileau's pithy epigram to Doctor Perrault, of which I will give you an humble imitation.

You say, then, you blood-sucking elf,
That you've been our physician all round!
I swear that you ne'er bled myself,
And the proof is—I'm yet above ground.*

From this testimony of Dewees, however, you are requested, and almost *ordered*, to believe, that Mr. Cobbett had no real dislike to the Rushite *system*, but that his attack on the system arose from the *malice* which he entertained against the *man*. This conclusion, admitting the premises, is very unfair, for the evidence does not state that the witness was either employed or recommended by the defendant in cases of the *yellow fever*. Indeed it expressly states that *he was not*; and you well know that the defendant has had the *yellow fever* twice in his family, and that it is the Rushite treatment of *this disease alone*, which the publications before you were intended to destroy.

But this general reply, though quite satisfactory, shall not content me, the witness deserves to be exposed. Being asked how long he had *attended* in Mr. Cobbett's family, he replies, "*from the return of the citizens in 1798,*" which certainly means that he had given *all* the medical assistance required in the family from the autumn of 1798 to this present time, the autumn of 1799. Now, gentlemen, recollect that this man was

* "Tu dis, donc, que tu, Monsieur l'assassin,
" M'as guéri d'une forte maladie!
" La preuve que tu ne fus pas mon médecin,
" C'est, que je suis encore en vie."

It is worthy of remark, that the *satirist* here calls Doctor Perrault an *assassin*, and that, harsh as the term is, Perrault never brought an action of slander against him; if he had, all the satisfaction he would have obtained would have been a horse-laugh.

sworn to "tell the truth, the *whole* truth, and nothing but the truth, so help him God;" and then I beg your attention to a true story.

Doctor Budd was Mr. Cobbett's family doctor from the time that he arrived in Philadelphia to the time that he quitted it; but in the summer of 1798 Doctor Budd retired into New Jersey, where he remained till the people returned to the city. Mrs. Cobbett was at this time pregnant, and as a precaution, in case of need, some one was sought for to supply the place of Doctor Budd. Mr. Cobbett was situated at Bustleton, fifty miles from Doctor Budd, twelve from Philadelphia, and eight from Dewees. Very pressing solicitations were made to Doctor Budd, who would have stayed at Bustleton on purpose had not his family demanded his presence. No one from the city could be thought on, because, besides the great risk arising from his constant employment, the gentleman engaged might die before the time arrived, and Mr. Cobbett knew that the friends with whom he lived had some objection to receiving into their house persons coming from the seat of infection and mortality. Under these circumstances Dewees was applied to, but not till after repeated efforts had been made in vain to secure the attendance of a reputable *female* practitioner.

In the summer of 1799 the parties were distributed precisely in the same way as they were in 1798. The dysentery raged in the neighbourhood of Mr. Cobbett, who was afraid that his little boy had got the disorder, and who thereupon wrote a note to the *pis-aller* Dewees, describing the state of the child, requesting him to ride over to Bustleton, and to bring with him what he thought might be of use. He attended the next day and left a packet of powders. As soon as the man of science was gone, Mr. and Mrs. Cobbett, and a young man who has long lived in the family, held a *consultation*, not on the patient but on the drugs; which, after a very deliberate discussion, it was unanimously resolved to *throw into the fire*. The child recovered; Dewees attributed the recovery to his mercurials, and has I dare say recorded it amongst the wonders he has wrought. He was suffered to hug himself in the deception, and there ended his "*attendance*" in the defendant's family for the second and last time.

Now, Gentlemen, was this attending Mr. Cobbett's family "*from the autumn of 1798?*" Dewees called at Mr. Cobbett's in the spring of 1799, and observing a mark on the little boy's arm he asked if he had been inoculated; Mrs. Cobbett told him he had, and he well knew that *he* had not been the inoculator. He therefore knew that he had *not* attended in the family "*from the autumn of 1798.*"

Being asked whether he had ever been recommended by Mr. Cobbett to any other *families*, he replies: "Yes; frequently." The *truth* is this. While Mr. Cobbett was at Bustleton, and while the physicians were all employed or dispersed, he advised *two* neighbours, one in the *dysentery*, and one with a *bleeding at the nose*, to send for the *pis-aller*, judging him to be somewhat better than no doctor at all. *Twice* is not *frequently*. *Frequently* means *oftentimes* and *commonly*. Besides, if Dewees had recollected that the oath bound him, in the name of God, to tell the *whole* truth, he would have told you, that at the very time that he was visiting these two neighbours of the defendant, another neighbour was taken ill of what was thought to be the yellow fever, and that Mr. Cobbett, who could have brought Dewees to the spot in an hour, sent for *Doctor Monges*, first to Philadelphia, then into the Neck, and after that to

Jenkintown, whence he was at last brought to the patient, at twelve o'clock at night!

What, then, becomes of the evidence; what becomes of the character and conscience, the body and the soul, of Dewees?*

But, Gentlemen of the Jury, this refutation of the verbal testimony was entirely useless to *you*. You wanted no information on the subject, but what you already possessed. You *all know of yourselves* that, when the yellow fever was in Mr. Cobbett's own family, the physicians he employed were not of the school of Sangrado; you *know* that they were *Doctor Monges* and that very *Doctor Stevens*, whom the impudent and insolent Rush had accused of *slaying more than the sword*, and to whom the defendant, along with hundreds of others, owe the preservation of their lives. Neither you nor any other inhabitant of Philadelphia, can plead ignorance of this fact. Mr. Cobbett has more than once made his *public* acknowledgments to these preservers of himself and his family. What further information, then, can you want? You *know* that, when he was *himself* attacked by the dreadful disease, in that awful moment, you *know*, that he not only rejected the system against which he had written, but that he put himself into the hands of the very men whom your Rush had marked out as medical murderers, and thus gave to his opinion the pledge of his life! What better assurance could he give of his disbelief in Rush, and of his confidence in the opposite system? What clearer proof of his sincerity, of the purity and benevolence of his intentions, do you want? And what clearer proof, you suspicious and ungrateful people, what clearer proof can you have, unless you rip open his bosom and look into his heart?

Here, Gentlemen, I close my defence. I have shown you that the publications of the defendant are *true*; and that, with respect to his intentions, the imputation of malice is *false*. You must be convinced, that the action is vexatious and groundless; that it is a war of private interest and ambition, against the safety, the happiness, and the very lives of the people. Standing thus upon the firm ground of justification, I disdain hackneyed invocations to the liberty of the press. The defendant stands in need of the interposition of no imaginary goddess; he seeks no shelter from new-discovered principles and new-fangled institutions; he asks no other rights, privileges, or immunities, than those which the humblest of his humble forefathers enjoyed; his motto is the motto of his countrymen, *Nolumus leges Angliæ mutari*; † from those laws, the common, the established, the ancient laws of England, and from those laws alone, he will accept of protection. From *your* hands he begs not for mercy, but demands justice; and should you despise this demand; should you listen to the suggestions of his base persecutors, and endeavour to "make him a blighted picture of infamy and ruin," I venture to predict, that not only your efforts will prove impotent, but that you, and your country, will repent of your compliance. My word for it, *ruin* is not his fate. "I have been young, and now am old; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his seed begging bread." And, though you should succeed in wresting from him the fruit of his care and his toil; though you should embitter his life with domestic distress, you will, thereby, but extort fresh

* I am told that Dewees has said, that he is *sorry* for what has happened; and, for once I believe him most sincerely! But it is a pity he was not taken with this fit of remorse, before he marched amongst the volunteers to the Court, to betray the private conversation of his customer.

† "We desire not any change of the laws of England."

proofs of his fortitude and integrity, and of the baseness, the malice, the ingratitude and perfidy of his foes; you will only give lustre to his character, and stamp infamy on your own. Nay, should your friends, your neighbours, your countrymen, and the world, join in applauding an iniquitous decision; and should you go on rejoicing to the very verge of the grave, still you and your accomplices should bear in mind, that all does not end there, and that death is not eternal sleep. The witnesses, to whom you have listened with such delight, are no casuists, I ween, or they would have perceived, that giving such evidence as manifestly tends to produce a belief of what is not true, is something very like perjury; and that HE who has said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour," will not be put off with subterfuges and mental reservations. Nor would I have you forget, gentlemen, that there is another tribunal in which you will appear, not to judge, but to be judged; and that, affecting to believe what you do not and what you cannot believe, though it may serve here as a convenient excuse, will not justify you in the presence of the Searcher of all hearts, in whose awful name you have promised to do justice! There it will not be asked, whether the plaintiff were an American and a republican; nor, whether the defendant were a Briton and a royalist; the only question put to you, will be—*Have you acted according to your CONSCIENCES?* That, and that alone, will be the subject of the inquest, and the ground of the judgment!

THE RUSHLIGHT.

A Peep into a Republican Court of Justice.

"An Englishman loves liberty, but he loves it not for the sake of the mere name; he must have something substantial that results from it; something that he can see and feel: this he has in the freedom of his person, and the security of his property. An Englishman, therefore, thinks more of his *civil* than his *political* liberty."—REEVES'S THOUGHTS, &c. LET. I.

IN the preceding Rushlights, I have given a sketch of the parentage and of the moral and literary character of Rush; I have detailed the insolent absurdities of his general conduct, and the frightful consequences of his system of depletion; and I have, I trust, most satisfactorily justified the words, for the publication of which the oppressive and unprecedented judgment was given against me, in the city of Philadelphia. Here then I should stop, were my design confined to a defence of my own character, and to the blasting of that of my persecutors. But as I observed in the introduction to the subject, my views extend to far greater utility; and therefore, though the injustice towards myself is already universally acknowledged; though it has excited the indignation of every honest man; though it has roused into action, in my favour, every latent sentiment of friendship, and has, with respect to me, in a great measure extinguished the ardent embers of political hatred; though every wish of a private nature is gratified even to satiety, still the public and the world have on me a claim which it would be a dereliction of duty to resist.

The narrative of the judicial proceedings in the cause of Rush, furnishes, as I observed before, a series of facts, of which justice to the people of America, justice to foreign nations, and particularly to the deceived and infatuated in my native country, demand an ample exposure. This subject is of some importance to every man who has the slightest notion of *real* liberty, or the least desire to secure its enjoyment. The character and conduct of Rush, the fatal effects of his medical practice, and the decision against me, are, in different degrees, all matters of private or local consideration; but the proceedings of courts of justice, as they stamp the character of a state, and form the truest criterion of its government, are in some measure interesting to all persons, and in all places. *Political liberty* is a matter of speculation rather than of interest; it is an imaginary something of meaning undefined, and is, at best, a very distant, if not a very questionable, good. But *civil liberty*, which is perhaps better expressed by the single word *justice*, is clearly defined and understood, and is ardently beloved by us all: it brings us into contact with the Government, the excellence of which it makes us feel: it comes to our homes and our fire-sides; it throws a rampart round our property and a shield before our persons; it is our guide and our help through the day, and our guardian when we lie down to sleep. This is the liberty of which our forefathers were so proud: this is the liberty which their blood so often flowed to preserve to their children. What degree of *this* liberty is enjoyed in America, the following narrative will evince.

The malicious suit of Rush against me was brought in the *Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania*, and my first object was, to remove the suit from that Court to the circuit of the *United States*, a removal which my being an *alien* gave me a right to demand, but which was, by the Judges of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, absolutely refused.

The nature of the Courts of which I have spoken, and the extent of their jurisdiction, are understood by some few persons in America; but as I hope the *Rushlight* will be read in Great Britain and Ireland, some little explanation respecting these Courts appears to me to be necessary.

The several States composing those dominions which are known to foreign nations by the title of *The United States of America*, are so many distinct and independent sovereignties, and not, as is generally imagined in Great Britain, so many counties or provinces. The State of Pennsylvania, for instance, has its own governor, who is the chief executive magistrate, and whose authority is, in many respects, less limited than that of the King of Great Britain. It has, besides, its two houses of legislators, who, with the governor, make laws for the government of the state, and who are uncontrolled by any other power whatever. In like manner it has its own judges, who are appointed by the governor, but without the advice or consent of a privy or other counsel, and without the instrumentality of any ministers, on whom responsibility will attach.

In some of the other states, the power of the governors is more limited; in that of New York, for instance, there is a Council of Appointment; but every state is totally independent of all the others, and, as far as relates to jurisdiction, it is also independent of the Government of the United States. In some cases, however, the judiciary of this latter has, in all the States, what is called a *concurrent* jurisdiction; which concurrent jurisdiction is expressly provided for, in cases where an *alien* is a party.

The constitution of the United States is very clear on this head. It says, in Sect. II. "The judicial power of the United States shall extend *to all controversies between a State, or citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects.*"

In order to obviate misconstruction, and more fully to provide for the due observance of this part of the constitution, so necessary to the security of the property of aliens, the Congress of the United States, amongst the first of its proceedings under the present Constitution, passed a law, which says: "And be it further enacted,* that if a suit be commenced in any State court against an *alien*, and the matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, to be made appear to the satisfaction of the Court; and the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance in the said State court, file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the next Circuit Court of the United States, to be held in the district where the suit is pending, and shall offer good and sufficient security for his entering in such Court on the first day of its session, copies of said proceedings against him, and also for his there appearing and entering special bail in the cause, if special bail was originally requisite therein, it shall then be the *duty* of the State court to accept the surety, and *proceed no further in the case.*"

Such is the provision which the constitution and the laws of the United States have made for the security of the property of aliens; and whoever knows any thing of America, whoever is in the least acquainted with the national partialities and antipathies which mark the words and the conduct of but too many of the rulers of the individual States, must at once perceive that such provision is absolutely necessary. In Pennsylvania, for instance, it was notorious, that all the influential officers of the Government, executive and judiciary, bore an implacable hatred against Great Britain, and all her *loyal* subjects; and though a *jury* stood between these rulers and the British subject, yet it was equally notorious that that jury must be chosen by a man, who held his lucrative office *during the pleasure* of the rancorous Governor.

In such a state of things, what justice had a Briton to expect in the Courts of Pennsylvania?—Besides, there is an absolute absurdity in his being compelled to plead in those courts; for who ought to administer justice to an alien, but that Government who makes treaties, and who maintains all the national intercourse with the sovereign of that alien? What does His Britannic Majesty, or what do his subjects, know of the government, or of the courts of Pennsylvania? They may hear of them, indeed, and they may stare at their transactions; but that is all. When a British subject contemplates on a residence, or on placing his property in the United States, he looks up for security to the government of those United States; and in order to estimate the security, where should he look but into the constitution and the laws on which alone that security depends?

But if British subjects in general were insecure in the Courts of Pennsylvania, how much more insecure was I, against whom it was well known that not only the Governor, his Secretary of State, and Attorney-General, but even the Chief Justice, who was to preside at the trial, had a personal and mortal grudge? I therefore resolved on removing the cause,

* This law was passed on the 24th of September 1789. See the Laws of the United States, vol. i. p. 56.

notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of my lawyers, who made use of every argument that could be thought of, to persuade me to abandon my intention. They were fully of opinion, that there was no danger in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and that declaring myself, in open court, a subject of the King of Great Britain, would be tantamount to a declaration that monarchy was preferable to republicanism, and would of course not only be very offensive to the Court before whom such declaration was made, but would inevitably tend to render me odious in the eyes of the people of America, and to weaken the force of all my future publications.

My lawyers were Mr. Thomas and Mr. Edward Tilghman. When this advice was given, I had every reason to suspect the former of the basest treachery; but in the fidelity of the latter I had then, as I still have, the most implicit confidence. The reasons, however, on which the advice was grounded, were far from being satisfactory to me. Declaring myself the subject of my Sovereign was no more than the formal assertion of a truth that did me great honour; it was saying nothing for, or against, either monarchy or republicanism; and as to its giving *offence* to the Court, or to the people of America, the idea appeared to me perfectly absurd. What! said I, you enter into a solemn treaty with my King, in which treaty you recognise my right as a British subject to come and live, and carry on trade amongst you, in return for which recognition you receive an equivalent; and you have, after this, the assurance to tell me, that I must forbear to plead my title of British subject, forego the protection it offers me, and passively submit to injustice and ruin, lest the Court and the people of America should be *offended*! What, added I, would you say, were such advice as this given to an American living in the British dominions? What would you say, were he told, that to disown and forswear his country were the only means of avoiding legal injustice and public odium? And what, in the name of God! what pretensions has an American to superiority over a Briton? Is his country more dear to him than mine is to me? Are his fellow-citizens more honest and more generous than my fellow-subjects? are they more famous for learning and for noble deeds? Are his rulers more powerful, more wise, more magnanimous, or more just, than my sovereign, who, though his fleets command the ocean, though he is the arbiter of nations, and the acknowledged saviour of the civilized world, makes his chief glory consist in being the defender, the friend, the father of his people?

In vain was I told that my plea was without precedent; and that it had been made by no British subject since the revolution. If this were the case, I thought it was high time that it should be made, and that we should cease to accept of safety and respect on such degrading conditions. Accordingly, at the first meeting of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania I presented, in compliance with the law above quoted, the following petition, which I now copy from the record.

Benjamin Rush	}	Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Case December Term, No. 3.
v.		
William Cobbett		

To the Honourable the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
The Petition of William Cobbett, the Defendant in the above action, an alien, and a subject of the King of Great Britain, humbly sheweth*,

* "Forgive me, that I am meek and gentle with these butchers!"

That he is sued in the action above mentioned, in which the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs; that he is desirous to remove the said cause for trial into the next Circuit Court of the United States, to be holden for the district of Pennsylvania, and hath good and sufficient security, ready, here in Court, to engage for his entering in said Circuit Court, on the first day of its session, a copy of the process in the said action, agreeably to the Act, entitled, "*An Act to establish the judicial Courts of the United States,*" and also for his appearing in the said Circuit Court. He therefore prays the Honourable the Court, that security may be taken for the purpose aforesaid, and that the said cause may be removed to the said Circuit Court of the United States accordingly.

Philadelphia,
30th Dec. 1797.

}

WILLIAM COBBETT.

William Cobbett, being duly sworn, saith that the facts within stated are true.

30th Dec. 1797.

WILLIAM COBBETT.

The consideration of this petition was put off to the next session, which was held in March 1798. But before I proceed to relate the fate of it, I cannot help remarking on the sensations which its presentation produced in the Court and the auditory. It was towards the evening of the last day of the session, when Mr. Thomas, albeit unused to the modest mood, stole up gently from his seat, and, in a faint and trembling voice, told the Bashaw M'Kean that he had a petition to present in behalf of William Cobbett. For some time he did not make himself heard. There was a great talking all round the bar; Levi, the lawyer, was reading a long formal paper to the judges, and the judges were laughing over the chit-chat of the day. Amidst the noisy mirth that surrounded him there stood poor Thomas, with his papers in his hands, like a culprit at school, just as the boys are breaking up. By-and-by, one of those pauses which frequently occur in even the most numerous and vociferous assemblies, encouraged him to make a first attempt. "I present," says he, "may it please your Honours, a petition in behalf of William Cobbett." The moment the sound of the word *Cobbett* struck the ear of M'Kean, he turned towards the bar, and having learnt the subject of the petition, began to storm like a madman. A dead silence ensued. The little scrubby lawyers (with whom the Courts of Pennsylvania are continually crowded) crouched down for fear, just like a brood of poultry when the kite is preparing to pounce in amongst them; whilst hapless Thomas, who stood up piping like a straggled chicken, seemed already to feel the talons of the judicial bird of prey. He proceeded, however, to read the petition, which, being very short, was got through with little interruption. When he came to the words, "*subject of his Britannic Majesty,*" M'Kean did, indeed, grin most horribly; and I could very distinctly hear, "*Insolent scoundrel!*" "*Damned aristocrat!*" "*Damned Englishman!*" &c. &c., from the mouths of the sovereign people. But neither these execrations, nor the savage looks that accompanied them, prevented me from fulfilling my purpose. I went up to the clerk of the court, took the book in my hand, and holding it up that it might be visible in all parts of the hall, I swore, in a voice that every one might hear, that I preserved my allegiance to

my king ; after which I put on my hat and walked out of Court, followed by the admiration of the few and by the curses of the many.

The consideration of the petition was, as I before observed, postponed till March term ; which gave kite M'Kean time to ruminate on the novel adventure. On the one hand was a violation of the constitution and laws of the general Government ; on the other, the escape of his prey. " Of two evils," says the proverb, " choose the least ;" and kite M'Kean chose on this occasion just as any other kite would have chosen. When the Court met, he did, indeed, listen for about an hour to a contention, which Thomas and Hopkinson called *law argument*, and which was full as edifying, though not quite so entertaining, as the disputes, with which I had frequently been delighted, between Punchinello and the Devil. While the lawyers were *arguing*, the Judges were engaged in a conversation, which, from the marks of risibility apparent on their countenances, seemed to be much more diverting than the contest between the puppets of the bar. When, therefore, this pleasant conversation was over, M'Kean, turning his head towards Hopkinson, bawled out, "*Ha'nt you 'most done ?*" This put an end to the *law argument* in a moment. No showman, with the help of his wire, ever produced more ready or more implicit obedience ; and kite M'Kean now hastened to put an end to the farce, by declaring, without the least hesitation, without consulting his associates, and without giving any reason whatever for his decision, *that the petition of William Cobbett should not be granted.**

Such is the manner in which *written* constitutions are observed ! That indefatigable constitution-grinder, Tom Paine, told his silly partisans in England that they had no *constitution at all* ; and this he represented as a most insupportable grievance. " Now," says he, " in America it is " not so. If you ask an American citizen whether a certain procedure be " constitutional or not, he takes down the book from the shelf, opens it, " turns to the article that treats of the subject in question, and gives you " an answer in a moment." Very true, Thomas : so you see, I took down my copy of the constitution and of the constitutional law ; I turned to the article and the section that treated of the subject in question, and I prayed the Judges to grant me my petition accordingly ; but the Judges laughed at me and the constitution too !

But, says the reader, is there no redress in such cases ?—None at all. The constitution which has made with aliens this solemn covenant for the

* READ THIS NOTE!—As I was going into the Court-house to hear this decision, I met *Mr. Coale*, a young man who lived and studied with Hopkinson, the lawyer of Rush. After the usual interchange of civilities, the following dialogue ensued, the correctness of which I am ready to vouch for upon oath :—

Coale.—What are you doing here ? You are going to remove your cause, are you not ?

Cobbett.—Yes.

Coale.—Then you won't succeed.

Cobbett.—Why ? How do you know I shan't.

Coale.—Why, *the Court are against you*, I can tell you that.

Cobbett.—What ! have they decided then before they have heard the parties ? They surely cannot be such barefaced rascals.

Coale.—Well ! you'll see.

And sure enough I did see in a very little time.—Now let the reader observe, that this *Mr. Coale* was in all the secrets of the lawyer of Rush ; let him compare *Coale's* prediction with the decision of the Court, and with the manner in which that decision was given ; and then I leave him to form his own judgment of the motives from which the petition was rejected.

security of their property, has made no provision for carrying it into effect, in opposition to the will of such men as M'Kean. Indeed there seems to be an intentional omission here. The Federal Government promises protection to every alien ; but in case he should be oppressed by the State Governments, it takes care, *by omitting to provide for redress*, to shift all responsibility from itself. Had I petitioned the Lord Chief Justice of the United States to quash the proceedings against me, he would have replied (if indeed he had given me any answer at all), that he had no control over the Courts of Pennsylvania, any more than over the Court of King's Bench in England ; and were I now to petition the President to show how I have been injured by a violation of the constitution, and to beseech him to give me redress, his reply would be similar to that of the Chief Justice ; he would tell me that the Government of Pennsylvania is a Government totally independent of him, and that he can in no way undo what it or its judiciary does. This is but too true ; but does this diminish my loss ? Does it do away the oppression ? If the Federal Government has not the power to protect an alien, it should not *promise him protection*. The Government has, by its constitution and laws, proclaimed to foreign nations that the property of aliens is under the safeguard of its Courts ; and when these aliens are harassed and ruined by the unjust and tyrannical proceedings of the State Governments, shall the Federal Government get rid of its responsibility by pleading its want of power ? The Government of the United States has stipulated with my Sovereign that his subjects (and I amongst the rest) shall have a right to live and carry on business here, being subject to the laws of the country, which laws provide that I shall have a right to remove my cause into the Federal Courts. And shall this Government now say, that it is not responsible for my having been deprived of this right ? If this be the case, neither would it have been responsible for the conduct of the Governor of Pennsylvania, had he banished me from the State. To *stipulate* always implies the power to *fulfil* ; any other idea of stipulation is absurd ; and if the power to fulfil does not exist, to stipulate is to delude.

The vindictive Judge of Pennsylvania having thus determined not to let go his grasp, I was compelled to submit to his jurisdiction, with very little hope of escaping a ruinous decision. I did, however, take every precaution that was in my power ; I employed Messrs. Edward Tilghman and Wm. Rawle as my counsellors, and to them I afterwards added Mr. Harper, a man on whose talents and whose spirit I placed a perfect reliance.* The necessary steps were also taken to ensure a special jury, who, it was thought by my lawyers and my friends, would be a sufficient protection against the intrigues of the plaintiff and the tyranny of the Court.

At the next term, September 1798, I was served with a jury list, which I struck ; but the trial was put off. I was served with another jury list at December term, 1798 ; with another at March term, 1799 ; with another at September term, 1799 ; and at every term, though the juries were always struck by me, and though I was always ready, the trial was put off. At last, on the 13th of December 1799, it was resolved to bring it to issue. The moment I saw the *jury list*, " Ah ! " said I to a friend that happened to be with me, " the action of Rush is to be tried this time." We looked over the list again and again, and, after the most

* Never was a man so grossly deceived in another as I was in this Harper.

mature consideration, we could find but seven men out of the forty-eight whom we thought fit to be trusted on the trial; but as I had the power of rejecting no more than twelve, there were left of course twenty-nine whom I disapproved of, to the seven whom I approved of; and as every one of these seven was struck off by Rush, there remained not a single man on the jury in whose integrity I had the slightest confidence.*

But there were other circumstances highly advantageous to my adversary. M'Kean, the kite-like Chief Justice, who is better known in England under the title of the *Democratic Judge*, was now become *Governor* of the State, and had, by the early exercise of his power, struck terror into all officers under his control. *Shippen* was the senior Justice on the bench of the Supreme Court, and he was in eager expectation of succeeding to the post of Chief Justice; but M'Kean kept him in suspense, in a sort of state of probation, *till the action of Rush against me should be decided!*

Singularly favourable, however, as these circumstances were, there was another still more favourable wanted to encourage the American Sangrado to push the cause on to trial; which was *my absence from Philadelphia*. I had several months before publicly signified my resolution to quit Pennsylvania, if M'Kean should be elected Governor of the State; and every one knew I should be as good as my word. Indeed, it was known that my books, furniture, &c. &c. were already sent off to New York; but I remained in the neighbourhood of the city (where I was seen every day), in order to be present at the trial, if it should come on. On the 7th of December there was no prospect of the cause being brought to trial; on the 8th, therefore, I came off for New York, where my affairs required my presence. On the 11th my correspondent wrote me that the cause was put off to another Court; but the *very next day* it was all at once resolved to bring it to trial immediately. This sudden change was pro-

* The reader will see, in the particulars here stated by Mr. COBBETT, not only a rare specimen of "the law's delay," but also as vicious a legal principle as can well be conceived. We do not gather from this account that Dr. RUSH had any other pretence for putting off the trial than that which Mr. COBBETT attributes to him. If he had no other pretence, how happened it that the defendant was thus harassed by delay, from September 1798 to December 1799, in an American court of justice? The practice of the court must have differed greatly from that of English courts; or, if its rules were borrowed from our country, one of them, it would seem, was grossly perverted in this case. The five distinct special juries, struck in five different terms, all for the trial of one and the same issue; this is such a curiosity in the history of injustice that we are sorry not to be able to say, with certainty, whether it was done under some act of legislation purely American, or under English law, as adopted by an American republic, and misinterpreted by American judges. The latter, however, was most probably the fact. But, if the American law professed to be similar to the English, the American special jury ought to have been struck and returned, not as was effected by Dr. RUSH, but according to the intent of those same Acts of Parliament relating to special juries which are now in force in England. (See 3 *Geo. II.* c. 25. sec. 15, and 6 *Geo. IV.* c. 50. sec. 30; and see *Tidd's Practice*, 9th Edit. p. 779.) When Judge M'Kean was on the bench our law was, in this matter, precisely what it is now. And in England, when a special jury is once struck, that jury is the jury to try the cause. Our courts have never, we believe, permitted anything so monstrous as for a plaintiff to delay, term after term, and strike jury after jury, in order that he might get a majority of his partisans into the box, and thus make sure of a verdict. If the law were settled here as it seems to have been in the Pennsylvanian code of 1798, it could only be so upon the principle of allowing a party to be himself a whole jury in his own cause.—Ed.

duced by an advertisement of mine, signifying *my arrival at New York; and my resolution to drop the publication of Porcupine's Gazette*. Sure, therefore, of all the advantages to be derived from my absence, and relieved from all apprehensions on the score of my future writings, the dastardly wretches at last ventured on the execution of their long-meditated revenge!

In what manner the cause was conducted, on the part of Rush's lawyers, has already been noticed. The evidence has also been examined and *exposed*: it therefore only remains for me to insert, and to make a few comments on, the charge of Judge Shippen.

“ GENTLEMEN,

This is an action brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant for writing, printing, and publishing, divers scandalous libels, to defame and vilify him. The defendant has pleaded that he is not guilty;—his counsel, however, have acknowledged the publication of the papers, which otherwise it would have been incumbent on the plaintiff to prove. The question, therefore, will be, whether they amount in law to defamatory libels, or not.

“ *By the law and practice in England, in the case of libels, the only task of the Jury is, to judge of the fact of publication, and the truth and fair application of the innuendos; the Court, as judges of the law, reserving to themselves the sole power of deciding whether the paper amounts to a libel, or not.* But in this State, by the special directions of our constitution, the Jury possess the power of judging both of the law and fact, under the direction of the Court.

“ A libel is defined by the law, to be the malicious defamation, expressed either in printing or writing, or by signs or pictures, tending to blacken either the memory of one who is dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, or to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. This offence may be punished, either by indictment at the suit of the commonwealth, or by a civil action at the suit of the party injured. When the prosecution is by indictment, the Court only are to direct the punishment; but in a civil suit, the damages are to be assessed solely by the Jury.

“ The charges laid against the defendant in the declaration are various; but they may be reduced in substance to the following:—That he repeatedly calls the plaintiff a quack, an empiric; charges him with intemperate bleeding, injudiciously administering mercury in large doses in the yellow fever; puffing himself off; writing letters and answering them himself; styling him the Sampson in medicine; charging him *with murdering his patients, and slaying his thousands, and tens of thousands.*

“ The counts laid in the declaration are fully proved by the publications, which are certainly libellous. In what manner do the defendant's Counsel repel these proofs? Not by justifying the truth of the matters charged against Dr. Rush, *which on the contrary they have repeatedly acknowledged to be false*, but by analyzing the several allegations in the newspapers, and from thence drawing a conclusion that no intentional personal malice appears, which they say is the essence of the offence.—Malice rests in the heart, and is only to be judged of by the words and actions of the party; the words themselves import malice, and in that case the proof lies on the defendant to show the innocence of his intentions; if he has done that to your satisfaction you will acquit him: but this is chiefly founded on the allegation that the attack was meant to be

made on Dr. Rush's system, and not on the man; *it unfortunately appears that not the least attempt is made to combat the Doctor's arguments with regard to the system itself*, but the attack is made merely by gross scurrilous abuse of the Doctor himself. Added to this, one of the witnesses proves a declaration made by the defendant, *that if Dr. Rush had not been the man, he should never have meddled with the system.*

“Another ground of defence is of a more serious nature, as it leads to an important question on our constitution—it is said that the subject of dispute between the plaintiff and defendant was a matter of public concern, as it related to the health and lives of our fellow-citizens, and that, by the words of our constitution, every man has a right to discuss such subjects in print. The liberty of the press, Gentlemen, is a valuable right in every free country, and ought never to be unduly restrained; but when it is perverted to the purposes of private slander, it then becomes a most destructive engine in the hands of unprincipled men. The utmost purity and integrity of heart is no shield against the shafts and arrows of malice conveyed to the world by printed publications. Verbal slander may be frequently very injurious; but slander in writing, or print, being more generally disseminated and more durable in its effects, is consequently infinitely more pernicious and provoking. Our state constitution of 1790 contains certainly very general words with relation to the right of a citizen to print his thoughts, and offer them to the consideration of the public; but it at the same time guards against the generality of the privilege, by expressly declaring, that every person availing himself of the liberty of the press, should be responsible for the abuse of that liberty; thus securing to our citizens the invaluable right of reputation against every malicious invader of it.

“Printed publications attacking private character, are considered with great reason by the law as a very atrocious offence, from its evident tendency to the breach of the public peace—if men find they can have no redress in our courts of justice for such injuries, they will naturally take satisfaction in their own way, involving perhaps their friends and families in the contest, and leading evidently to duels, murders, and perhaps to assassinations.

“The principal subject of consideration with the Jury will be what damages they are to assess. On this subject you are the ALMOST uncontrollable judges—it is your peculiar province:—*The Court have indeed the power to order a new trial where damages are excessive; but in cases of torts and injuries of this kind, the law books say the damages must be so outrageously disproportionate to the offence, as at first blush to shock every person who hears of it, before the Court will order a new trial.*

“Every one must know that offences of this kind have for some time past too much abounded in our city; *it seems high time to restrain them—that task is with you, Gentlemen. To suppress so great an evil, it will not only be proper to give compensatory, but exemplary damages; thus stopping the growing progress of this daring crime—at the same time the damages should not be so enormous as absolutely to ruin the offender.*

“I hope no party considerations will ever have place in this Court, in the administration of justice—and I entreat you, Gentlemen, to banish them, in considering this subject, entirely from your breasts.”

Peter Porcupine to Judge Shippen.

SIR,

The Charge which you gave against me, on the 14th of December last, has given rise to a very interesting question; to wit:—which is its prominent characteristic, *stupidity* or *malice*?—This is a question far too knotty for me to presume to decide; but with all due submission to your Honour and the honourable Judge Brakenridge,* who sits on your right hand; I think I may venture to throw some light on the subject: and in doing this, I will endeavour to forget your private character, that it may not extort from me language derogatory to my own.

You say, “By the law and practice *in England*, in the case of libels, “the *only task* of the jury is to judge of the fact of publication, and the “truth and fair application of the inuendoes; the court, as judges of “the law, reserving to themselves the sole power of deciding whether “the paper amounts to a libel or not. But, *in this State*, by the special “directions of our constitution, the jury possess the power of judging both “of the law and fact, under the direction of the Court.”

Pray, Sir, what are we to call this? Are we to consider it as one of those stale tricks, which have been so long practised for the purpose of making the Americans believe that they enjoy *more liberty* than their former fellow-subjects enjoy? or, must we look upon it as intended to flatter the jury, and give them a high opinion of their power? If the former, if your intention were merely to keep the poor sovereign people in good humour with their present rulers, there is not much to be said; self-preservation is the first law of nature. But if your design were, by puffing up the pride of the jury, to embolden them to gratify your and their private wishes, at the expense of justice; if this were your motive, what do you deserve?

Be your motive, however, what it might; whether the object you had in view were to obtain and secure a good post for yourself, or to ruin me, whatever might be your end, your means were most vile; your statement respecting “*the law and practice of England*” was a shameful *falsehood*, and would have been a disgrace to any other bench than that from which it came. “Whereas,” says the English law, “*doubts* have arisen, whether “on the trial of an indictment or information, for the making or publishing any libel, where an issue or issues are joined, between the King and “the defendant, or defendants, on the plea of Not Guilty pleaded, it be “competent to the jury impanelled to try the same, to give their verdict “upon the whole matter in issue; be it therefore declared and enacted by “the King’s most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent “of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that on every such “trial, the jury sworn to try the issue, may give a *general verdict* of “Guilty or Not Guilty upon the whole matter put in issue upon such indictment or information; and shall not be required or directed, by the “court or judge before whom such indictment or information shall be “tried, to find the defendant or defendants guilty, merely on the proof “of the publication by such defendant or defendants of the paper charged

* This man was, a very little while ago, *pardoned* upon condition that he would turn State’s evidence!—This, reader, is a *Republican* Judge.

“ to be a libel, and of the sense ascribed to the same in such indictment “ or information.”—Act 33 Geo. III. c. 60. A.D. 1792.

This act was passed in 1792 ; but you will observe (if, indeed, you understand the meaning of the words), that it is a *declaratory* act ; an act made to remove doubts, to explain and to declare what *was then*, and what *always had been*, the law of the land. You will observe, too, if you are capable of comprehending the distinction, that this act declares the right of the jury to decide upon *the whole* matter put in issue even upon an *indictment or information* ; from which you will perceive, that this right in civil actions never was disputed, never was even a matter of *doubt*. So that it appears, Mr. Shippen, that your boasted Pennsylvanian constitution has given the people no *new* rights ; it appears that the sovereign citizens, whom you help to rule, enjoy, even nominally, no greater liberty of the press than they would still have enjoyed, had they remained the subjects of a king ; and it necessarily follows, that you were wretchedly ignorant of both the statute and common law of England, or that you advanced a wilful and most barefaced *falsehood*.

Your definition of the law, and your enumeration of the charges laid against me, which are really too stupid to deserve a comment, conclude with asserting that the declaration charges me with having accused Dr. Rush “ with *murdering* his patients,” and “ slaying *his* thousands and tens of thousands.” What could induce you to make this false, this impudent assertion ? Neither the word *murder*, nor any of its derivatives, nor any word that is synonymous with it, or any one of its derivatives, is to be found in the publications laid in the declaration. The passage to which you evidently allude is, I trust, fully justified in the *Rushlight* ; but lest that should have been kept from your sight by the operation of that *free* constitution which you so consistently boast of, I shall insert it here : —“ Dr. Rush, in that emphatical style which is peculiar to himself, calls “ mercury the Sampson of medicine. In his hands, *and in those of his* “ *partisans*, it may, indeed, be justly compared to Sampson ; for I verily “ *believe*, that *they* have slain more Americans with it, than ever Sampson “ slew of the Philistines. The Israelite slew his thousands, but *the* “ *Rushites* have slain *their* tens of thousands.” Now, is this as you say it is, charging Dr. Rush “ with *murdering* his patients, and slaying *his* thousands and tens of thousands ?” So shameful a perversion of a man’s words, had it been made use of by a *pleader* in England, would have been severely reprov’d by the court ; what then will Englishmen think of a *judge* who could be guilty of it ? And what will they, what must they think of the government under which such a man is judge ?

Continuing in your pleader-like strain, you observe that the counsel of the defendant do not repel the charges brought against him, “ by justifying the truth of the publications ; but that, on the contrary, they have *repeatedly acknowledged those publications to be false.*” It is true, indeed, that my counsel, to their shame be it spoken, did not justify the truth of the publications laid in the declaration ; but that they *might* have justified, every man in America knows well ; and you knew, that they *would* have done it, had their client not been an Englishman, and had they not, like you, been in fear of M’Kean and of your brother slaves who filled your *tribunes* and crowded round your bench.

In your zeal for the plaintiff, you did, however, go too far ; for my *counsel*, tame and submissive as they were, did not “ repeatedly acknowledge the publications to be *false.*” Neither Mr. Tilghman nor Mr.

Rawle did, in any one instance, make such an acknowledgment. Nor was even the trimming mob-courting Harper guilty of baseness and treachery to the extent that you have imputed to him. He did, indeed, say more than once, that he "*believed*" the publications were "*very untrue*;" but he made no *unqualified* acknowledgment of their being *false*. He went far enough, in all conscience, against a cause, which he was well paid to support; his conduct wanted no colouring; you might, therefore, have spared the daubings of your awkward brush.

"It appears," say you, "that *not the least attempt* is made [in the "publications against Rush] to combat the Doctor's arguments with regard to the *system itself*." If you had been candid, if you had remembered your oath, you would have observed further, that the publications for which I was sued, made only a *part* of those which appeared against Rush and his system of depletion; you would, therefore, have said nothing on this head, unless you had found, upon an examination of Porcupine's Gazette, from which the pretended libels were extracted, that I had never accompanied these pretended libels with serious arguments against the wild and destructive opinions and practice of the plaintiff. "But," say you, "added to this, one of the witnesses *proves* a declaration made by "the defendant, that *if Dr. Rush had not been the man, he should never have meddled with the system*."—Atrocious falsehood!—The words of the witness, Dr. Coxe, as reported in the account of the trial, are these: "He (the defendant) replied, that he did not *believe* he should ever have "said *so much* on bleeding and mercurials, if Dr. Rush had not been "the author of it."—Was this declaring, *that if Dr. Rush had not been the man, I "NEVER should have MEDDLED with the system?"* When you summed up this evidence, were you thinking of the office you filled, or of that which you were in hopes of filling? Were you afraid of being outstripped in the honourable course by either of your worthy competitors? It must be confessed, that such a fear was not unreasonable; for so well are you matched, that had you started together, it is a moot point with me which of the three would have won the prize.

But a misconstruction of the publications, and a perversion of the evidence, did not satisfy you: you seem to have been still afraid, that in spite of such cheering encouragement the jury might have some scruples; and, therefore, you took care to conclude with giving them an assurance, that, provided they laid on damages enough, their verdict should be approved of by you.—"The principal subject of consideration with the jury will be," say you, "*what damages* they are to assess." You then proceed to tell them that they are "the *almost uncontrollable* judges on "this subject," and that, "though the court has it in its power to order "a new trial in case of excessive damages, yet, that in cases of torts and "injuries of *this kind*, the *law books* say the damages must be so *outrageously* disproportionate to the offence, as, at *first blush*, to SHOCK "every person who hears of it, before the court will order a new trial!!!"

Bravo! Vivat Respublica! Huzza for "our *glorious* revolution!" Huzza for the sovereign people! Vive la liberté! But in the midst of all this rejoicing I had almost forgot to ask you, *what "law books"* you found this maxim in. In those of Robespierre and Fouquier Tinville, I suppose; or, perchance, in those of Pennsylvania, or of Algiers. Find it where you will, however, you have applied it, and you and your country are entitled to all the honours it confers. I would give a thousand dollars if old Price were yet alive, to have an opportunity of sticking this

charge of yours in one of the curls of his wig. Here, you wayward and discontented Britons, who are hankering after republicanism; look here! Here you see a complete specimen of the blessings of *liberty* and *reform*! Were one of your judges to declare, that, in order to induce him to grant a new trial, the punishment for calling a man a quack must be so outrageously cruel, as, at *first blush* to SHOCK *every person who hears of it*, you would stone him to death; you would shun his touch as you would the touch of a hangman; but were you in Pennsylvania only for one month, were you once "ameliorated" in the philanthropic city of Philadelphia, were you sovereign citizens instead of subjects, you would listen to him as patiently and submissively as a penitent does to his father confessor.

Begging your Honour's pardon for this digression, I return to you and your Jury. Having promised them that there should be no check upon their rapacity, you dismiss them with putting into their mouths a pretext for their conduct. "Every one," say you, "must know, that offences of this kind have, for some time past, too much abounded in our city; it seems high time to restrain them—that task is with you, Gentlemen. To suppress so great an evil, it will not only be proper to give *compensation*, but *exemplary* damages; thus stopping the growing progress of this daring crime—at the same time the damages should not be so enormous as *absolutely* to ruin the offender."

The doctrine of *exemplary* damages is new, and it certainly is as efficacious an instrument of oppression as ever was devised. The very word *damages* excludes every idea of *punishment*. It implies *compensation* for *injuries*; and no Jury can, without being forsworn, give a farthing more than what they believe to be *the amount of the injury*; for, if *example* be the object of prosecution, the process ought to be by indictment, or information.

It has sometimes happened, that actions, similar to that of Rush, have been brought by noblemen and gentlemen in England, who have preferred the civil to the criminal process, merely to challenge an investigation; because the former allows the defendant to justify the truth of his words, which the latter does not. The damages, if any are given in such a case, must be given for the sake of *example*; for it rarely happens that the slander is productive of any real injury to the plaintiff. Such were the actions brought by Lord Sandwich in 1773, and by the Right Hon. William Pitt in 1786, in both which cases damages were given, though it was next to impossible that the plaintiffs could have sustained any injury. But, Mr. Shippen, there is some little difference between these noblemen and a boasting inventor of purging powders. Neither Lord Sandwich nor Mr. Pitt could receive a *compensation*; yet, as they were charged with malversation in office, a civil process was necessary to clear up their characters: and, as neither fine nor imprisonment could take place upon such an action, damages were given for the sake of *example*. But in the case of a bleeder or powder-doctor, all the Jury had to do, if they found the publication false and malicious, was, to ascertain, to the best of their judgments, the amount of the real injury the fellow had sustained, and to assess, as damages, a sum just to that amount, and no more.

But whatever may have been the custom in England, respecting the legality of assessing *exemplary* damages, it is most certain that, as to the *sum* to be assessed, no Judge ever attempted, no Judge ever dared at-

tempt, to dictate to the Jury. The following extract from a charge of Lord Mansfield, shows how careful he was not to encroach on the exclusive province of the Jury to estimate damages. "I will not say a word to you about the damages. I am sure no observations on any side can occur, which you are not capable of making yourselves. You will take the paper out with you, and will consider all the circumstances of the case, of a public or private nature."—This charge was delivered in an action of *scandalum magnatum* (defamation of a nobleman), brought by Lord Sandwich against the printer of the London Evening Post, for the publication of a piece signed Alfred, on the 2nd of Feb. 1773, in which his Lordship, then first Lord of the Admiralty, was falsely accused of having exposed to sale the office of Commissioner of the Navy for the sum of 2000*l*. And this instance of Lord Mansfield's forbearance is the more applicable and forcible, as he was always charged (though I believe very unjustly) with bending the law to favour the ministerial side of the question, and to extend the power of the Judges as far as possible. If he could have found any precedent, or have invented any plausible motive for encroaching on this undoubted province of the Jury, he would not, it is to be presumed, have scrupled to use it on such an occasion.

Another, and still more striking, contrast to your charge is to be found in that of Lord Mansfield's, delivered in the action of Mr. Pitt against the printers of the General Advertiser and the Morning Herald, who accused him, he being at the time Chancellor of the Exchequer, of *gambling in the stocks with the money of the nation*. Lord Mansfield closed his charge thus: "The assessing of the damages is *entirely* in your province. *I shall not say a word upon it*. You will consider them under all the circumstances of the case, the malignity and the extent, and, for the sake of example, you will give those damages you *think proper*."*

This is the language of an *English* Judge. How different is it from yours! Lord Mansfield tells the Jury, that to estimate the damages is *entirely* in their province: that he shall *not say a word upon it*. You tell your sovereign men, that they are, indeed, the *almost* uncontrollable judges of damages, and you promise them, that their verdict shall not be set aside, unless it be so outrageously cruel, as, at first blush, to *shock* every person who hears of it! The libel on Mr. Pitt was a most atrocious one, yet Lord Mansfield forbears to suggest the propriety of great damages, and tells the Jury to give what they think proper, for *the sake of example only*. But you call for damages *both compensatory and exemplary*; you urge them to bring upon the head of the defendant the consequences of both a civil and a criminal prosecution! You do, indeed, observe to them, that "the damages must not be so enormous as *absolutely to ruin* the offender." This was a wholesome caution: it was telling them how far they might go, without endangering the success of the scheme; it was saying to them, "Ruin him in effect, but take care to do it in such a way as will not defeat our intention. Bilk him, embarrass him, break up his business, and plunge him into debt; but be careful not to let your malice so far overshoot the mark, as to leave us no excuse for confirming your verdict."—This was pretty

* The damages given for *falsely* accusing Mr. Pitt of this heinous offence was 250*l*.—British printers, bless your kind stars!!

language from a Court to a Jury! The Jury followed your directions with great exactness, and the malignant slaves thought they had given me a deadly blow; but that blow, while it has had no effect on me, has recoiled with redoubled force on themselves, their accomplices, and their city.

But your pretext for recommending a ruinous verdict, is, if possible, more atrocious than the recommendation itself. "Offences of this kind," say you, "have, for some time past, too much abounded in our city; it seems high time to restrain them—that task is with you, Gentle-men."—So, because offences of the same kind *had abounded in the city*, because they had passed unnoticed, because they had been tolerated, I was to be all but *absolutely* ruined I was to suffer for what all others had done, and also for the negligence of Courts and Juries! Precious justice this!

Yes; offences, not of "*this kind*," but of a much worse kind, had, indeed, for a long time abounded in your city. Libels the most false, scandalous, and malicious; publications the most obscene and most impious, had long abounded, and do still abound; and had I shared in these publications, not a farthing of damages would ever have been given against me. But I was a British subject; I had defended the character of my King and country against the infamous calumnies that you and your associates suffered to be propagated; I exposed the little despots of America; I had contrasted their character with that of the King, against whom they were continually endeavouring to revive the animosity of the people; and it was for this, and this alone, that you and your associates hated me. At the very moment when you gave this scandalous charge, when you called aloud for ruin on my head, you were perfectly convinced that I had rendered America essential services; you knew that my character was unblemished, and that my conduct, as a publisher, was singularly laudable; you knew that I never wilfully published a *falshood*; you knew that, as a bookseller, I never gave circulation to a seditious, an irreligious, or an immoral publication, but that, on the contrary, I had constantly endeavoured to obstruct the progress of such works, and that I had been the patron of every effort to counteract their deleterious effects. All this you knew, and with all this in your mind, you uttered the malignant charge which I this day rescue from that oblivion to which its stupidity had condemned it.*

One fact only remains to be narrated, and a most valuable one it is. I beg every Englishman to pay good attention to it, and to bless God for not having placed him under the jurisdiction of an American Judge.

The trial was begun on the 13th, and the 5000 dollar verdict was given on the 14th of December. It is well known that after every verdict, *four days* are allowed, previous to entering up the judgment, in order to enable the defendant to prepare for application for an arrest of judgment. On the 17th, therefore, my counsellor, Mr Edward Tilghman, made a motion for a rule to show cause why the verdict and judgment should not

* The partiality of these people does not appear in its true light, till it is known that Mr. Fenno, who was sued at the same time, and for the very same pretended libel, has been suffered to go off without further notice. They hate Fenno for his royalist principles, but he being an *American*, they knew that it would be hard to find a Jury to assess heavy damages against him, and to have given 5000 dollars against me, while they only gave, perhaps, 100 against him, would have been too glaring a proof of their infamy. For the same reason the action against him will never be brought to issue.

be set aside for excessiveness of damages; which motion was rejected by you and your associates. Well might you reject it! for, on the 16th, the *day before* you refused the new trial, I was *actually arrested* for the 5000 dollars at New-York! so that it appears, that the plaintiff and his counsel were *sure*, quite *sure*, that a new trial would not be granted two days, at least, *before* that new trial was moved for!—Vivat Respublica! Huzza for liberty and revolution!

“And what do I care for all this?” say you; “I have got the post of Chief Justice, and shall hold it; and in spite of all the exposures you can make, I shall still have the huzzas of the base herd of Americans.”*—That is true enough: I have not encountered the hopeless task of making any impression on you, or on the wretched beings by whom you are surrounded; but I know *where* I shall produce an impression: and though my labours may be slow in their operation, they will be sure and lasting in their effects.

W. COBBETT.

The Rushlight has already made some astonishing exposures respecting the much-boasted *liberty of the press*. It has many more to make. The mean arts and the abominable tyranny employed in Philadelphia, for the purpose of effecting the suppression of this work, surpass all that ever has been recorded of the detestable Court of Star-Chamber. The Governments of America appear to me to be approaching very fast towards absolute despotism. If a writer, like the author of the *Pursuits of Literature*, were in this country, he would be ruined, if not assassinated, in less than twelve months. The poor printers and booksellers are reduced to a degree of slavish dread hardly to be conceived; and to hear the language of the inhabitants in general, one would really imagine that the bloody laws of Valentinian (on which M’Kean lately pronounced an eulogium) were in full force.†

PORCUPINE’S REVENGE.

A Dialogue between Rush and Porcupine.

Rush. Master Peter, you see, with my twelve sov’reign men,
I have tipp’d you a squeeze for the strokes of your pen.
These twelve sov’reign men, now I no longer need them,
How shall I reward?

* When Shippen closed his charge, there was a *clapping of hands* amongst the people, who filled the galleries and the area of the Court-house; and when the verdict was pronounced, the joy of the malignant wretches broke out into *loud and repeated acclamations*! Nor was this joy confined to the herd of spectators; the shouting in the Court house was the next day recorded by the news-printers, who exulted in this proof of the *zeal and justice* of their *fellow-citizens*!

† A few days ago a paragraph appeared in a Philadelphia paper, recommending the passing of a law to punish the *lenders* and the *readers* of libels! This paragraph was, I am informed, written and published at the request of an officer under the Federal Government. Now let me ask, what the people of England would say to the editor of any of those papers that are called *ministerial*, were they to broach such a proposition as this? Would the public bear it? And is not its being borne *here*, without a murmur, a clear proof that the people have no true notion of liberty, and that they are amused with the *name*, while the *thing* is not known amongst them?

Peter. Why, bleed them, Rush, bleed them.

Rush. But to the Judge on the bench, so just and humane,
 (The worthy successor and tool of M'Kean) ;
 To my lawyers who bellow'd so loudly against you,
 To Hopkinson, Ingersol, Levi the Jew,
 The half-quaker Lewis (who once was a carter),
 And your faithful counsel, the mob-courting Harper ;
 To my volunteer witnesses, grateful young Mease,
 To the poor Dr. Coxe, and poor granny Dewees,
 (Who gen'rously came, with no duty to urge them.)
 What return shall I make ?

Peter. Why, purge them, Rush, purge them !

Enter Grave-Digger.

Grave-Dig. By my soul, Master Peter, I think it too hard
 That with such folks as these I must fill my church-yard.

Peter. Church-yard ! honest fellow, my meaning's not such ;
 For, where a man's buried it matters not much ;
 And the great Dr. Mitchell (of bleeding renown)
 Says, " Let all human carrion be dragg'd out of town."

A TRAGEDY SCENE.

Enter SANGRADO, with the Rush-Light in his hand. He remains for about half an hour in stupid, sullen silence ; and then, starting from his reverie, pours forth, in slow and melancholy accents, the following soliloquy.

Unthinking Doctor, wherefore did thy rage
 Urge thee with printer's prowess to engage ?
 O, why from puffing to the law retire ?
 Why for thyself construct the fun'ral fire ?
 What though an Ingersol before thee stood,
 With dangling brush, to paint thee fair and good ;
 A weeping Hopkinson, dear tender creature,
 Sobbing to wail the injuries of Nature ;
 What though kind-hearted jurors press'd thee round,
 And philanthropic judges too were found ;
 What though the gentle, just, and gen'rous crowd
 The verdict sanctioned with applauses loud ;
 What though five thousand dollars were the prize,
 Which, in idea, gratified thine eyes ?
 Say ! could such lenitives relieve thy shame,
 Or reunite thee to thy shadow, fame ?
 Could they kill Peter, whose vindictive art
 So well directs his venom to thy heart ?
 Could they prevent exposure and disgrace,
 Or change the tincture of an Ethiop's face ?
 Oh, no ! they bade these hellish fires arise,
 And bound thee to the stake.—(*He dies.*)

PRIESTLEY'S CHARITY SERMON

FOR

POOR EMIGRANTS.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—In the *Porcupine*, vol. 9, p. 389, we find this Sermon of Dr. PRIESTLEY, with notes upon it by Mr. Cobbett. The Sermon was delivered, it appears, in the University Hall in Philadelphia, on the 9th of February, 1797; and, while urging the claims of the distressed in general, it seems to have been more particularly intended to relieve those who had emigrated from Great Britain and Ireland. We insert below so much of the Sermon as will be necessary to our purpose; which is, to give one of Mr. COBBETT'S notes, in which he maintains the principles of our old *Poor-law system*, in opposition to some notions here put forth by the DOCTOR. Though the following contains but a part of Dr. PRIESTLEY'S arguments, we have been careful to preserve the strongest of his assertions in favour of relief, as well as those to which Mr. COBBETT objects as having an opposite tendency.—See the *asterisk* towards the close of the extract, which marks the passage to which the NOTE coming after refers.

“LET not the rich man make a boast of his charity, as if he gave what he was under no *obligation* to give. For, strictly speaking, it is a *debt* which he owes to the needy. Benevolence being the great law of our natures, and the happiness of all being the great object of the Divine government, whatever it be that promotes this end is the proper *duty* of all, according to their respective abilities, to contribute to it; and any person is guilty of a breach of trust who refrains from doing it. All the good that any man *can* do he *ought* to do. The Divine Being, our common Parent, expects it of him as a member of his large family; and if he *judge the world in righteousness*, as he assuredly will, he will punish the person who does less than it was in his power to do, as having neglected a duty that was incumbent on him.

“In whatever manner any person becomes possessed of wealth, it is the gift of God. If it have accrued to him from superior ingenuity or superior industry, that very superior ingenuity and spirit of activity are alike the gift of God, who makes one man to differ, in these respects as well as others, from another man: so that, as the apostle says (1 Cor. iv. 7), God may say to any man, *What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?* Consequently, not to make that disposition of our wealth which the Giver of it *intended* that we should, is to be guilty of ingratitude to God and real injustice to man. It is to act the part of an unfaithful steward. For in this light, and no other, ought we to consider ourselves with respect to everything that we have to spare, after the supply of our own wants.

“Neither let the rich boast of their *independence* with respect to the poor. In fact, they are more dependent upon the poor than the poor are upon them; and were all persons reduced to a level, every advantage of which they now boast would vanish. They must then labour for them-

selves, and do for themselves those menial offices which are now done for them by others. But, happily for us all, there is such a foundation laid in the course of nature and the order of Providence, for that inequality in the conditions of men, which has so excellent an effect in binding us all together, in making our connection both necessary and mutually advantageous, that no institutions of man can destroy it; though, as we are in duty bound, we may lessen the evils that necessarily arise from it.

“ Since, then, the rich, who really wish to act the part that in strict duty they are bound to do, have only a choice to make of objects on whom to bestow their superfluity; and there are many of them, so that some may apply themselves to the relief of one species of distress, and others of another, or of several in different degrees, according as their attention is attracted to them; I only plead, on this occasion, that the poor *emigrants* are entitled to a share. Not that I wish to have a fund so open to them as that they should have a claim upon it as a *legal right*. That circumstance, as we see in the case of the poor of England, would soon defeat the very object of the charity. The more poor of any kind you provide for in this way, the more you will create; the more you may burden yourselves, and that without limit, and the more distress you will occasion in others. By this most injudicious system you would only encourage idleness, improvidence, insolence, and profligacy of every kind.* But let there be a fund provided on which, though no person shall have a legal claim, yet from it persons of discretion may, as they shall see occasion, give temporary relief to such emigrants as really want it.

“ Observe, also, that I only say *temporary* relief, so as to put the poor emigrants in the way of relieving and providing for themselves; and to do *this*, some assistance may be absolutely necessary. It might not even be amiss to make the sums afforded them a debt which the institution might reclaim, if the parties relieved should afterwards, as it is hoped most of them will, be in a condition to refund it, and also with interest, for the benefit of others. But that, in some way or other, *many poor emigrants are entitled to assistance will appear to every person who shall consider their situation.*”

* MR. COBBETT'S NOTE TO THE FOREGOING.

Here the Doctor and I differ in opinion. The English system of poor-law is the best in the world; the fairest for the giver, and the least degrading to the receiver. By this wise and humane system those who possess the good things of this world are compelled to assist those who do not possess them; they are compelled to perform the “*obligation* which,” as the Doctor truly says, “they are under to give;” they are compelled to pay “*the debt* which they owe to the needy.” And, so wisely did our forefathers contrive this system, that the compulsion being general has in it nothing invidious on the one part, or humiliating on the other. The poor man, in England, is as secure from beggary as is the king upon the throne. The very worst that can befall him is to be obliged to make his distresses known to the parish officers, to the heads of the great family of which he is a member, who are obliged, by law, to give him what he needs, which he receives, not as an alms, but as his *legal due*. No one is vested with inquisitorial powers over him; he comes not as a supplicant for mercy or compassion, and, therefore, he fears no refusal; His body may be wasted with want and infirmity, but his heart is not broken by degradation. It is somewhat strange to hear *Doctor Priestley*

express his dislike to this system because it encourages “insolence” in the poor; him, who has discovered more insolence towards his superiors than perhaps any man that ever existed. There is no good without its concomitant evil; and it may be, that a *certain* provision for the poor does, in some instances, encourage idleness, improvidence, and insolence; but, how trifling is this evil, when weighed against the heart-cheering confidence which *every man* feels that neither himself, nor the widow or the orphans that he may leave behind him, can ever want for the necessaries of life, and can never be exposed to a precarious subsistence! To hear the Doctor railing against English poor-laws one would imagine that there were no poor-laws in the United States; but, to the honour of those States be it spoken, they have poor-laws upon the English plan. I, who have paid poor-taxes in that country, am able to speak with precision on the subject; and I can prove from my receipts that my poor-rates, in the very town where the Doctor was prating, were full as high as they are in London, in 1801. There are poor everywhere. We read of the poor from one end of the Bible to the other. It is the lot of mankind to be subject to poverty; and, as far as relates to the poor, that is the best country where poverty produces the least suffering of body and mind, and that country is Old England.*

* The view which Mr. COBBETT here takes agrees exactly with all that he has written elsewhere on the rights of the poor. This is precisely the same doctrine as that which the reader will find supported throughout the volumes of the *Register*, the *Poor Man's Friend*, and the *Legacy to Labourers*. It must be allowed that Dr. PRIESTLEY, too, in the passage above quoted, goes a great way to maintain the claims of the poor man. But his latter observations, touching “the case of the poor of England,” are virtually refuted by himself in what precedes them, as Mr. COBBETT points out. Dr. PRIESTLEY says the same, in substance, as Dr. PALEY; who, when writing of charity and of the treatment of our domestics and dependants, lays down as follows:—“Our obligation to them is much greater than theirs to us. It is a mistake to suppose that the rich man maintains his servants, tradesmen, tenants, and labourers: the truth is, they maintain him. It is their industry which supplies his table, furnishes his wardrobe, builds his houses, adorns his equipage, provides his amusements. It is not the estate, but the labour employed upon it, that pays his rent. All that he does is to distribute what others produce; which is the least part of the business.”—*Moral and Political Philosophy*, Book 3, Part 2, Chap. 2.—ED.

LETTERS

TO THE

RIGHT HON. HENRY ADDINGTON,

ON THE PEACE OF AMIENS.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.]—In 1801, Mr. Cobbett addressed a series of Letters to Lord HAWKESBURY (since Earl of LIVERPOOL), on the subject of the Peace of Amiens, which Letters were collected together and published, November 1801, in one volume, under the title of *Facts and Observations relative to the Peace with Bonaparte*. Immediately after, in January 1802, he published those Letters which we here insert, addressed to Mr. ADDINGTON (since Lord SIDMOUTH), together with another edition of the Letters to Lord HAWKESBURY, both in one volume. It is of these writings that MULLER the Swiss historian speaks, when he compares the style of COBBETT to that of DEMOSTHENES. We will not discuss the correctness of such a comparison: but the reader cannot help observing, throughout this part of Mr. COBBETT's works, a comprehension in the view which he takes, a clearness of thought, a vigour in statement, and a conclusiveness in reasoning, which exhibit, all together, what has rarely been equalled by the combination of similar qualities in any other writer. The Letters to Lord HAWKESBURY are somewhat more declamatory in their style, and less abounding in facts, than those to Mr. ADDINGTON; and therefore, in the space we have to spare, we give the latter the preference. Though the Letters to Mr. ADDINGTON are the most full of matter and most strictly to the point, there is, at the same time, no such material difference in manner of writing between the two as would require us to give them both here. Nevertheless, we find one passage in the Letters addressed to Lord HAWKESBURY which we think it right to quote. Mr. COBBETT says (*Letter III.*):—"The motives for my conduct, on this occasion, having been grossly misrepresented, I think it not altogether useless to state them to your Lordship. It has been said, that I acted from *pique* against Mr. ADDINGTON, Mr. PITT, or your Lordship, from one or all of whom I had received *some slight*. But, my Lord, you know that, as far as relates to yourself, this imputation is totally groundless; and I declare to you that it is equally so with respect to Mr. ADDINGTON and Mr. PITT, the former of whom stands the first, after the Princes, on the list of subscribers to my works, and the latter has shown me marks of commendation, of which many a greater and better man than myself would have been proud. I did, indeed, once hear of an expression, made use of by Mr. Pitt respecting me, at which I was deeply wounded; but, after inquiry, I have every reason to believe it to have been a base and wicked misrepresentation, fabricated by a servile wretch, who had the impudence to regard me as his competitor for the favour of the Ministry. In short, my Lord, till this unfortunate peace was made public, I entertained no other sentiment towards your Lordship, Mr. ADDINGTON, or Mr. PITT, than that of *respect*. Some have asserted, that I have shown this marked dislike to the peace, because I was gaining money by the continuance of the war. In every possible view of it, this assertion is false. The war brought me no private good, while it was a very heavy clog on much the most considerable branch of my business; and one of the very first effects produced by that peace, which I so decidedly disapprove of and so loudly condemn, was a saving to me of upwards of *seventy guineas* in insurance; a fact which, while it establishes my disinterestedness, may serve, *en passant*, to convince your Lordship and the

“ public, that my success in life depends neither upon your nor their patronage.”

* * * * “ *You stand alone,*’ say some persons. This is not true to the extent which is meant to be conveyed by the words. I do, indeed, stand almost alone with respect to the demolition of my house; but, had no fear of the mob existed in London and Westminster, that house would have been amongst the vast majority. The *Public Offices* gave an invitation to a general manifestation of joy, and the rabble enforced it. When I began my opposition to French principles and French influence in America, even my countrymen called on me to desist, telling me that I ‘stood alone;’ but I stood long enough to find myself in the majority. I stood long enough to hear *ça ira* exchanged for *God save the King*. I stood long enough to see the people of Philadelphia, who had threatened to murder me because I openly exhibited, at my window, a picture of Lord Howe’s victory over the French; I stood long enough to see these very people make a public celebration of Lord NELSON’s victory of the Nile. Nay, my Lord, I stood long enough to see the time, when I was the only writer in the country, who dared to stand forward in behalf of a body of injured and unfortunate Frenchmen, who finally owed to me, and to me alone, their deliverance from ruin, and perhaps from death.” In addition to this extract, the reader will find further light thrown upon Mr. COBBETT’s “ motives for his conduct,” in his Address to the People of Hampshire on the Court-Martial affair: *Register for June 17, 1809, vol. 15, p. 914*. In this address he incidentally introduces the following:—“ Mr. Windham and Mr. Yorke have been, since my return, and the former was before, *Secretaries at War*; they had the whole history in their office; and yet nobody in the country has ever *spoken*, and, I believe, *thought*, better of me, than Mr. Windham and Mr. Yorke have. I remember, that in dining with Mr. Pitt, at Mr. Windham’s, in August 1800, the former asked me about Lord Edward Fitzgerald. We talked about him a good deal. I gave the company present (of which Mr. Canning was one) an account of his conduct, while at the regiment; I spoke in very high terms of his zeal for the service, and I told Mr. Pitt, that Lord Edward was the only sober and the only *honest* officer I had ever known in the army. I did this for the express purpose of leading him on to talk about the Court-Martial; but, it was avoided. In fact, they all well knew that what I had complained of was true, and that I had been baffled in my attempts to obtain justice, only because I had neither money nor friends. The same is known to those who now are publishing and circulating this false account of that transaction; but, what they have in view, is not truth; it is, in short, to preserve their plunder, which they think is in imminent danger, unless they can destroy my credit with the public.” The occurrence of a dinner-party is again alluded to in Mr. COBBETT’s *Journal*, at the date January 15, in his *Year’s Residence*, where, speaking of a visit which he had paid to his birth-place, Farnham, shortly after his return to England in 1800, he says:—“The question eagerly put to me by every one in Philadelphia is, ‘Don’t you think the city *greatly improved*?’ They seem to me to confound *augmentation* with *improvement*. It always was a fine city, since I first knew it; and it is very greatly augmented. It has, I believe, nearly doubled its extent and number of houses since the year 1799. But, after being, for so long a time, familiar with London, every other place appears little. After living within a few hundreds of yards of Westminster Hall and the Abbey Church and the bridge, and looking from my own windows into St. James’s Park, all other buildings and spots appear mean and insignificant. I went to-day to see the house I formerly occupied. How small! It is always thus: the words *large* and *small* are carried about with us in our minds, and we forget real *dimensions*. The idea, *such as it was received*, remains during our absence from the object. When I returned to England, in 1800, after an absence from the country parts of it of sixteen years, the trees, the hedges, even the parks and woods, seemed so *small*! It made me laugh to hear little gutters, that I could jump over, called *Rivers*! The Thames was but a ‘*Creek*!’ But, when, in about a month after my arrival in London, I went to *Farnham*, the place of my birth, what was my surprise! Every thing was become so pitifully *small*! I had to cross, in my post-chaise, the long and dreary heath of Bagshot. Then, at the end of it, to mount a hill, called Hungry Hill; and from that hill I knew that I should look down into the beautiful and fertile vale of Farnham. My heart fluttered with impatience, mixed with a sort of fear, to see all the scenes of my childhood; for I had learnt before the death of my father and mother.

“ There is a hill, not far from the town, called *Crooksbury Hill*, which rises up out of a flat, in the form of a *cone*, and is planted with Scotch fir-trees. Here I used to take the eggs and young ones of crows and magpies. This hill was a famous object in the neighbourhood. It served as the superlative degree of height. ‘*As high as Crooksbury Hill*’ meant, with us, the utmost degree of height. Therefore, the first object that my eyes sought was this hill. *I could not believe my eyes!* Literally speaking, I, for a moment, thought the famous hill removed, and a little heap put in its stead; for I had seen in New Brunswick a single rock, or hill of solid rock, ten times as big, and four or five times as high! The post-boy, going down hill, and not a bad road, whisked me, in a few minutes, to the Bush Inn, from the garden of which I could see the prodigious *sand-hill* where I had begun my gardening works. What a *nothing!* But now came rushing into my mind, all at once, my pretty little garden, my little blue smock-frock, my little nailed shoes, my pretty pigeons that I used to feed out of my hands, the last kind words and tears of my gentle and tender-hearted and affectionate mother! I hastened back into the room. If I had looked a moment longer I should have dropped. When I came to reflect, *what a change!* What scenes I had gone through! How altered my state! I had dined the day before at the Secretary of State’s, in company with Mr. *Pitt*, and had been waited upon by men in gaudy liveries! I had had nobody to assist me in the world. No teachers of any sort. Nobody to shelter me from the consequences of bad, and no one to counsel me to good, behaviour. I felt proud. The distinctions of rank, birth, and wealth, all became nothing in my eyes; and from that moment (less than a month after my arrival in England) I resolved “never to bend before them.” Besides the conversation respecting Lord EDWARD FITZGERALD, there was another which Mr. COBBETT has been heard to relate, as having taken place at the same dinner-party, and the subject of which he himself introduced, by suggesting to Mr. PITT the propriety of doing something for a man who had been the means of rescuing those dispatches which are mentioned in our Preface (page 8). Mr. COBBETT’s own account was, that on his making this suggestion, “Mr. PITT turned round to Mr. WINDHAM, and inquired if that man had received no reward.” Our readers will now please to look back to Mr. COBBETT’s comment on the phrase of “*wild fellow*,” together with our note appended, at page 12 of our Preface; and we are sure that they will excuse the length of the present note, when they consider the conduct of those anonymous critics, who, while professing to give the public reviews of the works and explanations of the motives of Mr. COBBETT, are so candid to his prejudice as to affect a belief that Mr. COBBETT quarrelled with Mr. PITT because Mr. PITT’s pride would *not* suffer him to dine in Mr. COBBETT’s company! With regard to that “expression, made use of by Mr. PITT,” which Mr. COBBETT mentions in *Letter III.* to Lord HAWKESBURY; we are not able to say precisely what words he there refers to, or by whom they came reported to him. Mrs. COBBETT does, however, recollect, that just about the time when some offensive expression was attributed to Mr. PITT, Mr. JOHN GIFFORD (co-editor of Mr. CANNING in the *Anti-Jacobin Review*) came to Mr. COBBETT’s house in Pall Mall, and there stated that Mr. PITT had said, alluding to Mr. COBBETT, —“*Give him rope enough, and he will hang himself.*” If *pride* had anything to do in the case, it is probable that there was more of that feeling about Mr. COBBETT than about any of his superiors among the politicians of the day. It was a subject of blame (perhaps just blame) with Mr. COBBETT’s intimate acquaintance, that he studied rather to avoid the society of men of high rank and authority.—The sequel of the arguments against the Peace of Amiens will appear at the end of the following series of Letters, where we shall have to make some further remarks on the merits of those opinions which Mr. COBBETT maintained relative to this important question.—ED.

LETTER I.

Pall-Mall, 23rd Dec. 1801.

SIR,—Our sovereign has placed you at the head of the few whose duty it is to administer the government; and, as I am one of the many, whose prosperity, whose happiness, and whose honour, must be materi-

ally affected by the manner in which you perform that duty, I have an unquestionable right to examine into your conduct, and to communicate to my fellow subjects the result of my examination. Were I inclined minutely to investigate all the measures of your administration, I should not want for *variety* of matter; but the preliminary treaty of peace, which you have entered into with France, "like Aaron's serpent, swallows all the rest" of the evils which you have brought, and are bringing down, on the humbled head of your country. That treaty appears to me to have laid the foundation of the ruin of the *colonies*, the *commerce*, the *manufactures*, and the *constitution*, of the kingdom. This being sincerely my opinion, it is my duty to endeavour to convince others of its justness, and thereby to produce such a change of measures, as may yet save us from the destruction with which we are threatened.

Since the hypocritical sect of negro-loving philanthropists arose, it has been the fashion to speak contemptuously of our West-India colonial possessions; but, it is something remarkable, that the very men, who, one hour, have had their mouths full of the cant of humanity, have, the next, been ready enough to make a pompous display of the immense wealth and strength, arising from the possession of those favoured countries, which, for factious or selfish purposes, they denominated "scenes of human woe." You, however, Sir, who must, by this time, have discovered, that the nation will still stand in need of revenue, surely cannot even affect to despise the possession of those countries, from the productive fields of which so considerable a portion of our revenue has heretofore arisen. In speaking to you, therefore, I may venture to lament the loss of one-half of our colonies, and the perilous situation of the other half, without dreading the idiot-like reply which is generally made by the economists and philanthropists of the day.

The danger to our remaining West-India Colonies will arise from several causes, two only of which I at present think it necessary to dwell on; to wit: the additional dominion which France acquires on the coast of South America, and the powerful military force which she will have a sufficient excuse for maintaining in her island of Hispaniola, now commonly called Saint Domingo. Whoever casts his eye over the map of the West Indies, must at once perceive, that these are precisely the two positions which every military man would have chosen, in making his dispositions for the conquest of those territories, which England yet retains in that part of the world.

For more than a hundred years past, it has been the invariable policy of England, to prevent France from acquiring any considerable footing on those shores of South America which are in the vicinity of the West-India Islands, lest, in consequence of such footing, she should become mistress of all the Leeward Islands. For this reason, principally, it was, that French Guiana was considerably narrowed by the Treaty of Utrecht, and that special provision was made for keeping her not only from commanding the Amazons, but from approaching nearer than one hundred and fifty miles distance from that important river. Thus circumscribed within limits, which gave but little scope to enterprise, and holding even what was left her, only, as it were, during good behaviour (which is seldom regarded as a very secure tenure), she seemed to attach hardly any value to the settlements which she had there formed, and which she generally left exposed to the first invader.

But the treaty, the baleful treaty, which you have made with France, has totally changed her situation in that quarter. To the north-west of her former colony, you have given her the Dutch Colony of Surinam, and that of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, situated on the fruitful banks of four rivers of the same names. These colonies contain about 75,000 square miles, and have 300 miles of sea-coast.

That this country, Sir, is, *in fact*, given up to France, the world needs no other proof than the statements of yourself, your colleagues, and the public prints, which are known, and well known, to be under the influence, and even under the guidance of the Ministry. LORD HAWKESBURY, upon being asked by MR. WHITBREAD, "whether Spain and Holland had "been made parties to the preliminary treaty, and whether *they* had actually made the cessions of Trinidada and Ceylon," replied, that, "the "preliminary treaty was made *only with France*, and that *no direct communication was had, upon the subject, either with Spain or Holland.*" Some doubts having been expressed, in the public prints, as to the willingness of Spain and Holland to agree to these cessions, it was, by way of reply, stated in the *True Briton* (the proprietor of which daily receives his directions from the Treasury*), that those nations had not the power to prevent the fulfilment of the treaty. The article, I allude to, concluded with the following words: "*They* [Spain and Holland] *may GRUMBLE, but they MUST SUBMIT.*"

Now, Sir, if you look upon as valid a cession made to us, by France, of one part of the territories of Holland, you certainly will not deny, that that same France has a like power over every other part of the territories of Holland: and, indeed, would it not be an absurdity bordering on idiotism, to suppose that France will not virtually possess every Dutch colony, while her armies are quartered, and while her proconsuls dictate laws, in the mother country?

From the boundary line of Surinam, French Guiana sweeps round first towards the south-east, and then towards the south, comprehending a sea-coast of 330 miles. Here the French territory, in South America, would have ended; but, the treaties of Badajos and of Madrid extend it 150 miles to the southward, even to the bank of the Amazons, of the navigation of which river they give her the absolute command.

Before I proceed, Sir, to observe on the dreadful influence which this new empire must infallibly have on our colonial system, I cannot help making some remarks on the conduct of you and your colleagues, relative to the treaty, by which the last-mentioned part of that empire has been obtained by France.

In discussing the terms of a treaty which professed to *secure the integrity of the territories of our allies*, the effects of every other treaty, containing stipulations relative to those territories, were necessarily taken into consideration. For this reason it was, that Mr. GREY, previous to the discussion of the preliminary treaty, repeatedly inquired of His Majesty's Ministers, *whether the treaty between France and Portugal, signed at Madrid, on the 29th of September 1801, was, or was not, as far as related to cessions of territory, annulled by the preliminary treaty between England and France.* To this question, the Ministry at first

* I think it not wrong, that the proprietor of a newspaper has instructions from the offices of Government; but what a man, so instructed, advances, it is perfectly fair to cite as the language of the Ministry.

declined to give an answer; but, on a future day (still *previous* to the discussion of the preliminary treaty), LORD HAWKESBURY replied, to a repetition of the same question, that, "by the integrity of the territories of Portugal, was meant such territories and possessions as Her Faithful Majesty possessed *subsequent to the treaty of Badajoz*. In her subsequent treaty with France, some change was agreed on in the boundaries between French and Portuguese Guiana; but all cessions, *subsequent to the treaty of Badajoz, were annulled by the preliminaries with England.*" And this answer was, by every one, looked upon as proceeding from an unquestionable source, because his Lordship prefaced it by observing, that the reason why it was not given before, was, that "the officers of Government were not, *till that day*, in possession of "official information." Before, however, the Parliamentary discussion took place, the French official journal (the vehicle, alas! through which Britons are, in future, to learn their destinies!) informed us, that the treaty of the 29th of September had been ratified by BUONAPARTE, "*sans aucun changement*," a circumstance which led Lord TEMPLE to inquire, "*whether this ratification extended to any cessions, made since the treaty of Badajoz*;" to which Lord HAWKESBURY replied, that "he could assure the noble Lord, that the ratification DID NOT EXTEND TO ANY POINTS OF CESSION."

With this assurance, Sir, it was that the Parliament and the nation entered on the discussion of the preliminary treaty: and need I add, that this explicit and solemn assurance has, from the subsequent proceedings of the French Government, received a contradiction no less explicit and solemn? Need I tell you, Sir, that the ratification of this treaty, in all its parts, has been publicly announced to the Legislative Body of France; that the cession which you and your colleagues declared to be *annulled*, has there been represented as still in force, and as ensuring to our enemy a vast accession of riches and of power; need I tell you, Sir, that the very assurances, given by you to the Parliament of Britain, have been treated, by the Ministers of France, with the same sort of contempt which they bestow on the proceedings of the burlesque Legislatures of the Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics? No: I need not. The humiliating, the disgraceful truth, has been proclaimed to the universe; and, if it has not stung you to the soul, I would not exchange feelings with you for a million times all the millions of which you are the Treasurer.

The importance of the question, *whether the treaty of the 29th of September was or was not annulled (as far as related to cessions of territory) by the preliminaries with England*, must be evident to every one. To secure the *integrity* of Portugal was an object of great and general solicitude; and if the preliminary treaty did really effect that object, by annulling the cessions in South America, it acquired a merit which it otherwise did not possess, and thereby weakened the opposition against it. What then, shall be said of the Ministry, who could dare officially to state a circumstance which must so materially affect an approaching discussion, if that circumstance had not the slightest foundation in truth?

* Vide the Speech of the Counsellor of State DEFERMONT, in the treaty of the 29th September 1801, the whole of which speech should be carefully read, because it contains a development of the intentions of France with respect to Portugal. I wish the reader, too, to compare the insolent insinuations, and, indeed, the gross and unfounded calumny, contained in that speech, with the cautious and submissive tone recommended and observed within the walls of St. Stephen's.

Either you had "*official information*" on the subject, or you had not : if you had, Buonaparte has given you a tolerable specimen of that good faith on which you have made our future existence to depend ; if you had not, your conduct merits an assemblage of epithets which I shall leave the insulted nation to apply.

We have lately, indeed, heard from your own mouth that, notwithstanding the statements in the French Legislative Body, the treaty of Madrid, as far as relates to the cession of territory, *is not to go into effect*. From this it would appear that Buonaparte has yielded a little to your supplications. Some despicable creature, famous for low cunning, and for nothing else (I mean some *foreigner*, of course), has, perhaps, whispered in his ear, that to insist on the fulfilment of the treaty of Madrid, after what has passed in the British senate, would rather injure than assist his future projects. He has, perhaps, been told that such unqualified contempt of us *so soon* might yet produce some sense of feeling in the nation, and might augment the number of those who still wish to prevent their country from becoming a province of France. But, Sir, be assured, that his relinquishment is but a matter of expediency, a mere temporary trick. Some of his legions will garrison Fort Macapa, in less than three months after you have made the actual surrender of our numerous conquests.

The possession of the *territory*, however, back as far as the Carapanatuba, is by no means necessary to produce the effects which I so much dread. The extension of territory secured to France by the treaty of Badajos, an extension which you ought never to have suffered, will give her all the advantages of which she stands in need. It gives her the command of the Arowary. The mouth of this river affords excellent anchorage, and is but a few miles distant from that of the Amazons. In fact, the Arowary falls into the mouth of the Amazons ; and it will require, considering the future situation of Portugal, but a very trifling expedition to give France the possession of the little Island of Caviana, which, only tolerably fortified, will be to the Amazons precisely what a cannon is to an embrasure. This was the light in which these territories were viewed by the statesmen who presided in the councils of England in the reign of Queen Anne. They made the French retreat upwards of a hundred miles from the Arowary, never regarding the Brazils as secure while that river remained at her command, and never dreaming of putting up the sword till that security was provided for. But, alas ! the councils of England are changed.

From this long digression, Sir, I return to contemplate the dangers to which, from these newly-acquired possessions of France, our colonial territories will in future be exposed.

These possessions now extend from the Amazons, or at least from the Arowary, to the Essequibo, comprehending a sea-coast of 780 miles, terminated at each extremity by a navigable river, of which she will have the sole dominion.

On one flank the restless and mighty Republic menaces the territories of Spain, on the other the territories of Portugal ; while her front, well provided with harbours, ports, and fortresses, presents to our Leeward Islands an object of never-ceasing alarm. Grenada, Barbadoes, and St. Vincent, can never enjoy an hour's security, after France has once firmly established herself in her new American dominion ; and, as to our island of Trinidad, which we have so dearly and so honestly obtained, a very small detachment, from the mouth of the Essequibo, will, in the space of

a few hours, effectually relieve us from the load of expense and of shame with which the possession of that territory will ever be attended.

The evil which I fear in this quarter will not, indeed, be *immediate*. Those, therefore, who, for the sake of enjoying one or two years of ease and quiet, are willing to submit to a life of misery and disgrace, with the privilege of entailing these "blessings of peace" on their descendants, may treat my apprehensions with indifference. But, Sir, those who have a due regard for their country; those who wish to see her still great and powerful; those who have been proud of the name of Britons, and who wish to hand down to their children, untarnished, that name which untarnished they have received from their fathers; such men would feel no consolation in her *respite*, were it to postpone the day of her humiliation to the distance of ten thousand years. No such respite, as far as relates to the part of the globe I am now speaking of, will, however, be obtained. Her expulsion from the Leeward Islands was decreed on the fatal first of October. On that day her timid and degenerate sons, abandoning all the maxims and all the principles which had theretofore governed her councils, yielded up the keys of her safety, and exposed her weakest part to the ravages of her most powerful and most implacable foe.

On the other side of the Western Archipelago the danger is still greater, and much nearer at hand. France, having got possession of the whole Island of St. Domingo, will naturally be desirous of obtaining that of the Bahama Islands, which, held by us, are a bridle in the mouth of a power which is growing more and more formidable every day. What France here desires, the control which she has over the Floridas and Cuba, will enable her at any time to accomplish. She will stand in need of the Bahamas; and having the power to seize on them, she will find no inducement for forbearance, particularly in favour of a power whose ruin will ever be the object nearest her heart.

There remains, then, nothing but Jamaica for her to invade and destroy; and I sincerely wish that this opulent, this happy, this loyal island, may be the last on the list of her conquest, as it is on that of my enumeration. But this wish is vain. Long has the envious and malignant fiend scowled on this our favourite colony, this precious jewel in the British diadem. She well knows that it is one of the principal sources of our wealth and our power, and she will risk her very existence but she will wrest it from our hands.

Recollect, Sir, that it is *now* in the power of France to convey a powerful army to St. Domingo; nay, you already *too well* know that she is, as the first consequence of the peace, preparing such an armament. Recollect that the whole force which circumstances will allow you to keep up in Jamaica will never amount to much more than one of those legions of which she will have to dispose the moment the negro army is subdued. Recollect that the whole of St. Domingo is now hers; and that Trinidad, when you received it from her hands, was not more completely under her command than Cuba now is. With these facts well fixed in your mind, cast your eye over the map of the West Indies. You will find Jamaica three parts surrounded by St. Domingo and Cuba, from several points of either of which six hours of fair wind will convey an army to any part of its defenceless coast, from Point Morant to Montego-Bay.

But, Sir, I do you wrong to suppose you insensible to the danger. Your *warlike* preparations, like the clapping of a runaway cock, are a sufficient indication of your fear. Those preparations, which have been re-

tarded by that daring and fatal spirit that your pusillanimous peace has revived, will, instead of inspiring confidence, spread distrust and dismay through every part of our islands; and, in that of Jamaica, it will be justly regarded as the signal of approaching destruction. The fleet which but yesterday blockaded that of France in the port of Brest, must now sneak after it at a distance, unseen and unheard, like the impotent wittol, whose jealousy urges him to watch the invader of his honour, but whose cowardice withholds him from preventing the consummation of what he dreads.

Should our fleet, though disheartened by the nature of its employment, prove an efficient protection to Jamaica, *when* can we hope to withdraw it? With its continuance on the station will cease the protection which it yields; and how are we to reconcile that continuance with a state of *peace*? How are we to reconcile it with that "*security for the future*" which your predecessor constantly stated to be the chief object of the war, and which you and your partisans assert to be *completely obtained*? Am I told, that the commencement of this "*security for the future*" must take its date from the signature of the *definitive treaty*? I answer, that I have too high an opinion of your *gratitude* and *fidelity* to your sovereign to believe that you will call home the West-India fleet upon the signing of that treaty. Thus then, Sir, we have already entered on that tantalizing state "of mistrust, uneasiness, expense, and danger, on the one part; and of threats, intrigues, and hostile preparations on the other," which I took the liberty to describe to your noble colleague; and which, I greatly fear, after having broken the spirit and exhausted the patience of the nation, will lead it to seek for repose under the death-like tyranny of France.

To no part of the world can a Briton now turn his eyes without sorrow and shame; nowhere can he look without feeling his heart sink within him at contemplating the lamentable change which a few—a very few—months have, with the aid of you and your colleagues, produced in the aspect and situation of his so-lately great and glorious country. But, in no part of the ocean, of which Britain was truly called the mistress, has that change been so striking, so injurious, and so disgraceful, as in the West-India seas. There we were the uninterrupted lords of the waters and of the soil; not a hostile bark dared to show its canvass to the wind; not a gun was fired without our permission: our flag spoke peace and protection to the oppressed and terror to the oppressor. There foreigners, of whatever nation, gladly owned allegiance to our king, under whose just and gentle sway they found that prosperity and happiness they had never before enjoyed. Wherever we went, in whatever direction, from Mexico to Barbadoes, from Guiana to Bermuda, obedience, respect, and honour, followed our steps. This state of things, this source of wealth and of power, might and should have been preserved till we could have found a compensation for its loss, in the re-establishment of our due portion of weight and authority on the Continent of Europe; but you, Sir, thought otherwise; and, without any such compensation, you have yielded advantages and sacrificed character which your country will never regain. Those who had sought our protection, and had staked their fortunes and their lives on our promises, you have yielded up to the mercy of their remorseless persecutors; the trade and commerce which we had gained you have turned into the channel of our enemy; all the improvements, all the increase of population and of pro-

duce which had arisen under our fostering care, you have gratuitously surrendered to that insolent enemy; that *security*, which had doubled the value of the conquered colonies, is now wanting to our own, even to our oldest and most precious possessions. These will henceforward be every hour in jeopardy; and will, till they shall no longer own the sway of Great Britain, continue to experience that depreciation in value, and that decline in population, which even the suspicion of insecurity never fails to produce.

I am, Sir,

Your most humble and most obedient servant,
WM. COBBETT.

LETTER II.

Pall Mall, 24th Dec., 1801.

SIR,—In my last letter I endeavoured to show that the West-India colonies remaining in our possession, so far from having by your peace obtained “security for the future,” are by that peace placed in a state of continual alarm and danger, which must lead immediately to their decay, and eventually to their ruin; a process which, as I shall now attempt to prove, our *commerce* will also undergo.

That *very great commerce is a very great evil*, I, though perhaps somewhat singular in my opinion, am ready to avow. Mr. Pitt, in his speech of the 7th of June 1799, called the present war “*a war of finance*;” and Sir Wm. Eden (now Lord Auckland), in his letters to Lord Carlisle, published in 1779, observes that “*War is now become a science of MONEY. That side must first quit the field whose Exchequer first fails.*” Since the publication of these sententious sentences, his Lordship has had the mortification to see his country twice quit the field in disgrace before a bankrupt enemy. No, Sir; it is on the *warlike spirit* of a nation that her honour, security, and happiness, must chiefly depend; and this spirit is generally found to exist in an inverse proportion to the magnitude of her purse. When I cast my eye over the calculations of Messrs. Chalmers, Rose, and Pitt; when I perceive them deducing a proof of the increase of our greatness from the increase of our commerce and our wealth; when I see them recurring to the reign of Queen Anne, and stating that then our shipping amounted to only *two hundred thousand tons*, and that now it amounts to *two millions* of tons—that our annual revenue then was not *three millions* of pounds, and that now it is *thirty-six millions* of pounds; tired with the triumphant comparisons of these arithmetical logicians, I turn to view the *conduct and character* of my country at the two epochs. At the former, I find her waging a long and arduous war for the preservation of the liberties of Europe. I find her explicitly declaring and honestly pursuing her object; and having attained that object, having weakened the mighty and strengthened the weak, humbled the ambitious and exalted the humble, I see her retiring from the field, loaded with laurels alone; seeking for compensation neither in spices nor in sugars, but contenting herself with a barren rock, at once the emblem of her disinterestedness and the monument of her glory. If I become more minute in my researches, I trace her through a series of those solid and noble national acts which are the indubitable proofs of opulence at home and consequence abroad: her piety she shows, not in attempts to rob, but in bestowing a *Bounty* on, the pastors of the church;

she expresses her gratitude to her hero, not in air-built *Naval Pillars*, but in a real and princely mansion; with one hand she raises the dome of St. Paul, with the other she demolishes the works of Dunkirk.—Such was England, Sir, in the infancy of her commerce: what she is *now*, let the treaties of Shelburne and Addington tell.

But, Sir, at the present day the question with us is not, *whether very great commerce be a good or an evil*: unhappily, we have no choice. Our wants are created, and they must be satisfied, or we cease to exist as an independent nation. The necessities of the State, during *any* peace that we can preserve with the Republic of France, will require the whole of our present revenue. Nine-tenths of that revenue arise, directly or indirectly, from our commerce. If, therefore, that commerce should now experience a considerable diminution, the measure from which it will arise must necessarily be an object of just condemnation, and must as necessarily be attributed to imbecility, or to some quality more hateful, in the men by whom it was adopted. That such diminution will take place, that it will be the precursor of the total ruin of our commerce, I am thoroughly persuaded; and I now proceed to state the facts and reasons on which this persuasion is founded.

Our commerce, exclusive of that with the East Indies, which will probably continue undiminished, may be considered under three principal heads: I. With the Continent of Europe; II. With the West Indies; III. With the United States of America.

I. *With the Continent of Europe* Buonaparte will, in consequence of the absolute power he possesses over all those States which have hitherto afforded us the greatest commercial advantages, abridge our commerce by every means that the ingenuity of a rival can invent, and that the malice of an enemy can employ. In the Mediterranean we never had much commerce; what we had, however, will be diminished. The port of Leghorn, which now belongs to Buonaparte's king of Etruria, will be open to us only so far as is convenient to France, who may sometimes think it not inconvenient to suffer a large quantity of British property to be deposited there, if our merchants should be found adventurous enough to make such a deposit. Our trade with the Ligurian Republic, with Naples, with the Island of Sardinia, and even with Constantinople, will be abridged or not, as the interests of France may require.

In Spain and Portugal, with whom our commercial relations were of considerable importance, we shall have to support a competition with our enemy, and shall be hampered with partial restrictions. The latter of these kingdoms has already, through our pusillanimity, been compelled to throw open to all the world (that is to say, *to France*) those channels of commerce which, for a century past, have been open to England alone.

With the borders of the Baltic, with Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, our commerce is very unimportant, and may not experience a very great diminution; but with all the ports, through which we traded with Flanders, Holland, and Germany, the diminution will, after a short space of time, be immense. By your recognition, Sir, of the right of France to hold the keys of these countries, to retain the command of the *Rhine*, the *Meuse*, and the *Scheldt*, you have banished for ever from the heart of Europe the commerce and the influence of England. In my letters to Lord Hawkesbury, I stated generally my opinion on this subject, which opinion I find fully corroborated by a writer of great eminence, whose

work I had not then seen, but which made its appearance a few weeks previous to the signing of the preliminaries of peace. I allude, Sir, to the "*Financial and Political Facts of the Eighteenth Century*," by John M'Arthur, Esq., who is a professed eulogist of Mr. Pitt and yourself. His work, agreeably to its title, takes a view of the revenue, the expenditure, the debts, the manufactures, and the commerce of Great Britain, for a century past. In treating of the commerce, he takes occasion to insist upon the necessity of carrying on the war, till France can be induced to recede from her enormous encroachments. He insists; but I shall give you his opinion in his own words:—"Should the French succeed in their attempts to retain their conquests, and to secure to themselves the free navigation of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt," [which Sir, thanks to your treaty, they have now done,]—"they may, on the return of peace, put in execution the vast projects formed by the National Convention in 1792, and which Buonaparte *has obviously in contemplation*. A consideration of the outline of these projects may create some apprehensions in the minds of the generality of my readers; yet it is to be hoped, *for the commercial prosperity of this country*, that the Chief Consul's views, in his present arrangement of indemnities on the banks of the Rhine &c., and thereby attempting to obtain the free navigation of those rivers, *may be completely frustrated before this country makes peace.*"

In order to show the importance of our struggles to prevent the accomplishment of these ambitious projects, on the part of France, the author next points out the probable consequences thereof to other nations, and to Great Britain in particular.

"The French Republic," says he, "by joining, as intended, many of her navigable rivers and canals to the Rhine, the Meuse, and Scheldt, will be enabled to transport, at a cheaper rate than heretofore, the various bulky commodities of foreign growth and manufacture, and convey them to the centre of Germany; also from the Mediterranean Sea to the Bay of Biscay, to the British Channel, and to the North Sea. The consequence *obviously* resulting from such boundaries would be to *exclude the trade and manufactures of Great Britain from the northern parts of Europe*. By joining some of the rivers and canals to the Scheldt, the French would, in time of war, be able to transport without interruption naval stores, ammunition, and provisions of all sorts, from one place to another in the *ci-devant* Belgic provinces, and thence in- to Holland.

"The river Meuse would also open an extended communication with part of Germany and Holland, and facilitate the transport of their various articles of commerce. The river Rhine would most effectually complete the interior communication with the rest of Germany and Holland.

"France, with three hundred navigable rivers and a number of extensive canals, some of them already opening communications between the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean, would, in accomplishing her ambitious plans of securing the navigation of the three great rivers just mentioned, most *essentially militate against the commercial interests of this country*, and contribute to her own aggrandizement, population, wealth, and prosperity.

"The secret articles and additional convention of the treaty of Campo-Formio, develop in a striking manner the ambitious views of the French

“ Republic, with respect to the free navigation of these rivers. His
 “ Imperial Majesty consents to employ his good offices in the negotiation
 “ of the peace of the empire, to obtain, 1. That the navigation of the
 “ Rhine, from Huningen to the territory of Holland, shall be free both
 “ to the French Republic and the States of the empire, on the right bank.
 “ 2. That the possessors of territory near the mouth of the Moselle shall,
 “ on no pretence, attempt to interrupt the free navigation and passage of
 “ ships and other vessels from the Moselle into the Rhine. 3. The French
 “ Republic shall have the free navigation of the Meuse ; and the tolls and
 “ other imposts, from Venloo to Holland, shall be abolished.

“ The treaty of peace, concluded at Luneville on the 9th February,
 “ 1801, having regard to what had been agreed upon by the deputation of
 “ the empire, at the preceding Congress at Rastadt, resolved in conformity
 “ with the precedent of what had taken place in similar circumstances,
 “ to stipulate in the name of the Germanic body. Some of the principal
 “ objects stipulated are the cession of the *ci-devant* Belgic provinces to
 “ the French Republic in the most formal manner. The Comté of Falken-
 “ stein, with its dependencies, the Fricthall, and all belonging to the
 “ House of Austria on the left bank of the Rhine, between Zarzach and
 “ Basle, are to be given up to the French Republic. The Duke of Mo-
 “ dena, as an indemnity for the countries which this Prince had in Italy,
 “ is to have the *Brisgau*. In conformity with the second article of the
 “ treaty of Campo-Formio, the navigation of the Adige, which serves as
 “ the limits between his Majesty the Emperor and King, and the naviga-
 “ tion of the rivers in the Cisalpine Republic, are to be free ; nor is any
 “ toll to be imposed, nor any ship of war kept there.

“ France, by securing the unlimited freedom of navigating the great
 “ rivers already noticed, it is natural to expect that she will make every
 “ effort on the return of peace, to promote an extensive inland commerce,
 “ by means of making canals and rivers navigable. It will give many
 “ years employment to at least 50,000 di-banded soldiers, and render her
 “ ultimately independent, in peace or war, of many bulky commodities,
 “ drawn from the northern states of Europe ; more especially such ar-
 “ ticles as may be required for the construction, repairs, and equipment
 “ of ships in the navy and merchant service. In process of time, it may
 “ be feared that France may eventually, by dint of numbers, *even super-
 “ sede Great Britain in those two grand points, Navy and Commerce ;*
 “ the former of which may justly be considered the palladium of the
 “ country. *There are men who treat this matter lightly, and lull their
 “ apprehensions to rest, by an idea that these things cannot happen in
 “ our times ; but may the sun of Great Britain never set so long as there
 “ shall remain a sun in heaven !*”

Would to God, Sir, that you had participated in the sentiments of this
 writer ! But you are, I am afraid, one of those men, “ who treat this
 matter lightly ;” who lull their apprehensions to rest by a hope, that
 these things “ cannot happen in our times ;” and who, intrenching
 themselves behind these selfish reflections, sacrifice the interest, the
 honour, and the safety of their country to the obtaining of popularity,
 and the preserving of their places.—I resume my quotation :—

“ Should France be suffered to retain the three great rivers before-
 “ mentioned,”—[which she has now retained]—“ as the boundaries of
 “ the Republic, it will give her incalculable advantages ; and in propor-
 “ tion as such an event would diminish our commerce and manufactures

“ *it would give vigour and energy to those of the French.* They would open the most extensive interior navigation with Germany and Holland; they would be able to receive, in a direct manner, the productions and manufactures of Germany, with which they have hitherto been supplied through Holland, Bremen, and Hamburgh. It would open a more extended market for their wines, the growth of Burgundy and Champagne, which would be conveyed at a much cheaper rate by interior water-carriage, instead of being transported, as heretofore, by land-carriage to Rouen and Havre-de-Grace, and thence carried by sea to the Netherlands and Holland; and, what is of far greater consequence, in time of war they would be able to send naval stores, ammunition, and provisions, to the cities and fortified places situated on these rivers, and carry on an extensive commerce from the sea-ports in the south and north, without the protection of armed vessels.

“ Should Buonaparte be successful in accomplishing the avowed designs of all the rulers of France since the revolution” [which designs he *has now accomplished*], “ *it would not only militate against the trade of this country to Germany, but also materially affect the interests of the northern powers, from whom France formerly purchased timber for her navy; also iron, flax, hemp, &c. since it is obvious, that were France to have the exclusive and free navigation of the Rhine, the Meuse, and Scheld, and joining to them by art many rivers and canals, she could, in any future war, receive at the several ports in the kingdom, timber of all kinds, from the immense forests in Alsace, Lorraine, and Burgundy; also flax and hemp, the growth of the different countries situated on the borders of the Rhine, and of the several rivers which are united to it. The mines of iron, copper, and lead, of Luxemburgh and Limburgh, and the iron mines and coal-pits in the provinces of Namur, Liege, and other places; the leather manufactories in the principalities of Stavelo and Malmédy; and the manufactories of linen and woollen cloths, dispersed in the countries annexed to France, in the vicinity of these rivers, would all tend to increase the wealth and power of that nation to the prejudice of the other states of Europe. In short, France would acquire such a gigantic preponderance in the scale of nations, that she might, on a future day, become more formidable to the liberties of all Europe than she was when in the zenith of her glory and prosperity, in the reign of Louis XIV., or than tyrannical Rome in her best times. Indeed the strength of France would become too great for any power to resist.*”

“ Can Great Britain, then, seeing that her power depends upon the prosperity of her commerce, view with indifference these momentous and colossal attempts of France towards monopoly and universal tyranny? Shall she succeed in her designs of extending her territories and line of coast; at the same time annexing, either by direct or indirect means (and which, if permitted, she will do), all the ports on the Continent, from Dunkirk to Hamburgh, together with the enjoyment of the exclusive navigation of the three great rivers before-mentioned? If it be not insisted upon that France relinquish her former pretensions, and consent to some alienation of these countries, which, according to the laws of her own making, were, and are intended to constitute the territory of the Republic, so as to cut up by the roots the vast objects and designs constantly avowed by her successive revolutionary rulers, *there can be little security in peace either for the com-*

“*merce of Great Britain*, or for the tranquillity of the Continental Powers, whose proximity to the extensive boundaries of the Republic, will at all times particularly expose them to the danger of further encroachments. Neither can there be much confidence placed in her preserving, for any length of time, the relations of peace and amity. However painful and burdensome the alternative may be, namely, a vigorous continuance of the war; yet surely the evil will be compensated, if, by our energy and exertion, we ultimately defeat the developed views of France, and thereby retain that weight in the scale of Europe, and influence among nations, which, by the spirit and industry of ourselves and our forefathers, we have, at the close of the eighteenth century, so justly acquired.”

We have *not* defeated the developed views of France, nor any one of those views; and we *shall not* retain that weight in the scale of Europe, which was the best legacy of our forefathers. Every encroachment, here represented as big with danger to the commerce and the consequence of Britain, you, in the name of your infatuated country, have sanctioned by the treaty of Downing-street; and every evil here predicted will most assuredly ensue.

The copious extracts, which I have made from Mr. Arthur, leave me but little to add upon this part of the subject of my letter. It may not, however, be amiss, Sir, to state some few of the facts which have already transpired in confirmation of that gentleman's predictions. From the French papers we learn, that measures are actually taking for turning to account the possession of the *Rhine*, the *Meuse*, and the *Scheldt*. To prevent the free navigation of the latter river was, it must be remembered, at one time, the only ostensible object of the war. It was *then* truly said, that this river was well calculated to be the rival of the Thames; and such is now the confidence of its becoming so, that houses in Antwerp have risen to double their former value, since the signature of the preliminaries of peace. Where the *capital* is to be found to awaken, from its long sleep, the commerce of that city, and to render it once more the emporium of Germany, is a question to which you may easily find an answer on the *Royal Exchange of London*.

Precisely *when*, and *to what extent*, the diminution of our commerce with Flanders, Holland, and Germany will take place, it is at present impossible to say; but that a diminution will take place, at no very distant period, and to a considerable amount, and that the evil will go on regularly increasing, I think no man possessed of common sense, and a common regard to truth, will hesitate to allow.

II. *With the West Indies*, Sir, the commerce of Britain will experience, first an immense loss, and afterwards a regular decline, till the arrival of that fatal hour, when she shall there no longer possess a single inch of territory; which hour is, perhaps, less distant than our infatuation will suffer us to perceive.

In speaking of our commerce with Colonies, I must necessarily enter into details with respect to *population* and *produce*, for these are the source of *exports*, and furnish the means of purchasing *imports*, and these are the materials and the criterion of commerce. I must, too, consider this commerce relatively with that of France, with that of our rival, the sworn foe of our prosperity and our existence. Without taking this view of the subject, to enter on it at all would be totally useless: for, the question is, not how much commerce and power we do, or shall possess,

but how much France possesses, or will possess, more or less than we. Not to render still more complex, a discussion, which must of necessity embrace objects so numerous, I shall here avoid supposing, that the commerce of the West-Indies will, for some years at least, be molested by military or naval operations, notwithstanding twenty-five sail of the line and twenty-five thousand men have sailed for St. Domingo, from the port of Brest, and notwithstanding you are *attempting* to send out a British fleet to follow them *à la guette*.

With a view to disengage this important subject from the entanglement in which it has been involved by the officious ignorance of the defenders of the peace, I shall endeavour to give a clear statement of the West India commerce of Great Britain and France:—1st. Previous to the breaking out of the French revolution; 2nd, at the close of the war; and, 3rd, I shall give my opinion of what will be the state of it three years hence; for, I am not one of those, who are content to limit the duration of their national existence to less than six-and-thirty months.

A writer, Sir, who has at once *disguised* and *exposed* himself under the name of PHILANGLUS, has filled several entire pages of the Porcupine newspaper with figures, ranged in solid columns. These materials have been collected, undoubtedly, from official sources; and, as far as they relate to the commerce of Great Britain, I feel the less inclination to criticise them, because their only tendency, like that of the statements of LORD HAWKESBURY, is to furnish a proof of what I acknowledge to be true, and of what is, indeed, notorious to all the world; to wit: *that the commerce of this country has been doubled during the war*. I should not have noticed this writer, whom, from his style, and his notions of commerce and politics, I take to be some pedagogue out of place, were it not confidently asserted, that *you*, Sir, have declared *his* defence of the peace to be *the best that has appeared*.

That the commerce of Great Britain had regularly increased from the beginning to the end of the *War* is certain; but this would be a strange argument to use in defence of the *Peace*, were it not, at the same time, endeavoured to be maintained, *that the Peace would not, upon the whole, produce a diminution in that commerce*. Here I and your defenders are at issue. With respect to one of the four principal heads, under which I have divided our commerce, I have already stated that this diminution must be immense, a statement which I have backed with the opinion of a writer of great eminence on the subject of commerce and finance: I now proceed to prove, that a like diminution will take place in our commerce with the West Indies.

To reduce our resources even to *what they were before the war* would be certain ruin. Our *permanent necessities have doubled*; instead of three hundred millions, our debt is now six hundred millions. To attempt to support this debt upon our former resources, would be like feeding a grenadier upon pap. With great kindness and care, the poor fellow might eke out a miserable existence, as long as he was suffered to lounge about his barracks: but his nerves would hardly be strong enough to support the fatigues of a field-day, much less to encounter the toils, the hardships, and the dangers of war.

Before the beginning of the late contest, the French commerce was, in the West Indies, much superior to that of Great Britain, as will appear from the following table, on the statements of which I must here make some remarks.

TABLE, No. I.—[Referred to in page 227.]

STATE OF THE WEST-INDIA COMMERCE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE previous to the commencement of the War; being an Account of the Population of the several Colonies, the Vessels cleared outwards therefrom in one Year, and of the Kind and Value of their Cargoes.

COLONIES.	Population.			Navigation.			Sugar.	Molasses.	Rum.	Coffee.	Cotton.	Miscellaneous Articles, in Value.*	Value.
	Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.							
British.	Antigua	30,398	233	2,048	31,867,136	5,910	716,546	—	—	—	160,510	£ Sterling.	£ Sterling.
	Barbadoes	78,282	243	1,942	15,329,792	13,489	415,489	—	—	—	2,705,975	52,167	592,596
	Bahamas & Bermudast	14,622	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	46,324	539,605
	St. Christopher's	22,335	200	1,590	26,379,136	8,154	334,609	—	—	—	484,640	39,495	510,014
	Dominica	26,103	162	1,814	7,985,824	16,803	63,392	2,032,648	—	—	970,816	51,912	302,987
	Grenada	24,926	188	2,014	19,661,376	4,300	670,390	977,244	—	—	2,062,427	69,545	614,908
	Jamaica	280,000	674	1,344	90,109,376	6,416	2,543,025	716,240	—	—	1,906,467	247,286	2,136,442
	Montserrat and Nevis	20,720	122	10,787	12,347,536	1,313	289,076	—	—	—	92,472	1,755	214,141
	St. Vincent's	13,303	122	12,636	6,295,296	9,656	88,278	71,008	—	—	761,880	2,691	186,450
	Virgin Isles	10,200	40	436	8,870,736	2,011	21,417	—	—	—	289,077	2,440	166,959
Total	520,889	1,984	297,252	218,845,208	68,052	5,132,222	3,797,140	—	—	9,334,024	513,615	5,182,912	
French.	St. Domingo	578,623	1,640	318,015	193,485,336	1,986,139	—	—	—	—	7,384,620	8,486	7,328,801
	Guadaloupe	170,955	398	5,180	61,301,314	626,348	—	—	—	—	88,526	1,389	1,456,484
	St. Lucia	32,219	192	1,941	11,061,319	143,034	—	—	—	—	300,846	976	383,516
	Martinico	146,444	333	38,369	52,144,018	239,163	—	—	—	—	441,062	2,965	1,184,022
	Tobago	29,325	142	10,716	9,801,142	168,144	—	—	—	—	323,518	640	276,503
	French Guiana & the Isle of Cayenne†. . .	6,213	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	963,779	2,705	450,936	327,793,129	3,162,828	—	79,171,194	—	—	8,237,735	14,476	10,631,326	

* The Miscellaneous Articles consist of Tafia, Pimento, Ginger, Tobacco, Indigo, Cocoa, Hides, Fustic, Logwood, and some other articles of trifling import. Sugar, Molasses, Rum, Coffee, and Cotton are, and must ever remain, the principal objects of West India commerce. The amount of the Miscellaneous Articles being, however, given in this Table, together with an account of the Population and Shipping, will render the whole sufficiently minute for every useful purpose connected with the present subject.

† These Islands produce no exports worth mentioning. They are, however, of great importance as naval stations in time of war; and, as the possession of them is greatly conducive to the prosperity of the commerce with our other Colonies, it is fair to include them here, as far as relates to population.

* This Colony, like our Bahamas and Bermudas, produced but little more than provisions for the settlers.

I have contented myself in the preceding table with stating the *exports* from the several colonies, because they are quite sufficient as a criterion of commerce, the imports and all other advantages ever bearing a proportion thereto. As far as relates to the old British colonies I have admitted the statements of Bryan Edwards; but, with regard to those of France, I have had recourse to better authority. The statements respecting the population, shipping, and exports, of these islands, are founded on those of Moreau de St. Mery, and of Monsieur J. M. de la Borde, both of whom were French colonists, one an inhabitant of Martinico, and the other of St. Domingo.

The only statement, Sir, in this table, which will, I imagine, give rise to any doubt or contradiction, is that which relates to St. Domingo. Edwards has stated its population at 535,260, and its exported produce at 5,500,000 sterling, while my statement makes a considerable addition to both. But, not to speak of the superior information of the writers from whom I draw my facts, the misstatements of Edwards have, in the face of the British nation, long ago been exposed by Mons. de Charmilly, who has clearly proved the "*Historical Survey of the French Colony of St. Domingo*," to which Philanglus appeals as to "*high authority*," to be a tissue of misrepresentation, falsehood, and calumny. Mons. Charmilly divulged too many disagreeable truths to be listened to, at that time; but, I beseech you, Sir, to read his book, and you will, I am sure, agree with me, that the work of Edwards, instead of being quoted as indubitable authority, ought to be consigned to everlasting oblivion.

By means, which, in any times but the present, would have been the subject of parliamentary *inquiry*, at least; by means and by men, bearing a strong resemblance to those that lost us America, we lost St. Domingo, a colony worth more than all the other colonies we ever possessed. But, still the valour of our fleets and our army obtained us much that we preserved, till you and your colleagues once more reduced us to our former scanty limits. The state of our West-India commerce, at the close of the war, is exhibited in the annexed table. An increase had, indeed, been supposed to take place in the produce of our own colonies, as well as in those taken from the French; but, it is well known, that our old colonies do not admit of much increase, and it is more than probable, that all the increase, which was felt, arose more from the indirect trade with St. Domingo than from any other cause. For this reason, I have chosen to carry the same amounts through all my statements, except in that which relates to the French population of St. Domingo, which will receive a considerable addition (of which I shall speak more particularly hereafter) from the acquisition of the Spanish part of that immense island.

My statements, Sir, relative to the colony of Surinam, and that of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo,* are founded on authority, on which you may place implicit reliance. The statement respecting Surinam has been furnished me by a gentleman, who has long lived in that country, where he is a planter and proprietor. That which relates to the colony of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, was, if I am not misinformed, some few weeks ago, submitted to Lord Hawkesbury by a committee of West-

* These are the names of three rivers, at no very great distance from each other, in what was called Dutch Guiana, on the north-east shore of South America.

India merchants and planters. I am persuaded that the correctness of neither will be called in question. [See Table, p. 231.]

Such, Sir, was the spectacle which our West-India commerce presented at the moment when you and your colleagues chose to put an end to the war, and, as the price of peace, to yield all the advantages we had gained; when you chose to take the superiority from our scale and place it in that of France, and thereby destroy for ever that source of riches and power which the valour of our fleets and armies, under the favour of Providence, had deposited in our hands, as a balance against the European acquisitions of our enemy.

It now remains for us to see what will be the state of this commerce *in three years hence*, what will be the change which your administration will have produced, and what will be the consequences of that change. The immediate loss to us, and the immediate gain to our enemy, will be immense; but the subsequent relative change must produce the utter ruin of our West-India commerce. We shall at once become a little power, and finally a power totally insignificant, in that part of the world, where, at the epoch of your unexpected and ominous elevation, we were the greatest, and indeed the only power; where every sail bowed obedience to our triumphant flag; where the commands of our Sovereign were the universal law; where the earth teemed and the waters rolled for Britain, and for Britain alone.

[See Table No. III., page 232.]

TABLE, No. II.—[Referred to in page 230.]

STATE OF THE WEST-INDIA COMMERCE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, at the Close of the War.

COLONIES.	Popula- tion.	Navigation.			Sugar. lbs.	Molasses. Gallons.	Rum. Gallons.	Coffee. lbs.	Cotton. lbs.	Miscellaneous Articles, In value. £ Sterling.	Value. £ Sterling.
		Ships.	Tons.	Men.							
British.	520 889	1,984	297,252	23,061	218,845,208	68,052	6,132,222	3,797,140	9,334,024	513,615	5,182,912
	146,444	333	38,369	2,903	52,144,018	239,163	—	7,555,812	323,518	2,965	1,184,022
	32,219	192	18,536	1,941	11,061,319	143,034	—	300,846	441,062	976	383,516
	29,325	142	10,716	953	9,801,142	168,144	—	—	—	640	276,503
	105,877	309	35,133	2,796	26,862,964	268,695	—	16,003,424	5,013,436	93,121	1,386,355
	121,996	333	49,888	3,368	18,839,286	—	287,750	15,966,562	10,841,100	—	2,054,148
Total ..	956,750	3,293	449,894	35,022	337,553,937	887,088	6,419,972	43,623,784	25,953,140	611,317	10,467,456
French.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	500,000
	170,955	398	65,300	5,180	61,301,314	626,348	—	160,348	88,526	1,389	1,456,484
	6,213	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total ..	177,168	398	65,300	5,180	61,301,314	626,348	—	160,348	88,526	1,389	1,956,484

* The disproportion which appears between the Navigation and the Exports of the French Islands, when compared with that of the British Islands, arises from the *double voyages* having been included in the statements relative to the former, and not in those relative to the latter.

† By circuitous routes, France still received something from this Island; I have therefore given her the advantages attendant on a produce of half a million sterling. It is well known, that Great Britain also still derived great commercial advantages from this Island, which are not reckoned upon in the above statements.

‡ This Island, owing to many causes, has greatly declined in every respect; but I chose, in this view of the subject, to give France the full amount of all the advantages she could possibly enjoy.

TABLE, No. III.—[Referred to in page 233.]
 STATE OF THE WEST-INDIA COMMERCE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, Three Years after the Close of 1801.

COLONIES.	Population.	Navigation.			Sugar. lbs.	Molasses. Gallons.	Rum. Gallons.	Coffee. lbs.	Cotton. lbs.	Miscellaneous Articles in value. £ Sterling.	Value. £ Sterling.
		Ships.	Tons.	Men.							
British Colonies	520,889	1984	297,252	23,061	218,845,208	68,052	5,132,222	3,797,140	9,334,024	513,615	5,182,912
French Colonies before the War*	1,088,779	2,705	450,936	37,747	327,593,129	3,162,828	—	79,171,194	8,237,735	14,476	10,631,326
Surinam	105,877	309	35,133	2,796	26,862,064	268,695	—	16,003,424	5,013,436	93,121	1,386,355
Berbice, Demerara, & Essequibot	121,996	333	49,888	3,368	18,839,286	—	287,750	15,966,562	10,841,100	—	2,054,148
Total	1,316,652	3,347	535,957	43,911	373,494,479	3,431,523	287,750	111,141,180	24,092,271	107,597	14,071,829

* 125,000 are here added to the population of St. Domingo on account of the acquisition of the Spanish part of the island.

† In this, as well as in the preceding table, I might have included Curaçoa, St. Eustatia, and some settlements of less importance; but, not having the necessary authentic information at hand, I have chosen to omit them, rather than risk any inaccuracy in my statements. Besides, considered in the grand scale of commerce and dominion, they are of very little consequence.

A summary of these statements will simplify the comparison:—

		Population	Tons of Shipping.	Seamen.	Value of Exports. £ sterling.
Before the War.	{ Great Britain	520,889	297,252	23,061	5,182,912
	{ France	963,779	450,936	37,747	10,631,326
Before the Peace.	{ Great Britain	956,750	449,894	35,022	10,467,456
	{ France	177,168	65,300	5,180	1,956,484
Three Years hence.	{ Great Britain	520,889	297,252	23,061	5,182,912
	{ France	1,316,642	535,957	43,911	14,071,829

Thus, Sir, previous to the peace our West-India colonies had a population of more than nine hundred thousand souls, a produce of nearly ten millions and a half, and employed nearly half a million tons of shipping, with more than thirty-five thousand seamen; while the population of the French colonies was reduced to less than two hundred thousand souls, her produce to less than two millions, her shipping to sixty thousand tons, and her seamen to the number of five thousand. In three years' time the West-India commerce of Britain, supposing her to retain in full prosperity all the colonies you have left her, will be reduced to a population of five hundred thousand souls, its produce to five millions, its shipping to less than three hundred thousand tons, and its seamen to twenty-three thousand in number; while the commerce of the enemy will be fed by a population of nearly a million and a half of souls, by a produce of fourteen millions of money, employing upwards of fifty thousand tons of shipping, navigated by more than forty thousand seamen! This contrast must pierce the heart of any man not accustomed to anticipate with indifference the decline and disgrace of his country; and if I thought you could contemplate it without shame and remorse, I should think my time ill-bestowed in presenting it to your view.

Now, Sir, as to the *correctness of my statements*, those which relate to the *past* will admit of little contradiction or doubt. Those which relate to the *future* may be objected to on three grounds: 1. *It will probably be urged that the colonies of Surinam, and that of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, are not surrendered to the FRENCH, but to the DUTCH*; 2. *That the future population of St. Domingo is overrated, and that the colony will not so soon as three years, if it ever does, return to its former flourishing and productive state*; 3. *That the old British colonies may increase in population and produce, which will consequently occasion an increase of our commerce with them.*

1. It is not the *nominal* possession of territory, of any kind, and particularly of colonies, that is *advantageous* to the possessor. Such possession may sometimes add to the honours of a Sovereign or State, but never to their riches or their power. Our King was, till very lately, styled *King of France*, and the title of *King of the Indies* is still used by the feeble and abject Sovereign of Spain. Nor is it of any consequence of what nation the *inhabitants* of a colony consist. Those of the Island of St. Thomas are almost entirely English and Scotch; divine service is performed according to the rites and ceremonies of the Churches of England and Scotland, and in the English language; yet the colony belongs *bond fide* to Denmark, which derives therefrom all the advantages that it yields. The government of the colonies I am now speaking of may indeed be

for some time at least, administered in the *name* of the Batavian Republic; but can any man of common sense and common candour, after viewing the state of vassalage in which that Republic had been left by us, affect to believe that the commerce of all its colonies will not be rendered, either directly or indirectly, subservient to the advantage of France? Holland has not one single characteristic of an *independent* nation. French generals command in all her districts; her towns and fortresses are garrisoned by French armies; French pro-consuls dictate the measures of her Cabinet; France makes war and makes peace for her, answers for her conduct, stipulates for cessions in her favour, and alienates her territory. Can such a State be called independent? Can such a State be said to be the *sovereign* of any thing? You, Sir, ought to be the last of all mankind to attribute to her such quality; you who have actively consented to, you who have sanctioned and ratified her subjection, by receiving a portion of her dominions from the hands of her conqueror, without even the formality of her consent.

Without the *real*, though perhaps not the nominal, possession of the colony of Surinam and of that of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, France would derive little benefit from those possessions in South America which she has been so anxious to extend. The mouth of the river Surinam is the best naval station on the coast, and, as a cruising station, one of the best in the world. Unpossessed of the river Essequibo, she would hold but a slackened rein over the Spanish territory, which is another great object in the long catalogue of her meditated conquests. Add to these considerations the desire which she must ever have to prevent Holland from again becoming opulent and powerful, and the still stronger desire of acquiring opulence and naval power herself, and who can be idiot enough to believe that she will leave the immense commerce of these colonies really in the possession of that conquered and subjected state? Say, however, that this commerce shall still be carried on by the rightful owner, that none but Dutch ships shall trade to the ports of these colonies, and that Holland alone shall receive their exports; still France will be the real and only possessor of all the benefits therefrom derived; for while the fleets and the treasury of Holland are at her command and at her absolute disposal, it matters very little whether the fleets be stationed in the Texel or at Brest, or whether the treasure be collected at Amsterdam or at Bourdeaux; it matters very little to whom you *affect* to have surrendered her colonies, they are in fact surrendered to France, who now boldly and truly places them on the list of those commercial acquisitions which are to eclipse and extinguish the commerce of Great Britain.

2. It may be objected to my statements, *that the future population of St. Domingo is overrated, and that it will not so soon as three years hence, if it ever does, return to its former flourishing and productive state.*

The *population* of the French part of St. Domingo has been greatly underrated by Bryan Edwards, who estimated the white inhabitants at 33,000, at a time when he might easily have been informed that the *white militia* alone actually consisted of 16,000 men, a circumstance that will fully satisfy any one capable of the least reflection that the whole white population could not possibly have been less than from fifty to sixty thousand souls. To the French population before the war (and I shall hereafter prove that it will, in three years hence, supposing peace to

continue, have experienced no diminution) I have added the present population of the Spanish part of the Island, which your "best defender," Philanglus, states, upon the authority of Edwards, at 20,000, and which I, upon the authority of Moreau de St. Mery, state at 125,000, of which only 15,000 are slaves; and which population is distributed thus:—

In the district of Azua	500
_____ Bani	1,800
_____ Moulins à Eau	2,500
_____ Jayna	2,000
_____ Santo Domingo	20,000
_____ Mont-de-Plate	600
_____ Bayaguana	1,000
_____ Seybo	4,000
_____ Higuey	500
_____ Samana	}	500
_____ Savane-la-Mer					
_____ Monte Christ	3,000
_____ Cotuy	8,000
_____ La Vega	8,000
_____ St. Yago	27,600
_____ Hinché	12,000
_____ Banique	7,000
_____ St. Jean de la Maguana	5,000
_____ Des Plaines	21,000
					<hr/> 125,000 <hr/>

This statement of Moreau was made from the actual census, furnished him by the Spanish Governor. The parts of a hundred were dropped in order to avoid encumbering the sentences, or the total would, probably, have amounted to a thousand or two more. By casting your eye on the population of the *City of Santo Domingo* and its district, you will perceive whence has arisen the error of Bryan Edwards, and the consequent error of his humble imitator. They have mistaken the population of the *capital* for the population of the *whole colony*! And these are "high authorities;" these are writers, on whom a British Minister has the weakness to rely for a defence of his measures!

Nor will the other objection, that *St. Domingo will not, so soon as three years, recover its former flourishing and productive state*, require any thing to remove it but a simple statement of facts.

Since incapacity, or something worse, lost us the possession of this Island, and particularly since your disgraceful Peace has restored it to the hands of our enemy, it has been much in vogue, to speak contemptuously of its value; to represent it as a colony, which was, indeed, *once* of some importance, but which is now in such a state of devastation as to leave the owner no hope of deriving any advantage from it, for many years, at least, I can remember, Sir, when different sentiments were entertained, and when a different language was held. I can remember when, soon after our landing on the Island, Lord Hawkesbury (now Lord Liverpool) congratulated the House of Peers on the capture of a Colony, capable of yielding an export produce of *ten millions* annually; and this congratulation took place after the far greater part of the ravages had been committed. But *now* behold! this colony of unexampled, and

almost incredible resources, though it has been ever since on the return to peace and prosperity, is become "*the RUINED and RAVAGED St. Domingo;*" a mere waste, a heap of rubbish, where a banditti of negroes are wandering about amongst the graves of their masters. But, not to leave any room for cavil on this score, I beg leave to quote the very words of your *defender* Philanglus:—"The French colony, thus, appears to "have contained, eleven years ago, above 530,000 inhabitants. It was, "however, computed, in the year 1793, that the class of negroes alone "had sustained a diminution of more than 100,000. Mr. Edwards "says, that since that time the mortality has been still more rapid; and, "including the loss of whites by sickness *and emigration*, he reduces the "population of St. Domingo, in June 1796, to two-fifths of the whole "number of inhabitants (white and black) which it possessed in the be- "ginning of 1791. According to this calculation, *upwards of 300,000* "human beings have miserably perished in this devoted country within the "short period of six years. Of the cultivation and commerce of the "Island, we may form an adequate idea from the same authority; from "which it appears, that the average exports from the French part of St. "Domingo previously to the Revolution, were rather more than "5,000,000*l.* In 1791, they were upwards of 5,500,000*l.* In 1800 " (according to an official report of the Minister of the Interior, made in "1801),

"The Imports into France from all the French colonies in the East and West Indies, were	<i>livres</i> 1,433,800 or <i>sterling</i> £61,825.
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"The Exports from France to all the French colonies in the East and West Indies were	282,300 or £11,762.
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"In 1788, St. Domingo imported French goods to the amount of more than 3,500,000*l.* in five hundred and eighty vessels belonging to France, carrying 189,679 tons, exclusive of ninety eight vessels engaged in the African trade. In 1800, I believe (though I will not state this as a positive fact), *not a single French vessel cleared out from France for this Island.*"

Now, Sir, the inference, evidently intended to be drawn from this statement, is, that the whites and others who have *emigrated*, are dead, or, at least, are lost for ever to St. Domingo; that *three hundred thousand*, out of *five hundred thousand* blacks and mulattoes, have really died, or have been killed; and that the exports from the colony, in the year 1800, amounted to *only a certain portion of 61,825*l.**; and that, *not a single ship did, in that year, clear out for the colony!*

I will not charge Philanglus with *wilful falsehood*, nor with *wilful misrepresentation*, for, from the simplicity of his manner, it is evident, that his misrepresentation proceeds from that ignorance, in which he, probably, participates with those, who ought to have been better informed, before they adopted a measure, so desperate as to accept of a *defender* in him. But, Sir, this circumstance does not render an exposure of his misrepresentation less necessary; for, we have lately learned by experience, that neither the improbability, nor the falsehood, of a statement, operates to its discredit.

The devastation and the carnage, in St. Domingo, have been great; but have they been such as to warrant a belief, that 300,000 men have been actually killed by 200,000 survivors? There is, on the face of this statement, something too wonderful to obtain credit from any one, who has advanced beyond the history of Jack the Giant-killer. Philanglus does, indeed, drop a word about *emigration*; but he confines it to

the *whites*, and makes no deduction, on that account, from the number of his *slain*. If Philanglus had been where I was, in the year 1793, he might have seen *ten thousand* blacks, whites, and mullattoes, land, *in one day*, and at one port, from vessels coming from St. Domingo. Had he understood the subject, on which he was writing, he would have known, that the emigration began in the year 1790, and that it continued till Great Britain and America entered into a treaty with Toussaint, in the year 1798; he would have known, that 80,000 of the inhabitants of the French colony emigrated to the United States, that the slaves were there hired out by their masters, that the whole population there increased rather than decreased in number; and that both masters and slaves have, since the autumn of 1798, been gradually returning to the colony. He would have known, that there was a very considerable emigration of all colours to old France; that great numbers went to New Orleans, to the Floridas, to Cuba, to Porto-Rico, to St. Thomas, and elsewhere: so that Philanglus may rest assured, that a very great portion of "*the 300,000 human beings who have miserably perished in that devoted country,*" are yet alive and merry; and, I dare say, I shall receive his unfeigned thanks for having thus wiped the tears from his philanthropic cheeks.

Some writers deal in slaughter, as a popular species of the sublime, and as an infallible cure for the obstinate drowsiness of their readers. Whether this innocent motive produced the statement of Philanglus is more than I can say, but that statement is certainly a most glaring exaggeration.—Mons. Jean M. de la Borde, who wrote in 1798, computed the mortality, occasioned by the Revolution, in the French colony of St. Domingo, at *fifty thousand souls*, and the eventual loss of negroes, supposing the colony soon to return under the government of France, at *eighty-five thousand*; and these numbers were, by all the St. Domingo planters, whose opinions I had an opportunity of knowing (and they were not a few), thought to be much too high. There have not been many destructive battles in St. Domingo. Assassinations, murders, and most horrid acts of cruelty, have, indeed, been abundant; but, 300,000 men are not, in this way, so soon and so easily destroyed. The fact is, that the far greater half of the depopulation proceeded from emigration to friendly or neutral countries, and the persons so emigrating are now, and have long been, returning. Like birds that the gun of the fowler has scared from their food, they have been scattered in every direction; but your friendly hand having removed the cause of their fear, they are now flocking back to their haunt, where, when they are all assembled, they will scarcely perceive the diminution in their numbers.

But, false as is the statement of Philanglus, with regard to the depopulation of this colony, his statement respecting *the diminution in its resources* is still more so. "Of the cultivation and commerce of the island," says he, "we may form an *adequate* idea" from these facts, to wit, "that, in the year 1791, the exports were in amount upwards of 5,500,000*l.*, and that, in the year 1800, the imports of France, from all the French colonies, were only 61,825*l.*, and further, that, in the same year, not a single French vessel cleared out from France for that island."

To tell a lie in the words of truth is an art ascribed to the Society of Jesus, and were I disposed to join in the base calumnies heaped on that Society, I should not scruple to rank Philanglus amongst the most finished of its pupils. He tells us that, from the facts, which he has stated, "we

“ may form an *adequate* idea of the *cultivation and commerce* of this “ island,” which “ *adequate* idea” evidently is, *that the colony did not, in 1800, export produce to the amount of 60,000l., and that not a single ship did, during that year, clear out for the colony.* This is the “ *adequate idea,*” which the deceived and insulted British public are taught to form of the cultivation and commerce of the French colony of St. Domingo; and this is the writer, whom, report says, you and your colleagues regarded as *the best defender of the peace!*

Now, Sir, I beg you to listen to a few *truths*, and if you do not turn with scorn from Philanglus and his defence, you must have much less sense as well as less candour than I sincerely believe you to possess. During the year 1800, during that year in which Philanglus would persuade you, *that the exports of St. Domingo did not amount to 60,000l., and that not a ship cleared out for the colony;* during that very year, it appears, from the Custom-house returns of the United States, that 642 vessels were entered inwards, and 428 were cleared outwards, for the “ *ruined and ravaged St. Domingo!*” It also appears from those returns, that, during the same year, foreign produce, much of which came from St. Domingo, to the amount of 39 millions of dollars (upwards of eight millions sterling), was brought into the United States for re-exportation. Besides this, the Danes, the Swedes, and the Hamburgers, carried on a considerable trade with the “ *ruined and ravaged*” colony; nor was even Britain without her share; and, Sir, no trifling portion of those West-India imports and exports, boasted of in the House of Commons, on the memorable third of November last, ought to have been attributed to the “ *ruined and ravaged St. Domingo.*”

Of these facts I was in possession at the time when Philanglus began to *figure away* in the columns of the Porcupine. To stop him would have been an act of mercy, of which I thought him unworthy, and as to justice, I knew he would execute it on himself, were he but favoured with a sufficiency of rope. In the mean time, however, lest his ignorant spirit should resist the dictates of conviction, I provided me an instrument wherewith to give him the *coup-de grâce*. This instrument is a letter from a merchant, who was in St. Domingo, in the year 1800, and who gives me the following account of the state in which the French colony then was.

“ *Liverpool, Dec. 21, 1801.*

“ *DEAR SIR,—*In answer to your request about the state of St. Domingo, I have to inform you that, when I left it, *in the month of April 1800,* I had resided at Cape François for about three months prior to that time, and had occasion to go to Gonaïves and St. Mark’s to purchase cotton, about 100 English miles distant from the Cape. The estates every where appeared *in good order, and most of the sugar works and distilleries were rebuilt.* All the estates had been restored to the proprietors, except those on the list of emigrants. From the best information I could get, *they made nearly one-third the quantity of produce they FORMERLY made,* and every one seemed to think, they could make full as much as formerly, only for the large army they had to keep up to guard such an extensive colony, and carry on a war against General Rigaud and his Mulattoes, who were then in great force in the south-west part of the island, but who are now subdued and returned to cultivate the estates. *During the three months I was in the Cape, about one hundred and thirty American vessels loaded with produce*

“ sailed from that port, and also a number of Danes and Hamburgers,
 “ and ten French ships. In that time, I sold goods in the Cape to the
 “ amount of 102,000 Spanish dollars, and, much to the honour of the
 “ Blacks and Whites, collected the whole IN CASH without any dispute.
 “ I paid government duty on my inward cargo 10,500 dollars, and on my
 “ outward cargo of sugar, coffee, cotton, and fustic, 7,000 dollars, my
 “ ship carrying upwards of 400 tons; and I was allowed to bring away a
 “ quantity of dollars, as I had not room in the ship to take more produce.
 “ As to the police of the Cape, I have seen none better any where; indeed,
 “ all colours seemed to be happy with each other, for I never heard of a
 “ robbery nor saw any of the inhabitants intoxicated, or quarrel in the
 “ streets. The troops were well armed, clothed, and disciplined, and
 “ can, at a short notice, bring into the field upwards of 100,000 able
 “ men, under General Toussaint Louverture, Commander-in-Chief of the
 “ Colony in the name of the French Republic. The Custom-house,
 “ Treasury, and other public offices, were conducted the same as in all
 “ other French colonies. I have been often in company with the general-
 “ in-chief and many of the black and white officers, who always spoke
 “ with great respect of the French nation, and wished it was Peace with
 “ England, that the French might come and take possession of the colony.
 “ As to what state they are in at this time is not in my power to say;
 “ but, when I was there, produce and money were plenty, provisions and
 “ dry goods very cheap, and the colony in a prosperous state.

“ This, Sir, is a rough sketch of what I know of the island at that time.
 “ Since that the black army has taken possession of the Spanish part of
 “ the island, and a Mr. Caze is made governor of the city of St. Domingo.
 “ He is a Frenchman and came out from France, while I was in the colony,
 “ as first aid-de-camp to General Toussaint.

“ I wish, Sir, it were in my power to give you a more circumstantial
 “ account, but being always engaged with my commercial business pre-
 “ vented me.

“ I remain, dear Sir,

“ Your obedient Servant,

“ * * * * *

Not having taken the precaution to obtain this gentleman's liberty for so doing, and not having time to wait for a return of post from Liverpool, I do not think myself authorized to insert his name, to which, considering the insignificance of my work, he might, too, very properly object; but, should an occasion offer for him to state these facts at the bar of the House of Commons (and I am one of those, Sir, who hope, that such an occasion will yet offer), I pledge myself to the public, that his testimony there would be strictly conformable to the letter here submitted to your perusal.

This letter, Sir, firmly establishes the truth of all my statements relative to the French colony of St. Domingo. Here we find, that 130 American vessels, besides a number of Danes and Hamburgers, and ten French vessels, took in lading and sailed, in the space of three months from the port of Cape Francois alone, which every one knows to have been the most ruined and ravaged part of “ the ruined and ravaged St. Domingo.” We further find, that many of the distilleries and sugar-works were already rebuilt, that the plantations were in a prosperous state, and that the estates had been restored to all those proprietors who

had been wise enough not to place confidence in England. We find no want of that *capital*, of which your defender has represented the colony to be so destitute; we find cargoes, even British cargoes, paid for in cash; we find a profitable custom-house, under proper regulations; and we find abundance of proof that the produce of the colony, even in 1800, was full as great as that of Jamaica ever has been. Before facts like these how quickly do the leaden columns of Philanglus dissolve into their native dross!

If such, Sir, was the state of the French colony of St. Domingo in 1800, and such I am persuaded you will now be convinced it was, it has certainly been growing better and better to this hour. What, then, will it be *three years hence*, when all the proprietors, except those who foolishly trusted to British wisdom and British perseverance, have returned, strengthened by the connections which they, for the most part, have formed in the United States of America? When France shall, too, enjoy the inestimable advantages to be derived from the sole possession of the Spanish part of the island, which will greatly augment her population, strengthen her military defence, protect her navigation in time of war, extend her cultivation; and, above all, give her an ample, a regular, and never-failing supply of cattle of every description, a resource of which every other West-India colony is almost entirely destitute? Is it too much, Sir, to suppose that with all these additional advantages, and many more that could be mentioned, the French colony will, *in the course of three years*, attain to its former commercial importance? Most assuredly it is not; and those who attempt to hush the apprehensions naturally excited by such a supposition can be influenced by no motive but that of a desire to deceive the nation, and thereby to shelter Ministers from the effects of its resentment.

3. The remaining objection which will probably be urged against my statement is, *that the old British colonies may increase in produce and population, which will, consequently, occasion an increase in our commerce with them.*

The plantations in our old West-India colonies, Sir, like the fields of the mother country, will never be *exhausted*, while there are hands and capital to carry on their cultivation; but the progressive state of the former bears a strong resemblance to that of the latter, and leaves very little reason to hope for any considerable augmentation in produce, and without an augmentation in produce an increase of inhabitants would be an evil. Besides the state of the lands, however, there are two causes which will powerfully tend, not only to prevent an increase, but to occasion a decrease, in the produce and population of our old colonies; *I mean the migration of persons, and the transfer of capital to the more favoured colonies of our enemy; and the vast advantages which the French planters and merchants will enjoy over those of Great Britain both in the field and in the market.*

The population and produce, Sir, of our Leeward Islands have *already* experienced a diminution; a diminution, indeed, which we felt not, because what we lost in St. Vincent's, Grenada, Barbadoes, and St. Christopher's, we found transferred, with ten-fold interest, to the colony of Surinam, and that of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. These colonies are fertile beyond conception, and are capable of improvement to an incalculable extent. The progress of the latter colony, as exhibited in the following account, which your colleague Lord Hawkesbury knows to be

authentic, will enable you to form some idea of the value of one of those numerous acquisitions which were gained by the valour and the blood of our countrymen, and which you have surrendered into the hands of an enemy whom they had beaten in every part of the world.

Account of the Produce exported from the Colony of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, since the establishment of a British Custom-house there.

Years.	Vessels.	Hogsheads of Sugar.	Puncheons of Rum.	Bales of Cotton.	Pounds weight of Coffee.
1797 (from August)	45	1,483	720	2,425	4,938,230
1798.....	202	6,472	1,803	14,738	4,506,325
1799.....	212	5,392	1,501	15,758	8,846,877
1800.....	333	10,513	2,615	33,806	15,966,562

If this colony, Sir, while regarded as mere conquest, while its tenure was so very insecure, increased, as we here see it did, more than one-third in its produce in the space of three years, what, with its vast extent, may not be its produce when safely lodged in the hands of a power which now commands the world? It was the migration of British subjects, and the transfer of British capital, that occasioned this prodigious increase. Both sought a more propitious soil. And, if the difficulties and dangers ever attendant on a state of warfare were insufficient to restrain this inclination, what do you imagine will be able to restrain it in future? The mere circumstance of the colony having changed masters? O no, Sir! The planters who removed their capital and their slaves from Grenada to Demerara, took into their calculation the possibility and the probability of a transfer of a colony. And, if even this did not obstruct their speculations, what is there to obstruct them now, when the adventurers have seen the golden mine, and have begun to rifle its treasures? That the considerations of country, language, manners, and laws, will operate but as a very weak impediment, is clearly evinced in the instance of St. Thomas and many other colonies. Capital seeks for an increase as water seeks the sea; and it will follow wherever that increase is to be found, whether at home or abroad, whether in the country of a friend or in the country of an enemy.

Another cause of the decrease in the population and produce of our old colonies will be, the vast advantages which the French planters and merchants will, as I before observed, enjoy over those of Great Britain, both in the field and in the market. Their vessels will sail cheaper than ours, their slaves will be cheaper obtained; and, unless we open our West-India ports to the Americans, unless we, in this point, give up our Navigation Act, and with it those advantages which are absolutely necessary to the preservation of any considerable portion of our naval power, the French colonists will purchase lumber, flour, pork, and all the articles of first necessity, at a price greatly inferior to that on which ours will be able to

obtain them.* Be you assured, Sir, that one part of the plan of the rulers of France is, *to make the interest of America coincide with the ruin of England*; and, in the prosecution of this plan nothing can be imagined more effectual than the granting to America what she has so long and so anxiously sought for, those commercial concessions which England will not, which England cannot grant her.

The produce of the French colonies, being raised at less expense, will, of course, be sold cheaper than that of the British colonies; which circumstance, together with our exclusion from Flanders and Germany, and the opening of those countries to France by the navigation of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, will leave us the British Isles alone as a market for our West-India goods; which, as they will gradually become less profitable to the planter, will gradually cease to be raised; negroes, to the great joy of Saint Wilberforce, will cease to be torn from the bleeding bosoms of those tender fathers and mothers who now barter them for a bit of grass; the negro-driver will cease to lash, the African will cease to labour; and thirty thousand British sailors, who labour much harder, will cease to encounter the dangers of the sea. Blessed prospect! and all this, Sir, you will have the satisfaction to reflect is to be attributed to *you*!

Hitherto, in considering the decline of our West-India commerce, I have proceeded upon the supposition that it will, for some years at least, remain unmolested by warlike operations; but I cannot conclude this letter, long as it already is, without endeavouring to impress on your mind the great and imminent danger to be apprehended from even the *present* movements of our enemy. A French fleet and army, in spite of all the efforts which I am persuaded you have made to prevent it, have sailed for the West Indies. That army *and fleet too* you have, however, been led to believe, are destined for the reduction of Toussaint and his blacks to submission. But, Sir, you will, when it is too late, find that no such armament was necessary for that purpose.

Toussaint, Sir, holds his commission from the French Republic, in whose name he commands; in that name every act of authority in the colony is exercised; the Custom-house collects its duties, taxes are raised, writs are issued, processes are carried on, judgments are given, executions are levied, sentences are passed and executed, *in the name of the French Republic*. And, that Toussaint is not an imitator of the infamous and accursed Parliament who raised a rebel army in the name of their king, you may learn from the statement of my correspondent at Liverpool, who informs you that he was frequently in company with Toussaint and his officers, both black and white, who "always spoke with great respect of "the French nation, and wished for a peace with England, THAT THE "FRENCH MIGHT COME AND TAKE POSSESSION OF THE "COLONY." My correspondent adds this striking circumstance, that a M. de la Caze, a Frenchman, who came out from France in 1800, was and is Governor of the Spanish part of the island, and resides in the city of Santo Domingo. Methinks I hear you titter at the *authority* on which my apprehensions are grounded; but, Sir, I hope, for the sake of my country, that the document I am now about to produce will turn your

* The idle notion of obtaining *provisions* from Canada, Nova Scotia, and God knows where, is now-a-days completely exploded. They must come from the United States, or the sugar-plantations must be turned into Indian corn-fields, and the food of the colonists must be confined to homony and mush.

mirth into serious reflection. It is dated from the seat of government of the United States of America, and is signed by the French ambassador, who was, last year, sent out to that country by Buonaparte. With these premises in your mind, Sir, read the document, and throw yourself on the mercy of your country.

“ Notice is hereby given to merchants trading to the Island of *St. Domingo*, that the government of the said Island, in order to provide against the fraudulent entries and declarations made by traders, with the view of evading the duties laid on the value of goods, have desired the commercial agents of the French Republic in the United States to attest the prices quoted in the invoice bills as conformable to the prices current in the places from whence the shipments are made. In conformity to that desire, the agents aforesaid are directed to give the above-mentioned certificates. Such, therefore, as choose to have their bills so certified may apply for that purpose to the French Commissaries in the several parts of the United States.

“ L. A. PICHON.

“ *George-town (Potomac), 7th Floréal,*
“ *9th year (22nd April 1801).”*

Did you ever see this notice before, Sir? Were you before acquainted with a circumstance, which “leaves no loop nor hinge to hang a doubt on,” that Toussaint is, to all intents and purposes, an officer under the French Republic, and that his army is at her absolute command? If you were, and yet suffered that army to be reinforced by an army from France, sailing out with your knowledge, and with your consent, while our brave fleet lay manacled at Torbay, it is not for me to sit in judgment on your conduct. But, Sir, I am persuaded you were not, and I sincerely hope, that the information I now give you, may produce such measures as will yet defeat the perfidious intentions of the enemy. There is, however, no time to be lost. *The conquest of Jamaica* is an enterprize much less difficult than you imagine, and if that island falls, the sun of the western hemisphere will never again shine on a British sail.

I would now, dispirited as I am by contemplating the approaching ruin of my country, enter on my proposed observations on the future state of our commerce with the United States of America; but, as our commercial connections with that country turn principally upon our exports thereto, they more properly belong to the subject of my next letter. In the mean time, I remain, Sir,

Your most humble, and most obedient servant,

WM. CORBETT.

P.S. Since this letter was written, accounts have been received of a partial revolt of the blacks against the authority of Toussaint, “whom,” says the writer, “they had at last discovered to be no more than a mere DRIVER acting under the orders of their European masters;” late, however, as these poor ignorant wretches were in making this discovery, it would seem, that they had more early information than the *British Minister*. This new insurrection, so far from retarding, will greatly accelerate, the complete re-establishment of the ancient system. It will furnish Toussaint with an excuse which he otherwise would not have had, to deprive the blacks in general of that portion of freedom which they now enjoy, an object which, with the co-operation of the French army, he will

accomplish in the space of two months. This insurrection, however, which will now be instantly quelled, is one amongst many favourable events, the advantages to be derived from which we have for ever lost by the peace.

Destitute of the aid of a French army, Toussaint might have been reduced to such a state as would have induced him to have recourse to us; and the whole island of St. Domingo might, with his hearty co-operation, have become an appendage of the British crown, an acquisition which would have been more than balanced against the European aggrandizement of France.

LETTER III.

Pall-Mall, Dec. 29, 1801.

SIR,—Our *manufactures* will follow the fate of our commerce; their existence is as inseparably connected as that of the flesh and the bone; they have grown up together, and together they must prosper or decline.

The principal manufactures of this kingdom are, *hardware, woollens, linens, and cottons*. There are, indeed, many other important articles; but the facts and reasoning applied to these will, with some trifling exceptions, necessarily apply to all the rest.

In speaking of manufactures, of any and of every sort, two things present themselves for consideration; to wit: the *means of production*, and the *market*. The means of producing hardware, of the finer sorts, are not very soon, nor very easily acquired; this article of manufacture requires men trained to the business from their infancy; it owes its perfection to a system too complicated to be soon established in any of the countries of our rival. But the same observations do not apply to the coarser kinds of hardware, the production of these requires little else than strength, metal, and fire. Of the first France has more than we, and at a much lower rate; of the second, her supply may now be more abundant and cheaper than ours; of the third, without which the other two were of little use, she was almost totally destitute, until *you*, Sir, ensured her a constant supply. Your “best defender,” Philanglus, asks, with a triumphant sneer, how she is to rival us in hardware *without coals*. She has them, Sir; you have left them at her absolute command; to the leather of Stavelo and Malmedy, to the iron, copper, and lead of Luxemburgh and Limburgh, you have generously added the coal pits of Namur, Liege, and many other places, and have given her the principal rivers of Europe to convey them and their products whithersoever she may please.

If I am told of that *capital*, the imaginary exclusive possession of which seems to be the only source of your consolation; if I am told of the *long time* necessary to bring these means into operation, I turn from speculation to *fact*; I turn to a country, where experience has proved, that neither great capital, nor long time, is necessary to the accomplishment of what I dread. There was a time, Sir, when the now United States of America imported their *ploughshares* from England; and I dare say you can recollect, that only *twenty-seven years ago*, the great, though inconsistent, Lord Chatham, declared, that he “*would not suffer America to make a hobnail*.” Yet, Sir, this country, *though eighteen years ago a BANKRUPT*, now furnishes an abundant supply of all the articles of which I am speaking. Cutlery, a few choice edge-tools, and the finer kinds of hardware, she imports from England; but of anchors, cannons, mortars,

bombs, balls, stoves, chains, bolts, bars, hinges, agricultural tools, edge-tools in general, and, indeed, all the coarser kinds of hardware, she produces more than she wants, and at a price greatly beneath the prime cost of those articles in England. And, instead of *not making a hobnail*, she makes nails of every sort, in such quantities, and at so cheap a rate, that, in spite of our commercial regulations, in spite of the rigour of our laws, and the vigilance of our officers, she exports no small quantity of this article to our continental and West-India colonies, while the supplying of those of other nations is almost exclusively in her hands.

With this example before our eyes, can we, after surveying the present boundaries and influence of France, which give her at once the *market* and the *means of production*; can we doltishly persist that this article of our manufactures will not experience a considerable diminution?

In *fine* woollen cloth France has, to a certain extent, long been our rival. Cloth of this texture requires the wool of Spain, of which we shall, in future, have just as much as it pleases France to let us have, and not an ounce more. Those articles, which demand much wool and little labour, England will always be able to supply cheaper than any other country; but these articles are the least profitable to the nation, and the vent of even these will be circumscribed by all those commercial restrictions, which France can adopt herself, or dictate to our other customers, of doing which she will let slip no opportunity.

The increase in the manufacture of Irish *linen* has, like much of our other increase, been produced by the war, which has interrupted the operations of the manufacturers of that article in the other countries. Can we suppose that a decrease will not result from a peace, and from a peace, too, which has left those countries in the possession of a power, whose principal object is the ruin of England? The countries annexed to France abound in the raw material, of which linen is made; of hands she has more than an abundance; and if you again ask me whence the *capital* is to come, to revive the languishing manufactories, I again refer you to the example of America, or to the sentiments and dispositions on the Royal Exchange.

As to *cottons*, that immense source of individual and national wealth, we altogether depend, for the raw material, on our colonies and on foreign nations. Our consumption of this material amounts to 44,000,000 pounds weight, each pound costing, upon an average, 2s. and, when manufactured, worth, upon an average, 7s. 6d. Towards this astonishing consumption, the increase of which has been not less astonishing, our colonies, previous to your peace, furnished 25,000,000 of pounds; those which that peace has left us will furnish only 9,000,000, little more than one-fifth part of what our present establishment would need, the other 16,000,000 having been thrown into the lap of our enemy. The cotton of Demerara was not only our own, not only did the profits of its cultivation come to England, not only did the carriage of it home employ British ships and British seamen, but it was the *finest* in the world. This precious material is now gone to France, whither it will speedily be followed by all its attendant advantages.

For almost the whole of our future supply of cotton we must look to the Brazils and Georgia; abundant sources, indeed; but the former is totally under the power of France; and, from the latter, our exports will be the price of those commercial sacrifices, which, at no very distant period, we shall probably be called on to make to *another Republic*. Our supply will, at best, be very precarious, and will come to us at a vast in-

crease of price, while the profits of culture and the advantages of navigation will remain exclusively in other hands.

There are some persons, Sir, who affect to believe, that the *climate* of France is unpropitious to the manufacture of cotton, forgetting, I suppose, that our cotton manufactures came from that country, and forgetting that the same cloud covers Dover and Calais. Others pretend, with your "best defender," Philanglus, that the French cannot equal the inimitable ingenuity of our machines. Of this I greatly doubt, but, if it be really so, I am sure that the makers of those machines will never refuse to lend them a hand. To attempt to monopolize these inventions would be like bottling up moon-shine, or hiding the sun with a blanket. In short with her vast increase of territory and population, with the means of production in her hands, and the market of the world at her command, is it not next to impossible but France should endeavour to rival us in this capital branch of our trade? and if she makes the attempt, it is impossible but it should be crowned with success.

"Yet," (say the selfish and foolish partisans of the peace), "yet, let us hope that this will not happen *so soon*." Precisely how soon it may happen it is not in my power to foretell; but that this species of manufacture is capable of an increase astonishingly rapid, we ourselves have furnished a striking example. No longer than twenty years ago our annual importation of cotton amounted to only *four* millions of pounds weight, and it now amounts to *forty-four* millions. *Capital*, your adored capital, Sir; that capital, of which you seem to think we shall retain the exclusive possession, will follow where interest leads. He who can sell his goods cheapest will ever find the readiest market, and he who finds the readiest market will never want for capital to furnish him with a cargo.

Having now stated those facts and reasons, on which my fears of the successful rivalship of France are founded, I shall now, as briefly as I can, endeavour to show why, and in what degree, that rivalship will affect us in our several markets, following the same order which I observed in considering the diminution in our commerce.

To *the continent of Europe* our exports of manufactured goods will be diminished by the revival of the manufactures in France, Belgium, and Holland, and by those new regulations, which France will compel the nations of Europe to adopt. Of her eagerness to exercise this species of compulsion we have an instance in her treaty with Portugal, signed at Madrid, on the 29th of September. That this treaty, which absolutely severs a connection between England and Portugal, formed by mutual interest and cemented by an uninterrupted friendship of a hundred years, was not prescribed by France without an evil design upon our commerce, is evident from the tendency of its stipulations; and if any doubt remained on that score, it would be completely removed by the comments with which she has announced the treaty to the world. These comments, which are to be found in the speech addressed to the legislative body by the Counsellor of State, Defermont, state that the object of France was, to establish such regulations as should in time "*introduce French woollens into the ports of Portugal*;" to break those engagements "*which made that country submit to the monopoly of English merchants and manufacturers*," and rendered it "*an English colony, a great, and almost exclusive, market for the productions of her industry*."

Such, Sir, was the object of the treaty of Madrid, in the stipulations of which you have left our ancient and faithful ally fettered hand

and foot. Lord Hawkesbury's reply to Mr. Grey on this subject, can never be too often repeated. Mr. Grey asked, whether the recent treaty between France and Portugal would not deprive us of the commercial privileges which we had theretofore enjoyed with the latter country; to which the noble and amiable Secretary coolly replied, that he had no official information on the subject of the treaty, and consequently could make no positive reply; but that, with respect to the particular point in question, *it was one of those stipulations which nations might enter into in time of profound peace, as well as at any other time*; and that, if Portugal withdrew the privileges hitherto granted to English manufactures, *we might, in return, withdraw the privileges hitherto granted to the Portuguese wines, and admit those of OTHER COUNTRIES upon the same footing!* So because Portugal is compelled to encourage the importation of our enemy's manufactures, we, in revenge, are to encourage the importation of the wines of our enemy! As a mask to our own baseness we affect to believe, that Portugal has *voluntarily* withdrawn our privileges; and the sacrifices with which we hope to appease the wrath of the Grand Nation, we affect to regard as proceeding from motives of *self-interest!* And do you really believe, Sir, that the penetrating eyes of the world will not see through this mask? Buonaparte and the companions of his triumph must be highly diverted at the miserable tricks with which we are attempting to disguise our disgrace.

France, upon looking round her, will find several other nations on whom she can, and will, impose such commercial regulations as she finds necessary for favouring her own manufactures, or those of any other nation, and for excluding ours. In spite, however, of all she can do, the nations of Europe *must*, for some time at least, receive our manufactures; but every obstacle thrown in their way will surely enhance their price to the consumer, which will as surely diminish the quantity consumed, until the price be lowered by the rivalry of France or some of her satellites. At first the diminution may not be severely felt by us; but it will go on gradually increasing, till our present exports to the Continent will become much less than they were before the war, during which they have increased from 1,530,000*l.* to 2,545,000*l.*

To the *West Indies*, Sir, our exports of manufactures must instantly experience a diminution of nearly one half their present amount. We have given up nearly one half of our market, especially if we take into the calculation, the goods which we sent to St. Domingo. That this diminution will, to a certain degree, take place, is admitted by your defender, Philanglus, because, I suppose, he regarded the denial as too glaringly false to be believed, even by the ignorant herd that rejoiced at the peace.

There remain to be considered, Sir, our exports to the *United States of America*, that capacious market which has, for several years past, taken *more than one-fourth part of the whole of our exported manufactures.* This whole has lately amounted annually to 23,056,000*l.*, and it must be fresh in your mind that Lord Hawkesbury, in his defence of the peace, stated that our manufactures exported to the United States of America alone, during each of the last three years of the war, amounted to 6,232,000*l.* What purpose that cool and solid young nobleman meant to answer by this statement is probably explained by the pedagogue Philanglus, who, after piling up a whole column of figures upon the back of the unfortunate Porcupine, to prove the acknowledged and well-known increase

in the exports to the United States, makes the following sagacious observations :—

“ Our commercial connections with the United States of America are fixed on such *solid foundations*, that we have no reason to apprehend that the future political dissensions of Europe will affect them. For many years to come the Americans, although an extensive sea-coast, good harbours, and a spirit of enterprise inherited from their forefathers, suggest to them the employment of *a part of their capital in commerce*, must continue to direct the largest portion of it to agricultural improvements. While we can supply them with better and cheaper goods than other nations can manufacture for them, or than they can manufacture for themselves, they will, from the strongest tie, that of interest, continue to be united to us; but as a German writer well observes, there are considerations, totally independent of policy and interest, which must and will *for ever assure to this country the almost exclusive commerce* of the United States; these are, in the first place, the consanguinity of the two people; and in the second, the similarity of religion, language, manners, and taste; the consumption of the manufactures of Europe will necessarily keep pace with the progress of cultivation in America, until at some period yet extremely remote the surplus hands not wanted for agriculture or commerce must seek employment in manufactures. Our trade to North America is of the greatest importance, as it principally consists in the export of our home productions and manufactures. Its increase has been very rapid: and whether it be measured by the tonnage of the shipping employed, or by the value of the merchandise sent out, by years of war, or by years of peace, it will justify this conclusion, *that our FUTURE INTERCOURSE with the United States will ENLARGE those sources of employment and of wealth which that country has opened to British manufactures and merchants.*”

This is the conclusion which doubtless Lord Hawkesbury meant should be drawn from his pompous display of the state of our American exports; and, Sir, I sincerely regret that it is in my power to prove this conclusion to be grossly erroneous.

The increase in our manufactures exported to the United States of America has arisen from four causes: From the regular increase of population and consequent wealth in the United States: From the decline in the manufactures of Holland, and the suspension of those of France and the countries now annexed to her empire: From the emigration occasioned by the war: From the re-exportation of our manufactures from the United States to the colonies of France, Holland, and Spain.

All the increase which has arisen from the first of these enumerated causes, that is, *from the REGULAR increase of the population and consequent wealth of the United States*, we shall retain till France shall be able to rival us, or till our trade shall be interrupted by the hostility of the American government, of which latter contingency I shall speak by-and-by. But, Sir, that this increase forms but a comparatively small portion of that which has of late years taken place, will evidently appear from the following facts:—A census was last year taken in the United States, from which you may learn that their population then amounted to 5,214,801 souls. In the year 1790, when the former census was taken, it amounted to 3,929,326 souls; so that, during the ten last years, the increase has been 1,285,475 souls. But from this increase must be deducted 30,000

emigrants from St. Domingo, who had not yet returned to their island when the census was taken; and at least 80,000 emigrants from France and Holland, and from the other French and Dutch colonies and dependencies. This reduces the increase to 1,175,475 souls, which is an addition of little more than one-fifth to the number and consequent wealth of our permanent customers, while the increase in our manufactures exported to America has, during the same period of ten years, been nearly as *two to one*: in 1790 they amounted to 3,694,000*l.*, and in 1800 they amounted to 6,232,000*l.*

Such a disproportion would have taught Philanglus, if he had understood the subject on which he was writing, or rather figuring, to seek for other and more proportionate causes; and he would have found that these causes were, the suspension of the manufactures in the countries under the power of our enemy, which manufactures will now be revived. He would have found that the emigration, occasioned by the war, sent to America backs to wear our cloth and cotton, and money to pay for them; which emigration has not only now ceased, but a re-emigration is daily taking place. And, which is of still more importance in the account, he would have found that of the vast quantity of British manufactures exported to the United States of America during the war, one-fourth at least was re-exported to the West-India and South-American colonies of her enemy, and her allies, Holland and Spain. These facts are so well known, and the deduction from them is so evident, that if Philanglus had applied to any American merchant, if he had spent only one evening in either of the American Coffee-houses, if he had strolled but one hour in the American 'Change, he would have been fully convinced that our manufactures exported to the United States, even *next year*, will experience a *diminution of more than ONE-FOURTH*, on the correctness of which opinion I would venture to stake my life.

Nor, Sir, is the enjoyment of the American trade, even with this diminution, fixed on such "*solid foundations*" as your "best defender Philanglus seems to imagine. This man knows nothing of the present state of America, or of any other nation. He is a mere furbisher of cast-off maxims, a collector of political ors: he is fit enough, indeed, to be the secretary of a friendly society, to keep the accounts of a poor house, to be a meter at a soup-shop, or a tally-man to the London Flour-Company; but as to the resources, the interests, and the views of nations, he knows no more than the baby that is now riding my stick across the room. He, poor soul, thinks that there are circumstances "which, independent of "interest and policy, will *for ever* ensure to this country the almost *exclusive commerce* of the United States!" But, Sir, no longer to suppose you a party to his opinions, I now throw the driveller aside, and address myself directly to you.

You, Sir, are, or ought to be, a *statesman*; you, Sir, have, or ought to have, an accurate knowledge of the resources, the inclination, and the views of America; and if you have I need not tell you how ticklish is our situation with respect to that country; on how slender a thread depend our commercial connections. If, however, you will take the trouble to open those writings and selections of Peter Porcupine, to which you did me the honour to subscribe, you will find relating to this subject some facts with which, without the least derogation from your talents or your zeal, I may venture to believe you are, as yet, unacquainted. To these facts I shall sometimes beg leave to refer you,

The "*solid foundation*," on which our commercial connections with America are fixed, is a treaty, all the commercial and maritime regulations of which, are of themselves to cease in *two years* after the end of the late, or the *present* (I do not know which to call it) war with France. Then, Sir, it is to be determined, in the negotiations of a new treaty, what further regulations shall be adopted *with respect to the American Commerce with our West Indies*; and also it is to be determined whether in any, and in what cases, *neutral vessels shall protect an enemy's property*. These are points, Sir, on which America will be much more obstinate than you imagine. They have ever been the objects nearest her heart; and, she will ere long obtain them, or she will effect the ruin of our colonies. The most formidable part of the opposition to the treaty of 1794 arose from those stipulations, which in granting to the Americans a permanent trade with our Islands, restricted the carrying on of that trade to vessels of seventy tons burden or under, and which exacted as the condition of that privilege, that America should neither ship nor carry West-India produce to Europe. This, though no trifling concession on our part, though a dangerous departure from our Navigation Act, was, instead of being received as a favour, regarded as an injury and an insult. Nor were these sentiments confined to the *Jacobins* of America; they were the sentiments of the nation, who with the utmost unanimity, rejected the stipulations which were even *excepted* in the ratification. So that in two years from this time, our commercial stipulations with America will cease, and we shall then have to open our West-India ports to her, or she will impose such restrictions on the importation of our manufactures as shall compel us to yield. She will impose on goods of British manufacture a duty so much higher than that which she imposes on goods of other nations, as shall at once greatly diminish the importation of British goods, and, in the end, turn the channel of trade to other countries.

This mode, Sir, of forcing us into commercial concessions was proposed to Congress in the year 1788. It was again revived in 1793-4, and was carried in the Lower House by a very great majority, but was thrown out in the Senate. By turning to Porcupine's works,* you will find that Mr. Jefferson was the author of this plan, which was in both instances brought forward by Mr. Madison;† and you will please to recollect, that Mr. Jefferson is now *President* of the United States, and that Mr. Madison is his *Secretary of State*. You ought to know also, that the faction of our enemy had in America gained a complete triumph previous to your disgraceful peace, which will estrange from us the last of our friends. There will not remain a man in that country who will not, hereafter, be ashamed to harbour an attachment to England. The contempt of us in the continent of Europe is great; but in the continent of America it will be, if possible; ten thousand times greater.

That the *people* of America will do nothing contrary to their *interests* I know; but the people of every nation look to their *immediate* interests; and, as I observed to you before, it is one part of the plan of France, to *make the interests of America coincide with the ruin of England*; and to effect this nothing more is wanted than to open the French and Dutch West-India ports to the former, and thereby furnish a plausible, and even

* See the Treaty, Art. XII. Porcupine's Works, vol. 2, page 257.

† See "*Plain English*," p. 52, and "*New Year's Gift*," p. 85, in this volume; and also our introductory notes to those two tracts.—ED.

Just ground, for such a discriminating system as will exclude our manufactures, little by little, from the United States.

Nor, were we disposed to carry on this trade, sword in hand, should we have the power to gratify that disposition. While the marine of France was unable to stir; while it remained unaugmented by that of Holland and Spain, and unrevised by the immense resources which you have left in her hands, the naval and military power of America was a thing to be contemned; but your peace has at once humbled us and exalted every other nation, whose interests or views are or may be opposed to our own. It is much in vogue to talk of the United States of America as we talk of Otaheite. The sage who owns the *True Briton*, speaks of it as a country "at so great a distance as to be little interesting to Englishmen;" PHIL-ANGLUS calls it an *agricultural* country; it is never mentioned (except, perhaps, by way of parenthesis) in any of the comparisons between the increase of the commercial and maritime greatness of England and other nations; when, indeed, it is thought necessary to make a flattering display of exported British manufactures, America becomes an *item* in the account; but, on all other occasions, our financiers and politicians affect to regard that nation as being independent of us in *form* only, as a mere colony, where the foolish people hew the woods and till the lands to no other end than that of earning money to pay for British manufactures, and to swell the estimates of British navigation and commerce. Would these profound statesmen condescend, however, to receive information from such a distance; would they exercise but a very trifling portion of that industry which they bestow in hunting out proofs of the decline of the commerce of France, Holland, and Spain, they would find that the United States is not entirely a nation of ploughmen and threshers; they would find that she has considerable manufactures and *some little* commerce; they would find that her exports, in the year 1800, amounted to 71,000,000 dollars, or upwards of 14,000,000 sterling;* and they would find, to their great surprise, that her shipping, at the end of that year, amounted to 939,000 tons, nearly one half as much tonnage as Britain now has, and 200,000 tons MORE than Britain had only nineteen years ago, at which time America was a *bankrupt*, and had not a single plank swimming on the water. These are, one would think, statements which might, with no great impropriety, be introduced amongst the "*financial facts of the eighteenth century*." But no! men of all parties imitate the servants of the King, who have long seemed ashamed or afraid to turn their eyes to America; but, be you well assured, Sir, that if fortune does not speedily favour us in France, America, which we obstinately persist in treating with contempt, will, with the co-operation of a power that knows how to manage her better, give us the most mortal of those blows under which you have doomed us to sink.

Such, Sir, not to mention numerous other untoward circumstances, are the "*solid foundations*" on which our commercial connections with the United States of America are fixed, and on which we are taught to rely, not only for a continuance of our present exports to that country; but for an *increase* of those exports.

With regard, however, to our exports to America, as with regard to all the other branches of our trade, it is, as I before observed, impossible to

* This was before the scarcity in England was known in America. In 1801 the exports from America have been much greater.

say precisely *when* and in *what degree* the diminution will take place. The result of my statements and reasoning is, that the diminution in the exports of our manufactures in general will, in the course of three years, reduce them to what they were before the commencement of that war, from which, and its attendant conquests, a very great portion of the increase has arisen ; and that the European and colonial aggrandizement of France, with the irresistible influence which the peace has for ever ensured to her, will enable her, in time, whether by intrigue, by force, or by rivalry, almost entirely to cut off our market, and to produce that ruin which it is her favourite object to effect.

If a short time should, as I am fully persuaded it will, verify my predictions ; if even the first year should cause a *diminution of one-fifth* in the foreign orders for our goods (not taking into the account a *hundred thousand* domestic consumers, *who will now go to reside in France*), and if *half a million of people should thereby be thrown out of work*,* the inhabitants of Manchester, Norwich, Exeter, Birmingham, and Sheffield, will derive no more pleasure in reflecting on their foolish illuminations than the brutal miscreants, who broke my windows to the tune of "Peace and plenty," now derive from *the price of provisions*, on which score, by-the-by, I beg leave to present both them and you my hearty congratulations.†

Having now, Sir, taken a view of the effects which the peace with Buonaparte will have in our *colonies*, our *commerce*, and our *manufactures* ; and having, as I think, fully proved that it will finally produce the ruin of them all, I should next enter on an examination of those effects with respect to our *Constitution*, that Constitution which you truly say has been "*preserved by the war*," and which, I greatly fear, will be *destroyed* by the peace ; but this must be reserved for another opportunity. I wish our Constitution to be what it *was*. Such as my small share in it came to me, such I wish it to descend to my children. But this is a matter that requires more reflection than I, at present, have time to bestow on it. The rights and privileges of a British subject I most earnestly desire to preserve ; but I would sooner be deprived of them for ever than suffer a syllable to escape me prejudicial to the durability or the influence of the throne.

With this, Sir, I take my leave ; begging you to be assured that I have, in this discussion, been actuated by no motive but that of public good ; and that, whatever I may have incautiously uttered, savouring of asperity,

* The silk-weavers in Spitalfields have already felt the effects of the peace. Many of the orders which they had received have been countermanded ; and, if I am not greatly misinformed, several hundreds of those who were in employ before the peace are now begging about the streets.

† Since the preliminaries of peace were signed ; since "*Peace and plenty*" have been sung through our streets, and have decorated the windows of those who live by amusing the idle and flattering the tastes of the ignorant, bread has not, upon the whole, fallen a farthing, and every other article of life has advanced in price ; mutton has risen one-ninth, beef one-seventh, butter one-tenth, bacon one-twelfth, and potatoes have trebled in price. There is now no resource left but to cry aloud and spare not, against forestallers, regraters, monopolists, farmers, corn-dealers, millers, bakers, graziers, butchers, cheesemongers, dairymaids, and every other living creature that has, either directly or indirectly, anything to do with the producing, procuring, or preparing of human food ; but, above all, against Quakers, whose religion forbids them to employ either the arm of flesh or the arm of the law, the only two things in this world or the world to come that your hunter of monopolists is afraid of.

is to be attributed, not to any personal dislike, but to that anger and resentment which, after having combated so long with the regicide Republic, I must naturally feel against those who have established and exalted her on the ruin and disgrace of my country.

I am, Sir,

Your most humble and most obedient servant,

W. M. COBBETT.

P. S.—Sir, the reply, the *standing* reply, to observations such as I have, in these Letters, taken the liberty to address to you, is, *that the enemy would not, at present, grant us better terms of peace, and we were unable, by a longer continuation of the war, to compel him so to do.* I deny both these positions. A dignified and resolute mode of proceeding would have procured good and honourable terms even now; and if it had failed, I am certain that this *nation* had both the *means* and the *will* to force him to compliance. The proof of these assertions I postpone to some opportunity which will be afforded me by a *new weekly publication*, the first number of which I shall submit to the public in a few days.* Having mentioned this work, Sir, give me leave to observe beforehand, that I have no intention to range myself in a *systematic* opposition to his Majesty's Ministers, or to their measures. Such an opposition I disclaim. The first object, which I have invariably had in view, is, to contribute my mite towards the support of the authority of that Sovereign whom God has commanded me to honour and obey; and, as the means most likely to effect this object, I have generally endeavoured to support the measures of those who have been appointed to exercise that authority. If, therefore, I do now, or shall in future, openly disapprove of *some* of the measures of his Majesty's present servants, religiously abstaining from every act and word tending to *weaken* the Government, and exerting all my feeble efforts to defend it against its enemies, foreign and domestic, I trust that you yourself, if I should happen at all to attract your notice, will have the justice to acquit me of inconsistency of conduct.†

* The *Register*, the first number of which appeared on the 1st of January, 1802.—ED.

† The remarks of MULLER on these Letters, to which we alluded at page 212 of this volume, are contained in a letter written by MULLER to his brother, dated March, 1802:—"Have you read," he asks. "WILLIAM COBBETT'S Letters to HAWKESBURY and ADDINGTON, the most eloquent writing since the time of the two great professors of philippic oratory? How apprehensively he demonstrates what is, and what is coming!" &c.—*Collection of the Works of JOHANNES VON MULLER*, Part III., p. 14, Edit. 1812.—ED.

LETTER

TO

SIR FREDERICK M. EDEN, BART.,*

ON THE PEACE OF AMIENS.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.]—We insert the following Letter, principally on account of that formal prediction which it contains relative to the effects of the peace. By referring to the *Register* (vol. 1, pp. 509, 541), the reader will see in what a state of determinéd hostility Mr. COBBETT was at this time with those who were indulging in the "*delirium of joy*" which the peace, cried up by the Ministerial press, had occasioned. General illuminations took place in celebration of the measures of Government; and, as Mr. COBBETT resolved not to *light*, his house in Pall-Mall underwent that "demolition" which he speaks of in Letter III. to Lord Hawkesbury (see our note, p. 213).—"A numerous and boisterous rabble," he says, "coming from Cockspur-street, began to assault the house, at about half-past nine o'clock. Mr. Graham (one of the Bow-street magistrates) with his officers, used their utmost exertions to prevent violence, but in vain. The attack continued, with more or less fury, for about an hour and a half, during which time a party of horse-guards were called in to the aid of the civil power. Great part of the windows were broken; the sash-frames of the ground floor almost entirely demolished; the panels of the window-shutters were dashed in; the window-frames broken in several places; the door nearly forced open; and much other damage done to several parts of the house. Six of the villains were apprehended, namely, CHARLES BELOE (son of the Rev. W. Beloe), a clerk in the General Post-Office; CHARLES WAGSTAFF, another clerk in the General Post-Office; JOHN HARWOOD, a sort of amanuensis to the Rev. W. Beloe and to the British Critic; JOHN PARNEL, an Excise-Officer; SAMUEL WISE, a servant to a brush-maker at Aldgate; WILLIAM HARVEY, nothing at all. Out of six villains apprehended at my house, four are in the pay of Government!" CHARLES BELOE was, we believe, seized by Mr. WINDHAM, who, walking among the crowd to ascertain the instigating parties, caught this offender armed with a brick-bat. BELOE, WAGSTAFF, and HARWOOD, were afterwards tried at the sessions on the charge of rioting, and convicted. The two former were sentenced to pay a fine of 30*l.* each, and the latter to pay 10*l.*; and they were all bound to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for the space of two years. (See *Register*, vol. II., pp. 60, 99.) Mr. COBBETT says (p. 541):—"My rescinding the capital charge was an act of clemency, and as such it was felt, and publicly acknowledged, by Mr. Mackintosh, the counsel for the prisoners."

SIR,—In your defence of the peace, you have stated, that the most valuable part of our trade is the exportation of goods of our own manufacturing; and, with a desire to inculcate an opinion, that this branch of trade will not be diminished by the peace, you have stated, that, "we may reasonably expect that the export of our manufactures to the United States of America will increase." In contradiction to this opinion, Sir, I have stated, in my Letters to Mr. Addington, that our exports to that country, in 1802, will be *one-fourth* less in amount than those of 1801.† Here we are at issue, and it must be left

* This gentleman was the writer "*PHILANGLUS*," who is noticed in the foregoing Letters.—Ed.

† See MARSHALL'S "*Digest of all the Accounts*," &c., a work professing to be compiled from the most authentic sources. If this work be correct, it contains a remarkable record of time's decision in Mr. COBBETT'S favour. According to Mr. MARSHALL'S Table of Exports (in the second part of his volume, p. 74), the official value of all British merchandise sent to the United States in 1801, was

to time to decide between us. Yet, if either of us can find a strong corroboration of our opinion, drawn from respectable authority, it seems in nowise improper to bring it forward. Such a corroboration I have just received in the official report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, which report you will find by referring to pages 141 to 150 inclusive of this work.

In my Letters to Mr. Addington, above alluded to, I remarked that, according to the parliamentary statement of Lord Hawkesbury, our exports (always speaking of British manufactures) to the United States had *doubled* since the year 1793, and that his lordship seemed, with you, to imagine, that an *increase*, instead of a diminution, in these exports, would be produced by the peace. In refuting this error, I observed, that the increase in our manufactures exported to the United States had arisen from four causes: 1. from the regular increase of population and consequent wealth of the United States; 2. from the decline in the manufactures of Holland, and the suspension of those of France and the countries now annexed to her empire; 3. from the emigration to the United States, occasioned by the war; 4. from the re-exportation of our manufactures from the United States to the colonies of France, Holland, and Spain. I next stated that till our connection with America should be interrupted by the rivalry of France, or by the hostility of the American government, we should retain all the increase in our exports which had arisen from the *regular increase in the population and consequent wealth of the United States*, and that we should lose whatever had arisen from the other three temporary causes. Having laid down this as a basis for calculation, I showed that there had since 1790 been an increase of little more than *one-fifth* in the population (excluding emigrants) and *permanent wealth* of the United States; whence I concluded that there would, even in 1802, be a diminution of *one-fourth* in our exports to that country, on the correctness of which opinion I expressed my readiness to stake my life.

Now, Sir, by turning to the report of the secretary of the treasury, you will doubtless be astonished to see how exactly his statements concur with this opinion. In speaking of the imports on merchandise and tonnage, he proceeds in his calculations upon the position, "that the *permanent wealth* of the United States has, during the war, increased in no greater proportion than their *population*," and that, therefore, all the increase in the imposts, during the same period, beyond this proportion, will *now cease*. The imposts of 1801 amounted, he says, to dollars 10,500,000, and he calculates, that the annual amount of those imposts for the next eight years will be 9,500,000; and, by comparing the imposts of 1792 with those of 1801, and determining the ratio of increase, you will find, that he calculates upon a diminution of nearly *one-third* in the impost of the year 1802. The positions of this part of his report, the reasoning thereon, the conclusion he draws therefrom, and even the words he makes use of, so exactly correspond with my own, that, were

7,517,530*l.*; while the same in 1802 was 5,329,490*l.* By which it appears, that the actual falling off in our trade for the stated year was to an amount of more than 300,000*l.* beyond Mr. COBBETT's prediction. To this Table of Mr. MARSHALL there is a note, in which he says:—"The increase of both export to, and import " from, the foreign West Indies after 1795, arose from several islands successively " falling into the possession of England; and *their being given up to their previous possessors at the Peace of Amiens in 1801-2, accounts for the sudden and " great reduction in 1802-5,*" &c.—Ed.

his report not dated at the very time that my letters were in the press, you might be tempted to believe, that the statements of the latter were borrowed from those of the former. He, indeed, speaks of American *imposts* and I of British *exports*, but if there be a decrease in the former, it must arise from a previous decrease in the latter, which always have been, and yet are, the principal source of American imposts.

To *my* opinion, Sir, I could not suppose, that either you or the ministry, or the people, would pay much attention; and, even backed with such authority as that which I have here cited, I have very little hope of producing much effect. *Peace* is the word. Peace and plenty is, and will be, the cry till our manufacturers are starving for bread, and till our merchantmen are rotten in our ports.

I am aware, Sir, that you are not singular in your notion respecting an *increase* of commerce to be produced by the peace. A right hon. gentleman, whose opinion has for many years past been a law with the people of this country, concurred with you in sentiment on this point; whether he concurs with you *now*, I do not know; for, he has already had occasion to hear of the stagnation of trade, in *all* its branches, and of the alarming falling off in the receipts of the customs. There is no longer that crowd and bustle at the Custom-house, which prevailed previously to the peace and plenty. Merchants may now get their business dispatched with great ease and comfort to their clerks; nor will there be any occasion to tear down houses to build wharfs, and erect iron bridges, for the purpose of "enlarging the port of London." There are men, Sir, who imagine that this stagnation of trade is but *temporary*; that it will be done away by the definitive treaty; and, upon this presumption it is, that the minister has been teased with the anxious inquiries of merchants and manufacturers respecting the concluding of that compact. This is, however, a gross error. That the present state of uncertainty adds to the diminution, which has already commenced, I can readily believe; but that trade has begun to depart from us, and the definitive treaty, though it will unfurl a few yards of canvass, which are now reefed up in the port of London, will, in the course of two years, reduce our two millions of tonnage to less than a million and a half, every particle of which loss will go to aggrandize our already too powerful rival and enemy.

You begin to feel the force of these truths; I know you do; but your reply will be: "Would you then have continued the war for ever to prevent this loss of trade?" No, Sir; but I would, had I been minister, have continued the war till I could have brought the enemy to such terms of peace *as would have enabled me with safety to diminish the expenses of the country in proportion to the diminution of our commerce.* Without effecting this object, peace is not only as bad, but it is worse than war. If it shall be found that, contrary to my opinion, this object is effected, there are few people who will rejoice more sincerely than I shall; but if time should confirm my apprehensions, I shall think myself fully justified in complaining of the conduct of those who, by their ill-timed and indecent manifestations of public joy, furnished the ignorant admirers of peace with an excuse for demolishing my house, because I refused to join in their swinish exultation.

I am, Sir,

Your most humble,

and most obedient Servant,

W. M. COBBETT.

FRENCH MORALS.

THE following statement of the births, marriages, divorces, and deaths, in Paris, during the year 1801, is taken from the *Moniteur* of Feb. 18, 1802:—

Born in wedlock.....	14,829
Bastards	4,841
	Total births.... 19,670
Marriages	3,826
Divorces*	720
Died in their own houses	12,510
Died in the poor-houses and hospitals.....	8,257
Found dead in the streets	201
	Total deaths.... 20,968

The births in Paris, for the year 1784, were estimated at 20,500, and the population at 680,000 souls. They are, then, diminished only 800 in number, and we may therefore conclude that the population is now 650,000. The divorces and bastards exhibit a horrid total; and when we perceive that more than one-third of the whole of the persons who die, expire in poor-houses and hospitals, we may form some judgment of the prosperity and happiness of the people. Another item in the above statement will convey a tolerably correct notion of the degree of personal safety enjoyed in the metropolis of Jacobinism, that is, the number of persons *found dead in the streets*; during the year this number is 201, to which if we add all the deaths arising from the acts of assassination and suicide, committed in the houses, the picture is enough to make the stoutest heart tremble. This is the scene of gayety, and the emporium of the fine arts, to which English fools are flocking for pleasure and refinement! Feeling, as we do, that it is the bounden duty of every one (who has it in his power) to expose such facts as those above stated, we cannot refrain from expressing our indignation at the attempt, which has lately been made, by persons high in office here, to stifle every inquiry,

* Mr. BURKE states, that during the *three first months* of the year 1793 the number of divorces in Paris alone amounted to 562, while the marriages, for the same period, were 1785; the proportion of divorces to marriages being not much less than that of one to three! When BUONAPARTE became lawgiver, he made a new law of divorce, the principle of which was as bad as were the practices of his wild predecessors in government. BUONAPARTE'S enactment has since been expunged from the *Cinque Codes*; and the French are now, we believe, in this respect, just as they stood before the Revolution.—ED.

and to suppress every exposure, respecting the wickedness of persons in France. Such attempts are so flagrantly immoral, so detestably base, and of a tendency so baneful to our own country, that we would fain hope the authors of them will desist. Should they not, however, they may be assured, that we shall not fail to discharge our duty, in contrasting their present conduct with their former public and *written* professions, and in exposing the motives from which they now act.

BULL-BAITING.

LETTER TO THE REV. MESSRS. NARES AND BELOE,

CONDUCTORS AND PROPRIETORS OF THE "BRITISH CRITIC."

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.]—MR. COBBETT was always an advocate for such sports as tend to exercise bodily strength among the country people. Probably he derived some of his opinions on this matter from Mr. WINDHAM, who, though a person of great gentleness in his own manners, advised the encouraging of such things. When Mr. COBBETT went to live at Botley, in 1806, he, together with some gentlemen of the neighbourhood, established prizes for players in the game of *singlestick*. The play used to take place in the village of Botley, and it continued, with great spirit, until the time when Mr. COBBETT was sent to his two years of imprisonment in Newgate. How singular has been the degeneracy of our best national games! Witness our *boxing-matches*, the foremost patrons of which, persons in the higher and richer orders, have brought them into their present infamy by making them mere gambling transactions.

GENTLEMEN,—I have long observed, and not without great mortification, that the *British Critic* has abandoned the principles upon which it set out, and that it has, in many instances, favoured the cause of the PURITANS.

On two articles, in your last number, I think it my duty to make some remarks. The first is your review (if, indeed, it can be so called) of a *sermon on bull-baiting*, preached by the Rev. Edward Barry, in the parish church of Wokingham, Berks, on the 20th of Dec. 1801, being the day previous to the annual bull-bait in that town. After bestowing some commendation on the sermon, you say: "We find with regret, that, *even in Parliament*, this SAVAGE SPORT has been *again defended*. But we learn with *astonishment*, that, in the parish of Wokingham, not only one bull is provided by the charitable donation of Geo. Staverton, in 1661, but a second bull is purchased annually out of the poor-rates;" for which you censure the parish officers and the justices for allowing "such an unwarrantable article in the overseers' accounts." You conclude by asking this question: "After all, is not every bull-baiting indictable at common law, as a public nuisance?"

That you should think bull-baiting a "savage sport" would not be at all astonishing, had you not had an opportunity of perusing the late debate in Parliament; but having had that opportunity, and having, as evidently

appears from your own reflections, actually perused that debate, your observations may be fairly ascribed to perverseness.

As to the conduct of the parish officers of Wokingham, I can, for my part, perceive nothing censurable in it, though so loudly condemned by Mr. Barry and the British critics. It is the duty of those officers to provide *meat* for the poor; bull-beef is the cheapest, and I see no harm, no "*misapplying* of the money intrusted to them," if the overseers can find the means of at once providing the poor with food and with sport at the festive season of the year. Nor is there any thing "*savage*" in the practice. The poor at Wokingham first bait the bull, and afterwards slaughter him and eat him, with just as little ferocity as the lord of the manor first hunts the hare to death, worries her, and breaks her heart, and then devours her, broken heart and all. The magistrates are guilty of no "*negligence*" in allowing the charge in the overseers' accounts. The Court of King's Bench *would* compel them to allow it. It is a charge for the price of a bull purchased for and given to the poor: with the manner of treating that bull, previous to the killing of him, neither the magistrates nor the Court of King's Bench have any right of inquiry.

No, no, gentlemen, be assured that bull-baiting is *not* "*indictable* at common law, as a public nuisance." The common law, on the contrary, fully sanctions the baiting of bulls, and, I believe, that to sell the flesh of a bull, which has *not* been baited, is an offence, which is punishable by that very law to which you appeal. You have echoed the puritanical denunciation which has rung, and which is yet ringing, through every part of the country. In the hands of the busy sect which has undertaken to *reform* the manners of the people, the law would become a most dreadful scourge; a curse instead of a blessing. The life of a poor man would be ten million times worse than that of a negro slave. Every assemblage of persons, except at a club or conventicle, would be embraced in the vague denomination of "*a public nuisance.*" The "*ungodly games and anti-christian sports,*" against which the murderers of the martyr Charles so furiously inveighed, would be totally suppressed, as a prelude to the ulterior views of the "*gospel-preaching ministry,*" who have already created a schism in that church, which it is your duty to defend, but which you have shamefully deserted. No, no, gentlemen, the law is not yet to be twisted to the purposes of this gloomy and intolerant sect. For those, who assemble to commit acts of violence on the persons or the property of his Majesty's subjects; for the base villains who, under the cover of night, lead an ignorant rabble to demolish a man's house,* the law has, indeed, provided a punishment; but none has it ever contemplated for those who, without injuring the person or property of their neighbour, choose to enjoy the contest between two of those animals, from which, though man is their sovereign lord, he derives the most noble example of courage and of fortitude.

I am, Gentlemen, &c.,

WM. COBBETT.

* See our Note, p. 254.—ED.

MULTITUDE OF LAWS.

WE congratulate the country on the fate of the "Manure Bill," which, on the motion of Lord Holland, has been thrown by, as being of a nature too trifling and low for the consideration of the House of Peers, a motion for which his lordship will receive the thanks of every considerate man in the nation. The *multitude of laws* has been, and with good reason, reckoned amongst the greatest calamities of the French Revolution. In America, where there are eighteen different sets of lawgivers hard at work every year, from about Michaelmas to Lady-day, legislating upon trifles, has finally produced such indifference with respect to legislative decisions, that a new law is regarded as the mere lumber of a newspaper. Yet these lessons produce no effect. There are a set of *well meaning men*, in this country, who would pass laws for the regulating and restraining of every feeling of the human breast, and every motion of the human frame; they would bind us down, hair by hair, as the Lilliputians did Gulliver, till anon, when we awoke from our sleep, we should wonder by whom we had been enslaved.

PITT SYSTEM.

FROM the result of the elections in general, we are led to hope, that the race of "well-meaning men," of "economists" and "philanthropists," will have experienced a considerable diminution. The disorder of this nation is not a fever, but a palsy. Any thing that will enliven is good. An actual rebellion would not be half so dangerous as that torpor, that total indifference, which has lately prevailed; the former might be quelled, but the latter, if it continue for any length of time, must end in radical destruction. The decline of life and of genius has ever been marked by a return to childish fancies and amusements; and really the last House of Commons, with its bills about "bull-baiting" and "rabbits' dung," exhibited a scene strongly resembling the last stages of mortality; a scene so disgusting, so humiliating to the nation, and so pleasing to its enemies, we hope never again to behold within the walls of St. Stephen. With the new parliament we hope to see also a new ministry; or, at least, an efficient and responsible ministry. We believe Mr. Addington to be a very *honest* man, but what is that? Honesty alone is not a recommendation for a footman, and shall it be for a first minister? He is not altogether destitute of talents as an orator, and even, perhaps, as a financier. In truth, he is what may be called a clever man. But he wants those great and commanding qualities, which mark the statesman, and which are at this time, more than ever, necessary to the preservation of the country. There are several persons in the ministry possessed of very good talents, nor are they at all deficient in point of industry and zeal; but they want weight, they want consequence, they want birth. At no period of our history were the powers of Government ever shared by so

few men of family. The ancient nobility and gentry of the kingdom have, with a very few exceptions, been thrust out of all public employments: this part of the aristocracy has been, in some measure, banished from the councils of the State. A race of merchants, and manufacturers, and bankers, and loan-jobbers, and contractors, have usurped their place, and the Government is very fast becoming what it must be expected to become in such hands. We think it probable that Mr. Pitt may again be Minister, and if he should, we hope he will perceive and avoid the evil consequences of surrounding himself with *low* and *little men*. In a minister who is himself a little man, it may be excused; but Mr. Pitt must always be great, even among the greatest. If Mr. Pitt should ever cast his eye upon this page, we are well persuaded he will not impute any selfish or malicious motive to the writer of it, and we therefore beg leave to tell him what many good men think, what is thought by many of his warmest admirers, but what he will never hear from any body but ourselves; and that is, that his preference of low churchmen has excited great jealousy and suspicion in those who are sincerely attached to the hierarchy, amongst whom are certainly to be reckoned a vast majority of the clergy; that the project, imputed to him, for rendering the clergy pensioners of the State, has greatly strengthened this suspicion; that, in short, the clergy do not regard him as a friend of the church. While Jacobinism was at our doors, while all was in jeopardy, the clergy supported him, because the existence of the Church and State was, in some sort, identified with his administration; but, now that the danger of commotion and rebellion is past, the minds of men will return to considerations of a nature somewhat more private, and, he may rest assured, that the attachment of this powerful body, powerful by their numbers, their talents, their character, and their local situations, is to be preserved by nothing short of unequivocal testimony, that he harbours no intention of invading or undermining the Established Church; to effect which was, as many persons believe, the sole object of the establishment of the Board of Agriculture, a belief which has been but too strongly corroborated by the proceedings and publications of that Board. We also beg leave to tell him, that his partiality for young and new men, for persons of his own creation, to the almost total exclusion of the old nobility and gentry, is a subject of complaint with a great number of very good men. In the present state of this country a minister might set the nobility and gentry at defiance, if the ill-will excited amongst them could be confined to their own breasts; but it cannot; the people, we mean the better sort of the people, resent the neglect and ill-treatment of those whom they have been, from their infancy, in the habit of respecting, more especially when the honours and favours due to them are conferred on persons of mean birth. *Il vaut mieux qu'une cité périsse qu'un parvenu la gouverne*, is an old Norman proverb; and though the age of chivalry is certainly gone, men yet retain soul enough to dislike the power that places them beneath an upstart. This upstart system naturally grew out of the peculiar circumstances under which Mr. Pitt came into power. It was adhered to, with some exceptions, from the first moment of his administration to the last: he appears never to have voluntarily and cordially given the hand to any thing great, whether of birth, character, or talent. Let us hope that, if he should again come into power, he will discard a system so injurious to the harmony and welfare of the State. Another error, which it is to be hoped Mr. Pitt will correct, is, that superabundant caution which prevents him from clearly and unequivocally

stating his object and his resolution, which leaves the public mind for ever in a state of uncertainty, and which has, in so many instances, proved injurious to the country. To this very error, and to this error alone, the French Republic owes all its successes. The British Parliament never, at any one time, knew the real object of the late war; and how then should Europe know it? From an over-anxiety not to fail in any enterprise, the British Minister acted in a way in which he never could be said to undertake; and therefore he was never cordially joined, either at home or abroad. No man voluntarily embarks to be drifted to and fro by the tide, or to shift his course with every change of the wind; but, tell him his destination, and he cheerfully braves the toils and dangers of the sea. Mr. Pitt's forte lies in the domestic rather than the foreign department of politics. Having, from his very youth, had one eye constantly upon the Bank and the other upon the Parliament House, he has never been able to look abroad into the great world of politics. Without therefore at all detracting from the powers of his mind, we may venture to say, that he has discovered no great degree of penetration as to the conduct, the interests, and views of other nations. This is a science, however, which he must now apply himself to. The career on which he is now about to enter bears no resemblance to that which he has heretofore run. The present peace has laid the foundation for an entirely new distribution of power, the effects of which must be felt in a very few years. We must then have war; and it behoves him to consider how we shall be able to resist the confederacy which France can, and will, form against us. It behoves him to consider, *in time*, how the people of this country are again to be roused to arms. "Husbanding our resources" will not save us. France has neither "commerce, capital, nor credit," yet, at only six weeks' notice, she ships off an army of thirty thousand men across the Atlantic. She has, in the whole, sent 45,000 men, and more are preparing. This shows that "commerce, credit, and capital," are not essentially necessary to the power of France; and we hope that Mr. Pitt will no longer regard a contest with that power as "a war of finance." Men are very apt to attach the greatest degree of importance to that science which they best understand: "You may," said the currier, "think what you please about stone and oak, but if you have a mind to have the town well fortified, take my word for it there is nothing like leather." We have opposed money to a military spirit, and we have failed. Let the eloquence of Mr. Pitt be employed to create something more efficient than wealth; something that France cannot rob us of; then will he acquire a renown more lasting than brass and marble.

THE ENGLISH PRESS AND BUONAPARTE.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.]—The reader will be much entertained by a review of the part which Mr. COBBETT took at this period, when BUONAPARTE'S insolence laid the foundation of that fixed hatred which our Government afterwards entertained for him, and when Mr. COBBETT'S free lashings of the press, for their truckling to BUONAPARTE, added not a little to the envy and malignity which his previous independent career had inspired. The reader will see, from the Postscript to the following article, that Mr. COBBETT'S caution to the

"knights of the quill" (page 265) was not given without good reason. The reproaches and threats of the French government-press soon forced the English Government to *check* the press of this country. The French Minister, M. OTTO, by the express order of BUONAPARTE, applied to the English government to cause Mr. COBBETT to be prosecuted criminally for his satires on the great conqueror.—*Register*, vol. iii., p. 102.—The *Register* was not the only medium adopted by Mr. COBBETT to make known his opinions; for at this time (February 1801) he started a monthly periodical, bearing a stamp, and the contents of which were in the French language. The publication was entitled LE MERCURE ANGLAIS DE COBBETT (Cobbett's English Mercury), and was intended for readers on the Continent.

To constitute a politician, it formerly required a large stock of information, as well as a considerable share of acuteness; it was necessary to know the extent, population, and resources, warlike and pecuniary, of each of the principal States of Europe, and to obtain some acquaintance with the characters, interests, dispositions, and views of the different sovereigns, as well as of their respective ministers, and of the political parties in each State. This is no longer the case: the whole science is now reduced to the capacity of learning *the will of Buonaparte*. That will is indeed, sometimes, very difficult to ascertain with precision; but when you have ascertained it, you may place perfect reliance on seeing its dictates obeyed. This remark, which we made more circumstantially on a former occasion, has been fully verified in the effects lately produced by Buonaparte's attack on the English Ministers and the English press. An article in the *Moniteur* of the 9th of August last contains the most infamous libel on the Ministers and Government of this country that perhaps ever was published in the world. It accuses the last Ministry of exciting the massacres of September, of causing the manufacturing cities to be destroyed, and of influencing the movements by which the King was brought to the scaffold. The present Ministers it accuses of hiring the pages of the English newspaper called the *Times*, and of employing them to circulate the grossest calumnies against the rulers of France. It accuses them of receiving French robbers and assassins, of harbouring them at Jersey, and of sending them to make predatory incursions, to rob, murder, and to burn houses, on the coasts of France. It accuses them of giving their special protection to the person whom it chooses to regard as the inventor of the infernal machine, and this, too, as a recompense for that invention. To cap this climax of most impudent and atrocious falsehoods, it insinuates, that if the infernal machine had succeeded in killing the First Consul, the assassin would have been created a Knight of the Garter.*

As to hiring the proprietor of the *Times*, we shall say but little. *Once* to have hired such a man merits everlasting suspicion and reproach; and, to say the truth, we believe that the *Times* is, to this moment, as much in the pay of Government as the *True Briton* is. But while we

* See the translation of this article of the *Moniteur*, *Register*, vol. ii. p. 179.—To show to what an extent we were insulted by the Government of BUONAPARTE at this time, Mr. COBBETT observes (*Register*, vol. ii. p. 857):—"There is, in one of the picture-rooms at Versailles, a design of a monument to the memory of Robejot and Bonnier, the two French plenipotentiaries, who were assassinated in the neighbourhood of Rastadt; and upon a pedestal represented in this picture are these words: *Ils furent égorgés par des assassins soudoyés par le Gouvernement Anglois.*" (They were murdered by assassins in the pay of the English Government.)—ED.

candidly confess our belief that the articles in the *Times*, which have given such offence to Buonaparte, were, if not dictated, approved of by the Ministers, we are far from acknowledging that those articles were not true and proper to be published. There are, in this country, hundreds and thousands of traitors, whose whole time is spent in endeavours to produce the subversion of the Government; and is it not the duty of Ministers to endeavour to counteract them? And how can they do this more effectually, than by showing the people what has been produced by a subversion of government in France? By drawing a comparison between the monarchy and the republic, between Louis XVI. and Buonaparte, between the wooden shoes of 1789 and the fetters of 1802?

It is not, however, for the sake of exposing the impudence and insolence of the up-start Corsican that we have introduced these remarks, but for the purpose of showing how completely he has brought our Government to his feet. And here we must beg leave to premise that the newspapers called the *True Briton* and the *Sun* are, in some sort, the *property* of the Ministers. They are, at any rate, as absolutely at the command as the *Moniteur* is at the command of Buonaparte. This being acknowledged (and we believe nobody will deny it), the language of these two papers will enable the world to judge of the effect which the threats of the Consul have produced on the British Ministry.

As the menacing *Moniteur* arrived late at night, the article of which we have been speaking was, of course, inserted in the *True Briton*, before the editor had an opportunity of receiving his instructions from the Treasury; and as the attack on the Ministers (particularly *Mr. Pitt*) was inserted, it was thought necessary to insert also something by way of defence. This defence was not, indeed, very spirited; but it contradicted the falsehoods of the *Moniteur*, and took the liberty to remind Buonaparte, that, if England did really *hire* the assassins of September, he would do well to ask Fouché and other persons concerned in the massacres, and now in the Government, what became of the *wages*. Before the next morning, however, the Ministers had had time to convey their instructions, and the tone of the *True Briton* instantly changed. We shall copy this second article at length:—

“*The more we reflect upon the article which we had yesterday occasion to animadvert upon, the more we see grounds for supposing that it could not have been inserted in the Moniteur with the knowledge and consent of the French government.*” [Not so much as a *hint* of this sort was given the day before.] “We are the more inclined to *indulge* in this opinion, when we recollect that some time ago an article appeared in the same paper, in which justice was, in some degree, done to the talents and virtues of *the late Minister*. We can hardly suppose it possible that the men who thus had magnanimity enough to pay just homage to one who had so lately been their enemy, would condescend to authorize the publication, in the face of Europe, and of the civilized world, of assertions at once so mean and so groundless. But even if the French government chose, which we believe *improbable*, to vent its spleen against the man who *conciliates* the admiration of *all nations*, and must continue to be that of *all posterity, while civilized society has existence*, why should it indulge in *invectives* against the present Ministers of this country? men who have established peace between the two nations with a candour and sincerity of conduct which must entitle them to the respect and *esteem of all mankind*,—who have produced a reconciliation at which both nations so warmly and sincerely rejoiced, and which it is so much the interest of both to render complete and permanent. For the expression of any hostile sentiments, we are certain there can be no reasonable grounds, and therefore it is that we are *bound to believe* any member of the French government incapable of entertaining it. The article

“ in question we are inclined, ‘upon the whole,’ to think the offspring merely of
 “ some malevolent writer in the French journal, who either gratifies his per-
 “ sonal feelings, or has some interested end to answer, by an attempt to disturb
 “ the good understanding which prevails between two Governments, upon whose
 “ pacific dispositions so entirely depend the tranquillity and happiness of the world.”

Such was the reply to the false, malicious, impudent, and insolent article in the *Moniteur* ! It is not upon the language of a French and an English newspaper that we are commenting, but upon that of Buonaparte and Talleyrand on one side, and of Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury on the other. These poor men may endeavour to disguise their and our disgrace, but all their endeavours will be in vain. Every politician, every man of common information, in Europe and America, knows that such an article could not have been inserted in the *Moniteur*, without the express command of Buonaparte. The Ministers know it as well as Sir John Brute knew that his wife was in the closet ; but, like Sir John, they know, too, that their antagonist wears a sword ; and, if we are not misinformed, he has upon this occasion reminded them of that awful circumstance, in terms too explicit to be misunderstood.

But what are the views of Buonaparte ? His views are, first to silence the English press, as far as it relates to himself, family, and government ; and, second, to sink still lower, in the eyes of the world, the character of the English government and nation. In the latter he has succeeded to the full extent of his wishes ; but the news-printers affect to believe that he will never succeed in the former, which, in their eyes, is far the most valuable of the two. As to the *honour of the nation*, its character for good faith, for fortitude, for generosity, for valour, and for loyalty, that they will yield you with little reluctance ; but the *liberty of the press* ! the “ palladium of freemen !” the “ birthright of Britons !” this precious possession they are determined to enjoy. To a certain extent they may. They will have full liberty to ridicule, contemn and abuse every person and institution belonging to the church or the state of this kingdom ; and as to foreign states, they may freely revile all those which are not closely connected with France. With respect to those that are so connected, they must be cautious ; and should they have the folly to attack France herself, their fate is not at all difficult to be foreseen. If, however, they are a little cramped in this quarter, they will be amply compensated by the unlimited swing which Buonaparte will allow them against all the powers which he may wish to destroy.

The knights of the quill have talked of the *impossibility* of silencing them ; and some of them have gone so far as to challenge Buonaparte to meet them in Westminster Hall. Are they aware of the probable consequence of this challenge should the hero of Acre accept of it ? Are they certain what would be the verdict of a *pacific* jury, if told by the Attorney-General, that the licentiousness of the press, if suffered to remain unpunished, would inevitably produce another war with France ? Another “ extended, expensive, and bloody war !” A war that would again raise the quartern loaf to eighteen pence, and compel the Minister to re-impose the Income-tax ! We do not ask the knights of the quill whether a jury would not, under such a persuasion, give a verdict of guilty against a man who should censure Buonaparte ; but we ask them, whether they are quite sure, that such a verdict would not fall upon any one whom the Consul might choose to have punished for printing and publishing the Lord’s Prayer, the Apostles’ Creed, or the Decalogue ?

There would, indeed, be Lord Ellenborough to place the broad and impenetrable shield of his integrity between the innocent printer and the wrath of Buonaparte; but if a man can, merely by holding his tongue, save his lordship the trouble, it may be full as well to do it.

The truth is, that the *liberty of the press*, as far as relates to Buonaparte or to his government, is completely at an end. The news-printers may, for a little while, vent their anger in puns and fables; but even in these they will gradually become more and more timid, till, at last, not one person in ten thousand will be able to discover who or what is the object of their satire. Nor are we certain that this circumstance, in itself considered, ought to excite much regret. Nine-tenths of the censure bestowed on Buonaparte by the English prints is levelled against his good, and not against his evil, deeds; and, if it has any rational object, it is to create a thousand tyrants in France by the destruction of one despot. Those whose silly factious heads are filled with lofty notions about the liberty of the press we leave to mourn over the dumb-founded columns of the newspapers; for our parts, we should not be sorry to behold the complete destruction of that which has been the most efficacious instrument of destruction, which has filled the world with falsehood, hypocrisy, atheism, and rebellion;* but the worst of it is, this dreadful instrument, this truly "infernal machine," will still be employed against every body and thing, except Buonaparte and his government.

The knights of the quill, in order to justify their animadversions on the Consul and his measures, remind him of the *greater liberties* which they

* We may here remind the reader, that the paper attacked in the above article happened to be the very same in which the Government had offered Mr. COBBETT a share when he came from America. See our *Preface*, p. xii. This view of the merits of the press agrees with all that he has ever said upon the subject. No one ever wrote more earnestly than he did in favour of removing impediments to printing and publishing; for he always said, that the effect of such impediments must be to stifle the truth. Yet, when of late it was asserted that the tax upon the newspapers of the day was a tax upon "knowledge," he denied that assertion, and contended that the tax was one upon "lies and nonsense." For saying this, Mr. COBBETT has been accused of singularity in opinion. But why? Other men, of various political parties, have made remarks of the same kind. Much of BURKE'S rage, in his *Thoughts on the French Revolution*, is directed against that phalanx of men of letters who were maintained by the "monied interest." The writer of the *Anecdotes of Lord Chatham*, in speaking of the American Tea Act, observes:—"Upon this occasion the Ministry resorted to the same methods to deceive the nation, which had been so successfully practised by their predecessors, and during the administration of the Earl of Bute; namely, hiring a number of writers, hiring a number of newspapers, and printing an immense number of pamphlets, which were sent, free of postage and expense, to every part of the kingdom. At the same time, all those writers and printers who presumed to arraign the conduct of Ministers, were prosecuted in the Court of King's Bench. Addresses highly flattering to Ministers in their contest with America, were procured from every venal borough and town. By the hired pens of Dr. S. JOHNSON, MESSRS. DALRYMPLE, MACPHERSON, STEWART, LIND, KNOX, NAUDUIT, &c., and other artifices, the nation was again deluded and duped."—Vol. ii. cap. 41.—JEFFERSON, a great ultra-republican, is not more complimentary to our "free press." In a letter written from Paris, he says:—"You know well that that (the English) Government always kept a kind of standing army of news-writers, who, without any regard to truth, or to what should be like truth, invented, and put into the papers, whatever might serve the Ministers. This suffices with the mass of the people, who have no means of distinguishing the false from the true paragraphs of a newspaper. When forced to acknowledge our independence, they were forced to redouble their efforts to keep the nation quiet."—*Life*, &c. vol. i. p. 343.—Ed.

formerly took with the Bourbons and the monarchical government of France, without ever having produced any complaints from that quarter, much less recrimination and threats of hostility. What answer Buonaparte will make to this we know not : ours is ready : " You will now learn, " then, that *lawful kings* are not the most overbearing of mortals ; and, " while the liberties you took with the Bourbons cannot possibly be a justification for your taking liberties with him who has driven the Bourbons from their throne, it may not be amiss for you to reflect, how far " the scandalous misrepresentations and falsehoods, propagated by the " English press, against the monarchical government of France, may have " contributed towards the destruction of that government, the exaltation " of Buonaparte, and, of course, your present humiliation."

We are very anxious to enable our readers to form a correct opinion as to the feelings produced in his Majesty's Ministers by the bullying paragraphs of Buonaparte, and, for this purpose, we shall again have recourse to the *True Briton*. In that paper of the 10th of August appeared the supplement to the consular constitution, followed by certain comments from which we shall extract several passages. On the 13th came the *Moniteur* containing the reproaches respecting the press, &c. SINCE that, there has appeared in the *True Briton*, another set of comments on the change in the French constitution, not only completely unsaying all that had before been said in the very same paper, but strongly censuring those who had taken the liberty to animadvert on the said constitutional change. That these two sets of comments may the more easily be compared, we shall insert them directly after each other, begging the reader, before he enters on the perusal of them, to fortify his breast, lest it should burst with indignation against the men, who have brought on their country such indelible disgrace.

Comments, in the True Briton, PREVIOUS to the Receipt of the menacing Article in the Moniteur.

" Buonaparte was seated on the throne of the Bourbons. He promised every thing ; he *swore* to preserve this new form of government without deterioration. Scarcely a week had elapsed, before he *altered a considerable part of its fundamental principles* ; and, on the remonstrance of Sieyes, he placed his sword on the written copy, and asked whether any person could dispute the power which that instrument could enforce ?

* * * * *

" Since that period, the constitution *was but a name*, the First Consul every thing.

" The present constitution is therefore the sole offspring of the First Consul's brain, and it may be observed respecting it, that he has shown in its organization, *a total ignorance of every kind of legislative principles.*

* * * * *

" It must not, however, be supposed, that the constitution which we now present to our readers, has been a sudden ebullition from the restless and impetuous temper of this man. We are warranted in asserting that it has been the fruit of at least six weeks' vast meditation ; it was kept in embryo till the votes could be collected respecting his nomination for life, and when that point was decided (which *his bayonets rendered almost certain*) it was popped on the kind public, as an evidence of the gratitude and wisdom of their modern Solomon.

* * * * *

" This constitution was presented to the French nation, in a manner that argues *an utter contempt of public opinion*. Some change was expected by the people, but it was hoped it would be a change from military despotism to civil authority. On the contrary, it was ushered to their notice amidst the thunders of martial power, and: was adopted by the Conservative Senate of France, *the*

“only remaining wretched depository of popular authority, on the very same day
 “on which it was presented to their consideration. This event proves either
 “that it was above their capacity, it being of divine origin, or that they were such
 “timid slaves (not forgetting their 1200*l.* per annum) as to adopt it without dis-
 “cussion. *O wretched and degraded senate!* to what a hapless condition has the
 “terror of military apparatus reduced you! *O wretched people,* who have shed
 “the blood of thousands, for a principle you can never obtain! Like Ixion, you
 “have seized a phantom instead of a substance, and while you calumniated the
 “rest of mankind as slaves, *you have proved yourselves unworthy of that freedom*
 “for which you have disturbed the peace of all mankind; the peace of nations
 “who would have known happiness, had they never known your crimes.
 “Senators of France! the Roman senate, after the usurpation of Octavius,
 “became a farce and a pageant. The old forms were preserved, amidst the car-
 “rear of despotism. ‘What a collection,’ said Tiberius, the last time he was in
 “the senate, ‘of willing slaves!’”

*Comments, in the True Briton, AFTER the Receipt of the menacing Article
 in the Moniteur.*

“In resuming our remarks upon the new Constitution of France, we cannot
 “but observe that it hath been discussed, or rather *abused*, with considerable vio-
 “lence, by some of our contemporary journalists. It appears to us that the dis-
 “tinction between the internal policy and the exterior relations of France, has
 “not been sufficiently marked and preserved in many of these discussions. That
 “the *vehement* advocate for liberty should declaim against the present system of
 “government in France is by no means surprising; but that such a spirit should
 “lead to gross invectives against that country, or its chief magistrate, *is greatly*
 “*to be lamented.* Whether France now possesses the only government which is
 “suited to her disposition or her character, is a question that may be calmly dis-
 “cussed without violence and without agitation. Why direct the grossest in-
 “vectives against the chief magistrate of the French Republic, for doing that,
 “which *it remains yet to be proved, is not an act beneficial to the French nation?*
 “Liberty in the hands of those who know not how to enjoy it, can only degene-
 “rate into anarchy, and *the only remedy for anarchy is the strong arm of power.*
 “Governments are good or bad only in proportion as they are adapted to the
 “respective characters of the people who are subject to them. It is evident,
 “that if the British constitution was suddenly transplanted into Turkey or Persia,
 “it could not take root in either of those countries, because no soil could
 “there be found analogous to its properties and its habits. The fundamental
 “error of most of the speculatists upon government, has consisted in beginning
 “with theory instead of experience.

* * * * *

“Whether the present constitution of France is calculated to promote the
 “comfort and happiness of the individuals of that nation, *time only can determine;*
 “but when compared with the monstrous systems of democatrical, or of oligar-
 “chical tyranny which have preceded it, *the people of France have certainly reason*
 “*to congratulate themselves on the change.* More has unquestionably been done
 “under the present system to conciliate the feelings of the heart, and increase
 “the stock of domestic comfort, than under any system which preceded it since
 “the revolution.

“This subject may be considered in many different points of view, but let it be
 “discussed with temper and with moderation. To mix with the discussions, in-
 “vectives and reproaches, breathing in some degree a spirit of hostility, is unne-
 “cessary and improper, impolitic and unjust. The government of France,
 “become more consecrated, and surrounded with pacific emblems, offers an
 “additional security for the permanence of the peace. To blend therefore re-
 “marks upon the constitution of France with invectives which can only wound
 “and irritate, *betrays a spirit inconsistent with that peace which this country has*
 “*promised to maintain,* and is desirous of preserving. While France faithfully
 “maintains, on her side, the peace which has been so happily effected between
 “the two countries, it is obviously *in the highest degree improper to make an hostile*
 “*attack upon her Government and her chief magistrate, which can only provoke*
 “*animosity and engender hatred.*”

Such has been the effect of the threats of Buonaparte! Such is the

meanness, the cowardice, the undescrivable wretchedness, of the British Ministry! We must once more remind our readers, that it is not the language and sentiments of a printer of news that we have here taken the pains to lay before them, but the language and sentiments of the Ministers; of those men, who, whatever they may be in point of character and talents, have, at this time, the nation's wealth, power, and reputation in their hands. Let us not comfort ourselves by hoping, that the world will confine its contempt to the Addingtons and the Hawkesburys: they are indeed justly entitled to the pre-eminence, but we shall all be partakers with them: they will be despised for their ministry, and the nation because they are Ministers.

POSTSCRIPT.

Political Register, August 21.

We have this moment heard, with great pain, but without any surprise, that a prosecution is commenced, by order of the Ministers, and at the request of Buonaparte, against Monsieur Peltier,* editor of a French periodical work, entitled *L'Ambigu*. In our last *Register* (p. 265), we made use of some very strong expressions in order to dissuade the writers of this country from their apparent intention to invite Buonaparte to a meeting in Westminster Hall. We then declared the liberty of the British press to be completely destroyed, as far as related to Buonaparte and his government; the prosecution of M. Peltier will convince every one of the truth of our assertion, especially when the nature of his publication is considered. We shall now witness a new scene of baseness; we shall now see newspapers, magazines, and reviews, filled with eulogiums of the Grand Consul, and with censure on those who disapprove of his proceedings. We desire M. Peltier not to deceive himself; not to expect support from the other periodical publications; the hunted stag is always shunned by the herd; and a baser herd than the one we are here speaking of, is not to be found even in this degenerate nation. The

* The prosecution against Monsieur PELTIER was conducted by the Attorney-General, the Hon. SPENCER PERCEVAL; and Mr. MACKINTOSH (the late Sir JAMES) was Counsel for the defendant. The trial took place before Lord ELLENBOROUGH, and PELTIER was found guilty. Our books of history and law contain all the particulars relative to this trial. See various numbers of the *Register*, vols. ii. and iii. After the trial, Mr. COBBETT addressed two letters to Mr. MACKINTOSH, in which he reprobates the mode in which that gentleman had defended his client, questions the "intrepidity" of such defences, and justifies Monsieur PELTIER, in an elaborate and ingenious argument upon the law and the facts of his case. *Register*, vol. iii. pp. 289, 321.—The prosecution ended with the verdict, Monsieur PELTIER never being called up to receive judgment. But the occurrence of the trial, though evidently a measure of conciliation towards BUONAPARTE, did not produce the intended effect. On the contrary the officiousness of our Government only served the scribe of the *Moniteur*, with fresh excuse for defiance and contemptuous ill-nature. "A person of the name "of PELTIER," says the *Moniteur*, in his comment, "has been found guilty, "before a court of justice at London, of printing and publishing some wretched "libels against the First Consul. It is not easy to imagine why the English "Ministry should affect to make this a matter of so much *éclat*. * * * The "First Consul was even ignorant of the existence of PELTIER's libels, till they "came to his knowledge in the public accounts of this trial, &c.—*Register*, vol. iii p. 374.—

newspapers will affect to bluster for a little while; but it will be mere affectation; they will out-crawl any of the spaniel Prefects of France. There prevails all through the country, a strong disposition to submit to Buonaparte. In two words, we are a *beaten* and a *conquered* people.

THE
TAKING OF THE INVINCIBLE STANDARD,
IN THE
BATTLE BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH ARMIES
NEAR ALEXANDRIA, MARCH 21, 1801.

[NOTE BY THE EDITORS.]—It would be impossible to make an abstract of this Narrative, without doing injustice to both the subject and the writer; and therefore we insert all of it, omitting only some quoted documents, for which the reader will find a reference to the columns of the *Register*. Nor will any thing in explanation be required from us: the history of the affair is so clearly and circumstantially stated by Mr. COBBETT. Here is one striking example of his power in detecting, exposing, and frustrating a grand public fraud; of the ability he possessed to set the nation free when entrapped by a deception, and to put to the rout, single-handed, a whole legion of its deceivers. The case of LUTZ made much noise in England for several months, entirely from the active and vigorous manner in which Mr. COBBETT took up and urged his cause. The question was not decided for some time. In the third volume of the *Register* there are several articles on the subject, with further evidence adduced on both sides. LUTZ became, in a short time, one of the most famous men of the day. A costly portrait of him was published by Mr. COBBETT, who says (*Register*, vol. iii. p. 169):—“The lovers of truth and justice will be glad to hear, that, amongst the numerous copies which have been sold of LUTZ’s portrait, several have gone to Petersburgh, Vienna, and Berlin; from which latter place I have received a request to publish my Narrative in *French* as well as English.” Though Mr. COBBETT never did, in the course of this discussion, offer any thing in detraction of the “Caledonian name,” the dispute on the main point became so hot at last that a Scotch writer, styling himself “A Retired Officer,” actually made a public call on the Attorney-general to prosecute the author of the Narrative for a *libel* on the Highlanders!

Render, therefore, to all their dues; tribute, to whom tribute; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour.—*Rom.* xiii. 7.

THE precept inculcated, in the words which I have chosen for my motto, has, with respect to the taking of the invincible standard, not only been unobserved, but directly and flagrantly disobeyed. Honours upon honours have, indeed, been rendered to this meritorious and gallant achievement; but they have been withheld from him who, alone, has any claim to them, and lavished upon others to whom they do not belong. The columns of our public papers, the windows of our print-shops, the canvass of our public exhibitions, the scenes of our theatres, the proceedings of public bodies, have proclaimed to the army of England, to the people of England, and to the whole world, that the honour of taking the invincible standard is due to some persons of the 42nd or Royal Highland Regiment; whereas the whole of that honour belongs to Antoine Lutz, a Frenchman by birth, and a private soldier in the Queen’s German Regiment. In doing justice to this gallant, though friendless,

foreigner, I could have wished to avoid every thing like controversy with any body, and particularly with any part of the army of Egypt; but I am compelled to controvert and to refute too, or to leave my duty undischarged. The Highlanders have claimed the honour; to them the meed has been awarded, through every channel which a nation has of conveying its sentiments to the world and to posterity: there is but *one* wreath of invincible laurel; before I can restore it to Lutz, I *must* take it from the brow of the Highlanders.

Most of my readers will remember, that for some time after the unofficial accounts of the battle of the 21st of March arrived, public report ascribed the victory of that day almost entirely to the 42nd regiment; not only in every narrative that was heard, was the Queen's German Regiment totally overlooked; but no other regiment found a place, except by way of a foil to the 42nd.—The Highlanders!—the brave Highlanders!—the more than invincible Highlanders!—were, as in Mr. Porter's panorama, always in the foreground; always active, always victorious. It was, in short, the Highlanders who won the battle, and therefore it was perfectly natural, that to them should belong the honour of *taking the invincible standard*, which was regarded as the sign and proof of that victory. The London newspapers, "never last to hand about a lie," soon began to lend their aid; whether gratuitously or not is more than I can say. In the month of February 1802 (I have lost the *day*), the following paragraph appeared in the ministerial paper, the *True Briton*: "Lieut. Corbett [not Cobbett] has arrived from Egypt with the official dispatches of the battle of the 21st of March, and brought with him the standard of a French corps taken in that battle, entitled 'The Invincible Legion of Buonaparte,' and *which was seized by the 42nd regiment, who were the particular object of the attack of that French corps. The whole of them were cut to pieces, and their standard remained in the hands of our gallant soldiers as a trophy of their victory.*"—After verbal and newspaper report had passed for some time uncontradicted, the *Highland Society* held a meeting, at which certain resolutions were passed respecting the battle of Alexandria; and, what is more important, the question respecting *who took the standard* was inquired into and settled. The proceedings at this meeting were published in the *True Briton* of the 25th of February, 1802; and, as will be perceived by the remark with which they are introduced, they were evidently published, if not by authority of the Society, at least by that of some active member of it. I must further premise, that the resolutions, which make part of these proceedings, have since been published by order of the Society, and have, so lately as the month of August last, been transmitted, in a circular letter addressed to each member of the Society, by Mr. John Mackenzie, their Treasurer. I shall now insert these resolutions which were:—

I. That the 42nd, or Royal Highland Regiment, had, by their heroic conduct in Egypt on the memorable 21st of March 1801, nobly maintained the hereditary glory of the Caledonian name; and that, as an honorary testimony of the applause and admiration of the Society, a Medal is to be struck, with appropriate devices and inscriptions, to perpetuate their highly distinguished and gallant achievement.

II. That one of those medals is to be presented to every officer and soldier now surviving, with the name of each inscribed, and also to the lineal descendant of every one who fell on that day, inscribed with the name of the fallen hero. It may be remarked, that the love of glory is the most striking passion of the human heart. All that the hero asks, in return for his efforts and his toils, is; that his fame be celebrated; that the glory of his name be united with the merit

of his actions. His soul swells with delight by the habitual consciousness that the attention of a great number of men is directed towards him. How appropriate then is the measure now proposed! It will be considered in the families of these brave men as an inestimable inheritance of glory, carrying down the tide of time, to ages yet unknown, the illustrious deed of that day.

III. That an elegant and characteristic cup (of the value of 100 guineas), with suitable devices, be presented to the mess of the regiment; that thus, even in their convivial hours, the achievement of the 21st of March may never be forgotten.

IV. That a voluntary subscription be immediately opened among the members of the Society for defraying the expenses that may attend the same; and that each Subscriber of two guineas be entitled to one silver medal; Subscribers of five guineas to two silver medals; and Subscribers of ten guineas and upwards, to three silver medals.

V. That a Committee be appointed to carry the above resolutions into immediate execution, composed of the following noblemen and gentlemen:—His Grace the Duke of Athol, the Right Hon. the Earl of Breadalbane, the Right Hon. C. F. Greville, Sir Hector Munro, K.B., Sir John M. Murray, Bart., Sir John Sinclair, Bart., John MacArthur, Esq., Geo. Mackenzie, Esq., John Grant, Esq., and the Secretary.

These proceedings gave a more decided character to the thing. The honour of *taking* the standard was now formally and publicly claimed. The *carrying of it into* the head-quarters was, indeed, left to the German regiment; but the *capture* was fixed as the right and property of the 42nd regiment. The press having thus lent its aid, that of the pencil was next called into the service. A panorama of the battle of Alexandria was made by Mr. Robert Ker Porter, and was, for many months, exhibited to crowds of spectators in London, whence it was, in October last, removed to Dublin, in order to be shown to the people of Ireland also. At this exhibition there was an explanatory pamphlet, sold to such of the spectators as chose to purchase it, entitled, "*An Historical Sketch of the Battle of Alexandria, and of the Campaign in Egypt,*" in which historical sketch the name of Lutz, or that of his regiment, is never once even mentioned in any way whatever, good, bad, or indifferent. With regard to the invincible standard, we find (p. 17 of the pamphlet) the following remarkable passage:—"Our *reserve*, the 42nd and 28th regiments, finding the enemy in their rear, faced about, charged them with the bayonet, and drove them backward, step by step, into the inclosure of the ruin. Six hundred of these *Invincibles* were already extended upon the ground; the remaining two hundred and fifty called for quarter, and obtained it; not a man of them returned! This was the business of twenty minutes. It was *at this time that the invincible standard was taken*; the palm of numerous honours gained by this legion, and on which was inscribed their victories. It was wrested from the brave possessors after a gallant fight, in which they began assailants and ended defendants; *this trophy will ever be honourable to Great Britain*, as won from some of the bravest warriors of the age. Mr. Baldwin's conduct, as before related, entitled him to as much honour as it was possible to bestow; and *there could not be a greater than to make him the bearer of Buonaparte's invincible standard to London*. This standard of Buonaparte's own invincible brigade, *brought home in the Flora*, is so much shattered and defaced by service as well as by blood, that the inscriptions recording its victories can with difficulty be traced,—*Le Passage de la Piavé, Le Passage du Tagliamento, Le Passage de l'Isonzo, and La Prise de Gratz*, are tolerably distinct, but scarcely any vestige remains of the inscription relative to the affair

“ of the *Pont de Lodi*.”—But, besides this pamphlet, Mr. Robert Ker Porter, the historian and historical painter, handed to his spectators another, containing the outlines of the several parts and figures of his panorama, and also printed explanations of the same. These explanations contained the following passage:—“ Next is a party of the Minorca “ regiment (the Queen’s German regiment was called Stuart’s, or the Minorca regiment) “ attacking [with the bayonet] the officer who held “ the French standard, *now at Lord Hobart’s office*. This standard was “ *taken* by one of their *grenadiers*. Below them lies the Frenchman, “ supposed to have assailed Sir Ralph, bayoneted by a party of the 42nd, “ and a little onwards is a sergeant of that regiment in personal conflict “ with General Roize, who was killed:—Menou’s orders for the attack “ were found in his pocket. To the right of these are the French IN- “ VINCIBLE regiment met by a party of the 42nd: *their colours* are “ seized by Sergeant Sinclair, who being afterwards cut down, left them “ somewhere in the field.”—Begging the reader to pay good attention to the very material variations in all these different statements, I shall now mention one more fact, and then proceed to the evidence on the other side.—Mr. Watson, goldsmith and jeweller, No. 149, near Somerset-house in the Strand, had an order (which, I believe, he is now executing) to make the silver cup, mentioned in the resolutions of the Highland Society. In the month of August last, I saw and examined a drawing of this cup, on which there is to be, or, at least, there *was* to be, a medallion, representing a Highlander with *the invincible standard in his hand, and with a French officer lying at his feet*.

Such are the statements of the Highlanders and their partisans; such are their pretensions, and such the evidence on which those pretensions are founded. Before I analyse this evidence (which, to say the truth, stands in need of no such process), I shall lay before my readers *authentic* documents to establish the claim of Lutz, previously stating the circumstances which led to the obtaining of those documents.

Till I read the narrative of Sergeant *Sinclair* (who was, it seems, brought forward by Sir John *Sinclair*), I took it for granted, as most people did, that the invincible standard had really been taken by the Highlanders; but that narrative, so full of the marvellous, and even of self-contradiction, staggered my belief; and when I came, soon afterwards, to compare its statements with the statements and representations at the panorama, I could no longer believe a single word of the story. It then became matter of regret with me, that I knew not where to apply to ascertain the real state of the case; and to contribute my mite towards restoring the laurel to the brow of its rightful owner. Some months, however, having passed away in discussions on the definitive treaty, the invincible standard, together with the poor German soldier who picked it up, while the gallant and *modest* Sergeant Sinclair lay in a trance, were almost forgotten, when, in the latter end of July, or early in August last, happening to cast my eyes on a newspaper, under the head of the “*Winchester Assizes*,” I perceived “ that a man named Anthony Lutz had been “ arraigned there for murder; that it appeared his offence was nothing “ more than manslaughter, and that, in the course of the proceedings, “ the Adjutant of the Queen’s German regiment, to which corps the said “ Lutz belonged, appeared as a witness to his character, and, amongst “ other commendations of him, stated that he *was the very man who took “ the invincible standard from the French, in the battle of Alexandria.*”—

This was the first gleam of *real* light which had been thrown upon the subject. Here was not only the declaration, but the declaration of an officer, and upon oath too, in direct contradiction to the statements of Sergeant Sinclair and Mr. Robert Ker Porter. This was testimony on which reliance might be placed. It at once revived a desire to do justice to this German (for such I then took him to be), and pointed out the means of doing it. The first step was to see and converse with the man himself. Mr. Windham, who, on all occasions the lover of truth, of justice, and of honour, on all occasions the friend and protector of the loyal and the brave, obtained leave from Major Wilson, then the commanding officer of the regiment, for Lutz to come to London from Gosport, where the regiment then lay. He arrived in Pall Mall on the 10th of August, accompanied by a sergeant, who was intended to serve him as an interpreter; an office, however, which was unnecessary, as Lutz could converse with us very well in French. He was, of course, dressed in his regimentals, and (a circumstance of which I shall speak more particularly by-and-by) wore a badge upon his left breast, representing the Invincible Standard, as perfectly, at least, as a tailor, with pieces of coarse cloth, could make out such a representation. But, to my great surprise, and as if for the express purpose of discrediting Mr. Ker Porter's Panorama, instead of a huge German *grenadier* with monstrous whiskers on his face, I found a little, young, smooth-faced Frenchman; well set, indeed, and of a manly countenance and deportment, but only five feet six inches high, and no more than twenty-five years of age, though he had already been ten years a soldier, and in fourteen different battles. During his residence in London, I collected from his own mouth the following particulars:—

Antoine Lutz, is the son of Gregoire Lutz, of Rosheim in Alsace, where Antoine was born the 5th of July 1777. Gregoire Lutz was a vineyard labourer, and had, besides this son, two other sons and a daughter. In 1792, the father and family emigrated, with many other persons, into Germany, to avoid the requisitions and other persecutions of the Republicans; but, some time previous to this emigration, Antoine was taken in requisition, and sent to join the 13th regiment of Foot, then serving in the army of the Rhine. He served in this regiment about three months, when he got away and returned to his father's, where he remained seven weeks, at the end of which time a party of French cavalry came after him, and carried him back to the regiment; but he was not punished for his elopement. He remained with the regiment nine months, during which time he was in two battles, at no great distance from Landau. In July 1794 (the first fair opportunity he had); he escaped from the Republicans, and went over to the army of the Prince of Condé, which then lay at and about Fribourg. He enlisted in the Legion de Mirabeau. During the time he was in the army de Condé he was ten times in battle. He was wounded slightly in the knee by a musket-ball in the second of these battles. In 1797, the army of Condé being in part disbanded, and the soldiers having liberty to choose, amongst the allies, what service they would go to, Lutz chose the Russian service, and joined the legion of Damas, at Lutzcow, in Polish Russia. Here he remained four months, and then was exchanged to the Austrian regiment of Green Loudon, which then lay at Limburgh in Gallicia, with a detachment of two companies of which regiment he went into Italy in 1799, joined the army of Kray and Melas near Verona, and in the first engagement after his joining, was taken by the army of Moreau, at Castel Nuovo. He was sent prisoner

to Cremona, where he saw a French soldier who had known him in the republican service. Fearing that this man would inform against him, he escaped from Cremona to Milan, where, with about 225 German soldiers, he was kidnapped by the Spaniards, and conveyed to Genoa; there he was put on board a ship bound to Barcelona, in Old Spain. On the 22nd of May, 1799, the ship was taken by an English cutter and carried into Minorca, where, on the 27th of May in the same year, he enlisted into General Stuart's corps, now the Queen's German regiment, which regiment, having embarked on the 29th of August 1800, and touched successively at Gibraltar, off Cadiz, on the coast of Barbary, at Malta, and at Marmora, arrived at Aboukir, and landed there on the 8th of March, 1801, but without being engaged with the enemy till the 21st of the same month. On that memorable day, the Queen's German regiment, the regiment of Dillon, and that of De Rolle, forming what General Hutchinson calls the Foreign Brigade, and commanded by General Stuart, composed a sort of reserve, the Queen's German regiment being upon the right of the brigade, and nearest to the 42nd regiment who led the attack. Soon after the battle began, which was before day-light, the 42nd having had to meet the violent and desperate effort of the French, were thrown into confusion,* which induced General Stuart to push on his brigade to their assistance. So complete was the confusion of the 42nd, so entirely were they broken and dispersed, that, when the German regiment came up, many of the men of the 42nd fell into the ranks of the German regiment, by ones, twos, threes, fours, fives, &c., and actually fought there to the end of the engagement. The Queen's German regiment began by a well-directed and most dreadful fire by files, at the distance of about 40 yards from the front rank of the French infantry; but, as both sides kept advancing, an instant brought them to within musket-length of each other. The battle now became extremely furious and bloody; some were firing, others fighting with the bayonet, and others with the butt-ends of their muskets; and this too at a time when the morning afforded but just light enough to distinguish one man from another. In about a quarter of an hour after the Queen's German regiment had been at close quarters thus, the French began to retreat, and were pursued by the Germans for about forty or fifty yards, when General Stuart, perceiving the enemy to be covered by their cannon and other artillery, which kept up a constant fire from some heights, towards which the fugitives were approaching, ordered his men to halt. In this pursuit, however, the irregularity of which every reader may easily conceive, some soldiers of the Queen's German regiment,

* The forty-second regiment was, indeed, in such a state, that, had not General Stuart marched up his corps (which he actually did *without orders*) not a man of them would have escaped either death or captivity. Their confusion (not to say *defeat*) was, and is still, attributed to their "*impetuosity and indiscipline.*" But, be the cause what it might, the effect is well known by every man of the army of Egypt, and is frankly acknowledged even by the officers of the 42nd regiment themselves, who, I am well assured, are ready to avow, that, had it not been for General Stuart and his corps, they must inevitably have perished, or been taken, to the last man. I have always heard the 42nd regiment highly praised: were I a general, I know of no soldiers I should like better than Scotchmen, they are sober, honest, obedient, hardy, brave, and faithful to their colours: I love and honour the Scottish nation, because I have, wherever I have been, found them, generally speaking, distinguished for their loyalty, and because I have, in almost every stage of my life, experienced from them friendship the most ardent and most sincere:—but, not any, not all, of these reasons will induce me to withhold one single syllable from the cause of truth and of justice.

more active and more eager than the rest, ran rather forward after the enemy. Amongst these was Anthony Lutz, who, having got so close as within about eight paces of the officer who carried the Invincible Standard, and who was a few yards behind his flying soldiers, he shot him, with his musket in the back. The officer fell forward upon his face. Lutz, perceiving him fall, re-loaded his musket, went and took up the standard, and was about to cut the gold epaulets from the officer's coat, but the tremendous fire from the French batteries, and more particularly the appearance of a body of the enemy's horse, induced him to make off as fast as he could. He had not gone far from the spot where the officer lay, before he found it necessary, in order to avoid a party of French horse, to throw himself into a hollow place, and to lie down as if he were dead, covering the standard, as well as he could, with his body. This party of cavalry having overlooked him, he got up and was hastening towards his regiment, when two French dragoons rode towards him, one of whom shot at him with a pistol, upon which Lutz threw down the standard, shot at the dragoon, and missing him, killed his horse. The other dragoon, receiving, as Lutz thinks, a shot from another quarter, rode off. The wounded horse fell; his rider, whose foot was entangled in the stirrup, begged his life, and presented Lutz the butt of his pistol, in token of submission. Lutz spared his life, went and took up the standard, and thus, in the midst of this bloody battle (for the heavy charge of the French cavalry had not yet been made), did he return to his regiment, with the enemy's colours in one hand, and a prisoner of war in the other. Thus he presented himself to his officer, Lieutenant Moncrieff (whom I have since conversed with, and who pledges his honour for the correctness of this part of the statement), offering him the standard—"No, my brave fellow," said the lieutenant (giving him, at the same time, a dollar, which was all the money he had about him), "the standard is yours, and I will not rob you of it. Go and carry it instantly to head-quarters, and take your prisoner with you." This order Lutz obeyed. He lodged his prisoner with an officer of the provost, and carried the standard to the tent of the commander-in-chief, where he delivered it into the hands of the assistant adjutant-general.

Such is the narrative of Lutz, as taken down by me, from his own mouth, and as fully confirmed (as far as relates to the *bringing in* of the standard) by Lieutenant Moncrieff. I now beg the reader's attention to some documents a little more authentic than the narrative of the modest Sergeant Sinclair, and the no less modest representation of Mr. Ker Porter and his Panorama. I shall begin with an order or two relative to the conduct of the whole of the Foreign Brigade, and particularly that of the Queen's German regiment, which corps, it appears to me, has, from first to last, been studiously kept in the back-ground, though it certainly was in the front of the battle.

Extract from the General Orders of the Army, 24th March, 1801.

"The support given to the reserve by Brigadier-general Stuart and the Foreign Brigade was as gallant as it was prompt, and entirely confirmed the fortunate issue of that brilliant day."

Extract from the Brigade Orders of General Stuart's Brigade, 25th March, 1801.

"It was with the most heartfelt satisfaction that the Brigadier-general contemplated in yesterday's general orders the honourable reward offered to the

“brigade in the flattering testimony of the commander-in-chief’s approbation of their conduct in the action of the 21st. Sincerely and warmly attached to each corps from long and peculiar circumstances of connection, the Brigadier-general acknowledges his own obligations to their exact obedience and discipline, and he cannot but participate with them in the credit of having rendered themselves conspicuous on a day which, independently of the glorious events which have so recently preceded, must ever add lustre to the character of a British army. Regret for the loss of those brave men who fell, is a tribute due to their worth, and for none can the Brigadier-general sympathize more fully with the brigade than for that of his late esteemed and valuable Brigadier-major.

The following documents relate solely to Lutz and the standard, and I beg the reader to peruse them with attention :—

Copy of a Certificate, given by the Adjutant-General’s directions to Anthony Lutz, Private Soldier in the Regiment of Minorca, or Stuart.

“I do hereby certify, that Anthony Lutz, private soldier in the regiment of Minorca or Stuart, did (on the 21st of March, 1801, during the action between the English and French armies commanded by Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and the French General-in-chief Menou, on the above day, within three miles of Alexandria) *take FROM THE ENEMY* a standard, which bore several marks of honourable distinction, such as the *passage of the Piava and Tagliamento* when under Buonaparte, in Italy, and in the centre of which is a bugle horn within a wreath of laurel. I do also certify that the said Anthony Lutz *brought the standard to the head-quarters of his Excellency Sir Ralph Abercrombie, where he delivered it into my hands*, when he, at the same time, received from me, by order, a gratuity of twenty dollars, for so signal an instance of good conduct. And I do farther certify, that I forwarded the standard, thus taken by the above Anthony Lutz, to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, then ill of his wounds in his Majesty’s ship Foudroyant, that his Excellency received it accordingly, and that it is now in our possession. Given under my hand at the Adjutant-general’s quarters, in the camp before Alexandria, this 3rd day of April, 1801.

(Signed)

“JNO. M’DONALD,
“Assis. Adjut.-General.”

Copy of a Regimental Order, in the Regiment of Minorca, or Stuart, now called the Queen’s German Regiment, 4th April, 1801.

“Private Anthony Lutz, who *took the standard FROM THE ENEMY, on the 21st last month*, is directed to wear the *representation of a standard* (according to the model prescribed by the Brigadier-general) as a mark of his good behaviour, on his right arm *—and the Brigadier-general notifies that, as soon as the regiment is in an established quarter, he will institute a valuable badge, in a certain proportion per company, to be worn by such men as shall have been proved, upon sufficient testimony, to have distinguished themselves, by acts of valour, or by personal instances of meritorious service; and officers are, on this account, to make note of the conduct of individuals.”

Now, here is nothing about *picking a standard up!* Here are two official documents, positively declaring that the standard was “*taken from the enemy*” by Lutz. Neither the Assistant Adjutant-general nor General Stuart did indeed actually see the achievement with his own eyes; but, it was very improbable indeed, that either of them should have so positively ascribed it to Lutz, and that the latter should, by a public order, have awarded him a badge of honour, without having previously obtained very accurate information on the subject, especially as we see the certificate and the order are dated a *fortnight after* the standard was taken, which gave ample time for inquiry. As, however, the contrary was barely possible; and as an attempt might still be made to oppose the declaration of the modest Sergeant Sinclair to the records of the army, it was thought

* The badge was, by a subsequent order, removed from the arm to the left breast.

necessary to trace the standard back to the time, if possible, when it came into the hands of Lutz. With this view there was held a regimental committee of inquiry. [See Proceedings, *Register*, vol. ii. p. 563.]

This copy of proceedings, which was transmitted to me on the 29th of August last, by Major Wilson, the commanding officer of the regiment, completes the testimony on the part of Lutz. Before however I proceed with my remarks on the evidence, I must again trespass on the patience of the reader, while I give some account of the conduct of Lutz while in London. His having been arraigned for killing a brother soldier naturally excited a fear that he might be a violent and dissipated man; but the whole of his behaviour proved him to be exactly the contrary. He was lodged in a public-house, where, as to expenses, he had *carte blanche*; yet I saw him twice every day, and he never had the least appearance of that mortal military vice, intoxication. He several times breakfasted and dined at my house; where every one that saw him was delighted with his good sense and unassuming manners. But I had a still stronger proof of his general good behaviour in the assurances of Captain M'Kennon and Lieutenant Moncrieff of the same regiment, who both confirmed by observation, that he was not less remarkable for his good-nature and docility than for his bravery; and the former gave a strong mark of his approbation, by taking Lutz with him to a dinner which he gave at an hotel, and by placing him by his side in a front seat at the Haymarket Theatre. Both these officers assured me that the unfortunate affair of manslaughter by no means originated in the fault of Lutz, who, being attacked by a drunken man, pushed him away from him, and he unfortunately fell against a naked bayonet, the point of which was projecting over the side of an empty berth. His death was, indeed, purely *accidental*; and had the matter been rightly understood, Lutz would most assuredly have been *bailed*, instead of being kept twenty-seven days, in the first instance, upon bread and water, and two months in jail and in irons! But it was to this suffering that he owes the restoration of his honours; for had he never seen Winchester-jail, it is very probable that he never would have seen London, and that London would never have had the honour to see him.—During his stay in town his portrait (of which I shall presently have to speak more particularly) was taken, though very much against his will. As to the story of Sergeant Sinclair, it was not till after he had been several days in town, that he could be made to consider it as any thing more than a joke on our part; nor could he be convinced of the contrary till the sergeant who came with him read and translated to him in German (which is the native language of the lower orders of people in Alsace, and which he understood rather better than he did French) the modest and pious narrative above extracted from the *True Briton*.* When he found a *real* attempt had been made to rob him of his honour, he expressed his surprise; but it was not till he went to Lord Hobart's Office, to look at the standard, that he discovered any thing like resentment on the subject. The instant it was brought into the room, all the ideas of the moment when he took it seemed to rush into his mind; he snatched hold of the staff, and, stamping it upon the floor, while his face reddened with anger, "Now," said he, in German, "let that sergeant come, and claim this standard if he dares!"—He had, before he saw the colour, described every part of it very accurately, and he now showed us the large hole near the middle, which he had told us was made by a bomb-

* *Register*, vol. ii. p. 552.—ED.

shell, after he took it, and while it lay on the ground during his capture of the French dragoon. After staying in town from the 10th to the 25th of August, he returned to his regiment, where he has since, I understand, been promoted to the rank of corporal, a promotion which he had declined to accept of before, and which now, I trust, is only the precursor of something much more advantageous and distinguished.

It was my intention now to enter into an analysis of the statements on both sides, as to the claim with respect to the taking of the standard; but really, upon a review of the whole of the evidence, that on the side of the Highlanders (if, in truth, it can be called evidence) bears, on the very face of it, such striking marks of error (to give it no harsher term); it contains such palpable self-contradictions, that it seems almost an insult to my readers to trouble them with any remarks on it. I cannot however refrain from just pointing out a few of its most prominent features.

I will for a moment suppose it possible that Major Stirling (of whom, by-the-by, we have heard nothing directly), after having taken an Invincible Standard, should not only give it into the charge of another, but that that other should be no more than a non-commissioned officer, and that he should then send that non-commissioned officer, with the standard, in his hand, to *protect* a four-pounder; I will further suppose it possible, that Sergeant Sinclair might be "cut down," as Mr. Ker Porter calls it, that he thus lost the standard, that he afterwards rose up again, that he met with the six French soldiers whom he conducted to the right of the *forty-second regiment*, and *there* put them in charge of *Dillon's corps*; I will suppose it possible that the sergeant found a musket and fired *fifteen rounds* after his trance; but willing as I am to suppose even almost impossibilities, I cannot suppose that the sergeant, though endued perhaps with the second sight, could, while he lay "in a state of *insensibility*," see who it was that "*picked up*" the standard. Mr. Ker Porter tells the world, in his "Historical Sketch," that the "Invincible Standard, brought home by Mr. Baldwin," was taken by the 42nd regiment. Now, observe well how this agrees with his panorama-picture, as described by himself. "Next," says he, in the true showman-like style, "next is a party of the Minorca regiment attacking the officer who held the French standard, now at Lord Hobart's; it was taken by one of their grenadiers. —Below them, lies the Frenchman supposed to have assailed Sir Ralph, bayoneted by a party of the 42nd, and a little onwards is a sergeant of that regiment in personal conflict with General Roize,* who was killed:—Menou's orders for the attack were found in his pocket.—To the right of these are the French Invincible regiment, met by a party of the 42nd; their colours are seized by Sergeant Sinclair, who being afterwards cut down, left them somewhere in the field."—So! here are two standards! And which is still more surprising, the

* This, too, is a false representation. General Roize was not *hewed down* as represented in the picture, but was *shot*, and not by a *Highlander*, but by Corporal Karabaum of the *Queen's German Regiment*. The corporal, who was a native of Mentz, and who has since been discharged, took a gold watch out of Roize's pocket, and brought it in, together with a part of the embroidered collar and facing of his coat. The gold watch the corporal sold for one hundred and twelve dollars, with which money he went home to Germany, after the regiment came to England.—My authority for this statement is that of the Sergeant (acting Sergeant-Major), who came to London with Lutz, and who was astonished at the tale of Mr. Robert Ker Porter. Alas! little did he know of the secret history of *Panoramas*!

standard which Mr. Porter himself tells us (in his history) was the "*invincible standard, brought home by Mr. Baldwin,*" is "*now left somewhere in the field,*" and the standard, "*now at Lord Hobart's,*" is merely a "*French standard,*" and nothing more. But as if the spirit of contradiction itself had possessed Mr. Ker Porter, he says that the *Invincible Standard* had on it *Le Passage de la Piavé, Le Passage du Tagliamento, &c.*, and it perversely happens that these very words are upon "*the French standard, now at Lord Hobart's!*"—The fact is, that the palpable disagreement between Mr. Ker Porter's pen and his pencil arises from the circumstance of their having been employed upon the same subject at different times. When the historical sketch was written, there was no fear at all of detection; but before the picture was finished, there was an ugly story got abroad about a German soldier having *brought in* a standard; and as it seems to be agreed, on all hands, that there was but *one* brought home to England, Mr. Porter resolved, that, since *that* one was not taken by the Highlanders, it should *not* be the *invincible* standard. Hence the invention of *two* standards. Unfortunately, however, for the veracity both of Mr. Porter's writings and his paintings, that modest and pious youth Sergeant Sinclair declares, that the standard which was brought in by the German soldier was the *very same* that was taken by Major Stirling, and which he [the sergeant] lost when he was cut down by the French cavalry! But, then, which to believe, Mr. Porter or the sergeant? The sergeant says, that after having been knocked down and stunned, and having got up again, and taken six Frenchmen prisoners, "he perceived a soldier of General Stuart's foreign corps carrying into the rear the invincible standard, which he [the soldier] had picked up *while* Sergeant Sinclair lay in a state of *insensibility.*" Now, if the sergeant was in a state of *insensibility*, how could he see or hear what was doing the while? Did he, like Hudibras, send his senses out upon the scout: and did they, upon their return, inform him that a foreigner had been there and had picked up the standard? Or did he swoon, as a negro sleeps, with one eye at a time? The truth is, that this part of the sergeant's narrative places him in a most cruel dilemma, and furnishes strong grounds to fear, that if he did really think of his Maker during the battle of Alexandria, he completely forgot Him at the Shakspeare Tavern:—the sergeant either saw the standard "*picked up,*" or he did not see it picked up; if he did see it, how comes it that he, who was so vigorous as to fire fifteen rounds and take six prisoners afterwards, did not prevent another from carrying off his inestimable prize? And if he did not see it, he has told an absolute and shameful falsehood, which has been promulgated under the apparent authority of the Highland Society. One point more, and I have done. It has been stated as a *possible* case, as a last shift, that the standard might be first taken by the 42nd regiment, then retaken by the enemy, and afterwards taken by Lutz. On this case I shall only observe, that if the 42nd regiment should think proper to boast of having had the standard taken from them, Lutz can have no great objection to have it thought that *he took the standard from those who took it from the 42nd regiment.**

* I here wish to declare in the most positive and explicit terms, that I have no intention to insinuate that Major Stirling, or any of the officers of the 42nd regiment, who were in Egypt, have lent their aid in favouring the imposition of Sergeant Sinclair and Mr. Ker Porter; on the contrary, I am well assured that they have not; but, at the same time, I must observe, that if they were informed

Turning, with disgust, from this tissue of misrepresentations, mis-statements, contradictions, absurdities, and, I must add, falsehoods, with what pleasure does the mind contemplate the plain and honest narrative of Lutz, supported, in every point, by authenticated documents! We see the man with the badge of honour, the representation of the standard, on his breast: we find that he has worn this badge ever since the date of the achievement, and by a public order of his commanding officer: to prove that this order was not given without cause, we have next the certificate of the Adjutant-General: to prove that the Adjutant-General was not deceived, we have the testimony of Lieut. Moncrieff, to whom Lutz brought the standard from the enemy; and to prove that he took it from the enemy, we have the testimony of two men, on their oaths, who saw it in their hands, who saw Lutz run into the smoke after them, and, in the space of two minutes, came out of that smoke in possession of the symbol of victory. In short, no case was ever more fairly made out: no fact was ever more fully and uncontrovertibly proved: no judge, though in the righteous, the scrupulous, the merciful courts of England, ever required clearer evidence whereon to ground a decision, even of death.

Having thus established the exclusive claim of Lutz to the *honour* of taking the invincible standard, I shall say but a very few words as to the *reward* of that gallant and, even in a national point of view, most meritorious and important achievement. Of the claims which the hero has on the Sovereign and the country that he serves, the first is, that his deeds be ascribed to himself and not to another. This, which is, in truth, no more than a mere demand of right, Lutz is, I trust, now in a fair way of obtaining. But the reward of valour does not stop here: it demands rank and precedence, with a proportionate share of the comforts and pleasures of life: justice, because she watches over the weak and the timid, does not, for that reason, turn her back upon the stout and the brave. In considering, therefore, what ought to be done in the present instance, a narrative, such as I have here attempted, was determined on, not only as absolutely necessary to do away the mis-statements already abroad, and as a means of restoring the laurel to the brow of Lutz, but also as a foundation whereon to proceed in any other endeavours that might be made in his behalf. Leaving to the justice of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief (when he came to be fully informed of all the circumstances of the case) to award such honours as he might think proper, it was thought that, in the meantime, some method ought to be adopted for giving the noblemen and gentlemen of the kingdom an opportunity of contributing towards a pecuniary reward.

of the sergeant's publicly claiming the honour in the name of the regiment or officers of the regiment, they should instantly have *dis-claimed* it in the same public manner; and which, indeed, they would, perhaps, have done before now, had they been acquainted with the mode of effecting such a purpose.—It is hardly necessary for me to say, that to the Highland Society in a body I cannot impute any intentional misrepresentation. Of the Sinclairs (the modest *Sergeant* and his patron *Sir John*) I shall leave the reader to form his own opinion, expressing, however, my sincere hope, and indeed my firm reliance, that in this project in behalf of his namesake, Sir John will finally meet with no better success than when, with modesty unparalleled, he called upon the people of England not only publicly to venerate Washington, but to *contribute towards a fund for the raising of a monument to his memory, even in the dominions of their Sovereign, from whom Washington had snatched what was called "the most precious jewel of his crown."*

A *subscription*, the last resource of misfortune, imprudence, and decayed patriotism, was thought an unsuitable expedient; the man who took the invincible standard ought never to appeal to the *charity* of England. After some deliberation as to the most proper means to be employed, an engraved *portrait of Lutz*, to be sold at a *guinea*, was resolved on, as at once calculated to commemorate his heroic deed and to procure him a handsome sum, without wounding those sentiments which he must, and which he does, entertain.—The portrait was executed accordingly. It is a full-length. Lutz is dressed in the regimentals of the Queen's German regiment, having the badge upon his breast, and the standard in his hand. A face of a bastion is to his left, while, behind him and to his right, the distant spires of Alexandria terminate the view. The likeness is exact; the print is in colours, and is in size nine inches by twelve. It is *now ready for sale*, at No. 18, Pall-Mall.—What importance has been attached to the taking of the invincible standard, how highly we have prized this trophy of victory, is well known to this nation and to the world: indeed, it is the great pledge of our military fame: it is the *pivot* on which has turned every eulogium, of every sort, respecting the Egyptian campaign. "We fairly defeated them," says the historian, "and the proof is, we took their invincible standard." This standard was sent to Sir Ralph Abercrombie to cheer him in his last awful moments: it is to be placed on his grand and costly tomb, voted by a grateful Parliament: and shall the gallant Lutz, shall the man who took this standard, be rewarded with a worsted shoulder-knot, and two-pence a day added to his pay? Shall he, because he is a *foreigner*, waste his life in penury and obscurity, and finally, perhaps, drop into the grave from the wards of an hospital or a poor-house? Forbid it justice! Forbid it British justice and British honour!

WILLIAM COBBETT.

London, 22nd December, 1802.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(Register, December 25.)

THE Narrative which I last week published on this subject has excited an uncommon degree of public curiosity, and, I am proud to add, of generous public feeling. About *forty* of the portrait of the brave Lutz have been sold; the first purchasers were Lord and Lady Folkestone, the former five prints, and the latter two. I have received a great number of letters on the subject from different parts of the kingdom, all expressing the utmost admiration of Lutz, and entirely approving of my humble endeavours in his behalf. Amongst these letters there is one which, with the omission of the name of the writer, I shall take the liberty to insert here, as it appears to me to contain the general sentiments of all those who have done me the honour to write to me on this occasion; and as it contains, moreover, a hint which I hope will be turned to account.*

Yes! the man who jumped overboard, and saved the dispatches of Buonaparte, was rewarded with a *pension for life* by the City of London,

* See Letter, Register, vol. ii. p. 603.—ED.

in Common Hall assembled. John Saunderson, the sailor, who, during the heat of the battle of Camperdown, went aloft and nailed to the mast the flag of his admiral, which had been shot away by the enemy, received a very handsome gratuity; enough to enable him to live at his ease, and to make a comfortable provision for his aged parents. "But the men thus rewarded were *natives* of this country!" This will be the observation of some few persons; but, as if it were decreed that nothing should be wanting in support of the claim of Lutz; as if no proof should be wanting of the injustice of those who would withhold a reward from him, the history of the war furnishes an instance of a *foreigner*. I allude to Mr. *Goddard*, an American. He was a prisoner of war on board the French privateer the *Jean Bart*, which privateer was going to France from the United States, and had the French minister Fauchet's dispatches on board. The *Jean Bart* was, in the channel, obliged to strike to a British frigate, and while the frigate's boat was making towards her, the French captain threw the dispatches overboard, when *Goddard* (whose family had been loyalists, and who had been one himself) most gallantly jumped over the side after them, and was lucky enough to keep them afloat till he was taken up by the boat of the frigate.*—*Goddard* (whose rank in life was that of captain of a merchantman) was offered a good situation in the West Indies, which he refused; he was, I believe, also offered the Consulship of Rhode Island, worth about 500*l.* a year. He wished for a situation in England; but whether he finally got one, or took a sum of money, I know not, nor indeed is the fact at all necessary to the inference which I mean to draw from this statement, which is, that the quality of *foreigner* has not heretofore been regarded as a bar to claims on national gratitude and national justice. And shall it be so regarded now? Shall this selfish exception be made in only *one* case; and that, too, in a case which calls aloud for an extraordinary exertion of liberality; in a case calculated to banish every sinister feeling from the breast?

As to the hint of my correspondent, relative to a subscription for the purpose of purchasing a commission for Lutz, it will, I think, be right to postpone that laudable undertaking a little while, for two reasons; first, to give the public time to be fully convinced that the claim of Lutz cannot be invalidated; and, secondly, to afford his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief an opportunity (now that he will know all the circumstances) of proving to the world that deeds of glory are, in the army which has the honour to be commanded by him, sure to meet with their reward. In the meantime, the *fame* of Lutz is spreading far and wide. The *Political Register* will carry it to *every Court in Europe*, without one single exception. In the United States of America it will be echoed through about three hundred different newspapers, and will be known to every man, woman, and child in the country. In the East and West Indies it will circulate sufficiently; and in his Majesty's European dominions, it has already made no inconsiderable progress. The *Register* itself is read by a vast number of persons. There has been a great extra demand for the narrative, which will take altogether upwards of five thousand stamps, and will bring into the Stamp-office about *seventy pounds* duty! (Poor Lutz might have *this*, one would think!) The London newspapers, too, have, from one motive or another, almost all of them,

* See our Note p. 214 of this volume.—ED.

for once, at least, during their existence, contributed towards the circulation of truth. Some of them have made extracts from the narrative, others have mentioned it, and *all* of them have inserted a paragraph in the following words, which appears to me to have been published by the authority of some persons deeply concerned :—“ We have good reason
 “ to believe that the statement which appeared in a periodical publication
 “ of recent date, respecting the capture, in the battle of Alexandria, of
 “ *what has been called* the ‘Invincible Standard,’ will not escape obser-
 “ vation from those whose business it is to notice it ; and that it will be
 “ clearly and incontestably proved that the 42nd regiment did take the
 “ standard from that body of men termed the Invincible Legion, whom
 “ they engaged in the commencement of the action ; which standard was,
 “ in a subsequent attack by the enemy, lost by Sergeant Sinclair, who
 “ received it in charge from the officer of the 42nd regiment, to whom
 “ it had been surrendered ; nor will this fact be found inconsistent
 “ with the documents adduced in the publication above-mentioned,
 “ however *contrary* to the *reasoning* and *insinuation* of the author.”—
 So ! “ what has been called the Invincible Standard ! ” Mark the
 hypothetical phraseology ; “ What has been called ! ” Yes, what was
 so called in all the public prints ten thousand times over ; what was
 so called in the theatres, at Sadler’s Wells and at Astley’s ; what was so
 called in the Panorama ; what was so called by the dukes, earls, barons,
 baronets, and gentlemen of the Highland Society ; and what was so called
 by his Majesty’s Minister, when in Parliament he signified the pleasure of
 his Royal Master that it should be placed on Abercrombie’s tomb. Yes,
 not only what *was* called the Invincible Standard, but what *is* called the
 Invincible Standard, and which is not only *called* such, but *is* such, or *else*
we have no Invincible Standard in our possession. And is it possible that
 the nation will relinquish this honour rather than do justice to Lutz ?
 Will it be inveigled into this act of baseness and folly merely to gratify the
 spleen arising from disappointed assurance and intrigue ? My “ *reasoning* ”
 and my “ *insinuation* ” are before my readers : let them judge. I do
 not know who this paragraph comes from ; but its publication in so many
 papers cannot have cost less than *twenty guineas*, an expense to which
 an *individual* would, at least without some very powerful motive, scarcely
 have put himself to on such an account. As to the *case* stated in this
 paragraph, I shall say nothing, until it shows its front in a more authentic
 form ; but while I sincerely desire to avoid a controversy, which, if per-
 severed in, must finally bring shame on some portion, at least, of my fel-
 low-subjects, it will not, I trust, be expected that the advocate of Lutz
 will suffer either his hero or himself to be unjustly attacked with impunity,
 however numerous or powerful the assailants. It is not my intention to
 trouble my readers with remarks on every *unofficial* misrepresentation
 that may appear relative to this subject : a passage, however, in the
Morning Chronicle of the 27th inst. seems to demand immediate atten-
 tion. After inserting the substance of my narrative, the writer concludes
 thus :—“ The above narrative certainly will give great offence to the
 “ 42nd regiment, who are represented to have been in a very shameful
 “ situation when rescued by the German regiment ; and, if this account
 “ be true, were so. If it is false, the officers will no doubt vindicate the
 “ character of the regiment by a fair narrative of facts ; and, if their
 “ regiment has just claims to the honour of having taken the invincible
 “ standard, will defend them by evidence. It certainly will afford us

“ great pleasure to find that the merit of an exploit so highly extolled belongs to a British regiment and a British soldier, and not to a *French deserter*, which Antoine Lutz was. We do not blame any man for endeavouring to vindicate the claims of a *foreign deserter* to a gallant action he had performed ; far less do we blame any one for endeavouring to strip another of honours he has arrogated by lies and misrepresentations. If the above narrative be true, Sergeant Sinclair has been guilty of lies and misrepresentations. We think, however, what we are sure every *British heart* must feel, that it was possible to have vindicated the claims of this French deserter without the innumerable sneers at, and we will venture to add, misrepresentations of the conduct of the 42nd regiment.” To this I must add the closing sentence of a paragraph, in the same print of the 29th inst. “ It does not show much of the *English spirit*, of the want of which some people so petulantly accuse others, to insinuate that the *foreign* corps had a greater share in the victory of the 21st than any of our *native* troops.” With respect to sneers at, and “ *misrepresentations* of, the conduct of the 42nd regiment,” none are to be found in my narrative, which I have now re-perused with great attention, and in which I see nothing to lament but that want of ability on my part which I doubt not my readers will have the goodness to excuse. But it seems that “ to insinuate that the *foreign* corps had a greater share in the victory of the 21st of March, 1801, than any of our *native* troops, does not show much *English spirit*.” I will not disgrace the lash by bestowing it on a sentiment so mean, so grovelling, so detestably vile and base ; but I must just point out the artful attempt which is here made to drag in *all* the native corps to make *common cause* with the 42nd regiment, or rather with Sergeant Sinclair. “ *Any* of our *native* troops ?” Where did I say so ? Where did I say, or insinuate, that the “ *foreign* corps had a greater share in the victory than *any* of our *native* troops ?” I have merely stated the fact as far as related to the Highlanders and the Queen’s German regiment, and even that no farther than was necessary to elucidate and establish the particular case of Lutz. The Highlanders, while the honour of taking the standard was awarded to them, never called upon the rest of “ the *native* troops” to share that *honour* with them ; but now that something a little resembling *detection* and *disgrace* appears to be approaching, they are calling in all the “ *native* troops” to unite with them. For what ? No other part of the “ *native* troops” ever claimed the honour, and why should they share in the disgrace ? Neither the 28th regiment, nor the 90th regiment, both of which corps behaved most gallantly, have ever brought forward any Sergeant Sinclair. No, no ; I must not suffer the question to be thus battered out : it must be confined to the 42nd regiment and to Lutz ; and there, if it pleases God to grant me life and health, it shall be confined, till there remains not a single human being in this kingdom unacquainted with the truth and the whole truth relative to the subject. The writer in the *Morning Chronicle*, foreseeing that the result of every inquiry will but injure his cause, endeavours beforehand to prejudice the public against Lutz, by calling him a “ *French deserter*, a *foreign deserter* ;” and these phrases are studiously repeated two or three times in a paragraph. Lutz was, as I clearly and truly stated, taken in *requisition* by the republicans ; that is to say, he was seized by his rebel fellow-subjects and carried by force to their army, where he was detained by force till he found an opportunity of escaping to the Prince of Condé’s corps ; so that, he *deserted* to the

army of his lawful king, a step which the writer in the *Morning Chronicle* must naturally abhor. Far, however, be it from me to complain of this malice against Lutz, who is honestly, indeed, entitled to the slander of that pen, that infamous pen, which has eulogized O'Connor, Napper Tandy, and Fox; what degree of honour the cause of the *Royal Highlanders* will derive from such a defender it is none of my business to inquire.

London, Dec. 29, 1802.

WM. COBBETT.

ENGLISH MANUFACTURES.

IN our last *Register*, we inserted an account of the proscription, if we may so express ourselves, which the Swiss, at the command of the French General, have issued against goods of English manufacture, and, indeed, against merchandise in general coming from England. In the meantime, such regulations, in consequence of the same influence, have been adopted in Holland, as must, we think, very soon shut our staple manufacture out of that country; while in Piedmont and in Spain measures have been taken to cut off from us the means of coming at the raw silk of the former, and the fine wool of the latter. As to Piedmont, it is now, thanks to the Richmond-Park Ministry, the 27th military division of France; a quality which puts it, together with all its products and resources, under the absolute, and, indeed, the lawful, control of Buonaparte, but the Ministers having affected to consider Spain as an *independent* power, the edict passed against us in that country would seem to have rather more of the nature of an act of hostility on the part of France, at whose demand it has been passed. It is well known, that the manufacture of the finest English cloths absolutely requires a certain proportion of Spanish wool. The vain attempts to supply the place of this commodity, or, rather, to obtain the commodity, without having recourse to Spain, are fresh in every one's memory, and have only served to prove the absolute necessity of importations of wool from Spain. The French have been duly apprized of this circumstance, and, as it was foreseen and foretold at the time of making the peace, they have already taken effectual measures for obstructing, or, at least, imposing a burden on that importation. Our dealers in Spanish wool have, to their great surprise, found that there exists in Spain, an edict prohibiting the exportation of wool, except it be sold to a *Frenchman*, and, we believe, unless it be also shipped first to *France*. The consequence of this measure is, not altogether a want of the commodity in our manufactures, but an enhancement of the price. Our capital, as the wise young Lord Hawkesbury told the planters of Demarara, will always (as long as it lasts) command the raw material; but it comes at a higher price than if we possessed our ancient political power; it comes loaded with a duty which it has paid at Havre de Grace; it comes charged with

* The claim of LUTZ was eventually established by proof, and officially recognised. Capt. T. WALSH, in his *Journal of the Campaign in Egypt*, also asserts it. LUTZ was promoted to be a sergeant in the King's German Regiment, and was allowed by the King a pension of 20*l.* a-year during life, "for his courage displayed in the capture of the Invincible Standard from the French."—*Register*, vol. iii. p. 225; vol. v. p. 255.—ED.

a tribute paid to France; paid to the nation which has more political influence than we. The trade is now carried on in this way: a partnership is formed between a house in France and a house in England. The former purchases the wool, brings it to France; and the latter receives it from France, paying, of course, a handsome profit to the French house. This is a curious mode of obtaining, at an easy rate, a share in the profits of English industry, a portion of the interest on English capital. France is a sort of sleeping partner in our national firm: she has her full portion of the benefits, without appearing in the drudgery and dirt of the business. If we complain, if we ask by what right she insists upon this share, she will tell us: "By that right which we have conquered from you, *the right of the sword*." The lovers of "peace and a large loaf" will comfort themselves with observing, that it is no matter, for that the enhancement in the price of the wool will, by rendering the cloth dearer, only *take more money from our customers*, so that, in the end, the nation will lose nothing by this exertion of French power. This is not true; for, first, whatever France *gains* by our means is a loss to us; and, in the next place, a great part of "our customers" are *ourselves*. But, if *all* our finest cloths were actually exported, every penny of enhancement in their price tends to give a preference to the cloths of other countries. This oppression may have no very striking effect for some time; but it will in the end, and, as the Government of France becomes consolidated, capital will remove to within the sphere of its *all-protecting* power, and this removal will be greatly accelerated by the proofs, which are daily exhibited to the world, of the feebleness of our own Government. Confidence in the French government is daily and hourly increasing, while the exactly opposite sentiment is growing into vogue with respect to our own. Millions of capital have already been removed, and, lamentable as is the fact, men begin to look forward to the time when the dominions of France will be *the only place of safety for property or person!* Base, infamously base indeed, must be the mind that can bear the idea of such a refuge: but, alas! it is useless to rail. We have confessed ourselves *inferior* to France; we have made a treaty with her upon the principle of *acknowledged inferiority*; it has been proclaimed to the world, and the whole world believes it, that we are *no longer able to contend against her*; and who, then, shall blame the mass of the people for looking after security where alone it is to be found? Who shall blame them for seeking to appease, beforehand, the wrath of the enraged victor? With sorrow, with shame, we make the acknowledgment, but we do, from the bottom of our souls, believe, that this has been the *principal object* of a great majority of those, who have gone hence to prostrate themselves at the Court of St. Cloud!* The fate, too, of the French Royalists, is a most persuasive monitor on this subject. A resistance against the French Revolutionists, whether in or out of France, has constantly been punished with ruin, and not unfrequently with death, while all their partisans have been protected, even when found at the foot of the gallows. Is it to be supposed that this lesson has been lost upon the world, and particularly upon a people, who have been systematically taught, that nothing is of any value but *money*? That the wealthy fools will be deceived is certain: but that is no matter: they will perceive their error when it is too late to save either themselves or their country.

* Alluding to Mr. Fox and other Englishmen.—Ed.

PROSPECTS OF WAR.

TO LORD HAWKESBURY.

I WAS much pleased, my lord, to hear Lord Auckland give it as his opinion, that we were able, single-handed, to contend against the monstrously augmented force of our enemy; but I could have wished that his lordship's confidence had been built on a foundation more solid than that of mere *pecuniary means*. I noticed, in my letters to Mr. Addington, on the preliminaries of peace, that his lordship had long entertained a high opinion of the virtue of this species of force. "War," says he,* "is now become a *science of MONEY*. That side must first quit the field, *whose exchequer first fails*." One might have hoped that the result of our two last wars, in both of which, with unshaken credit, we quitted the field before a bankrupt enemy, would have cured his lordship of this error. But men are apt to attach most importance to the science which they best understand; and as his lordship has some little knowledge in calculation, he is naturally inclined to oppose money, or rather figures, to men and arms. After, however, the total inutility of the noble, and almost incredible exploits of Sir Francis d'Ivernois, whom the French call *le chevalier d'arithmétique*, we should, I think, be very cautious how we place confidence in the effects of this science. Your lordship, too, was pleased to lay great stress on "*credit, capital, and confidence*," which words were by some persons taken to have a cabalistic meaning, and to possess, when properly applied, the nature and powers of what the vulgar call a spell or charm. But taking them in their literal sense, it was rather an unfortunate moment for his lordship to make use of them, when the stocks, which form the criterion of the things expressed by these words, had just experienced a tumble, or rather a jump, from 71 to 62 per cent, and when the paper of that excellent loan negotiated by your worthy colleague was at a discount of 14 per cent. This was, my lord, rather an unlucky moment to oppose "*credit, capital, and confidence*" to the five hundred thousand soldiers of France, in which country, since the peace of Amiens, the funds have been *constantly rising*, while ours have been almost *constantly falling*. This latter is a curious fact, and it is a proof that *power* will always create *credit*, while *credit* will *not* always create *power*. Where the confidence is, there will the real solid capital go; and confidence rises much more from the *military and political*, than from the pecuniary or mercantile means of a country, especially in times of commotion or convulsion; because all men know, that in such times, when there is the greatest degree of physical force, there is the greatest degree of security from violence. While the nations of Europe preserved their political and military balance, confidence, in pecuniary matters, depended upon the state of the finances, upon the character for honesty and punctuality of each nation respectively; but now, when the existence of governments, when the independence of nations are daily brought into jeopardy, this confidence depends upon the opinion which men have of the *power*, the military and political power of the several nations. Till since the peace of Amiens no one doubted of the capability of Great Britain to maintain her indepen-

* In his letter to Lord Carlisle, published in 1779.

dence ; but can this be said now ? Can we hope that men, and particularly moneyed men, will not doubt of it ? After all the humiliations, all the insults, all the disgrace and ignominy to which we have submitted, can we possibly flatter ourselves that the sons of wealth will not fear that we shall not long have the power to protect them and their property against the rapacity and rage of a nation, which has overturned state upon state, and which has sworn our destruction ? And, fearing thus, will they not endeavour to have a stake, at least, under the safeguard of this all-commanding and protecting power ? Does not the fate, too, of the French, the Dutch, and the Italian loyalists, strongly admonish all other men, not to neglect this salutary precaution ? Does it not, in the skeleton form of hunger, and with the voice issuing from the lips of death, warn them to shun the miseries attached to loyalty and patriotism ? Millions of pounds, my lord, have from these considerations already been transferred from England to France ; and if our present state of *uncertainty* continues but yet a little longer, there will not be many of our rich men who will not have deposited, in some shape or other, a part of their capital in that country ; and thus, will the very thing that was to supply the place of courage and of honour be taken from us, precisely because we have, by our national acts, renounced our pretensions to those ennobling and commanding qualities. Therefore, my lord, we must inevitably lose our pecuniary means, and a national bankruptcy must inevitably ensue, unless we regain the confidence of ourselves and of the world, which can only be done by another war, a *successful war against France*, because such success alone can recover our lost reputation.

As to our *capability* of doing this, that is another question ; and, however the time-serving herd may execrate me, I venture to express my thorough persuasion that we *are not capable*, unless we are willing to make such exertions and such sacrifices as this nation never yet made, nor even dreamt of making. Able we were, and well able, to have *continued* the war, and to have finished it with glory ; but it does not for that reason follow, that we are able to *renew* the war, after our enemy has *doubled his strength*, and after we have been *deprived of three-fourths of ours*. It is the peace, the improvident, the disgraceful, the heart-chilling, the courage-killing peace of Amiens, that has wrought this fearful change in the relative situation of the two countries. Where is our fleet, my lord ? The ships are in the several ports ; but can they *go to sea* ? What is now become of the empty Munchausen-like boast of your modest and disinterested colleague, “ that *fifty* ships of the line could, at any time, be sent out to sea in the course of a *month* ? ” You must, one would think, have had some notion of your present danger for a fortnight back at least ; and are there, then, *twenty-five* ships ready to put to sea ? Are there *two*, my lord ? And does your lordship think that the proclamations of his Majesty will bring home the seven thousand British sailors and the hundreds of naval artizans, whom the peace and its *economical* regulations have driven into the service of the enemy ? And as to the land force ? You are a colonel, or something of that sort I believe, in the same corps, which has the advantage of possessing that ingenious and enterprising knight, Mr. John Hiley Addington ; I therefore put it to your lordship, whether you think that the militia can possibly be rendered of any use for this twelvemonth to come ? In most of the counties they are not yet *ballotted for* ; three weeks is allowed by law for an appeal against the ballot ; men who have served before are not obliged to serve now ; so that,

in about three months' time, the *drilling* will commence, and if the corps are formed and fit to meet an enemy in less than nine months after that, then will I say that miracles have not ceased. An addition to the militia in *Ireland* is proposed. Will that measure be soon and easily effected, my lord? And will Mr. Ogle still say, that "every *loyal* man in that country *rejoices* at the peace, while every *rebel* views it with *disapprobation and regret*?"* And will your modest and candid colleague still quote this as a proof that Mr. *Windham's* sentiments "are in unison with those of the *United Irishmen*?"† In short, I greatly fear, that while it is indispensably necessary to send ten thousand men to the West Indies, we have not on foot a force nearly sufficient to protect our home dominions, if the enemy should seriously think of an invasion, with all their ports open, and with all the numerous facilities furnished them by the peace of Amiens; by that peace which Mr. Sheridan was "*glad of*," though it was "degrading to the national dignity;" by that peace which Mr. Fox rejoiced at, "because it was *glorious to France and to the First Consul*;" by that peace on the signing of which Mr. Addington "reflected with *inward satisfaction*;"‡ by that peace the advising of which Lord St. Vincent considered as the "*pride of his life*;"§ by that peace of which your lordship, like another *EROSTRATUS*, wished "to be known to *posterity* as the author;"|| by that peace, and by that peace alone, my lord, it is, that we have been stripped of our character, our consequence, and our power, and that we are now exposed to the inroads of a rapacious, an enraged, and a merciless enemy.

WAR OR PEACE.

THIS is the question now, as it was in October last, and we will still answer *peace*, if the present Ministry exist. They know the country would not trust them with a war: it would deserve to be burnt up if it did; and they are resolved to keep their places to the latest moment that they can hang on, with any chance of safety to themselves. They have put up with injury upon injury, insult upon insult, ignominy upon ignominy, till they have made their country a by-word and a reproach amongst the nations; and our readers may be well assured, that they did not make the present show of resistance, upon any other consideration than that of their *own safety*. They must long have known the intentions of Buonaparte; they would have made any further sacrifices to pacify him; but they, at last, were persuaded that he was actually about to make an attack, and then they became alarmed for *themselves*, fearing that, if his Majesty should awake some morning and find himself no longer the sovereign of Ireland, ministerial *responsibility* might become something more than a mere pompous sound. It is possible, therefore, that their fears may have magnified the danger of invasion. When a coward turns his head towards his enemy, he always either shuts his eyes or sees double; two most admirable properties in a statesman, for the former of which we have already paid most dearly, and we are now, perhaps, to suffer for the latter.

* See debates on the Preliminaries, Register, vol. ii. p. 1190.

† Ibid., p. 1191.

‡ See Debates, Register, vol. ii. p. 1669.

§ Ibid., 1111.

|| Register, vol. ii. p. 457.

As to the object of the negotiation, or pretended negotiation, it is impossible for us to say precisely what it is; but this we well know, that, if it be any remnant of the treaty of Amiens, it is of far less importance than many of the sacrifices already made and completed by that treaty. Malta is, too, of infinitely less importance than Louisiana, and the Ministers are ready and willing to suffer the French to depart for that colony, even before the point with respect to Malta and Egypt is settled! Nay, it would appear from the message, that they would regard as a proof of a *pacific* disposition the departure of the French troops to the neighbourhood of Jamaica, which is much more vulnerable than Ireland itself. Such is the state to which this peace has reduced us, that we think about nothing but our own domestic, nay, almost our *personal* safety. We were formerly sensible to the slightest blow in the limbs, and even in the extremities of the empire; but having been kicked and bruised, having become "a most vile and beaten thing," we seem to have no wish remaining but that of preserving our lives. We have seen it stated, and in print too, that Buonaparte *yielded* in the affair of the *indemnities* and of *Switzerland*; and, if that really was yielding, we are fully persuaded he will yield now. *Reculer pour mieux sauter* is, too, an art which the Corsican perfectly understands. "The tiger," said Mr. Pickering to the Americans, "always *crouches* before he leaps upon his prey;" and, we beg our readers to be assured, that if Buonaparte draws back at present so far as to furnish the "safe politicians" with a plausible pretext for keeping their places a little longer, he will, at no great distance of time, fall upon this country with a force which she will not be able to resist.—The *Moniteur*, copies of which we have received to the 15th instant, seems also to strengthen the opinion we have formed on this subject. It contains the King's message, without any remark upon it; and this state paper, which operated like a thunder-stroke on the funds of this country, had, when the last advices came away, produced, as will be seen by our stock table, very little depression in those of France. The cause of this, however, we cannot, without more information, fully ascertain.

THE MECHANICAL MINISTRY.

BESIDES many other forcible reasons for Buonaparte's patching up the present dispute, there is one which alone, we think, must decide him so to do; and that is, he must know that the present Ministry would, in case of actual war, be instantly driven out of place, and he must also know that, if the whole British dominions, in every quarter of the world, were ransacked, another set of men, of whatever country or colour, could not be found so exactly fitted to the purpose of maintaining with him "*the relations of peace and of amity.*" Negroes would have mutinied fifty times under the treatment which they have patiently and silently received at his hands. If war, or any other cause, should ever bring their precious diplomatic transactions to the light, the people of this country, if they have any sense or feeling left, will die with shame at having been governed by such men. Lord Carlisle, to whom the nation is indebted for the first warning it received, respecting the dangers to be apprehended from these "*new and untried ministers,*" has lately most happily de-

scribed them as being a *machine*, formed by Mr. Pitt. "I will not," said his lordship, "call them an *infernal machine*, but I will say, that they "have proved infinitely more destructive to their country, than that machine was to the buildings and the people of Paris." Shamefully, indeed, was the nation insulted in the construction of this machine, which is hardly worthy the hand of even a journeyman politician. One of the wheels was soon taken out and replaced by another. What further repairs will take place, what further mending and patching, what further nails, and pegs, and bolts, and cleets, and braces, will be used to hold together this feeble and ricketty frame, it would be presumption in us to predict; but the public must by this time be well convinced that, unless it be knocked to pieces in a very short time, it will work the complete destruction of the British monarchy.—The Corsican is said to have grossly insulted Lord Whitworth. We deeply lament that our Sovereign should be exposed to insult in the person of his representative; but what else was to be expected, when the tame and degrading conduct of the Ministers was taken into consideration? It is to their pusillanimity, their propensity to crouch at his feet, that we are to attribute the insolence of Buonaparte! "He were no wolf, but that he finds them to be sheep." As Lord Temple observed, "they attract danger and disgrace, as conductors attract lightning; as blunt conductors, which attract most strongly, "and spread the mischief most widely."* They are always in a state of uncertainty: not one of them can even guess, now at this moment, whether we shall have war or not: their councils are full of doubt and of indecision: they are continually balancing between the fear of losing their places and that of incurring the *responsibility* attached to those places:

——— "Whate'er their doubtful hands
 "Attempt, confusion straight appears behind,
 "And troubles all their work. Through many a maze,
 "Perplex'd they struggle, changing every part,
 "O'erturning every purpose; then, at last,
 "Sit down dismay'd, and leave the entangled scene
 "For scorn to sport with———"†

STOCK-JOBGING NATION.

THE *Mercure de France*, of the 26th of March last, has the following remarks on the conduct of the London stock-jobbers:—"Hitherto, we "have been able to discover, in the minds of the English, little more "than the spirit of stock-jobbing, which seems to have acquired new "vigour from the warlike bluster of the Ministers; and, as the spirit of "stock-jobbing is no more than the parody of the spirit of patriotism, "one may take the liberty to laugh at the agitation it produces. The "gaping inhabitants of the London 'Change, look with great solicitude "towards the stocks in France, to see whether they rise or fall; doubt- "less, if there were stock-jobbers in France, they would look to the "stocks of London, in order to know what value to set on the credit of "their own country. Miserable game! at which Frenchmen formerly

* See Debates, Register, vol. ii. p. 1690.

† Akenside.

“ had to blush ; selfish calculation ! which can never grow up amongst
 “ an agricultural people, without producing the total extinction of public
 “ spirit, but which suits very well in a nation, where everything is bought
 “ and sold, where the Government is compelled to buy even the power of
 “ governing ! ” * If such were the sentiments of this writer two months
 ago, what must he think of us now ? What must he think of the nation
 which has been disturbed, to the remotest corners of its territory, by a
 mere waggish trick played off on the mayor of one of its cities, and, a
 second time, by a paragraph in one of its newspapers ? † These are most
 alarming symptoms. They prove the body politic to be in a state of
 fearful feebleness. Its nerves are shattered. It starts and trembles at
 every report. The events of the last week have, we fear, stamped the
 character of the British public for ever, or, at least, till some great and
 strong, and perhaps violent, remedy be adopted for the cure of the money-
 loving malady which now weighs us down to the earth. What that
 remedy will be, or whence it is to come, we know not ; but this we ven-
 ture to assert, that England cannot, with its present feelings, long con-
 tinue to be an independent nation. Our readers will do us the justice to
 acknowledge, that we long ago predicted that it would be on the side of
 the funds which France would first attack us. We then stated, that with
 our present funded debt, it was impossible to maintain public credit, while
 there was a power who could *raise and sink our funds at its pleasure*. It
 is absolutely impossible ; and therefore that debt must be destroyed, or
 we must, by some means or other, get rid of that *menacing power* which
 France has acquired over us, and which she now exercises with so much
 address and insolence on her part, and with so much folly and cowardice
 on ours. It is asserted, and we believe upon no very weak foundation,
 that the French have gained *two millions* in the British funds, since the
 date of the King’s message. Of this sum a part has passed over to France
 in cash, the rest has been and is now passing in merchandise, through
 various channels, and the effect is felt amongst our bankers and other
 speculators in stock. We now feel the salutary, the practical influence,
 of that “ capital, credit, and confidence,” which Lord Hawkesbury and
 his worthy colleague held forth as the “ *best security* ” to Great Britain.
 — While, therefore, France is gaining so immensely in this way, as

* *Mercure de France*, p. 84.

† FROM A MORNING PAPER.—“ One of the most infamous frauds and im-
 positions ever practised, yesterday threw the whole City of London into confusion.
 “ Some persons, yet unknown, about half-past eight o’clock, or about nine, sent the
 “ following letter to the Lord Mayor :— ‘ *To the Rt. Hon. the Lord Mayor.*—Down-
 “ ing-street, 8 a.m.—Lord Hawkesbury presents compliments to the Lord Mayor,
 “ and has the honour to acquaint his lordship that the negotiation between this
 “ country and the French Republic has been amicably adjusted.’—The Lord Mayor,
 “ without the least suspicion of fraud, sent a copy to Lloyd’s, stuck up the substance
 “ of the note on the Mansion-House, and went himself to the Stock Exchange.
 “ The market began at 69. and the price varied to 70½. No suspicion appears to
 “ have been entertained for three hours. At length the following letter from
 “ Lord Hawkesbury arrived at the Mansion-House :— ‘ *Downing-street, May 5.*—
 “ My Lord,—As I have just been informed that a letter has been sent to your
 “ lordship, pretended to be signed by me, respecting the state of the negotia-
 “ tions between this country and France, I lose no time in informing your lord-
 “ ship that no such letter has been sent by me, and I request, therefore, that you
 “ would take immediate steps for undeceiving the public, and detecting the daring
 “ forgery.”

“ I have the honour to be, &c. &c., ”

“ *To the Rt. Hon. the Lord Mayor.* ”

“ HAWKESBURY. ”

well as by the base folly of the English nobility and gentry, who are daily making a pilgrimage to kiss the boot of the First Consul, that nation would be very foolish not to keep peace with us on almost any terms. A little quarrel, a menace of war, about three times a year, would effect her object much sooner than it could possibly be effected by any other means. "France," said Mr. Windham, in his speech upon the Preliminaries, "will be under no necessity to go to war with us; and *nothing but her own intemperance and insolence, and an opinion of our endurance and weakness, beyond even what they may be found to deserve, can force upon us that extremity.* She has much surer and safer means of going to work; means at the same time sufficiently quick in their operation to satisfy any ordinary ambition:—she has nothing to do but to trust to the progress of her own power in peace, *quicken'd, as often as she shall see occasion, by a smart threat of war.* I cannot conceive the object which a judicious application of these two means is not calculated to obtain. A peace, such as France has now made, *mixed with proportions of a seasonable menace of war,* is a specific for the undoing of a rival country, which seems to me impossible to fail."* How correct, how exactly correct, was this opinion! Whether the intemperance and insolence of France have, or have not, been pushed *beyond our forbearance,* is a question that remains to be solved; but that she has tried them to the utmost is certain.—If peace, beloved peace, should after all be continued for some time longer, the stock-jobber's hope will not, however, be realized. The nation must keep up an establishment nearly equal to that of war, or we shall have to arm afresh, and pay new bounties twice or thrice a year. One or the other of these must be, or we must become the subjects of Frenchmen. The candid Minister now stands between the horrors of war and the greater horrors of a financial deficit, which will be discovered, to the eyes of the most ignorant, long before the end of the year. War would be a good act of oblivion for his estimates of December last, and, accordingly, the French writers do not scruple to say, that, to obtain this act, was one of the objects of the present quarrel.† Indeed, every man of any tolerable knowledge in the public affairs of the country cannot but perceive, that it is absolutely impossible for us to maintain, for any length of time, the peace establishment last fixed on, without *annual loans* or immense *new taxes* annually added to those already in existence: and, that such a course would, in a very short space, inevitably produce a failure in the payment of the interest on the public debt, or consequences infinitely more fatal, it requires no great sagacity to foretel. Therefore, "the hope of the coward *must perish.*" Something must be done to add to our power, or to diminish that of our mortal enemy. The lovers of "peace and plenty," the hypocrite, the coward, the drunkard, the glutton, the pic-nic, and the miser, may continue to unite their voices in the praise of peace, they may continue to despise the terms of that peace, they may continue to revile all those who yet stand up for national honour; but neither their praise nor their revilings shall avail them aught; that honour must be regained, or their wealth and their luxury shall be destroyed, and they themselves shall become the most wretched, as they already are, the basest of mankind. There are some persons who, adopting the opinion lately quoted by us from a daily paper, seem to

* See Debates, Register, vol. ii. p. 1162. † Mercure de France, March 19.

think that a remedy for all our evils is to be found in a *mere change of Ministry*, without any subsequent sacrifice or exertion on the part of the country. "Give us Mr. Pitt," say they, "only give us Mr. Pitt, and we shall think ourselves *perfectly safe*." And why? We should be glad to know why? Is it supposed that Mr. Pitt can curtail the sea-coast of the French, which now sweeps round one half of the continent of Europe? Can he make Buonaparte disband any portion of his army? Can he prevent the sudden rise of a French naval force? Can he reduce, *greatly* reduce, the establishments of England, without hazarding the safety of the country? If he cannot do these things, he can bring no security in peace. Undoubtedly, the French would not insult him as they have done his creatures; they would proceed more cautiously, perhaps not quite so fast as they hitherto have done, but their object would be still the same; and, it is by no means unlikely, that caution and a relaxation of pace would only render its accomplishment the more sure. It is the immense disproportion of that relative state, in which we were placed by the treaty of Amiens, that must be got rid of, before any reasonable man will see a hope of safety for England, and this is to be done only by war; yes, horrid as is the sound, war, war, another war, a *successful war against France*, is the remedy, and the sole remedy, for the disease which is now eating out the heart of the kingdom. "What!" say the slavish crew who have been crouching at the feet of Buonaparte, "would you go to war in order to drive the French within their ancient limits? You are *mad*." Mad as we are, you degenerate beings, the nation must think with us, and act up to its thoughts, or your splendid mansions will ere long change possessors, the emblems of your honours will be trampled in the dirt, while you yourselves will shift places with those who now eat the crumbs that fall from your tables. *Mad*, indeed! This charge is never preferred against the silly Ministry who made, and the sickly-brained Parliament who approved of, the treaty of Amiens. That imbecility which looked for strength in the credit, capital, and confidence of four hundred miserable Jews; that canting enthusiasm which bids us rely on Providence, while we were too base to use the means which Providence had placed in our hands; those fits and lucid intervals which one day dictated a remonstrance in favour of the Swiss, and the next day abandoned them to their fate; which one day ordered the retention of the Cape, and the next its surrender. None of these are called *madness*; no fear, however groundless, no reliance, however absurd, no assertion, however false, inconsistent, and contradictory, nothing is thus stigmatized, unless it leads to war; nothing is *madness* which does not call for exertion, which does not point to *national valour* as the only source of national hope. Except this, nothing is excluded from some share of wisdom: money and manufactures; the nasal twang of a methodistical nose; the extermination of bull-dogs; the converting of negroes into saints; Sunday-schools for making scholars of those whose business it is to delve; soup-shops for feeding those who are too idle to work and too proud to beg; the abolition of tithes; thick handkerchiefs for ladies' bosoms: each of these, as being *the means of national salvation*, has its numerous partisans, while, in resistance of France and her half a million of soldiers, to use powder and steel, to call on the people to buckle on their armour, is almost universally regarded as *madness*!—Such a nation cannot, it will not, and it ought not, to remain independent. It voluntarily bows its neck to the yoke of a foreign power, and that yoke it ought to wear,

FINANCE AND TRADE.

THE deceptions on these subjects are kept up with unremitting attention. The following article we have extracted from a daily paper called the *Oracle*:—"Notwithstanding the *croaking that prevails amongst people in trade*, it appears from the accounts of the Custom-House, now lying on "the table of the House of Commons, that our exports amounted last year "to 48,500,683*l.*, which is 6,800,000*l.* more than the foregoing year, "and this only the British produce and manufactures. Our foreign "merchandise augmented also still more in proportion.—Our exports of "foreign merchandise have trebled since the year 1792, and that of our "manufactures and produce has increased 50 per cent. Our imports "have not increased nearly in an equal proportion; thus the balance in "our favour is great beyond example. Last year our imports were "1,750,000*l.* less than the year before, which, added to the excess of "the exports, makes an *augmentation of balance* in our favour in last "year of 8,550,000*l.*" This article has been inserted in *all* the daily papers, and has not, perhaps, cost the public less than the paragraph inserted in the *Morning Post* on the 5th instant, *comparing the conduct of the opposers of Lord St. Vincent to that of the traitor Despard*. Blessed liberty of the press! Blessed "palladium of free men!" Not only does it deceive the people, but makes them *pay for the deception!*—As to this article on Finance and Trade, however, we cannot much blame the editors of the daily papers for inserting it. The subject is one that they do not understand, and, such is the nature of their publications, they have not *time* to inquire into the truth of any statement of this sort which is sent to them. It arrives at their office at midnight, perhaps, and it is in print before three o'clock in the morning. But we request the editor of the *Oracle* to look into the *Register* of the 23rd of April, p. 584, *et. seq.*, and that of April 30, p. 614, where he will find the deception, with regard to British produce, and manufactures exported, completely exposed.—With respect to the *animation* in our imports, which he seems to have been led to view as a *favourable* circumstance, what would he say, if he were told that our own West-India and North-American produce, our own sugar, cotton, and furs, are included in those imports? This discovery would certainly upset his "*balance.*" But, the truth is, that there has been, during the last year, no other positive diminution in our imports than that which has arisen from the falling off in the importation of *corn, meal, and flour*, which was brought hither in such great quantities during the preceding year, for the sake of the bounty offered by Parliament.—We shall take an early opportunity of going more at length into the state of our commerce and navigation. If articles, such as we have here quoted, are inserted from inadvertency, we have said enough to prevent future impositions of the kind, and if their insertion is *paid for*, we have not the vanity to hope that any thing we could say would have the least effect on those who insert them; for, of all the sweet moments of a news-monger's sweet life, the sweetest are those which bring him *paid-for paragraphs*. No matter what it is, so that it comes accompanied with the guineas. Hence the never-ending inconsistencies and contradictions that are seen

in all the London papers. The *editor*, who is generally a man of some talent, would perhaps reject articles which militate against his statements of the preceding day; but in comes the interest of the *proprietor*, and silences all the remonstrances of sense, reason, and conscience; and, as the editor is not known to the world, his reputation is not at stake, and he has no right to complain. And, yet, it is to publications like these, that the public look for information! It is in publications like these that they think they find it! It is the continuation of a shameful traffic like this which is styled "the liberty of the press," and which is boasted of as the "birthright of Britons!" Oh, the inestimable birthright! the right of being led by the nose, by a set of the meanest and most ignorant creatures that ever existed upon earth; the right of being continually agitated and deceived, and the right of paying for that agitation and deception! Some persons, while they will readily acknowledge the justice of these remarks, will call in question the prudence of making them. Alas! there is nothing to be hoped for from the press, particularly the newspaper press, which always has been, and always will be, as long as it lasts, the curse of the country. No; it must be an influence quite different from this that will save this monarchy, if it be saved at all. The people must act from the dictates of their own minds, and not from the notions they imbibe through this corrupted and all-corrupting and degrading source.*

EMIGRATION.

A REPORT has been made to the House of Commons from the committee appointed to examine into the survey of the coasts &c. of Scotland, relating to emigration; and upon the authority of this report, the following resolutions were, on the 17th inst., moved by Mr. Hawkins Browne:—"That persons emigrating from different parts of the United Kingdom to his Majesty's plantations &c, had suffered greatly from the crowded state of the ships, from the want of provisions &c.—That the ships ought to be regulated with regard to the number of persons they take on board, the quantity of provisions, &c."—Those who read some of the first numbers of the newspaper called *THE PORCUPINE*, will recollect that, in an article entitled "*White Slave Trade*,"† the necessity of some such regulation as that which appears to be now in contemplation was pointed out, and the aid of the Legislature therein loudly called

* See our note, p. 266.—ED.

† Since the date of this article, the ideas upon emigration have been wonderfully matured. The *Edinburgh Review*, in 1826, had a grand treatise on "surplus population," in which the reviewer said, speaking of Ireland, that in order to make any decided and palpable improvement in the condition of the people, emigration would have to be conducted on a very large scale; that the removing of a few thousand individuals, unless it were in the way of experiment, would be little better than absolute loss; and that, in order to lay the foundations of a radical change, it might be necessary to remove a seventh part of the entire population of Ireland, or nearly one million of human beings. Number CIX. of the *Quarterly Review* says nearly the same. Again, Mr. GEORGE POULETT SCROPE, M.P. (in a letter to the hand-loom weavers, dated April 1835), proposes that "*the Atlantic be bridged over*," for the conveyance of the poor weavers "from the British islands to the British colonies, from that part of the British dominions which nature has specially adapted to manufactures, to that part which

for. We cannot, however, help expressing our surprise that the subject should have lain dormant for nearly three years, and that it should now have been brought forward by a cause so comparatively insignificant. The present report gives an account of the emigration during the years 1801 and 1802, *from the coasts and central Highlands of Scotland*. The places to which the emigrants have gone, the numbers in each year, and the totals of both years taken together, are as follows :—

Emigrated to	In 1801.	In 1802.	In both.
Nova Scotia	669	198	867
Upper Canada	—	2,173	2,173
Cape Breton	—	340	340
United States of America.....	130	600	730
Totals.....	799	3,311	4,110

The first observation that presents itself is the great difference between the last year of war and the first year of the “blessings of peace,” of that

“she has equally adapted to agriculture.” But we arrest the reader’s attention in this place to observe, that the phrase “*White Slave Trade*” appears not at all unlikely to be used, before long, from precisely the same cause of sympathy for white men that made us feel for the blacks before they were emancipated. It is not unlikely that our labouring whites will soon take the place of the blacks in Jamaica. Indeed, it has been reported that such is already the case. Our newspapers (*Morning Herald*, Dec. 1, 1834; and *Morning Chronicle*, Jan. 14, 1835) state, not only that the negroes will not work without a further importation of magistrates from England, but that English labourers are invited to go to Jamaica to cultivate the plantations. The *Preston Chronicle* of Jan. 3, 1835, has the following:—“Last week the ship *Hira*, Captain Lirigie, sailed from Gravesend for Falmouth, Jamaica, having on board 103 agricultural labouring men, women, and children, who are to be attached to the estates of the Hon. R. BARRETT, the Speaker of the Assembly there.” If these reports should be correct, they are by no means inconsistent with the policy of some of our economists. The 26th section of the bill for relieving the Irish poor, proposed to Parliament in their session of 1835 by Mr. G. POULETT SCROPE, and ordered to be brought in by that gentleman and Mr. HAWES, makes it a condition with the pauper that he shall submit to transportation. The words of the act are these:—“And in case any such applicant shall refuse so to emigrate under the directions of the Board, the said Board of Guardians is, and shall be, discharged from all obligation to relieve or set to work any such poor person, or his wife or children as aforesaid,” &c. But there is, to be sure, this circumstance to reconcile the white labourer to the present condition of a black; namely, that while Lord ALTHORP and our House of Commons refused Mr. COBBETT’S request to insert a clause in the new Poor-Law Bill to forbid the separation of wives from their husbands, and children from their parents, and while separations of that kind have, in spite of remonstrances made in Parliament by Major BEAUCLERK and Mr. WALTER, been winked at by our Government; the bill of 1833, which relieves the *Black Slaves* (3 and 4 Wm. IV., c. 73, s. 9), actually contains a humane provision, that the written consent, therein specified, of “two or more justices of the peace,” for transferring negroes from one plantation to another, “shall in no case be given, or be of any validity, unless such justices of the peace shall first have ascertained that such transfer would not have the effect of separating any such attached predial apprenticed labourer from his or her wife or husband, parent or child, or from any person or persons reputed to bear any such relation to him or her,” &c. One can hardly suppose, that the protection here given to the native negro, would be denied to the poor white who had passed over Mr. G. POULETT SCROPE’S “Atlantic bridge” to do slave-work in Jamaica!

peace and plenty brought us by the treaty of Amiens; and one cannot but admire the modesty and candour of Mr. Addington in not availing himself of this circumstance in stating the vast increase of his *exports* of British produce.—Four thousand one hundred and ten persons are, we perceive, all that have emigrated from the Highlands in the course of two years, and of this number the whole, except 730, have gone to *his Majesty's dominions*, are still his subjects, and are, probably, as to the general interests of the empire, full as advantageously employed, and full as happily for themselves, as if they had remained in the Highlands, or had come to crowd the Custom-house, the Excise, and the other public offices in London. In the Appendix of the Report, the committee has given an extract from the evidence of a Mr. James Grant of Redcastle, who states that the emigration from the part of the country alluded to, *since* the conclusion of the war, has amounted to 5,000 souls; that an equal number are ready to embark this season; that the whole depopulation is expected from this cause, might extend to 25,000 souls, a full *third part* of all the existing inhabitants of the West-Highlands, including the adjacent Islands. Truly this is an alarming circumstance, and highly deserving legislative attention; but how comes it that the Ministers, both the present and last, have constantly turned a deaf ear to all the representations relative to the emigration from Ireland and Wales? In the latter of these, the means of emigration have been furnished by the parish officers, in order to get rid of the poor. Publications the most delusive and false have been made for the express purpose of inveigling away the ignorant country people, not to Nova Scotia and Canada, but to the United States of America, where they must be for ever lost to the British empire. We know that these facts were duly communicated to the present Ministers; and we also know that they paid no attention to them; that they made no one exertion to undeceive the people, though ample means for so doing were ready at their hand. How comes it then that the subject is *now* taken up? There have been more than 10,000 souls, upon an average, emigrated from Ireland to the United States every year for ten years last past. Horrid is the treatment which these people have met with at sea, and, after their landing, they have been sold by public advertisement. How comes it, then, we again ask, that the voice of neither interest nor humanity has been listened to till *now*? The emigration from Ireland, not to the king's dominions, but to foreign parts, has been greater in amount, within the last ten years, than the whole population of the West Highlands of Scotland; and why are not the interests of Ireland, why are not the health and lives of her people as dear to the Government as are the interests of Scotland and the health and lives of her people? Where is the ground of this partiality? Is Ireland less fertile than the Highlands of Scotland? Can the people live in the latter easier and better than in the former? or are the land-holders in the Highlands more faithful to the Minister of the day than are the land-holders of Ireland? All that appears to be intended by the Bill at present to be brought in, is, to prevent ill-treatment to the emigrants; but, it is very clear from the language of the Report, that the ultimate object is to *prevent* emigration, not only of men but of *money*; for at the close of the return for 1802, it is said: "this year, the passengers, including freight-money, took out of the country above 100,000*l.* sterling cash—*lost to it for ever!*" Almost all the emigrants went to Canada, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton, and it is not very fair to suppose that their cash, their

dear delicious cash, was lost to the *country* for ever, unless by the word *country* Scotland *alone* is meant. Besides, why should not the poor Highlanders carry away their cash as well as the noblemen and gentlemen of Scotland and England? We greatly doubt that cash expended by these people on the woods of Canada and Nova Scotia is more completely lost to the empire than that which the Duchess of Gordon, Duke of Bedford, and a list of others too loathsome to enumerate, have expended in Paris. A hundred thousand pounds lost to the country for ever! *Three millions* of pounds have been thus lost for ever, during the same year, by those who have been crouching at the feet of Buonaparte and his wife. The very baubles bought expressly for the purpose of shining in the eyes of our mortal enemy, who to that quality adds the more hateful ones of rebel and usurper, have cost more than all the three thousand Highlanders have taken to America. That every Government has a *right* to prevent emigration to foreign parts is certain; it is not only an undoubted but a just and equitable right of sovereignty; but as to the *expediency* of using force for this purpose, that must depend upon circumstances, one of which certainly is not, that the possessors of the land set the un-patriotic example.

FINANCE.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.]—We have now come to that part of the *Register* where Mr. COBBETT began his attacks upon the Funding System, and as this subject is one of those on which he mainly dwelt, we think it necessary to show how he was led first to think of it, and how he studied it: the progress that he made will appear in the many articles and essays which we shall have to republish. We select what we consider the best articles, but we shall, of course, be careful to preserve those which show how early he adopted those principles with regard to the National Debt, and its effects on the country, which he has urged so frequently, and in so many shapes, on the attention of the King, the Government, and the people, from 1803 to 1835. In the “Manchester Lectures,” p. 95, he says, “I cannot adopt a better method of explaining this matter (loan-making) “to you, than by describing a transaction by which means I was likely to become “a loan-monger myself, and which first opened my eyes with regard to this “matter. When I came home from America, in 1800, I was looked upon by the “Government people as likely to become one of their vigorous partisans. It “was the custom in those glorious days of Pitt and paper, to give to the literary “partisans of the Government what were called ‘slices’ of a loan. For instance, “MOSES was the loan-monger; and, as the *scrip*, as it used to be called, was “always directly at a *premium*, a bargain was always made with the loan-monger “that he should admit certain favourites of the Government to have certain portions of scrip at the same price that he gave for it. I was offered such a portion “of *scrip*, which, as I was told, would put a hundred or two pounds into my “pocket at once. I was frightened at the idea of becoming responsible for the “immense sum, upon which this would be the profit. But I soon found that the “*scrip* was never even to be shown to me, and that I had merely to pocket the “amount of the *premium*. I refused to have anything to do with the matter, for “which I got heartily laughed at. But this was of great utility to me; it opened “my eyes with regard to the nature of these transactions; it set me to work to “understand all about the debt, the funds, and the scrip, and the stock, and “every thing belonging to it.” Mr. COBBETT, at the time which he refers to in the above extract, was in the habit of seeing Mr. WINDHAM and Dr. LAURENCE, the latter of whom, though not now so familiarly known by name to the public as Mr. WINDHAM, was a member of Parliament, and a very learned man. It was to him in particular that Mr. COBBETT applied for information concerning the subject of Finance and the Funds. The Doctor advised him to read the works of Dr. ADAM SMITH and Mr. GEORGE CHALMERS, which he accordingly

did; but, as we have often heard him say, finding nothing in those writers to give him a clear view of the subject, he then read all the Acts connected with the Bank from those of Will. III. down to the time we are speaking of; and till the beginning of the year 1803, he seems not to have thought himself so far master of the matter as to begin to write upon it; but in that year he began his attacks on the system. He does PAINÉ the credit of having been his real teacher, however; for in "*Paper against Gold*," p. 442, he says, that in the year 1803, he read the "*Decline and Fall of the English System of Finance*," and of that work he remarks: "Here was no bubble, no mud to obstruct my view: the stream was clear and strong: I saw the whole matter in its true light, and neither pamphleteers nor speechmakers were, after that, able to raise a momentary puzzle in my mind." It will be seen in the essays that we shall now publish, that Mr. COBBETT strongly urged a reduction of the interest on the Debt, and that he contended that that must be done, or that the monarchy itself would ultimately be in peril from the weight of taxation. In this opinion Mr. COBBETT "stood alone" again; for even Mr. WINDHAM and Dr. LAURENCE thought him whimsical in his notions, and the former remonstrated with him for giving so much attention to, and making so important, a matter in which he certainly was wrong! Agreeing with these two gentlemen as to the condition of the country, and in attributing it to the system of PITT and ADDINGTON, he differed from them both in attributing every mischief to the funding system; and he differed from them so widely, that it was not long before Mr. COBBETT, in pursuit of the means which should destroy the system, became a Parliamentary Reformer, and the associate of Major CARTWRIGHT and Sir FRANCIS BURDETT instead of Mr. WINDHAM and Dr. LAURENCE. While attacking the funding system in 1803-4 and 5, he wrote also against Parliamentary Reform, for that he then considered an attack on the "institutions of the country," and did it rather from old prejudice than conviction; but so positive was he that the pernicious system of funding would complete the ruin of all, that he at last came to the conclusion that a reform was the only means of saving what he once thought it would destroy. This, however, will unfold itself gradually as we proceed in this publication, and, therefore, we need say no more here.

THE hirelings of the Ministry are always unfortunate in the *time* they choose for vilifying our statements. Just at the moment when a discussion in the House of Lords was *confirming* our representations on the subject of Mr. Addington's estimates, some ministerial creature was advertising a *refutation* of those representations. We have not looked into this representation, a neglect which we participate with the public, but certain we are that whatever sum of the nation's money it has been purchased with has been totally thrown away.—Lord Grenville, in admitting, for argument's sake, the correctness of all the accounts laid before Parliament, and proceeding upon the supposition that peace had continued, clearly made out a *deficit* of more than 4,000,000*l.* per annum, instead of a *surplus* of 1,000,000*l.* on which Mr. Addington taught the deceived people to rely, making a difference of more than 5,000,000*l.* between the reality and the estimates of the Minister. The debate to which we allude, and which will, of course, be given at length in the Supplement to this volume, was opened with great ability by Lord King, who appears to be a young nobleman of promise. Lord Moira's speech was one of the best that ever was heard even in that assembly. He acknowledged that he had been deceived as to the treaty of Amiens; he deprecated that system of financial deception which had long been practised upon the people, in order to cover the blunders and misconduct of Ministers, and to prepare the way for some new and un-looked-for sacrifice; and he satirized in a most happy vein of contempt, the display of Lord Auckland's "*magnificent receipts*." Magnificent receipts! What a phrase! What a phrase for a *nobleman* to use! Not a whit less disgusting than the "*heavenly*

turtle" of a *Right Honourable* and guttling Lord Mayor. The speech of Lord Grenville, of which those who were not present can have but a very faint notion, unravelled the whole of the labyrinthian deception, and exhibited the juggling Minister in his native duplicity. Under blows like these Lord Auckland was *supported* by the Earl of Westmoreland; *how*, it would not be becoming in us to attempt to describe. The stock-jobbing lovers of peace and plenty; the omnium-eaters; all the innumerable swarm of locusts, who, without stirring ten miles from the capital, devour three-fourths of the produce of the whole land; this destructive race of beings may and will abuse every one who attempts to open the eyes of the nation, because they must know that every such attempt tends to their annihilation. But, events will, ere long, speak to them in a most tremendous voice. The thunder already begins to roll, and the bolt will assuredly fall. They may howl, but their howlings will not save them. They may cry "blood-hounds" as long as they please; but they must have war, and *to them* most certainly a war of extermination. The stroke may be postponed for a few months, or for a year or two; but it must come, and that shortly. We, for our parts, believe that another accommodation with Buonaparte will yet take place: another short respite from conflict: and the war will probably be nothing more than a sort of half peace, conducted by the sapient Addington and his colleagues: but all this will avail nothing; the great and tremendous war must finally come, and then adieu to all the golden dreams of the votaries of the Temple of Mammon. The scenes exhibited in the city of London for the last three weeks are too disgusting, too hateful, to contemplate without a mixture of indescribable loathing and horror; and the man who does not desire to see an effectual bar against their recurrence in future, must be lost to every sense of shame as well as of honour.

IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.]—The following paper we publish as we find it, with the few lines of heading, the official circular which instructed the clergy to distribute it in the churches and post it on the church-doors, and the royal arms at its head. This paper, though never claimed by him till some years after, was written by Mr. COBBETT in 1803. He had, as the reader has seen, opposed the Peace of Amiens, and foretold that that Peace could not be lasting. In May 1803, war was again declared against France, and Mr. ADDINGTON and Lord HAWKESBURY, who had made the Peace, were still at the head of the Ministry. BUONAPARTE threatened to invade England; he made preparations, such as collecting an army at Boulogne, fitting out flat-bottomed boats, &c., and in England all was terror and dismay, as the reader may see by turning to the columns of any newspaper of that day. He would find in the *MORNING POST*, for instance, of 6 July 1803, an account of BUONAPARTE'S progress towards the coast of France, in which the people of Amiens welcome and encourage him by inscribing on the façade of the gate of that town, which opens on to the Calais road, the words "THE ROAD TO ENGLAND." In the same paper of the next day, is a proposition of the editor that the conductors of the newspapers of England shall devote a certain portion of their columns daily to the purpose of rousing the people to the defence of the country. In short, one cannot read the papers of that time, without seeing that the nation must have been almost panic-stricken at the preparations of France; and it was under this state of things that Mr. COBBETT wrote, and the Government distributed, the following paper:—In June 1809, Mr. COBBETT was still writing against the funding system, and in

favour of such a reform of the Parliament as would rid the nation of this which he considered its bane. The Government met him by publishing a garbled account of a COURT MARTIAL, begun, at his instance, in 1792, on the conduct of the officers of the regiment of which he was the sergeant-major. We say that the *Government* did this, because no other persons could have done it, as will be seen by looking at the pamphlet itself; for it contains papers that could properly have been nowhere but in the government offices. This pamphlet was distributed by the thousand, if not the *million*. Mr. COBBETT observes, in page 899 of vol. xv., "They have sent hundreds and thousands of copies into Hampshire. All the gentlemen who signed the requisition (for a county meeting), have received them for nothing. The post-office at Winchester has charged only a penny for their transmission to Twyford. The robbers, as they have come down from London in their carriages, have brought whole bales with them, which they have tossed out to all whom they met upon the road. A few days ago, a landau full of *he* and *she* peculators passed through Alton, tossing out these pamphlets as they went." He answered it, and showed, amongst other things, that the Government had availed itself of his services and encouraged his exertions for some years while he favoured *them*, knowing, at the same time, that he was the same *William Cobbett* who, if he had preferred false charges against his officers in 1792, which they now pretended, was not worthy of the marks of approbation that they had repeatedly bestowed upon him; and was not worthy of having a list of subscribers to his works consisting of almost all the Royal family, many of the Bishops, all the Ministers, and a large part of the Peers. He instances, as one occasion on which they accepted of his services, the following paper; and he brings it forward also in answer to the new cry that had (1809) been raised against him, namely, that he was "a low and insignificant person," who ought not to be attended to. But we will give the extract from vol. xv. p. 916, *Pol. Register*:—"Each of you, gentlemen" (it was addressed to the people of Hampshire), "will probably recollect, that much about this time of the year, six years ago, that is to say, in the summer of 1803, at a time when there was a general fear of invasion, a publication was issued by the Government, was sent to all the parishes, was distributed in the churches, and was read from the several pulpits. The paper was entitled, 'IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE OF THIS KINGDOM.' It was, in the newspapers, attributed to Lord HAWKESBURY; afterwards to Dr. HORSLEY, Dr. RENNELL, and other learned and eloquent men; but the real author of it was *myself*. I wrote it; offered it to Mr. ADDINGTON, through Mr. YORKE; he accepted of it, in which he showed his sense of duty to be above party pique; and it was published and distributed at the expense of several thousands of pounds." Mr. COBBETT had no communication direct with the Ministers in this matter. The paper was given by him to the late Mr. JOHN REEVES, who had so far the credit of the performance, that the QUEEN (QUEEN CHARLOTTE) thanked him personally as the author at a drawing-room which he attended subsequently to its being published. The Ministers, however, did know that Mr. COBBETT was the author, and he was offered a sum of money, which he refused. Relating to this matter, we will insert here an extract from the COURIER of the 11th of April, 1817, a few days after Mr. COBBETT left England for America, on the suspending of the Habeas Corpus act in that year:—"We will do COBBETT another piece of justice. We believe that he did not look for, nor receive, money as a bribe for espousing any cause. Certainly *we know of one instance* wherein a present of money was offered to him for services rendered, which could not have been otherwise than a tolerably large sum, but he very handsomely refused it." Mr. COBBETT understood this to allude to the "Important Considerations," and it was put forth in the *Courier*, at that time his deadly foe, at a moment when he was supposed to be gone off the stage of politics, and when foes even could afford to be a little generous.

The following paper, which, accompanied with the circular letter preceding it, has been sent, by direction of the Government, to every parish in England and Wales, appears to be so well calculated for the present crisis, that notwithstanding its great length, we think it our duty to give it a place, in preference to all other matter:—

CIRCULAR.

To the Officiating Ministers of the several Parishes in England and Wales.

It having been thought necessary, that, at this momentous crisis, his Majesty's subjects, in every part of the kingdom, and of every rank and degree, should be fully apprized of the danger with which their property and their lives, their liberties and their religion, are threatened, in order that their energy may be called forth, and that, under God's providence, the safety of the realm may thereby be provided for, and its ancient honour maintained; it having been also thought, that THE CHURCH is the most safe, regular, and certain channel of circulation, as well as the best suited to the importance of the subject: It appears advisable to adopt that mode of communication, more especially as, in the execution of this great national purpose, such material aid may be expected from the wisdom and zeal of the Clergy. In consequence whereof you will herewith receive certain copies of a printed paper, entitled "Important Considerations for the People of this Kingdom." It is requested that you will be pleased to cause part of them to be deposited in the pews, and part to be distributed in the aisles, amongst the poor, on the Sunday following the day on which you shall receive them. There are also inclosed certain copies calculated for posting; one of which is intended to be placed on the church-door, and another in some such public part of the parish as you may deem best fitted for making it known among the parishioners.



IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS

FOR THE

PEOPLE OF THIS KINGDOM.

At a moment when we are entering on a scene deeply interesting, not only to this nation, but to the whole civilized world; at a moment when we all, without distinction of rank or degree, are called upon to rally round, and to range ourselves beneath the banners of that Sovereign, under whose long, mild, and fostering reign the far greater part of us, capable of bearing arms, have been born and reared up to manhood; at a moment when we are, by his truly royal and paternal example, incited to make every sacrifice and every exertion in a war, the event of which is to decide whether we are still to enjoy, and to bequeath to our children, the possessions, the comforts, the liberties, and the national honours, handed down to us from generation to generation, by our gallant forefathers; or whether we are, at once, to fall from this favoured and honourable station, and to become the miserable crouching slaves, the hewers of wood and the drawers of water, of those very Frenchmen, whom the valour of our fleets and armies has hitherto taught us to despise; at such a moment, it behoves us, calmly and without dismay, to examine our situation, to consider what are the grounds of the awful contest in which we are engaged; what are the wishes, the designs, and the pretensions of our enemies; what would be the consequences, if those enemies were to triumph over us; what are our means, and what ought to be our motives, not only for frustrating their malicious intentions, but for inflicting just and memorable chastisement on their insolent and guilty heads.

The grounds of the war are by no means, as our enemies pretend, to be sought for in a desire entertained by his Majesty to keep the island of Malta, contrary to the treaty of peace, or to leave unfulfilled any other part of his sacred engagements; they are to be sought for in the ambition of the First Consul of France, and in his implacable hatred of Britain, because, in the power and valour of Britain alone, he finds a check to that ambition which aims at nothing short of the conquest of the world. His Majesty, ever anxious to procure for his people prosperity and ease, eagerly seized the first opportunity that offered itself for the restoration of peace; but not without remembering, at the same time, that their safety, for which it was his peculiar duty to provide, was not to be sacrificed to any other consideration. This peace he concluded with the most sincere desire that it might be durable, and the conduct of France would be such as to authorize him to execute, with scrupulous punctuality, every one of the stipulations of the treaty. But scarcely was that compact concluded, when the First Consul, at the very time that his Majesty was surrendering to France and Holland the great and numerous conquests he had made from them during the war, began a new sort of hostility upon the weak and defenceless states on the Continent of Europe: Piedmont, a country equal to all Scotland, was added to France: Holland, which had, at the making of the peace, been recognised as an independent nation, became more than ever the object of French rapacity and despotism; was compelled to furnish ships and stores for French expeditions, and to feed and clothe French armies; the only use of which was to keep her in a state of slavish subjection, and to render her shores an object of serious alarm and real danger to Great Britain: Switzerland was invaded by a French army, which compelled the people of that once free and happy country to submit to a government framed at Paris, the members of which government were chiefly composed of men who had betrayed the liberties of their country, and who were nominated by the Consul himself. Notwithstanding, however, all these and several other acts of aggression and tyranny, some of which were highly injurious to Great Britain, and were shameful violations of the treaty of Peace, still his Majesty earnestly endeavoured to avoid a recurrence to arms; but the Consul, emboldened by our forbearance, and imputing to a dread of his power that which he ought to have imputed solely to our desire to live at peace, manifested his perfidious intentions again to take possession of Egypt, whence we had driven him in disgrace; again to open a road to our possessions in India, there to destroy one of the principal sources of our wealth and our greatness.

Not contented with thus preparing for our destruction from without, endeavouring to cut off our intercourse with the rest of the world, shutting, as far as he was able, all the ports of other countries against us; gradually destroying our navigation, commerce and trade, hemming us up in our own island, and exposing our manufacturers, artisans, and labourers, to the danger of starving for want of employment; not contented with these malignant endeavours, and seeming to regard us as already within his grasp, he audaciously interfered in the management of our domestic concerns; required us to violate our laws by banishing those subjects of the French Monarch, who had fled hither for shelter from his unjust and tyrannical government; demanded of us the suppression of the liberty of speech and of the press, and, in a word, clearly demonstrated his resolution not to leave us a moment's tranquillity, till we

had surrendered our constitution, till we had laid all our liberties at his feet, and till, like the Dutch, the Italians, and the Swiss, we had submitted to be governed by decrees sent us from France.

Besides the motives of ambition, the desire to domineer over, and to trample upon all the rest of mankind, the First Consul has a reason, peculiar to himself, for wishing to reduce us to a state of poverty, weakness, submission, and silence; which reason will be at once evident when we consider the origin of his authority, and the nature of his government. Having succeeded, through a long course of perfidious and bloody deeds, in usurping the throne of his lawful sovereign; having, under the name of *Equality*, established in his own person and family a government the most pompous and expensive, while the people are pining with hunger, and in rags; having, with the word *Liberty* continually on his lips, erected a despotism the most oppressive, the most capricious, and the most cruel that the Almighty, in his wrath, ever suffered to exist; having by such means obtained such an end, he feared that while there remained upon the earth, and especially within a few leagues of France, a people enjoying, under a mild and legitimate Sovereign, all the blessings of freedom; while there remained such a people so situated, he dreaded, and not without reason, that their sentiments and their example would, by degrees, penetrate through his forest of bayonets, his myriads of spies, and would, first or last, shake the foundation of his ill-gotten power. He could not, indeed, impute either to our Sovereign or to his subjects any design, much less any attempt to disturb him in the exercise of his usurped authority. We never have interfered, nor have we ever shown any desire to interfere, in the concerns of the Consul or his Republic, and his Majesty, even after all the acts of provocation, all the injuries and insults committed against himself and his people, has now solemnly renewed his declaration, that his object is not to destroy or change any thing in the internal state of other countries, but solely to preserve, in his own dominions, every thing dear to himself and his subjects.

This, however, is not sufficient to satisfy the Consul of France; it is not sufficient that we abstain, both by actions and by words, from exciting discontent amongst those who have the misfortune to be subjected to his sway; we must not afford them an example, we must not remain free, lest they should learn lessons of freedom; we must destroy our ancient and venerable monarchy, lest they should sigh for a lawful and merciful king; we must not be happy, lest they should covet happiness; we must not speak, lest our voice should disturb the peace of Buonaparte; we must not breathe, we must cease to exist, because our existence gives umbrage to a man who, from the walls of Acre, fled in shame and disgrace before a handful of Britons.

Such being the grounds of the war, such the wishes and designs, such the preposterous and insolent pretensions of the enemy, it next behoves us to consider, what will be the consequence to ourselves, what will be our wretched lot, if that enemy should succeed in the invasion and subjugation of our country. Of what the French would, in such a case, do here, we may form some judgment, from what they have done in all those countries, where the remissness of the Government, together with the pusillanimity of the people, have given them the predominance. There is no country into which they have been able to enter, where their footsteps have not been marked with blood; where they have spared either high or low, rich or poor, sex or age; where terror has not been their

forerunner, and where desolation and misery have not marched in their rear. In the long and black catalogue of French cruelties towards the people of other countries, those of the First Consul, and of the generals and soldiers immediately under his command, first present themselves to our attention. In 1796, Buonaparte, at the head of a numerous French army, invaded Italy, declaring to the people that he came as their friend and their brother, to deliver them from taxes and slavery, and promising them safety for their persons, security for their property, respect for their laws, and reverence for their religion. They listened, they believed; they threw open their gates, they laid down their arms, they received the Gallic Serpent to their bosom, and fatal indeed were the effects of their credulity. His reverence for their religion he displayed by giving up all their places of worship to indiscriminate plunder, and by defiling them with every species of sacrilege; his respect for their laws was evinced, not only by the abrogation of those laws, but by the arbitrary enforcement of an unconditional submission to the mandates of himself and his generals; the security which he promised to their property was exhibited in enormous contributions, in the seizure of all the public funds, as well as those of every charitable foundation, not excepting schools, hospitals, or any other resource for the support of the poor, the aged, and the helpless; and as to the persons of the unfortunate people, he provided for their safety by laying the whole country under the severest military execution, by giving up the towns and villages to fire and sword, and by exposing the inhabitants to be pillaged and murdered by his rapacious and inhuman soldiers, whom he authorized and even ordered to shoot every man that attempted to resist them, whatever might be the crimes in which they were engaged.

On his return from Italy, which he left in a state of beggary and irretrievable ruin, he prepared for the invasion of Egypt, a country which was at peace with France, and against the people or the government of which France had no cause of complaint; but the conquest of this country was necessary in order to open a road to the Indian possessions of Great Britain. In pursuit of this object, Buonaparte invaded Egypt, where he repeated his promises to respect religion, property, and persons, and where, the more effectually to disguise his purposes, he issued a proclamation, declaring himself and his army to be true Mahometans; and boasting of having made war upon the Christians, and destroyed their religion. One of his first deeds after this act of apostacy, was to massacre almost all the inhabitants of the populous city of Alexandria. "The people," says one of his generals, "betake themselves to their PROPHET, and fill their mosques; but men and women, old and young, and even babes at the breast, ALL are massacred!" Some time after this sanguinary transaction, Buonaparte, having made prisoners of three thousand eight hundred Turks in the fortress of Jaffa, and wishing to relieve himself from the trouble and expense of guarding and supporting them, ordered them to be marched to an open place, where part of his army fired on them with musketry and grape shot, stabbing and cutting to death the few who escaped the fire, while he himself looked on and rejoiced at the horrid scene. Nor were his cruelties while in Egypt confined to those whom he called his enemies; for finding his hospitals at Jaffa crowded with sick soldiers, and desiring to disencumber himself of them, he ordered one of his physicians to destroy them by poison. The physician refused to obey; but an apothecary was found, willing to perpetrate the deed; opium was

mixed with the food, and thus five hundred and eighty Frenchmen perished by the order of the general, under whose flag they had fought; by the order of that very man, to whose despotic sway the whole French nation now patiently submits. Let them so submit, but let us not think of such shameful, such degrading submission. Let us recollect, that this impious and ferocious invader was stopped in his career of rapine and blood by a mere handful of Britons; and was finally induced to desert his troops, and to flee from the land he had invaded at the approach of that gallant British army, by which Egypt was delivered from the most odious and most destructive of all its plagues. This it is for us to recollect, and so recollecting, shame and disgrace upon our heads if we do not resist, if we do not overcome, if we do not chastise this rapacious, this bloody-minded tyrant, who has now marked out our country for subjugation, our fields for devastation, our houses for pillage; and who, in the insolence of his ambition, has held us forth to the world as a meek, a feeble, and cowardly race, destined to grace his triumphal car, and to augment the number of his slaves.

Not, however, to the deeds of Buonaparte alone must our recollection be confined. Not only Italy and Egypt, but Holland, Switzerland, and Germany, and indeed almost every country in Europe, have been the scenes of French rapine, insult, and cruelty. Holland, formerly the seat of freedom, commerce, industry, and affluence, presents at this moment the sad spectacle of a country divided against itself, torn to pieces by factions, contending, not for the suffrages of the people, but for the favour of France; a country governed by the haughty mandates of a foreign power; awed by foreign arms, holding the remains of its wealth, together with the residue of its military and naval means, in constant readiness to be disposed of in the service of another nation, and that nation its ancient and implacable enemy, and now its inexorable oppressor. When the French armies entered the territories of Holland, their motto was, "*War to the Palace, but peace to the Cottage.*" They came to deliver the people from their rulers, and from the burdens which those rulers imposed. The Dutch, like the Italians, lent an ear to these artful and perfidious declarations, believing that their cottages would be spared, and careless of the fate of the palace. But, alas! they soon found that French rapacity, like the hail and the thunder, fell alike on the thatched roof and the gilded dome. The palaces once seized on, the cottages soon followed, while all those who were found in the intermediate space, the merchant, the manufacturer, the farmer, and the tradesman, were sunk in one common ruin; happy, if by the loss of their property, they had the good fortune to preserve their lives. Buonaparte is, indeed, now, not only the sovereign of the country, not only does he exercise the powers of dominion, but he is, as to every practical effect, the master and the owner of all the property and of all the people in Holland. These miserable beings possess nothing of their own; they can acquire nothing with the hope of enjoying, or bequeathing it; they can make no provision for the weakness of disease, the feebleness of old age, or the helplessness of infancy; they are the mere political drudges of a hard-hearted tyrant, who suffers them to live only while their labours administer to his projects of ambition, and who, when his purposes demand it, puts an end at once to their toils and their existence.

In Switzerland, where high rank and great riches were unknown, where men were nearer upon an equality than in any other country in the

world ; in a country having no commerce, scarcely any manufactures, and possessing few of the sources of wealth and distinction ; a country of shepherds and labourers ; a country which might be truly said to contain a nation of poor men ; in such a country to cry "*war to Palaces*" seemed useless and absurd. Yet did the French find a pretext for war with this poor and harmless race, and for invading and laying waste their territory. The Swiss, from their anxiety to preserve peace, consented to every sacrifice demanded of them by France ; they exposed themselves to the hostility of other nations, by sending away the ambassadors of those nations ; they broke off their connection with some of their most powerful allies ; they banished the loyal subjects of their ancient protector the King of France, men whom the ties of gratitude and the laws of hospitality bound them to cherish ; and when they had thus exhausted the source of concession, when they could grant no more because France could find nothing more to demand ; when they had humbled themselves in the dust, and degraded the character of their country in the eyes of all Europe ; when they had thus done and thus suffered, rather than see their country the scene of war, then did the French invade their territory ; then did these restless disturbers of the world march an army into the heart of Switzerland, in order to compel the people to change the nature and the form of their government, and to commit it to the hands of traitors who had been chosen by France, and by the assistance of whose treachery the French invasion had been effected.

After having, by means of an armistice, joined to the most solemn promise of respect for persons and property, lulled the people into a state of imaginary security, the armistice was broken, and the French pushed on their forces, when those of the Swiss were dispersed. Resistance on the part of the latter, whose numbers did not amount to a tenth of those of their flagitious enemy, now became hopeless ; and though the little army was brave, though the people were faithful and active, though the last battle was long, obstinate, and bloody ; though the Swiss achieved wonders, and though the women fought by the sides of their husbands, inciting them to victory or death, all was in vain ; hundreds and thousands perished by the sabres of the French, and while the earth was strewed with their dead bodies, and while the flames ascended from the once happy dwellings of this valiant and innocent people, the hard-earned and long-preserved liberties of Switzerland expired.

Germany, which closes this awful lesson, was invaded by the French in 1796 and 1798. These invasions were attended with crimes too atrocious to be credited, were they not proved by indisputable evidence, and did they not accord with the general practice of the inhuman wretches by whom they were committed. In adverting to these detestable acts of oppression and cruelty, we must recollect that they were perpetrated upon a people who had made no resistance of any sort against the invaders, and who in every instance had entered into an agreement with the French generals to pay them great sums of money, in order to preserve their country from plunder. In consequence of the ransom thus wrung from the people, the invaders declared, by public proclamation, that the persons and property of the inhabitants should be strictly respected ; and that their rights, usages, laws, and religion should remain inviolate and undisturbed. On these assurances, thus solemnly made, the credulous people all implicitly relied, while some of the poorer classes regarded the French, not as enemies, but as their deliverers from taxes

and labour. No sooner, however, had the invasion taken place, no sooner had the French become masters of the country, than they spread themselves over it like beasts of prey, devouring and destroying every thing before them. They spared neither cities nor towns, neither villages nor hamlets, nor solitary houses; from the church to the cell, from the castle to the cottage; no state of life, however lofty or however humble, escaped their rapacious assaults; no sanctity excited their veneration; no grandeur their respect; no misery their forbearance or their pity. After having plundered the houses of the gentry, the clergy, and the tradesmen; after having pillaged the shops, warehouses, and manufactories, they proceeded to the farm-houses and cottages; they rifled the pockets and chests of the inhabitants, cut open their beds, tore up the floors of their rooms, dug up their cellars, searched the newly-made graves, and broke open the coffins in hopes of finding secreted treasure. They sometimes threatened people with immediate death, sometimes put them to the torture, sometimes lacerated and crippled them, in order to wring from them a discovery of their little pittance of ready money. The deepest and most apparent poverty was no protection against their rapacity; gray hairs and lisping infancy, the sick, the dying, women in child-bed, were alike exposed to the most barbarous treatment, dragged from their beds, kicked, wounded, and frequently killed, under pretence that they were the keepers of concealed wealth. The teams and flocks, cattle of every kind, the marauders drove off, cut to pieces on the spot, or left in a state of mutilation; corn, hay, and straw, they wasted or burnt; they demolished the household furniture, destroyed the utensils of the dairies, the barns, and the stables; tore down the gates, levelled the fences. In many places they stripped the clothes from the backs of the people, set their liquor flowing in the cellar, burnt their provisions to ashes. The churches, whether Romish or Protestant, they rendered a scene of indiscriminate robbery, of sacrilege and blasphemy, too shocking to describe. Towards women of all ages and all conditions, they were guilty of brutality never before heard of: neither extreme youth nor extreme age; neither weakness nor deformity, nor the most loathsome disease; neither the pangs of labour, nor the agonies of death, could restrain them: cries, tears, supplications, were of no avail; and where fathers, husbands, or brothers interfered, murder seldom failed to close the horrible scene. To spread nakedness and hunger, to introduce misery and disease amongst all ranks, seems to have been their uniform desire; but the lower orders of the people, the artisans and the labourers, were the objects of their direst malignity; against them was directed the sharpest bayonets; for their bodies the choicest torment, for their minds the keenest anguish was reserved. From one end of the country to the other, we trace the merciless ruffians through a scene of conflagration and blood; frequently we see them butchering whole families, and retiring by the light of their blazing habitations; but amongst the poor alone do we find them deferring the murder of the parents, for the purpose of compelling them to hear their children shriek amidst the flames!

Such are the barbarities which have been inflicted on other nations. The recollection of them will never be effaced: the melancholy story will be handed down from generation to generation, to the everlasting infamy of the republicans of France, and as an awful warning to all those nations whom they may hereafter attempt to invade. We are one of those nations; we are the people whom they are now preparing to invade:

awful, indeed, is the warning, and, if we despise, tremendous will be the judgment. The same generals, the same commissaries, the same officers, the same soldiers, the very same rapacious and sanguinary host, that now hold Holland and Switzerland in chains, that desolated Egypt, Italy, and Germany, are at this moment preparing to make England, Ireland, and Scotland, the scenes of their atrocities. For some time past, they have had little opportunity to plunder: peace, for a while, suspended their devastations, and now, like gaunt and hungry wolves, they are looking towards the rich pastures of Britain; already we hear their threatening howl, and if, like sheep, we stand bleating for mercy, neither our innocence nor our timidity will save us from being torn to pieces and devoured. The robberies, the barbarities, the brutalities they have committed in other countries, though at the thought of them the heart sinks and the blood runs cold, will be mere trifles to what they will commit here, if we suffer them to triumph over us. The Swiss and the Suabians were never objects of their envy; they were never the rivals of Frenchmen, either on the land or on the sea; they had never disconcerted or checked their ambitious projects, never humbled their pride, never defeated either their armies or their fleets. We have been, and we have done all this: they have long entertained against us a hatred engendered by the mixture of envy and of fear; and they are now about to make a great and desperate effort to gratify this furious, this unquenchable, this deadly hatred. What, then, can we expect at their hands? What! but torments, even surpassing those which they have inflicted on other nations. They remained but three months in Germany; here they would remain for ever; there their extortions and their atrocities were, for want of time, confined to a part of the people; here they would be universal: no sort, no part, no particle of property would remain unseized; no man, woman, or child would escape violence of some kind or other. Such of our manufactories as are moveable they would transport to France, together with the most ingenious of the manufacturers, whose wives and children would be left to starve. Our ships would follow the same course, with all the commerce and commercial means of the kingdom. Having stripped us of every thing, even to the stoutest of our sons, and the most beautiful of our daughters, over all that remained they would establish and exercise a tyranny such as the world never before witnessed. All the estates, all the farms, all the mines, all the land and the houses, all the shops and magazines, all the remaining manufactories, and all the workshops, of every kind and description, from the greatest to the smallest; all these they would bring over Frenchmen to possess, making us their servants and their labourers. To prevent us from uniting and rising against them, they would crowd every town and village with their brutal soldiers, who would devour all the best part of the produce of the earth, leaving us not half a sufficiency of bread. They would, besides, introduce their own bloody laws, with additional severities; they would divide us into separate classes; hem us up in districts; cut off all communication between friends and relations, parents and children, which latter they would breed up in their own blasphemous principles; they would affix badges upon us, mark us in the cheek, shave our heads, split our ears, or clothe us in the habit of slaves!—And shall we submit to misery and degradation like this, rather than encounter the expenses of war; rather than meet the honourable dangers of military combat; rather than make a generous use of the means which Providence has so

bounteously placed in our hands? The sun, in his whole course round the globe, shines not on a spot so blessed as this great, and now united Kingdom. Gay and productive fields and gardens, lofty and extensive woods, innumerable flocks and herds, rich and inexhaustible mines, a mild and wholesome climate, giving health, activity, and vigour to fourteen millions of people: and shall we, who are thus favoured and endowed; shall we, who are abundantly supplied with iron and steel, powder and lead; shall we, who have a fleet superior to the maritime force of all the world, and who are able to bring two millions of fighting men into the field; shall we yield up this dear and happy land, together with all the liberties and honours, to preserve which our fathers so often dyed the land and the sea with their blood; shall we thus at once dishonour their graves, and stamp disgrace and infamy on the brows of our children; and shall we, too, make this base and dastardly surrender to an enemy whom, within these twelve years, our countrymen have defeated in every quarter of the world? No; we are not so miserably fallen; we cannot, in so short a space of time, have become so detestably degenerate; we have the strength and the will to repel the hostility, to chastise the insolence of the foe. Mighty, indeed, must be our efforts, but mighty also is the meed. Singly engaged against the tyrants of the earth, Britain now attracts the eyes and the hearts of mankind; groaning nations look to her for deliverance; justice, liberty, and religion are inscribed on her banners; her success will be hailed with the shouts of the universe, while tears of admiration and gratitude will bedew the heads of her sons who fall in the glorious contest.

BANK RESTRICTION BILL.*

THE motion which has been made in Parliament for the continuation of the restriction on the payment in specie by the Bank of England, naturally leads one back to what took place upon the bringing forward of a similar proposition last year. In no subject can the people be more deeply interested. Next after the military means of the country, the pecuniary are to be considered, and particularly that branch of those means which includes the banking system.—Every bank note contains a promise from the drawer to the bearer, that the drawer will, upon sight, pay to the bearer the *sum* mentioned on the said note; and that this payment is to be made in gold or silver is clearly understood, otherwise the promise would, in fact, be no promise at all. This being the case, the bank *restriction* acts produce and sanction a continual breach of promise on the part of the bank towards the holders of its notes, or, in other words, its creditors. Nor do those acts stop here. They make bank notes a *legal tender*, so far, at least, as to prevent arrests; and thus they render every creditor of the bank a sort of privileged person. To give to the effect of such acts the name of *restriction*, as applied to the demands

* The first act for “*restraining*” the Bank was passed in 1797, and it was continued till 1819.—ED.

or the rights of the noteholders and their creditors, would be proper enough; but as applied to the payments of the Bank, it is an instance of most cruel and insulting irony towards the public. There are, nevertheless, persons who not only defend the annual repetition of this measure, but who insist on its being a good, instead of an evil, and who accuse of factiousness, and even of disaffection to the state, all those who profess to be of a different opinion. The man who, by such means, is deterred from freely uttering his sentiments, must indeed be extremely pusillanimous; yet it may not be amiss for him to be armed with the acknowledgments, made last year, by the Minister who has now proposed the act of continuation: "It is," said he, "with the *utmost reluctance* that I submit this proposition to the House, but the reasons which suggested it were too strong, and the necessity too urgent to be resisted. That necessity will, I hope, *soon disappear*; and notwithstanding the opinions which have gone abroad, I *anxiously* and *impatiently* look forward to the day, which I trust is not far removed, when the bank will be at liberty to resume its payments in specie." In another stage of the bill, he said, "The storm which has agitated the commercial and political world, has not as yet subsided; but I trust it will be *soon laid in peace*, and that the favourable moment is not far distant when more auspicious prospects will be opened." In a still more advanced stage, he said, "I look forward to the commencement of the *next session* of Parliament for the gratification of the wishes of the House to *take off* the restriction." Who will now say, that Mr. Addington is either short-sighted or insincere? It was on the eleventh of February, only twenty-five days previous to the war-message, that he made this last declaration of his hopes. The former declarations were made on the seventh of the same month; so that only twenty-nine days before the message was sent by the King to the Parliament, calling upon the nation to arm for war, his Minister was telling that same Parliament that he trusted the "storm which had so long agitated the commercial and political world, would *soon be laid in peace!*" And yet he has the conscience to blame people for insisting that he was either a dupe or a deceiver, and his partisans have the assurance to say, that any man who ever expected the peace to be durable was "Nature's fool, and not Mr. Addington's!"—But, to return to the subject more immediately before us, it will be remembered that Mr. Tierney wished for an inquiry previous to the renewal of the act; so did Mr. Fox and Mr. Banks. In the House of Lords, there was much discussion upon the subject; some excellent remarks from Lords Moira and King, the latter of whom has since offered his opinions more at large and more accurately, in the shape of a pamphlet. The bill did, however, pass without any division in either house; but with a very general hope, that it never would be again renewed. That hope has now proved to have been not less fallacious than any other of the hopes, which the people have been weak enough to build upon the promises and estimates of this shallow and vapouring Minister.—There are, as was before observed, many persons who believe, or affect to believe, that the restriction, for which the proposed law will provide, can have no unfavourable effect in the community; nay, some of them, having observed that a pound note buys as much bread as twenty silver shillings, and feeling that the latter are more weighty and incommodious in the pocket than the former is, have no scruple to tell you, in the words of an advertisement which, *some time ago*, one frequently met with in the newspapers, that

“guineas are an encumbrance.” These gentlemen are not very deeply read in the science of political economy, or they would most assuredly have discovered that, though twenty shillings in paper did hitherto, *generally*, buy as much bread as twenty shillings in silver, twenty shillings in silver will not now buy nearly so much bread as twenty shillings in silver used to buy before any restriction was imposed upon the Bank; they would have discovered that this rise in the prices, which is another name for depreciation in the value of currency, and which always increases with the increase of currency, has, since the restriction was first imposed, increased much faster than at any former period of our history; and they would further have discovered, that this joint depreciation of gold and silver as well as notes, cannot surpass a certain boundary, without creating a rivalry between the metals and the paper, which rivalry must end in the paper’s sinking to a discount, always the forerunner, more or less distant, of its total extinction, and consequently of the ruin, or at least material injury, of all those who are so unfortunate as to possess it to any considerable amount. These discoveries, though not *made* by the persons alluded to, much less by the public at large, do nevertheless exist, and produce their effect on the minds of the mass of the people, who, without saying, and without knowing why, are at this moment, and have been for some months past, hoarding all the gold and silver which they can, by any means, collect, and which their necessities do not compel them to part with. This fact was stated, in the House of Commons, on the 30th instant, and was accompanied with remarks, which serve most happily to illustrate the tendency of the restriction acts. Mr. Jekyll wished, he said, to direct the attention of the House to the lamentable state to which the country was reduced for want of circulating specie. “The shameful practice,” said he, “of hoarding up cash has been carried to such an excessive pitch, that it is with great difficulty that specie can be procured for the common purposes of life. I am sorry to observe the prevalence of this ungenerous feeling, at a crisis which calls for every possible exertion; and I am assured, from the respectable authority of a principal banking-house, that, if the practice be not *put a stop to*, bankers will, in a short time, not be able to procure specie for the *fractional* parts of change. I have seen too, in a newspaper of the morning, some resolutions of a respectable corporation,* calculated to meet the evil, and recommending the acceptance of dollars at a certain rate, and of French crowns and half-crowns in change.” To which Mr. Addington replied, that “the evil complained of but too certainly existed; and he assured the honourable gentleman that it had been under the consideration of the Privy Council. He admitted that “the honourable gentleman had commented justly on the *baseness* of such a practice, at such a crisis.”—As to the point of “*baseness*,” that might be left to be adjusted by Mr. Addington and the “generous public,” whom, about a year ago, he boasted that he had the honour to serve; but while the people are thus censured for hoarding, it may, one would think, be permitted to ask, why the Bank, which is declared by this same Minister to be “perfectly able to pay in specie,” which has “not created notes to a penny in amount beyond its capital,” and as to the credit of which there is “not the slightest suspicion;” while such reprobation is bestowed on the hoardings of the people, it may surely be permitted to ask,

* Portsmouth,

why this Bank is not only *applauded* for hoarding, but is encouraged to hoard, and protected in it by law? The other point, the "*putting a stop*" to hoarding, is much more serious, or, at least, it will become so, if any attempt be made to carry it into execution: for nothing short of Robespierrean measures could possibly afford a chance of success; and let it be remembered, that even Robespierre failed. So that if the trade of banking cannot be carried on without fractional dealings, the parties must toss up for the fractions, or the Bank must e'en make them some shilling and sixpenny notes. An endeavour has been made, at and in the neighbourhood of Portsmouth, to put a stop to the buying of bank notes at a reduced price; the persons concerned in such traffic were informed, through the newspapers, that their names would be published, and that they themselves would be *prosecuted* and severely punished. The consequence of this threat has been the increase of the traffic, inso-much that it is stated that bank notes are exchanged against gold and silver at a discount of five, and sometimes seven and a half, *per centum*. And who can help this? Are people to be accused of "*baseness*" because they have no confidence in Mr. Addington? It is for a statesman to look into the causes of such a circumstance. If he cannot remove them, it is expected of him to take timely and effectual precautions against their consequences, and not to have recourse to unavailing reproaches and lamentations.—The Minister stated to the Parliament, that it was "satisfactory to know that the credit of the bank had remained firm and unshaken, during the past experience of this measure" [of restriction], "and that its sufficiency to make good its engagements both was, and is, unaffected by *even the slightest suspicion*." But in less than six minutes afterwards up he starts, and acknowledges that "the evil complained of," that is to say, the evil of hoarding up the specie, even to the shillings and sixpences, "*but too certainly exists*." Now, in the first place, if it were true that, as to the solidity of the Bank, not the slightest suspicion had arisen, why should people hoard specie, which in such case, if in their senses, they could not *possibly* regard as any better than notes? And if we suppose all these hoarders to be insane, their insanity may, indeed, be an "*evil*," but their hoarding cannot, if, according to his assertion, it has neither manifested nor excited "*the slightest suspicion*," relative to the sufficiency of the Bank. Such are the inconsistencies and contradictions into which men are led, when their statements are not founded in truth. The present scarcity of hard money arises, in great part, from the disposition to hoard, which, whether an evil or a good, whether a work of "*baseness*" or of prudence, is certainly very prevalent through the country; this disposition to hoard grows out of those apprehensions which people entertain of the consequences of the war, particularly invasion; and these apprehensions are but another name for a want of reliance, either in the means of the country, or the wisdom of the Government. If, therefore, the apprehensions should by any means be removed, the hoarded specie will come forth again. But, besides this temporary cause of the scarcity of specie, there are two others, which have a permanent operation, to wit, the *increase of taxes* and the *restriction on the Bank*. The former never fails to produce an increase of paper, that increase a depreciation in the value of the currency, and that depreciation a decrease in the quality of the specie, which, as fast as it can possibly work itself into a right channel, always hastens to the highest market; the latter is continually wearing away the confidence of the

public, who naturally and most justly conclude, that to the making of bank notes, beyond the power of payment, there is but one check, namely, the obligation to pay in specie, which obligation being done away by the restriction law, there is no legal security remaining.—As a *temporary* measure, the restriction might be expedient; but as a *permanent* measure, it must prove destructive to the credit of the bank; and it cannot very fairly be regarded as other than permanent, when the Minister introduces it by observing, that “though doubts have been entertained as to its propriety during a period of peace, he has never heard its policy questioned *during a period of war!*”—Amongst those who hope much and think little, a very common observation is, that the Bank restriction act has been in force for these five or six years, yet bank notes pass as well as ever, and therefore will always continue so to pass. Not *quite* so well as ever, else the statements from Portsmouth, Bristol, Worcester, &c. &c. are false. But, leaving this fact out of the question, is it not an odd way of reasoning to conclude, that because the credit of the Bank has not been annihilated, it has not been impaired? Upon this principle it might be insisted, that a house is always as good as new to the moment of its falling down. This was the course pursued by the partisans of the peace of Amiens: perceiving the nation to remain independent for the space of six months after the conclusion of that compact, they exultingly exclaimed, “We are not yet swallowed up! things go on just as usual, in spite of Mr. Windham’s melancholy forebodings. The death-warrant, which he told us was signed on the 1st of October, is not yet executed.” Their exultation did not last long: they were soon brought to a sense of their danger; and they now think it necessary to pray to God to prevent Buonaparte from “swallowing us up quick.”—As to the credence in bank notes, much of it arises from habit. The solidity of the Bank has long been proverbial, and when an institution has obtained such a degree of celebrity, it is not easily shaken: long after it has begun actually to decay, it lives upon its reputation. But there is a point beyond which this reputation will not preserve it; and towards that point the Bank is rapidly urged by the restriction on its payments in specie.—The advocates of paper money, to the exclusion of gold and silver; those who hope and believe that the system might go on without any help from the precious metals; these persons tell you, that when there is *nothing but paper*, there will be no competition of currencies, and of course no hoarding or discounting. This is very true, indeed; and another convenience will be, that the words “*promise to pay*” may be left out of the notes: any other words, a stanza from Nancy Dawson or Chevy Chase, will do full as well. And, then, as to the signature and counter-signature, John a Nokes and Tom a Stiles will be just as good as those of any two real corporeal beings in the city. In short, the idea of a currency consisting *entirely of promissory notes*, is an intellectual monster, engendered by ignorance and fear, a gross ignorance of the most simple principles of political economy, and a base fear of the difficulties to which a failure of the bank would give rise.—There is one argument more that has been advanced in support of the paper system, as connected with the war in which we are engaged. It is this, that France and America got through their dangers by the help of paper money. To this the answer is precisely similar to that which has been given relative to the comparison made between the French and English volunteers: if we are prepared to see our paper *come to the same end* as that of France

and America came to, then the example of those countries is a source of great consolation; but if we are not, that example is quite sufficient to deter us from placing any hope on a currency consisting entirely of paper.—What then? Are we to despair of the country? No: why should we? Cannot this great and *really* wealthy kingdom exist, cannot it preserve its honour and its power, without the aid of paper-money? This question shall be discussed in a future sheet.—In the meantime, it may not be amiss to observe, that what has been here advanced will not be overset either by *abuse* or by *misrepresentation*. If the writer be deceived, if his facts are misstated, or his conclusions erroneous, no one will rejoice more sincerely than himself at the triumph of whomsoever may take the trouble to refute him; and if it be not worth while to attempt such refutation, his remarks are certainly too harmless to call for that virulent calumny which has heretofore been but too often exercised against him, on similar grounds.

RESTRICTION ON THE BANK.

ON this subject, so closely connected with every rational view that can be taken of our ability to continue the war for any length of time, some observations were offered to the public in a preceding sheet. But, it was not then remarked, that, the paying, or not paying, in specie, at the Bank of England, is, by our enemy, if not by the world at large, considered as the proof of whether we are able, or unable, to carry on the present war, to an extended period, without utter ruin to our national credit, or, in other words, without a national bankruptcy. The late Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Rose, in his "Brief Examination of the Finances," observes, when speaking of the Income-tax, which had just then, in 1799, been imposed, that, amongst other great advantages arising from the resolution to levy a considerable portion of the taxes within the year, would be, "to convince our enemies, and to inform all Europe, that, if France built hopes on the expected overthrow of our financial system, and trusted to the failure of our resources, that those hopes were vain."* Lord Auckland, upon the same occasion, said;—"such, then, my lords, is the plan before us; establishing a system of supply essentially important in the present struggle, essentially beneficial on the eventual *return of peace*, and such as will hereafter induce all nations to *pause*, before they bring upon us the necessity of engaging in a new war with them."† France has not "*paused*" long. How delusive, alas! have been all, yes *all*, the promises of the English financiers for twenty years past! And how obstinately blind, how incorrigible, have been the people! The *people*? But, indeed, the people, properly so called; the people of Britain, know nothing of the matter.—Returning to the subject more directly in view, we find Mr. Addington, in proposing *his* Income-tax, his plan for "raising a great part of the supplies within the year;" we find him, too, holding out to us, as one of its most beneficial effects, "that of convincing the

* Rose's Brief Examination, 5th edit. p. 75.

† Lord Auckland's Speech, 8th Jan. 1799, pamphlet copy, p. 30.

“ enemy of this country, that it is *hopeless* for him to contend with our finances, and of convincing the other powers of Europe, that they may safely join with us, in a common cause, for that the resources of this country are such as to give full security for the punctual discharge of any engagements it may enter into.” It is truly surprising that these financiers should, at periods so distant, repeat each other’s sentiments and words so exactly. But to all this boasting, all this grand display of “ inexhaustible resources,” Buonaparte laconically replies: “ *pay your bank-notes in gold and silver*, and then we will believe you, without your going to war, and without your adding twelve millions annually to your taxes.”* The stoppage of cash payments, therefore, which the blind partisans of Ministers would fain have us regard as a thing of no consequence, is, in the opinion of our enemy, the criterion of our pecuniary means. Nor, can there be any doubt, that it is so in the opinion of the world; and as all credit depends entirely upon opinion, that which the world thinks, relative to our credit, really exists.—On the 13th instant, a debate took place in the House of Lords, on the third reading of the Bank Restriction Bill. Some remarks, well worthy of public attention, were made by the Lords Grenville and King, and by his Grace the Duke of Norfolk. Lord Hawkesbury replied to some of those remarks. The conversation, for such it was rather than a debate, was interesting; and the apathy of the nation as to the subject was tolerably well portrayed in the number of peers present, which amounted only to *fourteen!*—Lord Grenville dwelt much upon the vast increase of *private paper*, and apprehended the worst consequences from the further increase of it, because, he said, being payable *in specie*, it was likely to obtain a preference to the bank paper. But, this notion seems to be erroneous, because all private paper is payable in bank paper, at best, seeing that, of whatever sort the private paper may be, it can never be more than the evidence of a debt, and for no debt can a man be arrested, provided he tender bank paper to the amount of it. His lordship thought, that a joint committee of the two Houses of Parliament, or a committee of each house, ought, as soon after the recess as convenient, to be appointed to examine into and report upon, the state of the Bank, and of the currency of the country; and he also wished to see some measure prepared, for supporting, in case of invasion, the credit of the private paper of that part of the country in which the invasion might take place.—Lord Hawkesbury having observed, that he *doubted* of the increase of paper, since the first act of restriction on the Bank, Lord King produced the accounts to show, that the bank paper had nearly doubled since that time, whereupon Lord Hawkesbury said, that he did not mean the bank paper, but the *private paper!* Every man at all conversant with the subject knows, that, as Lord Grenville stated, since the first act of restriction, the private paper has increased *more* than the Bank of England paper. Driven from this, Lord Hawkesbury seemed to contend, that the increase of paper was owing to the increase of “ *trade, capital, and national prosperity* ;” and, if his lordship’s position be true, the progress of the increase of paper must be peculiarly encouraging to the people. The Bank of England notes in circulation,

In August, 1797 amounted to £10,828,880

— August, 1798 12,115,640

* Moniteur of 17th June 1803.

In August, 1799	13,759,940
— August, 1800	15,230,410
— January, 1801	16,365,206
— June, 1802	16,747,300
— February 1803	16,108,560
— June 1st	16,101,140
— August 1st	16,734,510
— October 1st	16,622,510
— November 25th	17,931,930

What a cheering prospect! According to Lord Hawkesbury's doctrine, our trade, capital and national prosperity, have been almost doubled in the space of six years! This is the sort of accounts, this is the financial view, to send to the different courts of Europe! Prosperity doubled in the short space of six years! Break your heart, Buonaparte, it is useless for you to contend with Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury!—And, not only has our prosperity been increasing along with the increase of bank notes, but, which is something truly curious, the value of our silver and gold, and of every thing else, even down to our bread and cheese, has also been increasing, and, except in peculiar cases, this increase has kept an exact pace with that of the bank notes! Happy, thrice happy, people! Lord King stated, that, though there were, perhaps, few instances, in which English bank notes underwent, as yet, a positive discount, still, they had depreciated, as clearly appeared from the price of standard silver, which, previous to the stoppage of cash payments, was 5s. 2d. an ounce, and which is now 5s. 8d. This is a *rise* in the value of silver, or a *fall* in the value of bank notes of more than nine per centum. There is no arguing against this fact. It is decisive as to the depreciation of bank paper; but, whether that depreciation be a mark of prosperity, or of the contrary, shall be left for Mr. Addington and his supporters to decide.—Both Lord Grenville and Lord King alluded to what had been said by Mr. Addington relative to the sin of *hoarding*. They thought the imputation of “unpatriotic motives,” extremely absurd. In times of scarcity, they observed, nothing was so common as to hear a clamour against the hoardings of the meal-men, corn-dealers, and farmers; and this clamour was just as unreasonable, but not more, than the clamours of those, who are now railing against persons hoarding money; for that, as in times of scarcity of provisions, the hoarding of corn and flour was the only effectual security against famine, so, in times like the present, the hoarding of money was the means most likely to prevent a total want of the precious metals. Lord Hawkesbury observed, that his colleague, Mr. Addington, recognising, as he did, the principles of freedom of trade, could not, in a tone of censure, have alluded to the amassing of gold and silver as objects of *commerce*, but only to the hoardings occasioned by a *want of confidence in the country*. To this Lord King replied, that, as to the blame cast on persons whom a want of confidence led to hoard, it put him in mind of the history of the assignats. Robespierre, his lordship said, in order to restore confidence, passed a decree to prevent people from keeping more than a certain sum of gold or silver in their possession, the effect of which decree was the total annihilation of the assignats. The hoarders of France were accused of *incivism*; people here are accused of *unpatriotic motives*. The former wanted confidence in Robespierre's government, the latter in the government of Mr. Addington, who is not less the cause of national ruin in political than in commercial concerns. The

contemptuous opinion which the world entertains of his administration keeps all the courts of Europe aloof from us; it has dipped us into a most dangerous dispute with America; it has shaken the confidence, which foreigners have heretofore had in our pecuniary establishments, and our public securities; and, amidst all this, shall the people be blamed, if they wish to provide a few shillings, which is all that seems to be now left against an hour of calamity? Shall every man be accused of "base-ness" (that's the word he made use of) if he refuses, by way of proof of his confidence in Mr. Addington, to suffer his children to starve for want of bread? Besides, Mr. Jekyll, who first complained in Parliament of the unpatriotic practice of hoarding, and whose observations the Minister highly applauded, seems, when in asserting, upon the authority of a banking-house, that, unless hoarding were "put a stop to," there would not, in a short time, be any hard cash to be seen; when citing this authority, he seems to have forgotten, that there had long been in circulation a pamphlet written in and published from a banking-house, which pamphlet, agreeably to its title, inculcates the doctrine, that "*guineas are an unnecessary and expensive encumbrance,*" and that there ought to be no currency but that of paper. From such a quarter, instead of a complaint against hoarders of hard money, one would naturally have expected an eulogium on their useful labours, for what can be more pleasing or of greater utility than that which tends to rid us of "an unnecessary encumbrance?" It has, indeed, been very well, and perhaps very truly observed, that as familiarity seldom fails to create contempt, guineas may now be viewed in banking houses, as well as every where else, with a little more respect than formerly; but this circumstance, it is to be presumed, ought by no means to weigh against those who are vying with the bankers in testifying this respect. At the close of the conversation in the House of Lords, the Duke of Norfolk observed, that if Ministers would, whenever the Bank-directors pleased, come to Parliament and obtain a law to protect those directors against the legal demands of their creditors it might be feared, that, in return, those directors might, at some time or other, give Ministers such aid as would enable them to dispense, for a time at least, with the concurrence of Parliament. In answer to this, Lord Hawkesbury denied, in the most positive terms, that the bill was introduced at the *request*, or even at the *suggestion* of the Bank-directors. There was, indeed, an *incontestable proof* of this, and it is a wonder his lordship did not cite it; to wit, that the bill is to "*restrain*" the directors from paying in specie, which, therefore, they are doubtless very desirous of doing. But why, then, not take off the *restraint*? Why not let these gentlemen give a loose to their noble natures? The fact is, that this connection between the Bank and Government, that is to say, between the Bank-directors and all the bankers and partners in banking-houses through the kingdom on the one part, and the Ministers on the other part, is one of the new and great points of our national situation, and one of the principal causes of our disgraceful acquiescence in every measure, the *immediate* object of which is the increase of *fictitious* wealth. Let the nobles, let the clergy, let the gentry, let the merchant and manufacturer think well of, and be duly prepared for, the final consequences of this connection. It is an object which the statesman, who would rescue his country from ruin, ought to have constantly in view. He must, indeed, expect to be loaded with obloquy by the numerous and the ever-active swarm of paper-dealers, and by the news-papers, almost the whole of

which these dealers have, either directly or indirectly, at their command ; but that obloquy he must set at defiance ; the current, or rather the torrent of events, which is fast rolling on, will soon wipe from his memory the recollection of the falsehood and abuse with which he is now assailed. When one looks forward only to the distance of five or six years ; when one considers not what *may*, but what *must* happen before the end of that time, with what contempt, or rather with what perfect indifference, one looks down upon those ignorant and venomous beings, who are railing at and cursing every man who has the sense (and it does not want much) to perceive, and the honesty to forewarn them of, the dangers and calamities that await them.

EFFECTS OF THE REGISTER.

IN casting my eye upon the date of the present sheet ; in reflecting that this day closes the second year of my labours, it is impossible not to look back to the time when those labours commenced ; and if, in surveying the changes which have been produced in the intermediate space, I feel a considerable degree of self-satisfaction, I shall not, I trust, merit the charge of inordinate vanity. From publicly expressing this feeling I should, however, have refrained, had I not thought, that, under the present circumstances, it was not only excusable, but, in some measure, necessary. The motive here alluded to also dictates an explicit statement relative to the circulation of the Register, especially when I consider, that that circulation may be regarded as a criterion of the political opinions of the well-informed part of the community, and that the statement may, in some instances, be necessary to counteract the reports of the Ministers, who, while they, with a consistency peculiar to themselves, are affecting the utmost contempt for the effects of my work, lose no opportunity of expressing their anxious hope, that the numbers of its sale are fast upon the decline. The truth, however, is this : that the work began with a sale of less than *three hundred* ; that upon an average there are now sold upwards of *four thousand* ; that there has been a constant increase in the sale from the first sheet to the present one ; and that this increase has, as far as I recollect, at no time been greater than during the whole of these last three months. I will not, in confirmation of this statement, add either affidavits or asseverations, but will content myself with just observing, that the Ministers, by only dispatching a messenger to the Stamp-Office, may, if I am incorrect, instantly obtain the materials necessary for enabling their writers to contradict me. In estimating the effects of the Register, it should be remembered, that it is not like a common newspaper, looked over, and then thrown away ; and that, in consequence of its being preserved, and being so convenient for reference, each number is read, first or last, by several persons, and generally by the same person more than once : so that I do not think it is being over sanguine to suppose, that upon an average every number is read by ten persons, making an aggregate of forty thousand readers. These readers, too, are, for the most part, persons whose opinions have weight with those who hear them ; for it is a circumstance on which I always reflect with peculiar satisfaction, that the Register, whether it be considered as to its form, its subjects, its

sentiments, or its price, evidently disdains that success which is to be derived from the approbation of the thoughtless, the ignorant, or the low; and I do trust, that of all the political writers who have at any time appeared in this country, no one has ever shown less inclination than myself to take unfair advantages of his opponents. These opponents were, and yet are, circulating their writings through sixpenny publications; on mine I put, from the very first number, a price nearly double, rejecting, at the same time, the aid of those baits by which the needy, the grovelling, the idle, the foolish, and the profligate, are usually attracted; and appealing to the better qualities, the better feelings, to the sense, the reason, the public spirit, the honour, and the loyalty of the nation. How different has been the conduct of the Ministers! They have attempted to establish no less than *six* periodical papers of one sort and another, for the express and *openly-avowed* purpose of destroying the Register, all of which papers, though varying in form, from a folio to a duodecimo, and, in price, from 10d. to 3d. have, in due succession, perished, not for want of funds, it will readily be believed, but for want of readers! To obtain success to these publications, no expense, no device, has been spared: advertisements and hand-bills, announcing a determination to "detect and expose Cobbett," have been published in numbers far exceeding those of the several works to which they related. These hand-bills, in the manner of publishing some of which Doctor Addington's people have followed the example of the publishers of Doctors Leake and Spilsbury, denominated me sometimes an "incendiary;" at others a "libeller;" at others an "impostor;" always "the lying Cobbett," and, in one or two instances, a "fool." The publications themselves were, as the public seemed to suppose, very fairly represented by these specimens. They were, one and all, filled, literally filled with abuse the most shameful, most loathsome, even the most blackguard abuse of every nobleman and gentleman who had made, or was supposed to be likely to make, any opposition to the Ministry, particularly Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham, against whom there were, in the publications here spoken of, more libels published, in the course of eighteen months, than there have been published in England in all other works put together for many years past. What native dulness and sterility left undone was completed by this disgusting virulence; the publications, as I have already observed, dropped off one after another, like blighted apples in a summer's storm; and the Addingtons and Hawkesburys found, very much to their surprise, no doubt, that, with uncounted thousands and hundred thousands of secret-service money at their command, they were unable to interrupt, for one moment, the daily and hourly increasing influence of this little work; they were astonished to find, that calling a writer "*incendiary, libeller, impostor, liar, and fool,*" did not deprive him of his readers; they were indignant at perceiving that the public remained totally unmoved by that dignified satire which was implied in omitting *Mr.* before the name of *Cobbett*; but still the public exclaimed, as they now exclaim, "*Disprove his statements, and refute his arguments, or away with your abuse!*"

WM. COBBETT.

“CAPITAL, CREDIT, AND CONFIDENCE.”

THESE were the deities which Lord Hawkesbury promised us would always watch over and protect this happy nation, and which would enable us, “at the breaking out of a new war, to meet France upon a more advantageous footing than we had ever before met her!” That his lordship was not quite correct will be readily allowed; but there is, at this moment, going forward a transaction, which is admirably calculated to illustrate the doctrine, on which the peace of Amiens was, by some persons, defended. By referring to the Register (volume iv., p. 883 to 886), it will be perceived that in consequence of the cession of Louisiana to the United States, France is to receive from the last-mentioned country about three millions sterling; not in cash, but in stock, which is to be created immediately. If the French government should be desirous of disposing of the said stock, there is a clause permitting it so to do, and contracts of this sort are now actually going on in London, before, perhaps, the law is passed for the creation of the stock. Here, then, we come to the practical effect of the doctrine of “capital, credit, and confidence:” we make peace with France in order to “husband our resources,” and thereby to preserve that capital, credit, and confidence, which is to carry us through the next contest; France, in consequence of this treaty, acquires Louisiana and sells it to America; America gives France stock in payment for it: we, for the said stock, *give the French three millions of our money*, upon her promising that the Americans will pay us the interest of it; and, notwithstanding our 400,000 armed shopkeepers, we give a much *higher price* for this American stock than we are willing to give for that of Mr. Addington. Wealth, then, does not give power; but power always gives as much wealth as a nation wants.

ANGLO-GALLIC CREDITORS.

A PAPER, entitled “A Short Statement of Facts relative to claims of British Creditors on the French Funds,” has just been printed and circulated, preparatory, as it is thought, to some application to Parliament for redress; and it is with a view of preventing the success of any such application, with a view of preventing the people of *this country*, properly so called, from being burdened with taxes to make up for the losses of those who chose to deposit their wealth, the fruits of English labour, in the funds of France, that these remarks are made. These creditors state,—FIRST, that previous to the French revolution, and indeed till the late war broke out between England and France, they became holders of French stock, the possession of property of that sort having been secured to them by the commercial treaty between England and France, concluded in the year 1786, wherein it was stipulated, that, in case of war between the two nations, the subjects of each residing in the dominions of the other should be suffered to remain, during the war, on certain

conditions, and, in case of their being ordered to remove, that "the term of twelve months should be allowed them for that purpose, in order that they might take away their effects and property, *whether entrusted to individuals or to the state.*"—SECONDLY, the creditors state, that the French government, when the war broke out, instead of faithfully executing this part of the treaty, threw all the British subjects in France into prison, and sequestrated all their property, whereupon the British government, as a measure of retaliation, and as a security for the British creditors in France, sequestrated all the French property in England.—THIRDLY, they state, that Lord Hawkesbury (that "*solid young man,*" that "*safe politician*") did abandon their interests at the peace of Amiens; that, in direct contradiction to the principle on which Lord Grenville had proceeded at Lisle, where the property in question would, if a treaty had been concluded, have been amply secured, Lord Hawkesbury, notwithstanding a request made to him by the creditors, during the negotiation at Amiens, neglected to make a positive stipulation in their favour in that treaty, the consequence of which was, that, while the French creditors in the English funds *immediately* received, even without applying for it, the full amount of their interest as well as their principal, the English creditors in the French funds received such a portion only as "the arbitrary and unjust Government of France was pleased to bestow on them." They were, it seems, soon informed that the treaty of Amiens had no relation to their case; that they must be content to lose the whole arrears of their interest, two-thirds of their capital, and, for the remaining third, must receive an inscription in a five per cent. stock, taken as at par, though the price was then fifty per centum. So that, according to this proposition, a creditor for 6,000*l.* besides the loss of all his interest, found his capital reduced to 1,000*l.* Some persons, in despair, accepted of these terms; but "their compliance was useless to preserve even a wreck of their property, for they could never obtain a farthing."—FOURTHLY, they state, that other creditors, who did not despair of the honour and justice of the English ministry, applied to Mr. Merry, the English resident at Paris, for protection against this injustice. Mr. Merry promised to apply for instructions to his Government, and to make an application to that of France for the execution of the treaty; but if any application was made by him, the French government treated it with contempt. Finding no hope from the efforts of Mr. Merry, the creditors assembled in London, in September 1802, and appointed a committee for the prosecution of their claims. This committee waited upon Lord Hawkesbury, stated their claims to him, and presented a memorial, calling for the *assistance* of their *country* against this injustice and breach of treaty. The memorial was presented about the 20th of September, but no answer was received till the 11th of January, a space of nearly four months, though Lord Hawkesbury promised an answer as soon as the opinion of his Majesty's Ministers could be taken upon the subject. The result of all this was, that Lord Hawkesbury (the "*solid young man*") did not think favourably of the claim of the creditors, but promised to write to Lord Whitworth to obtain for them such justice as they were entitled to. And here it should be observed, that, from the papers which have (thanks to Buonaparte) been published relative to the treaty of Amiens, it appears very clearly that *the French plenipotentiary was willing to consent to a stipulation, which would have rendered the claim of the British Debtors unquestionable*; but that, from the moderation of the

noble negotiator, or from that "mixture of conciliation and firmness," which has characterized all the conduct of the "*solid* young man" in Downing Street, no such stipulation was, at last, inserted in the treaty.—FIFTHLY, they state, that, notwithstanding the opinion of Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Whitworth, upon receiving a statement of the Creditor's case, presented a vigorous remonstrance to the French government, and declared, that he would never cease, unless prohibited by his government, to demand for them the same justice which the French Creditors had received in England, and which he conceived was due to them by treaty; and, in his conference with the First Consul, on the 21st of February, 1803, as reported by himself to Lord Hawkesbury, he says, "I alleged as a cause of mistrust and jealousy, the impossibility of obtaining justice, or any kind of redress, for any of his Majesty's subjects. He asked me in what respect. I told him, that since the signing of the treaty, *not one British claimant* had been satisfied, though every Frenchman of that description had been so within one month after that period." This sturdy behaviour, on the part of Lord Whitworth, promised, say the Creditors, to produce the happiest effects; for, a proposition was soon after made by Lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, and *accepted by him*, on the part of his government, to appoint commissioners of both countries for the liquidation of the claims of British Creditors; and, this proposition was *actually lying before our ministry for their approbation and approval*, when the war broke out!—Here it is absolutely impossible to refrain from observing the effect of *vigorous* measures. This is the only instance, in which any thing like vigour was shown; and the consequence was of the best kind. It is to be feared, too, that this fact, of which the public never heard before, will not tend to establish the assertions of the ministers, that nothing, on their part, would have prevented the return of war; for, in this case, we do find, that the remonstrance of Lord Whitworth instantly produced a proposition so favourable to his views in behalf of the British Creditors, that he forwarded it for the approbation of his government, having first approved of it himself.—The Creditors conclude in a sort of an apostrophe, which merits to be quoted verbatim. "After all this," say they, "what is the relative state of the French and English funded Creditors? The former received, at the peace, their whole principal and interest, without even the trouble of applying for it; and can, at this moment, receive their dividends, and sell their stock, as if they were natives of this country: the latter, after repeated applications, both to the French and English governments, have obtained nothing: such of them as went to Paris to prosecute their claims, and enforce the performance of the treaty of Amiens (and, amongst the rest, their accredited agent, a gentleman upwards of 70 years of age), are detained prisoners in France. The object of this statement is *not to criminate any man*, but to obtain final justice. At the beginning of last war, the property of Frenchmen in this country was sequestrated, for the purpose of securing, at the peace, the restoration of English property sequestrated in France. Is not a debt of *three millions*, due to subjects of England from the French funds, an object worthy of the attention of our government? Is it not their duty to secure those subjects from foreign oppression? Are they willing to subscribe to that state of *comparative inferiority* on our part, which the French are ready enough to inculcate? Or, do they think the *honour of the country* sufficiently

"preserved by protecting *our own shores* from violation, when not an Englishman can set his foot upon the Continent, without being subject to contumely, injury, and outrage? Surely the English creditors of France have a right to expect from their own country, a fuller measure of justice and protection, at the return of peace, unless some imperious necessity demands the sacrifice of their interests, for the good of their country; and, when the interests of individuals have been sacrificed for the public good, the generosity and justice of Great Britain have ever been forward to afford the fullest indemnity."—Yes, where the interests of individuals are *sacrificed* for the *public good*, nobody will deny, that those individuals have a claim, not upon the generosity, but upon the justice of the country. But, in this case, it is denied, that any such sacrifice for *such purpose* has been made. What *good* could the public, that is to say, the people of Great Britain and Ireland, derive from the abandonment of the private rights of these Creditors? Evidently none. If there had been any public good so obtained; if an island had been ceded to us in consequence of such abandonment; if we had thereby gained any other concession; or, if it had appeared, that peace could not have been obtained, without this sacrifice, though the peace might be a bad one, and have proved a great national curse, still one must have regarded the public as being the debtor of those individuals, at whose expense the sacrifice had been made. But, in the present instance, no advantage, or even pretended advantage, has ever accrued to the public, from the circumstance of there having been no clear stipulation made in favour of these Creditors; and, therefore, no claim erected thereon can possibly stand.—If this ground be exchanged for that of *implied stipulation*; if it be asserted, as, indeed, though with not much consistency, the Creditors have asserted, that the full restoration of their property is *stipulated for*; then it will be urged, perhaps, that, if the French refuse to fulfil the part of the treaty made in favour of these creditors, the British public ought to make them a compensation for their loss, or, to *compel* the French to fulfil the treaty. This is contrary both to the theory and practice of nations in this respect; and, indeed, it is consonant neither to reason nor justice. If the country, in its treaties with foreign states, obtains a stipulation favourable to any class of its subjects, all that is expected of it further, is to cause the stipulation to be fulfilled, *as far as it can so cause it to be done, consistent with its own interests*, and of this extent it always must be the sole judge. If the other contracting party be too strong to be compelled to fulfil such stipulation, or if the compulsion would be attended with an injury, loss, or inconvenience greater than the object is worth; in a word, if, all things considered, it be inexpedient to attempt to compel the refractory power to fulfil such stipulation, the attempt ought not to be made; but because the government cannot, from whatever cause, obtain justice to its aggrieved subjects, it does by no means follow that it is bound to provide them an indemnity for the loss which they may experience from the want of that justice. "What!" these Creditors will exclaim, "will you suffer us to be ruined by transactions, encouraged and guaranteed by the government." Every *legal* transaction may be said to be encouraged and guaranteed by the government. The man who lodges his fortune in the hands of a banker makes the deposit under the encouragement and guarantee of the law, that is to say, of the government; but, if the banker makes away with the money and absconds, the ruined man never

dreams of applying to the *government* for an indemnification. The government pursues the swindler; it catches him, if it can; it brings him to justice, and, if possible, makes him disgorge; but, failing in all these respects, it never makes any compensation. That the person so lodging money with a banker is actuated by motives purely private and selfish is certain, and that he enters into the transaction with his eyes open is also certain; but, it would be difficult to give a reason, why he should be regarded as being less patriotic, or more fully aware of his risk, than he who, under the faith of a treaty, deposits his wealth in a foreign land; or, why one of these persons should have, upon the government, a claim for indemnification superior to the other.—So much for the question of “*justice*,” and now let us see, what claim these Anglo-Gallic Creditors have upon the “*generosity*” of their countrymen. They tell us, that it was in pursuance of the treaty of 1786 that they intrusted their property to individuals and to the state in France; and, they add, that they have, on this account, “*incurred some degree of obloquy from persons, who, it must be supposed, were ignorant of the provisions of that treaty*,” and who must withdraw that censure, unless they have the “*presumption* to extend it to the *legislature* of that time, and the *great statesman* then at the head of his Majesty’s government, who did all “*in their power to promote the intercourse, now reprobated, between the two countries.*” This is a mode of arguing not at all uncommon amongst persons, who look upon the rest of mankind as being, like themselves, ready to surrender their reason at the sound of a name. That *no censure* ought ever to be bestowed on transactions merely because they are *tolerated by a treaty*, is a proposition to which few just thinking men will be found to subscribe; but, without dwelling upon this point, one may surely be permitted to ask, what very great “*presumption*” there could be in extending one’s censure to the parliament of 1786, and to the “*great statesman,*” “*then at the head of his Majesty’s government*”? As to the parliament, it would, perhaps, be hard to say precisely what share it had in the treaty, but by Mr. Pitt the treaty was made, and as far as it tended to induce Englishmen to deposit their treasure and their hearts in France, so far does Mr. Pitt merit, on account thereof, the severest censure; and, as to the persons who were so induced to make such deposits, to regard them as objects of national generosity would be to abandon all the notions and principles by which nations are kept in a state of independence. How completely the patriot passion had been extinguished, in the breasts of these creditors, may be perceived from their silence, during the negotiation at Amiens, and even after the conclusion of the treaty. They were dissatisfied with the provisions of the preliminary treaty; they requested Lord Hawkesbury to afford them protection in the definitive treaty; the definitive treaty was more dissatisfactory than the preliminary; but, still they held their tongues; not one of them complained to parliament; not one of them spoke or voted against the compact, in which their rights had been abandoned; they begged and prayed of Mr. Merry, M. Talleyrand, Lord Hawkesbury, and Lord Whitworth, but not one word did they say, either by way of petition or otherwise, either collectively or individually, in disapprobation of the treaty, against which they now utter such bitter complaints. No: they wanted peace, on any terms, that they might have a chance of recovering their treasure; and, though they found no positive stipulation in their favour, they did not despair of the *honour and justice of their own*

country;" or, in other words, if tears, prayers and broken hearts failed them at the foot of the Consular throne, they still relied on their influence or their address to procure, in the form of a parliamentary grant, a compensation for their loss of both principal and interest. *Now*, therefore, they set up a most melodious cry about preserving the "*ancient character* of their country;" about "a foreign despotism." They ask, whether it is not the duty of our government "to secure its subjects against foreign oppression?" Whether the people of England are ready to subscribe to that state of "*comparative inferiority*" on our part, which the French are so ready to inculcate? And, they indignantly ask, "Do the ministers think the honour of the country sufficiently preserved by protecting our own shores from violation, when not an Englishman can set his foot upon the Continent, without being subject to contumely, injury, and outrage?" This is all very fine; but where were those high sentiments at the conclusion of the preliminary treaty? Where were they during the negotiation, and at the conclusion, of the definitive treaty? Then was there not one of these creditors who did not, if he said any thing at all, join in the clamour against Lord Grenville for opposing a treaty, which was said to be built upon his project of Lisle, but which project of Lisle they have *now* discovered to have contained an effectual protection for their property. No; let us hope that *three* millions are not to be added to the burdens of the nation for the sake of indemnifying persons, who, whatever they may be in other respects, here present themselves to the public in the character of jew-like speculators, who have lost their money by depositing in the hands of the rival and the enemy of their country, that country to whom they have now the conscience to look for indemnification.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register*, February, 1804.)

ANGLO-GALLIC CREDITORS.—By referring to page 293, (*Register*, vol. v.) the reader will find a letter to the Editor, upon the subject of the claim, set up by certain persons calling themselves "British Creditors in the French funds." This letter appears to have been drawn forth by the remarks, which were made in page 240 (see the preceding article), which, upon being referred to, will be found to have originated from a *printed* paper, called "A Statement of Facts," which statement had been sent round to Members of Parliament, and other persons whose opinions were likely to have weight in parliamentary proceedings. The object of the paper, especially when thus circulated, was too obvious to be mistaken; and, as this object appeared to be such as ought not to be accomplished, such arguments were used as were thought likely to contribute towards preventing that accomplishment; but, let those who have read the remarks determine, whether the charge of "*calumniating*" the Anglo-Gallic creditors be well or ill founded. —Previous to the short reply, which it is intended to make to the letter in question, it may not be amiss to observe, that, since the *accession* of the "well-meaning" Doctor and his associates, an entirely new set of ideas, with respect to the liberty of

writing and of speaking, appears to have sprung up. Formerly, those who wrote and spoke upon public matters, felt themselves under no other restraint than that which was imposed by truth and decency; but, now, to censure, or to criticise, however truly and decently, is to "calumniate," if it bears hard upon the person or persons, whose conduct, or object, is censured, or criticised; so that, in few words, the doctrine now is, that the greater fool or knave a man is, the greater is the calumny in stating what tends to discover his folly or his knavery.—The Anglo-Gallic creditors were not accused of knavery; they were accused of no "crime;" their "characters" were not attacked; they are, indeed, described as "jew-like speculators," but, that they were speculators they will not deny, and whether the epithet *jew-like* was "injurious" and "calumnious," or not, will be easily determined, when we recollect, that the debts, for which they now claim indemnification, arise, for the far greater part, from the purchase of assignats and other stale paper at an average of more than two-thirds below par. Besides, what was the security of the paper so purchased? What was the security, written on the paper itself? Was it the treaty of 1786? Or was it the "National Domains" of France? Was the thing purchased a fair and legitimate object of trade? Was it a thing honestly come by; or was it a sort of stolen goods? In short, did it not consist, principally, of the plundered property of the Church and the Crown, and of that of those persons who remained faithful to them? Well, then, let the speculators go and seek the security, upon which they advanced their money: let them seek the "National Domains;" but, let them not come to the English Parliament, let them not hope to wring from the people of England a compensation for the losses they have, in such a traffic, sustained.—They say, they have been guilty of nothing "contrary to the laws of their country, or to the rights and usages of foreign nations." So much the better for them; but it is no better for us. We do not complain of them. That is to say, the complaint did not *begin* with us. We only say, that they are wrong in applying to us for money on this account; and we endeavour to show, that we owe them none.—They ask, somewhat exultingly: "Do the Englishmen reprobate the conduct, or patriotic principles, of those foreigners, Dutch, Swedes, Danes, Russians, or French, who place their money in the British funds?" The answer is: *Some* Englishmen certainly do reprobate their conduct, and hold them in the utmost contempt; but, whether this be the case or not, what has it to do with the making of compensation, out of the public purse, to those who have lost their money by such speculations? The question to be asked is, Did any government in Europe, or will any government in Europe, compensate its subjects for the money they have lost, or may lose, in the English funds?—We are told, that "the demands of health and convenience, the cultivation of science and the arts, and the relations of trade and commerce, carry Englishmen and their families abroad, in consequence of which connections arise, and call for the lodgement of money either on public or private security, as suits the convenience of the parties." That is to say, that certain Englishmen, either for their own pleasure or their own profit, deposit their money abroad.* How far it is laudable, and ought to be allowed, for people of

* From reports that have been circulated not long before this date (1835), it would seem that some of our great capitalists are dealers, to a vast extent, in

any country to reside abroad, and draw their incomes after them, may be a question; but, that persons, who, for their own convenience, pleasure, or gain, lodge their wealth abroad, should, when that wealth is lost, have a right to demand compensation from their countrymen, on whom they have turned their backs, from whom they have withheld all share in their enjoyments, is a proposition too preposterous to be for a moment entertained.—The French funds are represented as a channel, through which British property finds its way from India to England. They may be such a channel; but, while it is utterly impossible to conceive what this circumstance has to do with the present question, there can be no difficulty in stating, that, as far as such a channel is necessary, India is an injury to England.—The writer of the letter, on which these remarks are made, complains of scornful language, forgetting, like a true “well-meaning man,” that he and his associates have, in their printed paper, stamped the charge of “presumption” upon all those, who have dared, or who shall dare, to question the wisdom of the minister, who made the treaty of 1786. Men do not like to be bullied thus. There are persons in the world who doubt of the wisdom of Mr. Pitt, not only in war and peace, but in finance also, and who inquire, not altogether impertinently, where they shall look for the financial wisdom, which has, in the course of ten years, more than doubled the national debt, which has banished gold and silver from the land, and has left the country no other currency than that of a degraded paper. Suppose that a plain honest fellow were, with a ten-pound note in his hand, to go up to Mr. Pitt, and say: “Wise man, previous to the time that this nation began to enjoy the blessings of thy financial skill, I could buy 44 Spanish milled dollars with this note, which has been lying ever since in my drawer, and now, I find,

American securities of one kind or another. Names have been mentioned: among others, the names of men who were, once, not only Privy Councillors, but even Prime Ministers and Lord Chancellors; men who have distinguished themselves by their adherence to the system of PITT, and by their fine speeches in praise of “national faith;” men who have opposed parliamentary reform, on the ground that it would undermine the foundations of property, and who have contended that those ought to have most power in the government who have the greatest “stake in the country.” These men do not, if such reports be true, practise “national faith” so well as they preach it; else, why do they show their own misgivings by carrying away their capital from England and hunting about for safer places of deposit, such as *American canals* and other transatlantic speculations? They are, in their hearts, afraid of the system; they act accordingly, and shift their own capital to foreign countries: and yet, they patronise the system, and call on the people to run all the risks of “faith,” in order to maintain it. What “stake in the country” can these men pretend to, when compared with other men who live by productive labour; of what importance to England are they, with capital in American canals, compared with those whose capitals consist altogether in their ingenuity and industry, whose interest it is to depend entirely on their own country, while their country is equally dependent on them? The colossus of capital, standing with one foot on English soil, and the other amidst shares or stock in the United States, may well cry up national faith for other people to adhere to. If the ground should begin to quake on this side of the Atlantic, he can lift off the foot planted here. Not so with other people, who keep both their feet in England.—Mr. CANNING laughs at the dealers in the Parisian loan, called the Loan upon England, in the following Epigram:—

“The Paris Cits, a patriotic band,

“Advance their cash on British freehold land.

“But let the speculating rogues beware—

“They've bought the *skin*— but who's to kill the *bear*?”

—See *Anti-Jacobin*, p. 62.—Ed.

“that I can buy only 40 of those dollars with this same note.”* What answer would Mr. Pitt give? Must he not acknowledge, that the bank paper has been degraded in his hands, and by his measures, and must he not also acknowledge, that this degraded paper is almost the only currency of the country? What audacity, then, must those persons have, who stigmatize as “presumptuous” every one that dares to question the wisdom of Mr. Pitt? And this charge comes, too, with such a charming grace from the persons who, in the very same breath, rail against the treaty of Amiens, a compact which was made by the advice of, and which was publicly defended by, this very Mr. Pitt, this “great statesman,” of whose wisdom it is “presumptuous” to doubt! These challenges are very indiscreet, on the part of Mr. Pitt’s admirers and friends. Many men, who would never think of publicly criticising his measures, are thus goaded on to it. We overlook much in a person about whom little is said; but to hear him extolled to the skies, and to hear ourselves characterized as foolish and presumptuous, because we venture to express our doubts of his wisdom, and that, too, at the very moment when we not only see, but are smarting under, the effects of his want of wisdom; patiently and in silence to bear this, would argue a shocking want of independence of mind.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register, March, 1804.*)

ANGLO-GALLIC CREDITORS.—This subject appeared to be closed, when the letter, which will be found in page 392 of this sheet,† was received by the Editor. The public will have perceived, that these creditors have been very fairly dealt with. Their remonstrances have been inserted; and though of very considerable length, their representation of their case, which they themselves published, and circulated amongst the members of Parliament and other persons of influence, will be found entire, in the preceding sheet, page 366.‡ It seems, however, that all this is not sufficient to ward off a charge of want of candour. These Anglo-Gauls are certainly “well-meaning” men, whatever they may be as to honesty, honour, and patriotism; for no one but a “well-meaning man,” no one but an imitator of the “modest” Doctor, would have had the assurance to complain that this subject had not been fairly treated in the *Register*.—Whether these creditors have “half-abjured” their country, or not, shall be inquired by-and-by: at present some other parts of the letter, above referred to, demand a few remarks. It is denied, that the Anglo-Gallic creditors purchased the assignats and the “national domains” of France, and as a *proof* that they did not make such purchases, the writer says, that they would, in consequence of that act, be chargeable with “high treason, seeing that, at the period of the “depreciation of the assignats, an act of Parliament had passed, and then

* A bank-note of ten pounds will *not* fetch even 40 dollars. Stamped dollars were issued at 5s., that is 10 per centum above their sterling value; but they have *disappeared*. Very few of them ever found their way to the Eastward of Temple Bar. The fact is, a dollar is worth more than 5s. of English bank paper.

† *Political Register*, vol. v. March 17, 1804.

‡ *Ibid.* March 10, 1804.

“existed, making it high treason to hold any correspondence, or to have any money negotiation with France.”—This appears to be very little better than a quibble. The statement which the Anglo-Gaul here alludes to does not say, that *all* the assignats were purchased at two-thirds below par. It was obviously the average that was meant. But, is it not being very bold, for a “well-meaning” man, to say, or to infer, that *no* assignats were purchased at a degraded price; and that, too, upon no better proof than the circumstance of an act of Parliament having passed forbidding it? First; the act of Parliament was not passed till 1793; and, *before* that time, the assignats had lost much more than *one-half* of their nominal value. Secondly, whoever before asked us to conclude, that, because an act of Parliament had been passed against a certain traffic, such traffic no longer existed? There are acts of Parliament enough against smuggling. There are reams upon reams of revenue laws; there are penalties and oaths without end; but do we see, that a regard for either property, body, or soul; that ruin and infamy in this world, or everlasting torment in the world to come; do we see, that any, or all, of these, are sufficient to deter men from disobeying the law? Why, then, should we believe that an act of Parliament has been so completely efficient in the particular case before us, a case in which the avoiding of detection was so very easy, and in which the parties to be detected were the most cautious, the slyest and most artful of all two-legged creatures. The fact is, and it is a notorious fact, that the act of Parliament, to which this writer refers, was enforced, or not, as suited the convenience of commerce, or rather of commercial men and money dealers. During a short space, indeed, there was an almost total suspension of intercourse; but it was soon opened again; and, whether by the means of Americans, or other foreigners, or by direct communication, the money speculations were constantly carried on. So that, the argument founded on the high treason act is worth just nothing at all.—This writer, alluding to the resource that was pointed out to the creditors, states that they are refused “national domains” as an indemnity for the annihilation of their stock. It is dangerous to show the picture of food to a famished man. But, really, one could never have supposed, that in saying, “Let these creditors go and seek their indemnity in those national domains;” one could never have supposed, that this would have been received as a piece of serious advice.—That, *some portion* of the claims of these persons may arise from their having possessed stock in the French funds previous to the revolution nobody denies; but, without for a moment allowing that that circumstance gives the holders any right to an indemnity from Parliament, it may be safely asserted, that, of the three millions sterling, said to be due, not *one* arises from possessions in the funds of the monarchy.—This offended Anglo-Gaul makes what it is very likely he regards as a cutting allusion to “*Congress paper*.” His arrow is either very dull, or he aims it at a wrong object. Certainly there was very little difference in the conduct of those who speculated upon the plunder of the nobility and clergy, in France, and those who cheated the American soldiers of that which was to have been the reward of their toils, and who spared not even the widows and orphans of those soldiers who had been slain in the war.* Very little difference indeed;

* In 1790 the American paper money was passing for no more than from twelve to fifteen per cent. of its nominal value. The people had, for a long

but, what advantage the Anglo-Gaul could expect to derive from the allusion to "Congress paper," it would be very difficult to point out.—It is asked what "way are the justice and validity of this claim affected by the merit or demerit of Mr. Pitt?" No one said that they were affected thereby. It was only contended; nor would Mr. Pitt's name ever have been mentioned in the controversy, had not the Anglo-Gallic creditors themselves first brought it forward in support of the principle, upon which their claim is founded. By a reference to their printed statement, it will be seen, that they accuse, beforehand, of *presumption* all those who censure Mr. Pitt for having, in the treaty of 1786, adopted that principle. It, therefore, became necessary to show, that one might confer such censure, without meriting the charge of presumption; and, if, in defending oneself against such a charge, the defence assumed somewhat of an offensive nature, there was nothing in that, which is not fully justified by the laws of retaliation.—But, after all, we are told, that the claim of these persons "does not depend on the treaty of 1786, "nor upon the stipulations of any other convention; but on the usages "of nations, and the good faith of France." Well, then, why is an appeal made to this nation? There is the "good faith of France" still to apply to. As to the *usage* of nations, however, that foundation will never do to stand upon; seeing, that the general usage and law of

while, been perfectly scourged by this false money. In January, 1790, Mr. HAMILTON, then Secretary of the Treasury, made a grand report on the public debts, and recommended that they should all be assumed by the general government. He was vigorously opposed, in the debates on this measure, by many among the legislature. But he ultimately succeeded; and an act, "making provision for the debt of the United States," was passed, in August, 1790. See *Laws of U. S.* edit. 1815, vol. ii. chap. 61. JEFFERSON returned from his mission to France just after the measure had been resolved on. In his *Anas*, p. 156, he states the following scandalous particulars:—"It is well known that during the "war, the greatest difficulty we encountered was the want of money or means "to pay our soldiers who fought, or our farmers, manufacturers, and merchants, "who furnished the necessary supplies of food and clothing for them. After the "expedient of paper money had exhausted itself, certificates of debt were given "to the individual creditors, with assurance of payment as soon as the United "States should be able. But the distresses of these people often obliged them "to part with these for the half, the fifth, and even a tenth of their value; and "speculators had made a trade of cozening them from the holders, by the most "fraudulent practices, and persuasions that they would never be paid. In the "bill for funding and paying these, Hamilton made no difference between the "original holders, and the fraudulent purchasers of this paper. Great and just "repugnance arose at putting these two classes of creditors on the same footing, "and great exertions were used to pay the former the full value, and to the latter, "the price only which they had paid, with interest. But this would have prevented the game which was to be played, and for which the minds of greedy "members were already tutored and prepared. When the trial of strength, on "these several efforts, had indicated the form in which the bill would finally "pass, this being known within doors sooner than without, and especially than "to those who were in distant parts of the Union, the base scramble began. "Couriers and relay horses by land, and swift-sailing pilot-boats by sea, were "flying in all directions. Active partners and agents were associated and employed in every State, town, and country neighbourhood, and this paper was "bought up at five shillings, and even as low as two shillings in the pound, "before the holder knew that Congress had already provided for its redemption "at par. Immense sums were thus filched from the poor and ignorant, and "fortunes accumulated by those who had themselves been poor enough before. "Men thus enriched by the dexterity of a leader, would follow of course the "chief who was leading them to fortune, and become the zealous instruments of "all his enterprises."—Ed.

nations give a full right to every belligerent power to confiscate all the property, of every description, belonging to its enemy, or the subjects of its enemy. This writer says, that, "although sacrificed by perfidy on the "one hand and *pusillanimity* on the other, it remains to be seen, not so "much by an appeal to the generosity of this country, so much as to a "sense of its own *honour*, whether, in *some future negotiation* these British claims will not be supported with more energy and better success." What idea this gentleman may have of national honour it would, perhaps, be hard to say: but there can be little doubt, but that a treaty may be made without any mention of his claim, and yet not be dishonourable to the country; not half, no, not a thousandth part, so dishonourable as that treaty of Amiens, against which these creditors never uttered one syllable *till now*. They have now found out, that the ministers were base and pusillanimous; but, not one word of this sort did they say at the time when the treaty was discussed; not one of them voted against the conduct of those by whom that treaty was made; they all joined in an "humble representation" to the French government; they remonstrated and intrigued with Lord Hawkesbury, "the *solid* young lord," the "safe politician;" but never did they think of appealing to the Parliament, till they wanted *money*; money which they could find nobody else fool enough to give them; then, and not till then they came to the Parliament; that is, they came to the pockets of the people, who are to toil for the sake of indemnifying them for losses sustained by their French speculation! Of such men is it too much to say that they have *half* abjured their country?—No; no stipulations ought to be made in their favour in any future treaty. The bare *mention* of such a claim must cost something in a negotiation; the nation must give something for it, for even the setting of it up; and, therefore, it never ought to be brought forward; the nation is no more bound to urge such a claim, than it is to urge the claim of a merchant, whose ship has been captured by the enemy.

CAPITAL, CREDIT, AND CONFIDENCE.

UNDER this head a fact or two will be stated that will tend to illustrate what has been said, as to some of the general principles in the foregoing article.—It will be remembered, that, in vol. iv. p. 953,* mention was made in the manner, in which the riches of England were made subservient to the carrying on of the war, on the part of France. In consequence of the cession of Louisiana to France, which cession was produced by the peace of Amiens, France acquired the right of selling it to America, which she has done for the sum of 11,250,000 dollars, being 2,531,250*l* sterling, at 4*s.* 6*d.* the dollar, or 2,812,000*l.* in our present English bank paper, at 5*s.* the dollar; speaking, therefore, in the nearest round number, we must call the sum *three millions*. These three millions America agreed to pay in stock, to be created for that purpose, and the interest of which was to be payable in Europe, and transferable from the government of France to that of any other nation, or to individuals of France, or individuals of any other country. Having got his acquisition

* See p. 323 of this volume.—ED.

into this manageable, this really tangible form, Buonaparte naturally enough conceives the project of turning it at once into gold, or commodities which are to be purchased only with gold. He has no desire to bind France to America, to render himself in some degree dependent on America, by being constantly the creditor of America, that is to say, by having in her hands a large quantity of stock, which she can at any time sequester, and, if necessary confiscate: no; Buonaparte has no wish of that kind; it is above the reach of his mind, and therefore, he modestly leaves it to great financiers, such as Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt, who, in a possession like that of which we are speaking, would have desecrated the foundation of another "solid system of finance," and would, probably, have made out of it another sinking fund. Buonaparte, who understands nothing at all of these means of "husbanding resources," instantly abandoned all the immense advantages of interest upon interest, and, like the boy with the golden-egg goose, set on foot a scheme for getting into his clutches the whole of the principal at once. But, where was he to look for a purchaser of his stock? Who was he to apply to for that purpose? Where but in England? To whom but to Englishmen? In short, as was before stated, the bargain is said to have been made, some time ago, by Sir Francis Baring and Company, the same merchants, on whom, during the late peace, the merchants of Philadelphia drew for payment for the provisions and stores supplied to the French army in St. Domingo. It is not meant to insinuate here, or in any other part of these remarks, that there was, or is, any thing either unlawful or even blamable in the transactions of these traders. Individual interests are frequently at variance with the interests of the nation, without any fault on the part of the individual, who, if a trader, will act like a trader, that is, he will get money, if he can; and if, in this pursuit, he injures his country, and yet acts lawfully, the fault is with the government of that country. To return to the subject immediately before us, the bargain with Buonaparte appears to have been concluded about the time that it was said to be in negotiation, as will be evident from the date of the following document, which is a correct copy of a certificate for a portion of the stock, of which we have been speaking.

" TWO THOUSAND DOLLARS

" LOUISIANA SIX PER CENT. STOCK.

" No.—Treasury of the United States, Register's Office, December the 24th, 1803.

" BE IT KNOWN, That there is due from the United States of America, unto FRANCIS BARING AND COMPANY, of London, Merchants, or their assigns, the sum of two thousand dollars, bearing interest at *Six per Centum per Annum* from the twentieth day of December, 1803, inclusively, payable in London, semi-annually; viz. on the first days of July and January, and at the rate of *four shillings and sixpence*, sterling, for each dollar, being stock created by virtue of an act, entitled, 'An act authorizing the creation of a stock to the amount of eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, for the purpose of carrying into effect, the convention of the 30th of April, 1803, between the United States of America and the French Republic, and making provision for the payment of the same,' passed the 10th day of November, 1803, the principal of which is payable at the Treasury of

“ the United States, by annual instalments of not less than one-fourth part each, the first of which will commence fifteen years after the 21st day of October, 1803; which debt is recorded in this office, and is transferable only by appearance in person, or by attorney, at the proper office, according to the rules and forms instituted for that purpose.”

“(Signed)

JOSEPH NOURSE, *Register.*”

“ Dolls. 2,000.”

To trace this transaction to its ultimate consequence would be next to impossible, because that consequence may be materially affected by intervening events; but, it requires no great degree of penetration to discover, in its operations, effects very far indeed from advantageous to this country. Superficial observers are apt, upon such occasions, to say: “ Well, if Sir Francis Baring has so much money to advance, it only serves to show the immense riches of this country; and, as he will, of course, duly receive his interest, it is as well for him to employ his money in this way as in any other.” That Sir Francis Baring is merely the speculator, is understood; because nobody imagines, in the first place, that he has three millions of money; and, in the next place, if he had, no one can suppose, that he would keep it all in Louisiana stock. He is the mere dealer, and, in order to make good his bargain, he, of course, sells his stock, just as loan-mongers sell slices of their omnium. In order, however, to preserve as much simplicity as possible, in the statement and reasoning upon this subject, it may be convenient to consider the wholesale dealer as being, in this particular instance, the sole holder of the stock that he has purchased. . . . But, this discussion would, I perceive, require a much greater space than I can, at present, allot to it: I shall, therefore, postpone it till my next, when an endeavour shall be made to render the subject familiar to the minds of those, who may happen not to have turned their attention towards it.*

TRADE AND REVENUE.

TO THE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF THE PUBLIC.

SINCE it must be evident to every reflecting person, that our ability to support the present contest, and, of course, that of preserving the throne of our Sovereign and our own liberties, depends, in a great degree, upon the pecuniary resources of the country, it is not too much to hope, that, notwithstanding the dryness of the subject, an exposition of the true state of those resources will, at this time, meet with a serious consideration.

That the minister, now better known by the name of the DOCTOR,† has,

* This subject was not further treated of as here promised.—ED.

† The father of Mr. ADDINGTON was a physician, and the medical attendant of the great Lord CHATHAM. Hence the nickname of “ Doctor,” which is said to have been originally applied by Mr. CANNING. The following (from the *Register*, vol. v. p. 203) relates to the house of Mr. ADDINGTON (now Lord SIDMOUTH) in Richmond Park:—

upon all convenient occasions, deceived the public upon the several points belonging to this subject, it has, as my readers will have observed, fallen to my lot frequently and repeatedly to show. On many of these points, however, the Doctor has still been believed; because the refutation of his statements and calculations depended upon facts, which could not, as yet, be ascertained; and, because, in such cases, the public, not making a due distinction between the Doctor's character and that of former Chancellors of the Exchequer, have, from feelings of habitual and becoming respect for persons high in office, concluded, that till his assertions were disproved by facts, they ought to be credited, though opposed to the assertions and the arguments of other persons. The *facts* have, however, at last, come to light; and, grounded upon these indubitable facts, I am about to offer to my readers a concise exposition of the actual state of our TRADE, REVENUE, EXPENDITURE, and DEBT.

FIRST: with respect to the trade of the country, I beg leave to refer to that memorable speech of the Doctor, whence the motto to this paper has been chosen. I have no particular desire to recall the public attention to the apprehensions of those who thought that a diminution in our commerce would be produced by the peace; but, that such apprehensions were entertained must be and ought to be remembered. The Doctor, when he came to the Parliament with his flattering display of the 10th of Dec. 1802, could not, in the fulness, or, rather, the emptiness, of his vanity, forbear to make a triumphant allusion to those apprehensions, in the words contained in my motto. But, he was reminded immediately afterwards, that his triumph was ill-founded and would be of very short duration; for, that the opposers of the peace had never said that an *immediate* falling off in our trade would take place, and that, the excess of trade in 1802, was owing, in a great degree, to temporary causes, to causes, the operation of which would cease with that very year.*—Time has been swift in visiting vengeance upon the Doctor. We have now, at the end of only sixteen months from the day when the thoughtless boaster rose crowing upon his tip-toes, an account, presented to the Parliament from his own office, in which all his estimates and all his promises are clearly proved to be false, and in which he is proved to have been grossly ignorant of the concerns intrusted to his management, or, to have intentionally deceived the nation, by whom he and his family are maintained, and the Sovereign, under whose authority he acts.—Trade naturally divides itself under two heads, *imports* and *exports*. To form a just opinion as to the state of either of these, in any given year, we must compare their amount with the amount of the imports or exports of the

EPIGRAM.

In Richmond's shades the Premier sat,
Discoursing o'er his wine;
"What name, dear Hiley, shall we give,
"To this sweet place of mine?"

A wicked wag the question heard
Behind a neighb'ring tree;
"Call it, dear Doctor!" straight he cried,
"The VILLA MEDICI."

The early volumes of the *Register* contain many similar specimens of wit, in derision of "the Doctor" and his administration. Mr. CANNING was the author of most of them.—ED.

* See Pol. Register, vol. ii. p. 794.

preceding year. But, in the present instance, this mode of comparison is not sufficient for our purpose; because, if we should show, that, in the year 1803, the imports, or exports, have been much less in amount than they were in 1802, the safe politicians will exultingly remind us, that 1802 was a year of *peace*. To avoid this, we must take the three years ending with December 1803, which period, while it embraces the last year of last war, the year of peace, and the first year of this war, does also embrace the three years of the Doctor's administration. — To begin then with the IMPORTS; their amount (exclusive of corn and other grain), in the official value, was as follows:—

Imported in 1801	£24,145,500
1802	24,413,473
1803	20,634,099

The "official value" is only a sort of standard, or mode, which is made use of at the Custom-house, of rating according to the quantity of the goods, the real value being very difficult to ascertain. Probably the real value is nearly double the official value, but, as to our present inquiry, that circumstance is of no importance. The figures speak for themselves here, and much plainer than words possibly can. They show, not only that there has been an interruption to the Doctor's "continual increase," but, that the increase has been turned into a most alarming decrease; and, they show, that, if such an increase be "an indubitable proof of the growing wealth and resources of the country," the wealth and resources of this country are fast upon the decline. But, that description of persons, who may be called balance-of-trade-men, will, perhaps, assert, that a decrease in the imports is a mark of prosperity; and, I must confess, that such an assertion could not very consistently be contradicted by those who admit the principle of a balance of trade. At once, however, to blast the hopes which might arise from this source of deception, it is sufficient to state, that the decrease of imports has not taken place in articles which are the growth or produce of *other nations*, but, in those articles which are the growth or produce of our own West-India colonies; in the articles coffee, sugar, and rum, as will appear from the following comparative statement between the years 1801 and 1803 —

	Coffee.	Sugar.	Rum.
1801	£4,416,822	£5,351,707	£420,845
1803	1,474,154	4,232,143	370,182
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
	2,942,668	1,119,564	50,663
			1,119,564
			2,942,668
			<hr/>

Decrease in the three articles. . £4,112,895

By looking back to the comparative statement of the total of the imports, during the three last years, it will be seen, that the year 1803 has fallen below that of 1801 in much about the amount of the decrease of these articles of the growth of our own colonies; so that, here is no source of comfort to the balance-of-trade men, to those wise-acres, who imagine, that the sending of valuable things out of the country to a greater amount than that of the valuable things received into the country is a proof of national prosperity; to these persons the present state of our imports affords no hope, because, as it has been shown, the decrease in

the imports has been produced by a falling-off in the amount of the things coming from another part of our own dominions, and being the property of our fellow subjects.—The EXPORTS are divided into two classes, “*Foreign Merchandise*,” and, “*British Produce and Manufactures*.” The latter of these comes certainly more home to us than the former, but the former consists principally of the growth or produce of our own colonies, and, therefore, any falling-off in its amount must be regarded as of great consequence. The decrease in the amount of this class of goods exported will appear from the following statement:—

Exported in 1801 . . .	£16,601,892
1802	19,127,833
1803	11,537,148

This decrease is almost incredible; and one would wonder how any minister could, after such estimates as those made by the Doctor in all his financial speeches, find the hardihood to present this statement to the House of Commons! But, the Doctor knows his men.—I am anxious to keep in view, that it is not a comparison between a year of *war* and a year of *peace* that I am making, but between 1801 and 1803, that is, between a year of the former war and a year of the present war. Nor do I wish to confine the comparison to the last year of the former war: take any year for seven years back, and you will find no one in which there was not more foreign merchandise exported than in the year 1803. The statement now presented, therefore, by exhibiting a comparative view of the different effect of war upon trade, *before*, and *after*, the treaty of Amiens, demonstrates the ruinous tendency of that compact, which tendency will, however, still more clearly appear when we come to examine into the nature of the decrease in the exports of our home produce and manufactures.

Exported in 1801	£25,699,809
1802	26,993,129
1803	22,252,101

Here the total of the exported British produce and manufactures in 1801 amounts to nearly three millions and a half more than in 1803, for, it is between these two years that I particularly desire to continue my comparison. And, in what articles of produce and manufactures has this decrease taken place? Not in those which consist chiefly of materials first brought from other countries and afterwards wrought up in this; but, in those precisely, which are almost entirely the growth, and entirely the fabric, of this country: in *linens*, and particularly in *woollens*, the great staple commodity of England, as will appear by the following figures:

	Linens.	Woollens.
Exported in 1801	£1,009,194	£7,321,236
1802	895,156	6,487,263
1803	561,310	5,291,441

In the linens there is a decrease of nearly one-half, and in the woollens of something more than two-sevenths. There is a decrease of nearly one-half in wrought silks, and of one-third in the haberdashery and stockings. But, the woollens form the most important object of our consideration. They are made almost entirely of materials which are the growth of our fields, and the labour bestowed on them is entirely the labour of our people, a very considerable portion of whom are fed by the produce of this

branch of trade.—In my letters to Mr. Addington on the “fatal effects of the peace with respect to the colonies, the commerce and manufactures of this kingdom,” I endeavoured to prepare the public for the decrease, which has now taken place, and, I particularly pointed out the ruinous consequences which must, in a short time, result to the linen and woollen manufactures from the power which the peace had given to France of shutting out our goods from many countries, into which they found their way during the war.* How my apprehensions were received by the lovers of “peace and commerce,” the public will recollect; and, the Doctor and the “solid young lord,” his coadjutor, may now begin to believe what I then told them: that “popular noise would avail nothing against the power of events;” and that, they would, in a very few years, be “compelled to listen to the curses of those whose plaudits now afforded them the means of misrepresenting and calumniating the opposers of that disgraceful treaty by which they had prolonged the duration of their ill-deserved power and emoluments.”—What, then, I shall be asked, “would you have had eternal war, for the sake of preserving trade; *you*, who are continually expressing your contempt for trade, and representing it as the ruin of the monarchy?”—As to this latter point, my opinion was clearly and consistently stated at the beginning of Letter II. of the series just referred to. The whole discussion proceeded upon the presumption of the absolute necessity of maintaining the present system of what is called public credit; and, it is upon that presumption that I am, of course, now proceeding; otherwise, the decrease of which I have been speaking would certainly be considered as a favourable and a fortunate circumstance. And with respect to “eternal war for the purpose of preserving our trade,” never did I utter such a sentiment; but, on the contrary, I had strongly to reprobate the conduct of those, who with the vain hope of extending our trade, submitted to disgraceful terms of peace. I contended for the preservation of the national honour and independence: these were my great objects: the discussions as to trade proceeded from a desire to forwarn the nation, that, in exchange for its honour and its safety, it had received and would receive nothing. My position was this, that, if I were compelled to take the question of peace or war, merely as a pecuniary one, I would have continued the war, till I could have obtained a better peace; “because the peace of Amiens would produce a diminution in our revenue more than proportionate to the reduction that such a peace would enable us to make in our expenditure.”—To return to what more immediately concerns us, let me ask how the Doctor will be able to justify himself to the Parliament and the nation? The results, as above stated by me from the official papers, flatly contradict his predictions and his estimates. Will he plead general ignorance of the subject, or partial error? Either of them is, in a minister, and in a case of such magnitude, a crime. It is a crime for him to have taken upon him such an office, if he knew not how to discharge its functions; and if he did know how to discharge them, it was a crime not to have duly discharged them. Will he say, that the decrease in our trade has been owing to the war? Why did he, then, declare war? Why did he not remain at peace? or, having resolved on war, why did he not take care, that this war, into which we have been brought during his administration, should not be more injurious to our

* See Letter III.

trade than was the war, in which, at his entrance into power, he found us engaged? He will hardly contend, that we are acquiring more *glory*, or, that we enjoy greater *safety*, in this war than in the last. Therefore, as he found us in war, and has now brought us into war again, we have a right to demand of him, that he also place us where he found us with respect to trade. He will, perhaps, say, that it was not he, but the restless and insatiable ambition of the enemy, that again, and so soon, brought us into war. But did he not foresee, or ought he not to have foreseen, the consequences of this restless and insatiable ambition? Ought he not to have taken his measures accordingly, and to have prevented a new war, when it came, from placing our trade in a worse situation than that in which it was previous to the peace? Those who disapproved of the peace, have a right to charge him with the loss of that trade which we should have enjoyed by the continuation of the war; and those who approved of the peace, with the loss of that trade which we should have enjoyed by a continuation of the peace. The peace and the present war have taken place during his administration. He is answerable not only for the measures of his ministry, but for the consequences of those measures. We are to compare the state of the nation when he took the rule of it into his hands, with its present state; if we find its affairs improved, he is entitled to that applause and to those honours and rewards which are given to great talents and meritorious actions; but, if the result of our inquiries be of exactly an opposite nature, he deserves censure and disgrace. Apply this rule to the trade of the country, we find, that, from a total * annual importation of 27,300,000*l.*, leaving out the minor parts, he has reduced us to an importation of 21,600,000*l.*; that, from an importation of British colonial produce of 10,100,000*l.* he has reduced us to an importation of 5,900,000*l.*; that, from an annual exportation of foreign merchandise amounting to 16,600,000*l.*, he has reduced us to an exportation of 11,500,000*l.*; that, from a total annual exportation of British produce and manufactures amounting to 25,600,000*l.*, he has reduced us to an exportation of 22,200,000*l.*; and lastly, that, from an annual exportation of woollens, the great staple of our country, amounting to 7,300,000*l.* he has reduced us to an exportation of 5,200,000*l.*, a sum nearly one million less in amount than that for which we exported woollens in the year 1798, having, as to this important branch of trade, caused us to make a retrograde motion over the space of five years.— Thus it is to be ruled by “ safe politicians;” by men taken “ from the middle classes of society.” When the glittering display of the 10th of Dec. 1802 was made to the Parliament, the low and little men were filled with exultation. They thought that the sway of mediocrity, not to say stupidity, was for ever established; and, they began to proclaim aloud, that great talents were an injury rather than an advantage to a government. Their triumph has, thank God! been of short duration. Thank God! the nation has already, and, I hope, before it is too late, been made to *feel* the effects of having listened to, and acted upon, this grovelling, this base and degrading notion. For this wholesome lesson we shall have to thank the Addingtons and the Jenkinsons: they have furnished us with a practical and never-to-be-forgotten proof of the folly of committing the affairs of a nation to the hands of low-bred, low-minded, talent-less men.

* The East-India importations are not made up for last year, therefore, they do not enter, on either side, into any of these statements.

SECOND: the *Revenue* must ever, while the present system continues, thrive or decline with the trade. In speaking of the revenue it will be necessary, in order not to embarrass the statements, to confine ourselves to the produce of the permanent taxes, in the first place, and for the purpose of comparing one year with another; and, afterwards, if required, to speak of the war-taxes. When the Doctor became minister, in 1801, there was an Income Tax existing, which tax was afterwards done away. There were also in that year, new permanent taxes imposed to a considerable amount, part of which did not come into full collection till the year 1802. The best way, therefore, will be to take the net produce of the permanent taxes, including the sum paid for corn-bounties, in 1802, and compare it with the net produce of the *same* taxes, in 1803, in which *same* I do not, of course, include, new taxes which came into collection in this latter year, and which did not come into collection in the former year.

Net produce in 1802	£29,164,945
1803	27,743,526
	<hr style="width: 100%;"/>
Defalcation in 1803	1,421,419
	<hr style="width: 100%;"/>

There can be no error in this statement, unless the accounts laid before Parliament are false.—The net produce of all the taxes, in 1803, amounted to 30,710,747*l.*, which, as the reader will perceive, surpasses the produce of 1802, by a little more than half a million; but in the year 1803, new taxes to the amount of 2,967,219*l.* came into collection, and which did not come into collection at all in the year 1802; so that, though nearly three millions of taxes were added to the taxes in existence in 1802, the total net produce was only half a million more than it was in that year; and, indeed, if we make the due allowance for depreciation of money, the net produce of 1803, notwithstanding the addition of nearly three millions of new taxes, did not surpass, in the amount of one penny, the total net produce of 1802. This is a pretty clear proof, that taxation, in the Doctor's hands, at any rate, cannot be carried much further. Great pains appear to have been taken to prevent a minute investigation as to the particular department, and particular taxes, in which this falling-off has taken place; but, as to the general conclusion, it is not of much consequence what source has been first exhausted; whether the defalcation has taken place in the old or the new taxes, whether in the customs or the excise; whether people have sold their horses; or left off drinking wine or shut out their day-light, or whether some have done the one or some the other; upon the *whole* there has been a defalcation; upon the whole, additional *impositions* have not produced additional *receipts*, much less have they produced those "*magnificent receipts*," which were anticipated by Lord Auckland.—The *War-Taxes* have failed in a still more conspicuous manner. These taxes were "to inspire *confidence at home* and create *respect* abroad." "But," said the Doctor, in his memorable bombastical budget speech of the 13th of June last, "the pecuniary effect is not all, it will be a difference in another respect, "the difference between a temporary and a permanent tax. It will have "another effect also, that of convincing the enemy of this country, that "it is *hopeless* for him to contend with our finances, that it is not in his "power to affect us in that respect: it will have a still further effect, "that of convincing the other powers of Europe, that they may safely

“join with us in a common cause of resistance against the common enemy, for that the resources of this country are such as to give full security for the punctual discharge of any engagement it may enter into, and this is an object for which I have in view some provisions.”——What provisions the Doctor had in his wise head has never yet come to light, but, most assuredly, he has not produced, in the other powers of Europe, any disposition to make a common cause with us; nor, shall we wonder at this, when we have examined into the produce of the war-taxes, that source of “confidence at home and of respect abroad.”——The war-taxes were estimated to produce 12,500,000*l.* a year;* but, as they were not imposed till June, 1803, their produce, *in that year*, was estimated only at 4,500,000*l.* There was, indeed, half the year to come, at the time of imposing the taxes, but as the two first quarters of any tax are seldom so productive as the subsequent ones, it appeared reasonable to take the half year’s produce at 4,500,000*l.*, but it appears, from the official accounts, that the amount of this produce was only 1,800,000*l.* This defalcation was owing, in some part, to the non-collection of the new income-tax; but in whatever degree this cause operated, the blame must be attributed to the minister, who laid the tax and who proposed, and caused to be enacted, the law which was intended to enforce its collection. In short, we have nothing to look at but the effect; and, here we find, that, in 1803, the war-taxes, instead of producing 4,500,000*l.* did actually produce no more than 1,800,000*l.*——The Doctor, when called upon, in Parliament, to explain the cause of this fearful defalcation, is said, in the newspapers, to have stated, that a mistake had been made with respect to the period, for, that, by the words “*present year*,” made use of in his budget speech of the 13th of June last, he did not mean the year according to the Calendar, but the “financial years,” ending on the 5th April, 1804. Never was there so barefaced a falsehood as this uttered before in a public assembly, however puerile its purposes or despicable its character. The words of the budget-speech were these: “The committee must be aware, that, though Parliament may determine to raise so large a part of the supplies within the year, yet, it must be obvious, that a very considerable part of this sum cannot be raised within the *present year*, I will, therefore, only calculate the sum to be produced by these taxes, in *this year*, at 4,500,000*l.*” Is there, then, an honest man in the whole world, who will not join in characterizing as an impudent falsehood, the above-mentioned assertion which the ministerial newspaper reporters have dared to attribute to the Doctor? Let us take one more proof. There is now lying before the Parliament an official account from the Treasury, the Doctor’s own shop, entitled, “An account of the disposition of grants for Great Britain, given for the services of *the year 1803*,” and, this account, after enumerating the several services and their expense, concludes with a statement of the ways and means for meeting the said expense, and, amongst those ways and means, observe, *for the services for the year 1803*, are included the war-taxes according to the budget estimate, that is, 4,500,000*l.* Is it not clear, then; is it not a fact to be denied by no one who has any regard for truth, that the Doctor calculated, and that the Parliament and the foolish people relied, upon a produce of war-taxes to the amount of 4,500,000*l.* in the year 1803?

* See the Doctor’s Budget-speech, Register, vol. iv. p. 909.

“ So much the better,” some one will say : “ those who relied upon the “ Doctor ought to be deceived, ought to be ruined.” Granted, but that is another question. Far be it from me to lament, that they are, thus betimes, made to *feel* the effects of their selfishness and credulity ; but this has nothing to do with the financial fact that I have been stating. The war-taxes of 1803 were estimated at 4,500,000*l.* The Parliament imagined it was imposing taxes, for that year, to that amount ; and, those taxes have yielded only 1,800,000*l.*—What may be the produce of the war-taxes during this present or any future year, I will not take upon me to state ; but, if all the other taxes now existing continue unrepealed, and keep up to their present produce, I will venture to predict, that the now existing war-taxes will not produce more than 6,250,000*l.* a year, that is to say, *half the amount* at which they were estimated by the minister, and relied on by the Parliament and the people.

THIRD : How, then, are we to meet the annual *Expenditure* ? And, what is the magnitude of that expenditure, compared with the amount of the annual income of the nation ? In the year 1803, a year of half war and half peace, the expenditure amounted to 50,840,078*l.* and the income to 38,858,373*l.*, including war-taxes. This leaves a deficiency of nearly 12,000,000*l.* to be supplied by loan, and, that deficiency was so supplied, or nearly so, last year, and must be so supplied every year, and, I apprehend, to a much greater amount ; for, when we consider the expenses in the barrack department, and in several other branches of expenditure, which have been studiously kept back from the last year’s statement, we cannot estimate the total expenditure of the present and every future year, of even *this* sort of warfare, at less than 60,000,000*l.* Therefore, however he defer his loans, by whatever art he may attempt to hide the path to bankruptcy from our eyes, the loans must come at last, or, in one shape or another, the national debt, or rather the amount to be annually paid by the people as the interest of that debt, must go on increasing.—The Doctor told the Parliament, that his budget of war-taxes of the 13th of June last, would provide, without any addition to them, for the vigorous prosecution of the war, and for the carrying into effect all those great purposes, of which he was pleased to speak on that memorable occasion. But, behold ! he and his patriotic colleague, Citizen Tierney, are now preparing *another* budget of war-taxes, notwithstanding the Citizen’s repeated promise to the people of Southwark to “ lighten their burdens.” They, as was observed on a former occasion, may easily *impose* new taxes ; but, to *collect* them will be a different sort of task. The Bishop of Llandaff called out to the ministry to tax us as much as they pleased ; but, the question is, not how much taxes we are willing, but how much we are able, to pay ; how much can possibly be raised. As to the will to contribute towards the support of the government, or of the war, that is by no means wanted ; but the ability to contribute in a greater degree than we at present contribute, I very much doubt ; and, my doubt is fully warranted by the experience of the last year. The Doctor boasted, in the month of February last, that he had imposed new taxes on the people to the amount of 17,000,000*l.* per annum. It is now nearly a year since the last of these taxes were imposed ; and, if a comparative statement were made out up to the present month, I am certain it would appear, that he has not added 3,000,000*l.* to the annual revenue. To what end, then, is he about to impose more new taxes, seeing that what is added under one name is

deducted under another? "If," according to the old saying, "he has it in meal, he cannot have it in malt." Recourse must, therefore, be had to loans as large as ever, or the war must be put an end to upon any terms, or the interest of the public debt must go unpaid, which last produces that state of things which has been termed a national bankruptcy, and which, though long in coming, may, at last come in good earnest.

FOURTH: The Doctor had been warned, that, unless the *Debt* could be prevented from augmenting to any considerable annual amount, the "capital, credit and confidence" of the country must fail. Therefore, at the commencement of his war, he thought he was providing against this evil by imposing war-taxes, wherewith to prosecute the contest without making any addition to the debt by the means of loans. He did, indeed, acknowledge, that his intention was, to borrow annually to the amount of 6,000,000*l.* but, he observed, at the same time, that, as the Sinking Fund reduced the debt 6,000,000*l.* annually, there would, upon the whole, no addition to the debt take place. I remarked, at the time, that this was either an attempt to deceive the public, or a proof that the Doctor was himself grossly deceived; and, I asked, why if the Sinking Fund really did reduce the debt in the sum of six millions annually; if this reduction was a reality, I asked, why do you not, during the war, suspend the operation of the Sinking Fund, make no loan at all, and thereby save the expense of bonuses and discounts and charges of management to the amount, perhaps, of half a million annually? upon which I was told, by way of answer, that I was "an assassin, stabbing at the vitals of my country." A hard name, certainly, for a man whose proposition, if the Sinking Fund be not a downright humbug, went merely to the saving of the nation the sum of half a million of useless annual expense! Really, from the acrimony and rage, to which, upon this subject, my opponents have given way, a stranger to the controversy would, were he first to dip into their writings, were he to hear them reviling me as a "political swindler," a "cheat upon a grand scale," a "defrauder of the widow and the orphan," he certainly would conclude, that I myself owed the whole of the debt. A poor creature indeed, however, should I be, were such senseless abuse, though backed with the blubber of Mr. Sheridan's "true English feeling," to stifle any sentiment that I entertain upon the subject.—The amount of the national debt must increase with every new loan. It does so increase. At the close of 1802, the funded debt amounted to 547,000,000*l.*, at the close of 1803, it amounted to 561,000,000*l.*, not including the addition which has been made to the unfunded debt, which at the end of 1802, amounted to 21,000,000*l.*, and which now amounts to 26,000,000*l.*, an addition which the Doctor has made in consequence of his desire to make a proportionately smaller and more perceptible addition in the shape of loan. Millions upon millions are quietly borrowed in the shape of Exchequer Bills, but would excite great outcry and alarm, if borrowed in the shape of loan; and, though the dismal hour of reckoning must at last come, the trick does, in the meantime, answer the purpose of the minister, who, if he accomplishes no other object, keeps his place for some time with less trouble than he could do, were he to show the people the real state of their affairs. This is what the Doctor has been attempting; but, he might have read, in the fable of the cudgelled ass, that it is not for all animals to play tricks with impunity.—I shall,

perhaps, be told, that, in stating the continual increase of the *debt*, I should also have stated the continual, and proportionately, more rapid increase of the *Sinking Fund*; that, while I was stating the funded debt to have increased, during last year, from 547 millions to 561 millions, I should not have omitted to state, on the other hand, that the *Sinking Fund* had increased from 67 to 77 millions, and that, therefore, though there was, in the whole debt, redeemed and unredeemed taken together, an increase of 14 millions, there was, in the *unredeemed* debt alone, an increase of only 4 millions. Now, this reproof I certainly shall meet with; and who would not, from such reproof, conclude, that the *Sinking Fund lessened* the debt of the nation? who, when they are gravely informed in the official accounts, and even in the speeches of his Majesty, that such and such provisions have been made, and such and such sums applied, for the "*reduction*" of the national debt; who, when they receive such information, through such channels, would not believe, that *some* reduction, at least, has been made in that debt, especially when they are, with the same degree of solemnity, told, that 77 millions of the debt have been actually "*redeemed*"? What do we usually understand by the word *redeemed*, as applied to the affairs of debtor and creditor? When a man, who has contracted a debt by way of mortgage or bond, *pays that debt off*, he is said to have *redeemed* his mortgage or bond, and, it follows, of course, that he *no longer pays interest* on the money advanced him upon that security. I ask whether this is not the meaning, and the only meaning, which, in such transactions, is given to the word *redeemed*? Every one who has the least regard for truth will say, yes. Well, then I ask, do not nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand persons; in short, do not the whole nation, some, and those a very few, persons excepted, really believe, that, by the means of the sinking fund, we have bona fide *redeemed* 77 millions worth of stock, that we have actually *paid off* 77 millions of our debt, and, of course, that we *no longer pay interest* upon those 77 millions? I ask, whether this notion be not generally, and indeed, universally adopted; and whether the whole phraseology and tenor of the financial papers and accounts are not calculated and even intended to propagate and to establish this notion? And, if I am answered in the affirmative, am I not justified in calling upon my countrymen to join me in deprecating the longer existence of a deception so disgraceful to us all, and so big with calamitous consequences?—NONE of the stock has been *redeemed*: NONE of the debt has been *paid off*: and, we *continue to pay interest* on every farthing of the debt that existed before the sinking fund begun and that has been created since. The *unredeemed* stock consisted, at the beginning of this year, of 484 millions, and the *redeemed* stock of 77 millions; and, who would imagine, that we should have interest to pay on any more than 484 millions? Yet, it is a truth, and a truth, too, well worth the serious consideration of both king and people, that we shall still have to *pay interest upon the whole 561 millions*, and that *no reduction* takes place, or can take place, while the present system is pursued. There are persons, differing I confess, from myself, who saw, in the original plan of the sinking fund, a principle of real reduction; but, if this principle ever did exist, it was annihilated by Mr. Addington's measure of May, 1802; and, therefore, with any exception as to the effect of that principle I need not embarrass the simplicity and cripple the force, whatever it may be, of my reasoning, which applies to what is

and to what will be, and not to what might have been if different measures had been adopted, or if different men had had the management of our financial concerns. Here, then, I return to the simple and incontrovertible proposition, that whether our debt consist in redeemed or unredeemed stock, whatever be the shape or name it may assume, to us, either as individuals or as a nation, it matters not, so long as no reduction takes place *in the annual interest which we have to pay on account of it.* If this be granted me, and I should like to hear the reasons on which it could be refused, it only remains for me to show, that no such reduction has taken, or can take place, but that, notwithstanding the operation of the sinking fund, the interest goes on increasing in an exact proportion to the increase of the *whole* of the debt redeemed and unredeemed, funded and unfunded,* as will appear by the following figures, showing the amount of the debt and of the interest paid on account of debt, in the years 1798 and 1803 respectively.

	Debt.	-Interest.
1798	£448,490,014	£20,108,884
1803	£588,581,542	£25,066,211

Now, let it be observed, that in the debt of 1798, there are only 37 millions of what is called redeemed debt, while in the debt of 1803, there are 77 millions; but still the proportion of *interest is exactly the same!* Where, then, I again ask, are we to look for the alleviating effects of this *redemption*? When, oh, when! are we to begin to feel its powers of affording us relief?—But, am I asked: “To what do these questions lead? Where is the use of this gloomy exposition?” My answer is, that, by men of mind and of heart, men who love their honour and their liberties better than miserable pelf, this exposition, if it be true, will be welcomed; because such men would rather see danger at its distant approach and prepare to resist it, than wait its arrival and basely plead the inutility of resistance. My answer is, that, when my object was to inquire into the effects which the public debt would have as to the duration and the result of the present awful contest, this exposition became a natural and necessary preliminary; and, indeed, it has left little to be learned from that inquiry, it has left little else to do but to draw from indubitable premises, an inference too obvious not to be perceived by even the most inattentive of readers: for, if the last five years, four years of war and one year of peace, have added five millions to the annual amount of the interest to be paid on the national debt, would it not be something worse than infatuation to expect or to hope, that, if the present war should last five years, another five millions will not be added to the amount of that interest? And, then, how is the war to be supported, and this interest duly discharged? This is the question to which I want a rational answer.—The way in which it is generally answered, if it can be called answering, is, to ask: “How did we support “the *last* war, and, at the same time duly discharge the interest of the “debt, though the debt, and the interest also, of course were nearly “doubled in amount before the end of that war?” Whoever pursues this course of reasoning must have previously adopted the principle, that an increase of a pound has the same effect as the increase of a

* The difference produced by mixing the amount of Exchequer Bills with that of stock is too trifling here to be of any consequence, worth notice, as to the result in view,

penny. But, in answer to those who predicted great embarrassments and fatal consequences from the immense magnitude of the debt, it was always answered: "No matter how great the debt is, so long as our trade keeps pace with it;" and, as in the instances of Mr. Rose and Mr. M'Arthur, they produced you figures to show that the increase of the trade had kept pace with the increase of the debt during the whole of the war, and that, if the interest of our debt had doubled, during the war, our trade also had doubled during that period. At the breaking out of that war, the total official value of our exports and imports, was about 35 millions; in the last year of the war, they amounted to about 69 millions; at the former period, the annual interest of the national debt, was about 12 millions, at the latter period little short of 24 millions. Here the proportion is kept up, and, if it were still kept up, there would perhaps be little occasion for alarm. But, what is our present situation? We have all the interest of doubled debt to pay annually, while our trade has made a retrograde motion of five years; so that we have now a trade less than that of 1799, with a debt of 1803. Nothing can furnish so clear and so striking an illustration as a comparison in the proportion between the amount of the trade, and of the interest of the debt, in those two years respectively.

Amount of Imports and Exports.	Interest of Debt.
1798—£57,733,955	£21,472,166
1803— 55,436,231	25,066,211

Where, then, I repeat my question; where are we to look for the means of supporting the present war, and for discharging, at the same time, the annually increasing expenses of the debt? Am I again told that there will be little or no annual addition to these expenses because the greater part of the supplies are, according to the Doctor's plan, to be raised within the year? In the first place, even the Doctor allows that he shall *always* take a loan (he should have said as long as he could get it), of 6 millions a year, and *this* year he is about to take a loan of 10 millions, to say nothing of the 6 millions for poor Ireland, three times as much as it has been usual to borrow annually for that country, and, the interest of which, if it be paid at all, must, in great part, be advanced, and indeed finally paid, by Great Britain. At any rate 10 millions a year will be wanted by way of loan, which together with funded Exchequer Bills, will, in the course of five years, have swelled the annual interest of the debt to 30,000,000*l.* at least.

If what I have above advanced be not extremely erroneous, the conclusion is, that, in consequence of our reduced trade, our present means are inadequate to our wants. Last year, which was half a year of war and half a year of peace, the total expenditure of the nation, including interest of the debt, amounts to 50 millions (I make all these statements from the official accounts). The expenditure of the present year, when we consider the expenses that have been incurred and have not yet come to account, we cannot estimate at less than 55 millions. But, suppose us to continue on in this inglorious defensive war, and suppose the annual expenditure, on account thereof, to be no greater than it was last year, how are we, with our present trade, to meet that expenditure? And, must we not, at the end of a year or two, withhold payment of the annually increasing interests of the debt, or crouch down at the feet of the enemy? Will it again be answered, that *new taxes* are to be levied? An addition to the revenue *without an addition to the trade* cannot take place; for, if

we were to allow it to be possible, to carry on the war this year, for instance, without any loan at all, and, of course, without making any addition to the interest of the debt; if we were, for argument's sake, to allow, that the Doctor, accepting of the offer of a venerable prelate, were this year to squeeze the whole fifty millions out of the nation, what would be the consequence? would not a squeezed nation be like a squeezed lemon? Would it not yield less and less at every squeezing? Do you not, by eating the seed, cut off the hope of a future harvest? And, does not our present state itself afford us a practical illustration of this truth? Has not the Doctor heaped upon us loads of new taxes, and has not our trade, have not our future means of meeting those taxes, decreased in a fearful degree?—Since, therefore, we cannot, with our present trade, defray the annual interest of the debt and support the other branches of our expenditure, it follows, that we must revive and extend our trade, or leave the interest of the debt unpaid, or diminish our other expenses by putting an end to the war, be the terms of the enemy what they may; and, those who think it impossible that our means should receive an extension, while in the hands of the right honourable Doctor, by whom they have been so much contracted; those who think it impossible, that our country should, under this man's administration, recover abroad that respect and influence which is absolutely necessary to counteract the commercial as well as the political and warlike hostility of France; those who think thus, must allow, that our only choice lies between bankruptcy and slavery, unless our affairs are speedily committed to other and abler hands.

20th April.

WM. COBBETT.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register, April, 1804*)

The statement relative to our trade, revenue, expenditure, and debt, was, as to two points, left imperfect for want of the materials, for the use of which alone it could have been made perfect: I allude to the *present produce of the war-taxes*, and to the *exhausted state of our sources of taxation in general*. . . . But, before I proceed to add to my former statement, let me correct some errors which I now find in it, and which, though they are of little consequence as to any of the conclusions that were drawn, are, nevertheless, of sufficient importance to merit particular notice here. In p. 584, the nett produce of all the permanent taxes in 1803 was said to surpass the nett produce of 1802 in the amount of only "*half a million*:" it should have been "*a million and a half*;" which correction leads to another in the next page, where, in place of saying, that, making due allowance for depreciation of money, the nett produce of 1803 "*did not surpass, in the amount of one penny*," that of 1802, I should have said, that the produce of the first-mentioned year surpassed that of the latter in the amount of less than a million. The sums quoted in p. 584, and the subtraction of one from the other, are correct; but, in the remarks made thereon, the error here noticed crept in.—In p. 593, where, by way of illustration, a comparison is made in the proportion between the amount of the trade, and of the interest of the debt, in the

years 1799 and 1803 respectively, the year 1798 is erroneously given instead of 1799.—In speaking of the *annual expenses* of the national debt, I have almost uniformly called it “*interest* of the debt.” I should have termed it, “*charge* on account of debt,” because the sum I was speaking of included the allowances to the bankers and others for management, and also several other items not properly denominated *interest*. This misnomer could, indeed, make no difference at all as to the object or effect of the statement; but, in a subject of such vast importance, one cannot be too careful in the application of terms.—After having shown, that, during the last war, though the charge on account of the debt was doubled, the export trade was also doubled, I make the following remark: “here the proportion is kept up, and, if it were still kept up, there would, perhaps, be *little cause for alarm*.” As this may, possibly, be construed into a declaration of an opinion, that, so long as the trade increases in proportion to the augmentation of the charge on account of debt, that charge may, with safety to the country, be augmented to any degree, I think it necessary to state, that I entertain no such opinion; and, that, in the passage above quoted, “*little cause for alarm*,” I meant alarm with respect to our ability, during the present war, to defray the charges of the debt and to support our other necessary expenses, never intending to let drop any expression from which it might be concluded, that I did not regard the increase of the charge on account of debt, under whatever circumstances of increased trade and revenue, as an evil of a most alarming nature, and one, too, which, if not speedily put a stop to, the monarchy must fall a sacrifice.....I now proceed to my *additions*.

FIRST: As to the *present produce of the war-taxes*. Since the preceding *Register* was published, there has been laid before Parliament an account of the nett produce of those taxes from the commencement of their collection, on the 5th of July last, to the 5th of this present month of April, embracing exactly three quarters of a year, and showing the quarterly produce, thus:

The Quarter ended 10th October	£631,705	18	9 $\frac{3}{4}$
5th January	1,242,966	4	2
5th April	1,866,647	2	11 $\frac{1}{4}$
<hr/>			
Three Quarters	3,741,319	5	11

The remark that first presses forward here, is, that we have not *even yet* obtained, from this source, the 4,500,000*l.* which we ought to have had on the 5th of January. When, on the 21st of March, the Doctor, in answer to a question from Lord Folkestone, asserted, that he meant the war-taxes to produce 4,500,000*l.* in the first year ending on the 5th of April, and not on the 5th of January, who would not have imagined, that, by the 5th of April, he would have taken care to bring forward a produce to that amount? Who would have thought, that, after having excited too much curiosity on the subject, he would not have been provided for a satisfactory result? Could those who contemned his judgment the most, those who were the most anxious to see him exposed to new shame; could even such persons have hoped, that he would in the latter end of April come lagging out with an account, showing that the war-taxes, those taxes which were to have produced 4,500,000*l.* in January, had, in three months afterwards, produced only 3,700,000*l.*?—The account here referred to shows the amount of the produce of each tax in each quarter. It will be perceived, that the last quarter has been,

as, indeed, it must have been, the most productive ; but, it does, nevertheless, appear, that some of the taxes, some of even these war-taxes, have not only reached their utmost stretch, but are already upon the decline. The war-taxes upon Goods and Shipping, for instance, yielded 377,738*l.* during the quarter which ended on the 5th of January, whereas, during the quarter which ended on the 5th of April, those taxes yielded no more than 258,976*l.* The war-tax on Tea discovers similar symptoms of decline. During the quarter ending in January, it produced 309,622*l.*, but, during the April quarter, it produced only 266,161*l.* It must, indeed, be allowed, that this falling-off in the tax upon goods and shipping may be, in part at least, owing to the circumstance of the winter quarter being unfavourable to the making of shipments ; yet, some part of the decrease must be attributed to a general decline in the export trade. As to Tea, I am less acquainted with the causes that are likely to operate upon a tax thereon imposed ; but, as I find it yielding, even in the first quarter, 215,813*l.* and, as I see it fall off considerably in the third, I must attribute the falling-off to a decrease in the quantity sold and used ; and, indeed, this falling-off was explicitly predicted by an intelligent and sensible correspondent, whose letter will be found in the Register of the 4th of February last, vol. v. p. 135, and the passage I particularly allude to in p. 441. It must be observed, too, that there was a tax upon Tea before ; a permanent tax ; and, that this tax, as well as the war-tax, is now collected. It will, therefore, not be at all surprising, if, before the present year has expired, the prediction of my correspondent should be verified in all its parts, and that both taxes together should not produce so much as was before produced by the old tax alone. —Another view of these war-taxes is this : the Doctor estimated their nett produce at 12,500,000*l.* annually. Let us try this estimate by the nett produce of the quarter which has just been completed, and into which, we may be assured, every attainable shilling was brought. That quarter produced 1,866,647*l.*, which, multiplied by 4, amounts to 7,466,588*l.*, the produce of a year of those taxes, which were said to be taken, by way of “ *superabundant* precaution,” at 12,500,000*l.* In the statement to which I am making these additions, I ventured, before I was in possession of the account now before me, to predict, that the present war-taxes would not yield more than 6,250,000*l.* annually, if all the old taxes remained unrepealed, and all kept up to their produce of 1803. If the whole year of war-taxes produced 6,250,000*l.*, the first quarter would have produced only 1,562,000*l.*, and, we see that it has produced 1,866,000*l.* ; but, has there been no falling-off in the old, or permanent taxes ? Have these taxes kept up to their produce of 1803 ?

SECOND : To the foregoing questions a complete answer is found in a comparison between the nett produce of the old or permanent taxes, during the quarter which ended on the 5th of April last year, and the nett produce of the same taxes during the quarter which ended on the 5th of April this year.*

Nett produce of permanent taxes in the quarter ended	
5th April, 1803.....	£6,261,000
Same taxes quarter ended 5th April, 1804	5,916,000
	£345,000

* This statement is taken from an account now before the House of Commons, dated 17th of this present month of April.

Here we see, that, while the war-taxes have, in the last quarter, yielded 304,000*l.* beyond the fourth part of 6,500,000*l.*, the old taxes have fallen short of their last year's produce, in the corresponding quarter, to the amount of 345,000*l.* So that my prediction of last week will, I think, appear to have been by no means hazardous; and, I also think, that it will not require much exertion to satisfy any reasonable person, that with our present trade, *the sources of taxation are nearly exhausted*, a position which, at every step in our examination of the grounds on which it rests, will appear less and less doubtful. The *whole* of the taxes of last year, though embracing only 1,800,000*l.* of the war-taxes, yielded 32,585,419*l.* 17*s.* 0½*d.*; and, if we suppose, that the *whole* of the taxes will this year produce, in each quarter, as much and no more than they have produced in the first quarter, to wit, 7,783,349*l.* 17*s.* 0¼*d.*, then the whole produce of this year will fall more than a million short of the produce of last year. But, a more conspicuous mode of statement is this: LAST YEAR the taxes, *exclusive* of war-taxes, produced 30,700,000*l.*; THIS YEAR, *including* war-taxes, the produce, if every quarter is like the first quarter, will be 31,100,000*l.* So that, by imposing war-taxes to the amount of 12,500,000*l.*, the Doctor adds me 400,000*l.* to the revenue!!! And *this* is to "convince the enemy that it is *hopeless* for him to contend with our "pecuniary resources!" *This* is to "convince the other powers of "Europe that they may *safely join us in a common cause*, for, that the "resources of this country are such as to give *full security* for the punctual discharge of any engagement it may enter into!" *This* is to "inspire *confidence* at home and *respect* abroad!"—When the Doctor uttered these words, what must he have thought? How completely ignorant he must have been of the whole matter upon which he was talking; or, how far beyond that of ordinary men must have been his contempt for the opinions of mankind! It is not till now that I have waited to point out the falsehood of his statements upon the occasion alluded to. I did it *immediately* after those statements were made; and this fact alone is a sufficient proof of his total want of knowledge and judgment on the subject, or, of his having acted with a deliberate intention to deceive the People, the Parliament, and the King, and thereby to prolong the duration of his power and emoluments; for, to that motive alone an intentional deception can possibly be ascribed, unless we suppose him to entertain the diabolical delight of doing mischief for mischief sake, a disposition, of which, if we look at the thousands and thousands heaped upon his family, we must certainly have the justice to acquit him.

I shall be asked, perhaps, what is the use of exposing these evils and dangers, unless I can point out a remedy? I do not know, that a remedy can be pointed out; but, that is no reason that I should not expose the evil, nor that I should refrain from calling for justice on the heads of those, through whose means that evil has come upon us. Besides, to begin the cure we must get rid of the cause of our malady; that cause is the Doctor: in his hands we have been brought to death's door; and few persons, I hope, will be so unjust as to deny, that I have used my utmost endeavours to remove that cause: few persons, I trust, however they may be prejudiced against me, will regard it as my fault that the country is still subjected to this degrading curse. I repeat, that I do not know that any remedy can be found for the financial evils which the Doctor has brought upon us; but, am I for that reason to abstain from exposing those evils? When a thief has taken a purse and spent it, there is, as to the loss, no remedy; but, is that a reason why the robbery

should not be exposed and the thief punished? This cry for a remedy has stood the Ministers in great stead. "If you do not like what we have done, or are about to do, why do you not point out something better in place of it? Why do you complain of evils unless you are provided with a remedy?" This, in substance, they have said, in Parliament, fifty times, during the present session and the last, and, in two or three instances, they have been supported therein by Mr. Sheridan. That the "men taken from the middling classes of society" should hold such language is natural enough: it comports with their vulgar and grovelling notions, according to which the affairs of a state are reduced to a level with those of a shop; but, for a man like Mr. Sheridan to give into the same strain is scandalous in the extreme.—If there be any remedy for the decline in the revenue, it must be to produce an increase in the quantity of the objects of taxation; for, as to augmenting the rate of the taxes, experience has proved that to be worse than useless. An increase in the quantity of the objects of taxation is to be effected only by an increase of trade; and, an increase of trade is to be effected only by a recovery of our influence in those countries of Europe, with which we formerly carried on an uninterrupted commerce, but which are now under the control of France. We were told, at the time of making the peace, that, in spite of all the restraints which France might, in these unhappy countries, impose upon our trade, that trade would still keep on increasing; that our goods were become necessaries on the Continent, and that they would find their way maugre the malice of our enemies. This was the doctrine of those "*prudent young men*," those "*solid young lords*," those wise, those "*safe politicians*," Lords Hawkesbury and Castlereagh. My answer was: "Yes, in spite of all France can do, the nations of Europe *must*, for some time at least, receive our manufactures; but, every obstacle thrown in their way will surely enhance their price to the consumer, which will as surely diminish the quantity consumed."* And, who will now deny, that the decline in our trade is to be ascribed, in great part, if not almost entirely, to this cause? To a loss of that influence which we formerly possessed on the continent of Europe, and particularly in those countries with which we traded? Whether this influence could now be recovered by *any* ministry, is a question that I am not prepared to answer; but, that it never can be recovered by the Doctor and his colleagues, is, I presume, a position that no one but a Treasury hireling will dispute.

WM. COBBETT.

April 24, 1804.

STATE OF PARTIES.

COALITION.—This is the watch-word of the Ministers: every thing they attempt to say, either by way of attack or defence, begins and ends with this word. Their clamour is so monotonous, so strongly descriptive of despair, and has so regularly increased, both in frequency and loudness, with the increase of their difficulties, that it always calls to my recollection the cries of the American frogs, in that season when the sun is imbibing the water from the ponds. At first you hear only now and then a solitary

* Letters on the Preliminaries of Peace, published in December, 1801, p. 240.

voice of complaint ; but, as the diminution in the vital element becomes more and more visible, the cries increase in number and vehemence ; till, at last, when these sons of spawn, these safe politicians of the meadow, clearly perceive their approaching fate, their dissonance grows so loud and so dismal, that the neighbouring cottagers collect together, and, with one united effort, put an end, at once, to their clamour and their lives. —Far be it from me to justify any act whatever by pleading the example of the present Ministers ; but, when those Ministers are exclaiming against a coalition, or co-operation, between persons who have heretofore differed widely in opinion, it is certainly allowable to inquire how they themselves stand in that respect. On the ministerial bench sits the Doctor, with Mr. Tierney on one side of him and Lord Castlereagh on the other, the former a constant opposer of the late war with France and the latter a constant supporter of it ; the former a constant opposer of the strong measures relative to Ireland and the latter the constant defender, if not the projector, of those measures. When he has reconciled these conflicting elements, then the Doctor has to tell us, how he *himself* can unite with *Lord Castlereagh*, who was the chief instrument in the affair of Catholic emancipation, and who now is acting in the same Ministry with him, the Doctor, who has declared, that he holds his house at the Treasury solely upon the condition of inflexible resistance to the claims of the Catholics ! And, how do Mr. Yorke and Mr. Hobhouse come to go on so harmoniously together ? And Colonel Maitland, too, who steadily opposed the war with France, until he deserted the ranks of Mr. Fox, in order to take a share in conducting that war, with what advantage to the nation let the reader learn from the history of the Saint Domingo campaigns.—And, these are the men who have the confidence to stigmatize as an unprincipled coalition, that co-operation subsisting between Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Windham, who are now not to agree, because they once disagreed ; who are not to coalesce for the purpose of inquiring into the state of the national defence, because they disagreed respecting the French revolution ! A *coalition* is neither more nor less than a joining together, and, in parties, it means a co-operation, an acting together as one party, and, if you will, with a view of becoming a ministry. There are no proofs, that, between the great men just mentioned, such a coalition has taken place : and, I am disposed to believe, that their co-operation has, at present, no other object in view, than that of convincing his Majesty, that his servants do not possess the confidence of the Parliament and the country, and, thereby, to effect the removal of those servants, an object, at all times, strictly constitutional, and, at this moment, peculiarly laudable. Therefore, whatever may have been, or may yet be, the difference in their general political principles and views, or in their particular opinions as to the measures now pursued, or to be pursued, that difference has nothing to do with the immediate object now in pursuit ; for, though their joining together in a cabinet might be impossible, that does not prevent them from agreeing as to the utter inefficiency of the present cabinet. Though we were to grant it to be impossible for Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox amicably to share together the powers of the state, does it follow thence, that each of them would not rather see the other minister than to see the place of minister filled by the Doctor ? —Coalition, unless *inconsistency* accompany it, can never be regarded as a ground of complaint against any set of public men, be they who they may ; and, there can be no inconsistency in Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox now

agreeing as to principles or measures *on which they never disagreed in their lives*. They have disagreed for twenty years : granted, as to most public measures. And, alas ! how often has this been, with all real lovers of the country, a subject of deep regret ! Great, then, would be the inconsistency of such persons, were they to join in the senseless and venomous abuse, now heaped upon these gentlemen merely because they are beginning to agree ! When, indeed, a coalition of persons, or parties, involves an abandonment of principle, and when this abandonment is apparent in some palpable instance of inconsistency, as in the case of Lord Castlereagh, and more conspicuously in that of Mr. Tierney (who assists in imposing an income tax, to the very principle of which he, during his opposition, applied every term descriptive of *public robbery*) ; in such cases, indeed, it is allowable, it is just, to ascribe the coalition to some improper motive. But, can any abandonment of principle, can any mark of inconsistency, be pointed out in the conduct, during the recent debates, of either Mr. Pitt, Mr. Fox, or any member of the Opposition ? Did any one of them defend what he had ever before attacked ? Did any one of them attack what he had ever before defended ? In short, though the members of the Opposition have coalesced as well as the ministers, the former have only agreed to endeavour to carry points as to which they *never disagreed*, while the latter are, in several instances, supporting one another through principles and measures as to which they *have disagreed*. — There is, however, as was observed on a former occasion, one purpose for which the Doctor will allow not only Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt but every other human being, to coalesce, and that is the . . . *support of the Doctor !* Here all his code of political morality gives way. Neither time nor space nor numbers nor principles nor passions form any bar to a coalition for this end. Coalition, when this is its object, is a most laudable thing. “ Come,” says the Doctor, “ let us be unanimous.” Well : there are Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, who have opposed each other for these twenty years past, have united. Is not *that* an important step towards unanimity ? All the talents and public character in the country are uniting. “ Yes,” say the Doctor and his colleagues, “ but that is not what we mean : we mean unanimity *in support of us*, his Majesty’s confidential “ servants.” Such, disguise the sentiment how they will, such is the language of their hearts ; such the modest pretension of the Tierneys, the Addingtons, the Jenkinsons, and the Bragges ! And, to the shame of the country be it acknowledged, that this pretension has been preferred, not only with impunity but with success. Yes, to our deep and indelible disgrace be it acknowledged, that, for three long years, our country has lain prostrate at the feet of this junto of upstarts. — “ Divide and govern ” was the maxim upon which the Devil acted, and, in this respect, at least, the Doctor has followed his example. A development of all the arts he has made use of for the purpose of preventing an union of the opposite parties, all his traits of low-cunning, all his wheedling and canting conversations, messages, and epistles, would be curious in the extreme. He has, however, failed at last : the junction has taken place, and he must fall before it. It is *a year ago this very day* [26th of April], that I took the liberty strenuously to urge an union of the great men of all parties, for the purpose of removing the ministers ; for delivering us from the degrading curse of their power. I have once before quoted the words I then made use of ; but, as this is a time when the tongue of misrepresentation is extremely busy and obtrusive ; as every effort is making by the

Treasury slaves to inculcate the notion of *inconsistency* of conduct in me, and thereby to lessen even the little influence which they are good enough to allow me to possess, I must again beg leave to repeat the passage to which I allude—"To rouse the people from the deadly state of indifference, into which the disgraces of the last eighteen months have plunged them, is or ought to be, now the object of those who wish to save the country; and is this object to be effected by a low selfish juggle, such as I have described?" [The patching up of a ministry between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington, which was then much talked of.] "No, never! And I further believe, that a return of the former ministry, to the exclusion of all other persons, would have no very great good effect. It would, indeed, put a stop to degrading concessions; it would revive confidence in the commercial and monied men; it would restore us to some little degree of consequence abroad; but, *in the hearts of the people*, 'there, where we must live, or have no life, the fountain from which our current runs, or else dries up:' on that most precious, that vital part of the empire, such a change would, I sincerely believe, be very far from producing an effect commensurate with the perils of our situation. To restore this country to her former greatness, to save her from destruction (for she must be great or she must be nothing), the people must be roused from their lethargy, they must be animated, their minds must be filled with high and honourable notions, their danger must be placed fairly before them, and they must be made to resolve, not only on a resistance of that danger, but on a removal of the cause of it. Unless this can be accomplished, the country is doomed to sink, not into poverty, insignificance, and contempt, but into absolute slavery. And this, I think, cannot be accomplished without an administration, which, in presenting something *new* as well as great, shall excite new hopes. The present ministers can be looked upon as nothing more than the dregs of the old administration; the mere return, therefore, of that old administration, *would only tend to revive party animosities*, unaccompanied with any one sentiment favourable to the energy of the government or the salvation of the country. A ministry composed of men of *talents*, and of *great public influence* collected from ALL THE PARTIES *that have hitherto existed*, taking, as the bond of their union, an inflexible determination to resist the aggrandizement of France, and as a proof that they themselves are pledged to a real responsibility, bringing the present ministers to a strict account for their conduct; with an administration so formed, so cemented, and so acting, the people would venture their last shilling and their last drop of blood; but, by any change which shall bear the marks of juggle, of selfishness, of mere love of rule, of rank, or of money, they will remain totally unmoved. They will continue obedient and silent; but it will be a cold grudging obedience, and a sullen silence. Next to a ministry, such as I wish to see, *an OPPOSITION of the same stamp is desirable*. The old ground of warfare between *the great and leading men of the country* NO LONGER EXISTS. Though not in place they are in parliament, and there they *ought to unite* for the purpose of preventing our final destruction. And, why do they not so unite? Why are they *all silent* in their seats, though, out of those seats, every one of them declares, that the present measures directly lead to inevitable ruin? Is it that they are all seeking to gratify their own ambition; and, not being able

“ to agree as to the division of the power each is afraid to stir, lest his
 “ movements should favour the views of his rival? Are they actuated
 “ by motives like this? Is this the tenure on which Mr. Addington
 “ holds his place? Is it thus that they are held in silence and subjec-
 “ tion? that they are become the mere automata, the sport, the mockery
 “ of a man, by whom, while they look on him with ineffable contempt,
 “ they are twirled about on the pivot of their own interests? This were,
 “ indeed, a shame, a disgrace, too great to be endured, and I trust that
 “ the result will contradict the supposition.”—Now, I trust, it will be
 remembered, that this passage was published long *before* there had ap-
 peared the least disposition towards an union between Mr. Fox and Mr.
 Windham; and, even before the declaration of war as to which they so
 widely differed in opinion. But, indeed, as I always thought that the
 country could not be relieved from the disgrace of being ruled by the
 Tierneys and Jenkinsons without a junction of parties, as I was well
 aware of the mighty force, as to numbers, which the Doctor possessed in
 consequence of possessing the command of the Treasury, I always was
 anxious for such a junction, for the purpose of breaking up the present
 ministry, whether the conquerors agreed or not as to the formation of
 another, seeing that it was utterly impossible that a worse could be
 formed. This, it must be allowed, is a subject of some anxiety, because,
 at the present moment, we stand in need of a wise and vigorous adminis-
 tration, and one not very greatly shackled by opposition: but, as to the
 materials, the present opposition could furnish *twenty ministries*, the
 most inefficient of them infinitely more efficient than the Doctor and his
 colleagues. It is a maxim with some of their partisans, that ten or a
 dozen shopkeepers, collected promiscuously in the Strand, would make
 as good a ministry as any other: and really, if the present ministers
 were suffered to remain in power to the end of their lives, or till they
 chose to resign, it would be hard to say, why their successors should not
 be taken from off the shop-board or from behind the counter. There is
 no reason to suppose, that the present junction has at all in view the for-
 mation of a new ministry: there is no appearance of such an object;
 and, if there were such an appearance, we ought to regard it as deceit-
 ful, since the fact has been openly and explicitly denied. The object is
 to remove the present ministry, and to leave it to his Majesty to choose
 another, an object much more consonant to the spirit of the constitution
 than the doctrine now prated by the ministers, who object to being turned
 out, because, as they choose to affect to apprehend, nobody will be found
 to agree in replacing them. In the approaching change, his Majesty
 will be *unshackled* in his choice. He will not have a ministry thrust
 upon him. The persons whom he may be pleased to honour with royal
 favour will be truly *his* ministers, and not the tools, not the “ sitting
 part ” of others, left upon the Treasury Bench merely for the purpose of
 keeping it till their masters chose to return. This, if for no other rea-
 son, would render a change desirable; for, look at the present ministers
 in a party view as long as you please, turn them as often as you will, you
 still find them made up of the dregs of the old ministry, and of de-
 serters from the old Opposition; and yet, these are the men whose parti-
 sans have the assurance to exclaim against coalitions.

“ KING’S FRIENDS.”—This appellation came into use about five-and-
 twenty or thirty years ago, and was then, as it is now, exclusively claimed
 by a set of selfish sycophants, friends to nobody but themselves, and,

while adding to their own riches, caring nothing about the fate of either King or Country. To this sort of "friends" his Majesty then owed the loss of his Colonies, and to the same description of "friends" he now owes the loss of his Electorate: the former drove him from the continent of America, the latter have driven him from the continent of Europe. Much, however, is done by the use of a *name*. The world, in general, are too indolent to inquire as to whether names be justly applied. If Despard had constantly called himself a "king's friend" he would have been regarded as such, without any examination whatever into the justice of his claim.—The appellation of "king's friends" is used out of doors: in the parliament, "his majesty's *confidential servants*" is the phrase, a phrase conveying notions utterly abhorrent to the main principles of the monarchy, and directly leading to consequences not less subversive of the prerogative of the Sovereign than of the liberties of his people. Having assumed the name of "king's friends," or, "*confidential servants*," they leave it to be concluded (not forgetting, however, to lend the aid of some very intelligible hints and insinuations), that all their opponents are king's *enemies*, and that the king has, of course, *no confidence* in them: whence it follows, in due course of reasoning, that the present object of the parliamentary opposition is to force a ministry into power *against the will* of his Majesty, and therein, according to their own expression, "to invade the undoubted prerogative of the crown!"—When the republicans tell us, that, notwithstanding the theoretical parliamentary check, our monarchy is as absolute as any upon earth, we deny the fact, and assert, that the monarchy is really limited by the power of the Parliament, which power is practically and efficiently exercised, when necessary, in opposing the ministers, and thereby producing a change of ministers and of measures. But, if we admit the doctrine of the pretended "king's friends," our republican adversaries certainly have reason and truth on their side; for, according to this doctrine, to make a parliamentary opposition, for the purpose of effecting a change of ministers and of conduct in the executive branch of government, is to "invade the undoubted prerogative of the crown;" and, thus, we are reduced to the necessity, either of allowing the monarchy to be absolute, and the republican sarcasm to be just, or, of contending that the Parliament constantly possesses the power and the right of committing an act very little short of high treason!—Leaving this doctrine to its inevitable fate, let us ask a little: *who* and *what* are these "king's friends;" these servants of his Majesty, who apply to themselves exclusively, the epithet "*confidential*?" The two Addingtons, the Jenkinsons, the Edens, Mr. Hobhouse, Mr. Bragge, Mr. Adams, Colonel Maitland, Mr. Bond, Mr. Golding, Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Yorke, Mr. Perceval, and that famous king's friend Mr. Tierney! And this, then, is the set whom we are to regard as the friends, the first, the leading, the greatest, the most sincere, the *bosom friends* of our Sovereign! Were not this insinuation most daringly slanderous, with respect to his Majesty, we should, indeed, be a people degraded beyond the power of description. But, daringly slanderous it is: his Majesty has no partiality for these men: the far greater part of them were thrust upon him at a moment of great public anxiety and danger, and when there was no time for deliberation or choice: the rest have crept into place singly and imperceptibly: nor has any one of the ministers, or the whole of them together, ever received any *special* mark of the royal confidence. And as to his Ma-

jesty's having, for so long a time, and in spite of all the calamity and disgrace they have brought upon the country, retained these ministers, that can by no means be construed into a mark of his *confiding* either in their talents or integrity; for, *till now*, where did he see a party to take in their stead? Out of the ministry all was division. The men fit to be ministers not only disagreed as to the measures which ought to be pursued; but, they could not agree in openly censuring those which were pursued, though they all disapproved of them. They all agreed as to the utter incapacity of the present ministers; but, till now, a rivalry natural to great minds, a rivalry for power and for fame, would not suffer them to co-operate even so far as to give each other a chance of preference. At last, however, every other consideration has given way to that of the danger of the country: they have, at last, happily united, for the purpose of affording their Sovereign an opportunity of making choice of more able ministers; and, notwithstanding all the insinuations to the contrary, notwithstanding the presumptuous language of those who now pretend to have the exclusive possession of his friendship and confidence, there is every reason to suppose, that, of the millions who will rejoice at their downfall, there is not one to whom that event will give greater pleasure than to his Majesty.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register, May, 1804.*)

From the time that the ministers requested a suspension of the parliamentary discussions; and, indeed, for several days before, some of them appear to have been deeply engaged in an endeavour to prevent the forming, as their successors, a ministry upon a comprehensive plan. The suspension took place on Monday, the 30th ultimo. A communication was made, on the 3rd instant, from his Majesty to Mr. Pitt, by the mouth of Lord Chancellor Eldon, who has been the principal adviser of his Majesty on this important occasion. To Mr. Pitt a tender of his former high situation was made; but, clogged with the conditions, that he should *not revive the Catholic Question*, and that he should *not bring in Mr. Fox*. After some further communications, and several interviews between Mr. Pitt and the Lord Chancellor, an interview took place between his Majesty and Mr. Pitt, on Monday last, the 7th of May, when his Majesty declared his resolution not to admit Mr. Fox into the cabinet. His Majesty had no objection to Earl Spencer, Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, or any of their friends, nor, indeed, to the friends of Mr. Fox specifically; but, to Mr. Fox himself, he declared his unalterable objection.—In this place it is proper to state what was the situation of Mr. Pitt with respect to the parties and persons above spoken of. The public men, not in or acting with the ministry, must be considered as divided into three classes; to wit; FIRST: Mr. Pitt and his friends, amongst whom were, Lords Melville, Harrowby, Mulgrave, and Camden, and in the lower House, the immaculate George Rose and Charles Long. SECOND: the New Opposition, consisting of Lords Fitzwilliam, Carlisle, Spencer, Grenville, Minto, Mr. Windham, Mr. Grenville, and

their friends. **THIRD**: Mr. Fox and his powerful party, the Old Opposition, purged of the Tierneys and the Hobhouses, and upon the point of undergoing the same operation with respect to Messrs. Erskine and Sheridan. A year ago it was perceived, that the reign of the Doctor, the scandalous triumph of imbecility, only existed by the division of these parties. The nation felt this; and all men who loved their country were anxious to see a reconciliation take place, and a co-operation, so far, at least, as was necessary, to obtain for the country an administration, embracing such a weight of talents and character as might excite confidence at home and respect abroad. It was time, too, to put an end to the effect of party animosities which had lived for ten years, and especially as the cause of these animosities had totally ceased to exist. Participating in this the general feeling of the country, the Old and New Oppositions seemed to make some approaches towards each other during the latter part of the last session of Parliament. This inclination gathered strength before Parliament met again; and, to the satisfaction of every one except the ministers and their creatures, the language of Mr. Fox and Mr. Windham soon indicated, that any further attempts to prolong the differences between them would fail of success. Mr. Pitt and his close adherents still kept aloof, till that gentleman himself began to perceive, that those, by whom he had been constantly supported, and whose support was worth having, were daily joining in those opposition divisions, from which he thought proper to keep away. Thus situated, he determined to co-operate with the Old and New Oppositions so far, at least, as was necessary to leave the ministers in a minority; but, without any positive engagement as to the composition of a new ministry, leaving himself at full liberty to act, as to that matter, according to the dictates of his own mind. Between the leaders of the Old and New Oppositions there might be, and it is probable there was, an understanding somewhat more friendly, but certainly no specific agreement. No pledge, or even proposal, as to the acceptance of office, or the division of power, had been made by either party. Amongst *all* the parties, however, the object of turning out the tinman ministry was clearly understood to be that of bringing into power the united talents, character, weight, and influence, of the leading men of both Houses, without any distinction as to party, and certainly without any idea of acting upon a principle of proscription.—Thus the parties stood with respect to each other when the ministers requested a suspension of the parliamentary discussions, and thus they remained till the day, on which Mr. Pitt had the first interview with the King. In a few hours after that interview, he went to Lord Grenville, informed him of the result, and requested him to communicate it to the other leaders of the New Opposition. His Lordship complied with the request, but he, at the same time, observed to Mr. Pitt, that he was certain, that without including Mr. Fox, and without a complete abandonment of the principle of proscription, he was certain that Mr. Pitt must make up his mind to proceed in his arrangements without including therein any of the members of the New Opposition.—It was also communicated to the friends of Mr. Fox, that there was no positive objection to any of them.—in this state of things, Mr. Fox, who, from the very beginning was sincerely desirous of seeing his Majesty surrounded with a strong administration, hastened to express to the members both of the Old and New Opposition, that, he wished them to consult only the good of the

country; to accept office, or not, whichever they thought most likely to effect that object; and, by no means, to act under any restraint on his account; but to consider him, since it was his Majesty's pleasure to object to him, as a person whose exclusion ought to have no influence whatever on their conduct; for, that, at a moment like the present, all personal considerations ought to give way to those immediately connected with the safety of the country. Public-spirited and magnanimous conduct like this would have met with but a very poor return in a decision founded upon the narrow grounds of personal attachment and party engagements. Both the Old and the New Opposition refused to participate in power without him; and this determination arose from a thorough conviction, that at a moment when the perfect union, when the hearty and friendly co-operation of every soul in the kingdom are called for, no salutary purpose could be answered by an administration, which should bear on it the marks of political animosity and proscription.— Thus was Mr. Pitt left to make up a ministry of his own; and thus have the hopes of the public been most cruelly disappointed.—Mr. Pitt's friends contend, that no blame attaches to *him*. Let them take care here; for, "the King can do no wrong;" his Majesty has acted under the *advice* of some one; and, if there be blame, the blame must attach principally to Mr. Pitt. It is said, that he used his utmost endeavours to prevail upon his Majesty to give up his objection with respect to Mr. Fox. It is very unconstitutional, if not seditious, to make assertions of this sort, the object of which is, to turn the public discontent aside from Mr. Pitt, and to direct it against his Majesty. It is next to impossible for us to know whether Mr. Pitt used any endeavours to remove the objection, or not: all that we can know is, that a ministry, upon a principle of proscription, has been formed; and, in whatever degree the forming of such a ministry, at this time, be a blamable act, in that degree is Mr. Pitt blamable, and his having associates in the blame does not in anywise remove it from himself.—Besides, if it be true, that Mr. Pitt was, previous to the interview with the King, informed of his Majesty's objection to Mr. Fox, it is not unreasonable to ask how that interview came to take place, unless it were *for the mere purpose of removing the objection*; for, knowing the objection to exist, he must, as it now appears, even before he went to the King, have determined to form a ministry to the exclusion of Mr. Fox, if the objection was not to be overcome; and, with such a determination in his mind, it is not probable, that his resistance would be remarkably stout. Nay, is it not possible, that he agreed with the Lord Chancellor not to press the admission of Mr. Fox? And does not the whole look very much like an intrigue; a juggle, and that too of not the first character even for a juggle? "No promise was broken, no pledge forfeited," say his friends. Very true. No positive promise, no specific pledge: but, are not the expectations of the public disappointed? Have not the Parliament been duped? Did not Mr. Pitt, when he was aiding in the divisions, well know what were the wishes and expectations of those who divided with him? And will he say, that the divisions would have been what they were, if the House could have foreseen what has now come to pass?—The leaders of the New Opposition, whose conduct is the theme of unbounded applause amongst the people in general, are, by the partisans of Mr. Pitt, blamed, and even abused for refusing to take part in his new administration, which refusal is ascribed to *ambitious and selfish*

views; as if it were likely that they should enjoy a greater share of power and emolument by the admission of Mr. Fox and his friends, than by their exclusion! That the whole undivided malice of the partisans of the new ministry would be, for some time at least, directed against the members of the New Opposition, it was easy to perceive; but, one would hardly have expected to hear their conduct attributed to *selfish* motives: that seems to be the very last construction that a man of common sense would admit it to bear: and, indeed, it would be very difficult to find out any plausible motive other than that which they have, from first to last, professed to have in view; namely, the forming of an administration upon a comprehensive plan, and upon liberal principles. The rancour which the partisans of Mr. Pitt now discover against the New Opposition, arises from their mortification at the refusal of these latter to be included in the new arrangements. This refusal was not expected: a resistance merely to save appearances was all that Mr. Pitt thought that he should have to overcome: he was stung at the rejection of his offer. It is a trite observation, that the last man in the parish who hears of a cuckoldom is the cuckold himself. The same may certainly be said of a declining minister. Mr. Pitt seems never to have imagined that he had sunk in the opinions of men; but, on the contrary, it is not at all improbable, that the flattery, with which his ears have been continually regaled by the military courtiers in the neighbourhood of Dover, might have even exalted him in his own opinion. No wonder, therefore, that he was astounded upon finding that Lord Grenville was not willing to commit to him the keeping of his honour. When he heard Lord Grenville say, that the arrangements must not include him and his friends without Mr. Fox; at that moment it was, that Mr. Pitt learnt, for the first time, that he was become a less man than formerly.—The Lord Chancellor, George Rose, Lord Castlereagh, &c. may hug themselves in the success of their juggle; but, I should imagine, that Mr. Pitt will view the prospect in a different light. One would think, that he must perceive some part, at least, of the dangers that are before him. And yet he has discovered such a want of foresight in other matters, that it is not altogether improbable he may partake in the infatuation; an infatuation which will, most assuredly, not last as many months as he was before years in the administration of public affairs.—Before this sheet comes from the press, it is probable that the new ministry may be formed, or rather, stuck together. The lists that have been published may be the mere creatures of conjecture: and, therefore, it would be useless, in this state of the business, to enter at any length into a particular examination of the constituent parts of the patch-work; but, I do not think it at all hazardous to say, that, if the principal offices of state are to be filled in the manner that has been stated; if the Lord Chancellor is to remain, if Lord Melville is to have the command of our fleets, if Lord Hawkesbury is still to keep the portfolio, if Lord Castlereagh is to have the management of the internal affairs of the kingdom, if Lord Chatham is still to hang upon the Ordnance, if the conducting of the war is to be left to Lord Mulgrave, if the cabinet is to contain nothing but ciphers, Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville excepted, if the Roses and the Longs are again to become predominant, again, like disgorged leeches, to be fastened upon the veins of the country, if this is really to be the case, it is by no means hazardous to say, that, *except as to its origin*, the new ministry will be worse than the last.—It is said that Lord Hawkesbury hesitates. That he demands

time to consider, whether or not he ought to consent to go into a cabinet with Mr. Pitt! This single fact; nay, the very belief that such is the fact, is decisive as to the decline, and the fearful decline, of the character and influence of Mr. Pitt. Only three years ago Lord Hawkesbury would as soon have thought of jumping from the top of St. Paul's as of opposing the wish of Mr. Pitt, even in the most trifling concern; and, what would the latter then have said, if any one had told him, that the time was at hand when he would have to sue for the official aid and parliamentary support of Lord Hawkesbury? No wonder, that, under such circumstances, Mr. Canning should, as is said to be the case, have left town in disgust: no wonder that he should endeavour to avoid the shame, which must, in a greater or less degree, be experienced by every friend and every partisan of Mr. Pitt. The time will come, and *it will not be long in coming*, when Mr. Canning will be utterly astonished that he should ever have thought Mr. Pitt a wise and great man.—The public consequences of the juggle may be unpleasant, at first; but, I am by no means of opinion, that, in the end, the country will have to regret that a ministry including all parties has not been formed, unless, indeed, it could have been formed without Mr. Pitt at the *head* of it. To have seen all the parties broken up, all their leaders, both of the first and second class, ranged under the banners of Mr. Pitt, would, to me, have been a sight the most fearful that could have been conceived; and, if his being *prime minister* was a *sine qua non*, I heartily rejoice that the project of a combined ministry has failed.—“I am for the men who will save the country, be they who they may,” was a sentiment which I heard expressed by a great, a wise, an upright statesman, immediately after the conclusion of the preliminary treaty with France, a sentiment which I most cordially adopted, and under the influence of which I have constantly acted from that moment to this, never having been, as far, at least, as I myself could perceive, in any one instance, seduced therefrom either by prejudice, on the one side, or partiality, on the other.—I was, I believe, the first person, who publicly called for an union, in ministry, of the great men of all parties, as the only means of rescuing the country from its present disgraceful and dangerous state; and, upon an occasion more recent, I have, as the readers of this work will remember, taken some credit to myself for having so stood forward. Those readers will, perhaps, wonder, therefore, when they now perceive me to be amongst those who are the least concerned at the failure of an union between Mr. Pitt and the leading men of the old and new opposition, and even to have entertained some alarm as to the consequences of such an union. But, it is not at the union itself that I should have been alarmed; it is the wrong distribution of power which might have taken place amongst the persons united; it is at the probable and likely predominance of the influence of Mr. Pitt; at the consequent perseverance in all his systems; and, in short, at the sanction which his vicious and debasing principles of policy, foreign and domestic, would have received, and the strength they would have derived, from the joint countenance and responsibility of Mr. Fox, Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, &c. which sanction, if once given, could never have been withdrawn, and which strength, if once communicated, would have given to those principles a degree of malignity, against which all the wisdom of man would never have been able to provide an antidote.—Yes, I sincerely wished for an union of the great men of all parties; but, never have I expressed this wish unac-

accompanied with observations intended to impress the reader with an opinion, that, if Mr. Pitt came into such an union, he must, as a preliminary step, give up, clearly and specifically give up, the principles and system, upon which he has governed this country; and that, even with such a relinquishment, he ought not again to be *prime minister*, though it might be very desirable that he should be a leading member in the cabinet. In order to show that my opinion, in this respect, has not undergone the least change, I could refer to several parts of the *Register*, beginning as far back as the winter of 1802, but I shall not, at present, trouble the reader with any quotation, except from the number of the 17th December last, vol. iv. p. 905, where, after having expressed my dissent from the opinion, "that Mr. Pitt was the *only man* to save the country," I proceeded thus: "Not only do I reject the humiliating notion of this kingdom's containing but *one man*; not only do I believe, that there are many men better calculated for weathering the approaching storm; but, I believe, that this storm never can be weathered with Mr. Pitt at the *helm*. As a *member* of an administration, he might do much; but, as the chief director of it, he is, in my opinion, totally inadequate to the task, at this time. Whenever the return of Mr. Pitt to office has been the subject of remark, I have uniformly given it, as my opinion, that we now stand in need of a system of politics and political economy, very different from that which has been pursued; and it is evident, that such a system would never be introduced by Mr. Pitt, because the introducing of it would be to lay the axe to the root of his own fame. Had Mr. Pitt been again placed at the head of the cabinet" [alluding to the intrigue carried on for that purpose in March and April, 1803], "he would have continued war, or made peace, upon no other principle than that of the price of stocks. He would soon have discovered the *prudence* of making another peace; he would soon have discovered that the main object of the war was again accomplished; again would he have talked of husbanding our resources against another day of trial; and thus would have ended the *second punic war*."—

What he would have done, had he become minister in March, 1803, he would now have done, had he been at the *head* of a powerful cabinet, or, that cabinet must have been broken up.—I have, for my part, long been fully persuaded, that Mr. Pitt is not a person fit to be at the *head* of the affairs of a nation, particularly in times like the present. His system of political economy must be destroyed, or, it must destroy the monarchy; and, such is his pertinacity, with regard to that system, that, it is much to be feared, he would *risk* the monarchy for its sake. How dangerous, then, would it be for such a person to be at the head of the government, to unite under him, and thereby to silence and neutralize at least, all the leaders of all the parties, leaving no one to oppose his projects! I am not supposing, that he would have been able easily to induce his colleagues to adopt every thing that came athwart his mind. They would, doubtless, never have consented to any further alienation of the real property of the Church, much less would they have yielded to the seizure of the tithes, or any such measure; but, for harmony's sake, they would, when once in, have yielded to a great deal; and, I must confess, that I should have been cruelly mortified to see Lord Grenville, Mr. Fox, and Mr. Windham lending their names and countenance to the execution of plans conceived by Lord Carrington or George Rose. In such a state of things the country would have been left without hope. The monarchy

would, in such case, have come to an end in the hands of Mr. Pitt, as the French monarchy did in the hands of Mr. Necker : the former, like the latter, would have presented his "Compte Rendu," and have left it to be settled by the Sovereign People. While there are men of great talents and character in the Opposition, the projects of Mr. Pitt never can be carried to this destructive length.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register, June, 1804.*)

The late divisions in the House of Commons would seem to indicate, that the present ministry stands upon a foundation not much more solid than the last. What the division of this night (Friday) may produce, I know not ; but, it is not expected, that it will discover any symptoms favourable to the minister. Very deep and general discontent at the conduct of Mr. Pitt, in patching up the present ministry, prevails through the country, and is heard amongst all ranks, and all descriptions of persons. His literary partisans, in whom, by-the-bye, he is extremely poor, have tried to its utmost, the cry against *coalitions*, and the *forcing* of ministers upon the king. This trick succeeded to a miracle twenty years ago ; but, tricks of this sort seldom succeed a second time, especially when people have paid so dearly for them. Some faint attempts have been made to conjure up the ghost of jacobinism and again to make Mr. Pitt the Anti-Jacobin hero. If this could be accomplished, then, indeed, were he safe. But, alas ! the materials are wanting : Buonaparte has completely extinguished the principle : and, it would be utterly impossible to make any one man in England, except he be an Anti-Jacobin by trade, listen, for a single moment, to any harangue upon the subject. The "pilot that weathered the storm" is, therefore in a situation entirely new : he can expect no support from the persuasion, which prevailed during the last war, that the duration of his power was identified with the existence of the monarchy. Many persons, very anxious for the welfare of that monarchy, entertain an exactly opposite opinion. He has no resource left. He has nothing new to offer. He has no hope to present to the country. All his showy schemes for the extension of trade, the augmentation of riches, and the discharge of debt, have been tried, and have proved to be bubbles. Men have had time to reflect ; they have traced him through his measures and the consequences of his measures. Those, who are the least capable of inquiry, compare the state of the country, when he took possession of it twenty years ago, with its present state : they know well, without any reasoning upon the subject, they *feel*, that he has had the absolute command of the nation from that day to this ; and they fail not to draw a conclusion by no means advantageous to him, but not, for that reason, the less rational or just. In their comparison they forget not the situation of our constant rival and enemy. They remember the decrepid state of France, they remember the boundaries of her territory and her influence, at the time when all the power of England was lodged in the hands of Mr. Pitt ; and, they cannot help observing the fearful change that has taken place, since he has been the

depository of that power. This is a course of reasoning so natural, that it is, and must be, pursued by every mind. It is not, therefore, to a division in the House of Commons that I look, in order to be able to calculate the duration of Mr. Pitt's power; but, to the steady, the rapidly advancing, and the finally irresistible, effect of public opinion as to the past, aided by the force of the events which will inevitably arise from a perseverance in those systems, upon the success of which Mr. Pitt's reputation was founded, and is yet thought to rest. We do not live in times, when a ministry is to be supported, for any considerable period, by court intrigue, or by party juggle or arrangement. We are going on at present under certain systems, which, independent of all adventitious circumstances, must sink either the minister or the country. As an enemy of these systems, I wish them to die a natural death; because, if they are prematurely cut off by an event, which they can have had no share in producing, both they and their founder may one day revive. By all means, therefore, it is desirable, that Mr. Pitt should meet with no other interruption than that which will naturally arise from an opposition in Parliament and from the effects of his measures out of doors. The cause of interruption, alluded to, and which, on other accounts, every man in the kingdom would join in deploring, must be particularly painful to the members of the opposition, who, in that case, would find themselves somewhat in the situation of the boxer, whose antagonist, when just about to yield, was crushed by the falling of a house, leaving the question of victory undecided.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register*, June, 1804.)

A copy of a letter has appeared in the public prints, the original of which is said to have been sent to Mr. Pitt from Lord Grenville, just after the former had proposed to the latter to make part of his new administration. I heard of this letter while it was in manuscript: it was said that several persons had copies of it; but, as I never saw it, except in print, I, of course, give it as a newspaper publication, believing it however to be authentic. It is as follows:—"I have already apprized you that all the persons, to whom, at your desire, I communicated what passed between us yesterday, agree with me in the decided opinion, that we ought not to engage in the administration which you are now employed in forming.—We should be sincerely sorry if, by declining this proposal, we should appear less desirous than we must always be, of rendering to his Majesty, to the utmost of our power, every service of which he may be graciously pleased to think us capable.—No consideration of personal ease or comfort; no apprehension of responsibility, nor reluctance to meet the real situation into which the country has been brought, have any weight in this decision, nor are we fettered by any engagement on the subject, either expressed or implied; we rest our determination solely on our strong sense of the impropriety of our becoming parties to a system of government which is to be formed at such a moment as the present, on a principle of exclusion.—It is necessary to dwell on the mischiefs which have already resulted from

" placing the great offices of government in weak and incapable hands.
 " We see no hope of any effectual remedy for these mischiefs, but by
 " uniting in the public service ' as large a proportion as possible of the
 " ' weight, talents, and character, to be found in public men of all descrip-
 " ' tions, and without any exception.' This opinion I have already had
 " occasion to express to you in the same words, and we have for some-
 " time past been publicly acting in conformity to it; nor can we, while
 " we remain impressed with that persuasion, concur in defeating an ob-
 " ject for which the circumstances of the present times afford at once so
 " strong an inducement, and so favourable an occasion.—An opportunity
 " now offers, such as this country has seldom seen, for giving to its go-
 " vernment, in a moment of peculiar difficulty, the full benefit of the
 " services of all those, who, by the public voice and sentiment, are judged
 " most capable of contributing to its prosperity and safety. The wishes
 " of the public on this subject are completely in union with its interests;
 " and the advantages, which not this country alone, but all Europe, and
 " the whole civilized world, might derive from the establishment of such
 " an administration, at such a crisis, would probably have exceeded the
 " most sanguine expectations.—We are certainly not ignorant of the dif-
 " ficulties which might have obstructed the final accomplishment of such
 " an object, however earnestly pursued. But when, in the very first in-
 " stance, all trial of it is precluded, and when this denial is made the
 " condition of all subsequent arrangements, we cannot but feel, that there
 " are no motives, of whatever description, which could justify our taking
 " an active part in the establishment of a system so adverse to our de-
 " liberate and declared opinions."—This letter, which is dated 8th of
 May, 1804, contains an explicit declaration of the principles upon which
 Lord Grenville and those in whose name he speaks, proceeded in refus-
 ing to make part of the present ministry. Nothing ever was more true,
 than that the public wishes pointed to an administration upon an extensive
 scale and a solid basis. The people wished for such an administration
 for two reasons, first, they wished to see an end to the political animosi-
 ties engendered by the French revolution, and the mutual recriminations
 and party violences which it had given rise to in this country. They had
 grown weary of the disputes arising from this source. The cause had
 ceased; they wished for the effect also to cease; and they easily per-
 ceived that this wish was to be gratified only by an union of the leading
 men of all parties in one cabinet. But, there was a motive still more
 powerful with them; that is, the safety of themselves and their country.
 They had no confidence in Mr. Addington's administration; and if they
 looked back to Mr. Pitt's, they saw very little to make them wish for its
 return; they by no means desired another war rendering another peace
 of Amiens, another peace of experiment, necessary to afford a respite to
 their country; they dreaded the exclusion of any considerable portion of
 the great talents; they had long seen and lamented the consequence of
 such exclusion; they themselves had buried all political animosities, had
 dropped all party distinctions, had sunk all private and selfish passions in
 pursuit of the safety of their sovereign's crown and their own liberties,
 and they wished, and had a right to expect, that those who were at the
 head of the legislature and the government, would be actuated by senti-
 ments similar to their own; they dreaded the renewal of the parliament-
 ary Trojan war; they cried out to the political leaders: " Unite for the
 " honour and preservation of your country! enfeeble not her arm, tear

" her not to pieces by your dissentions, while she is in hourly expectation
 " of an attack from the most inveterate and powerful enemy that she ever yet
 " knew." Is there any man who will deny, that this was the voice, the un-
 animous voice of the people of England, of every rank and description? The
 voice of sense and reason, of patriotism and loyalty? The next point, there-
 fore, to be settled, is, to what are we to look as the cause of this voice not
 being listened to? And, I scruple not to answer; to the selfish ambition
 of Mr. Pitt, which could not bear a division of ministerial power, and
 which dictated the exclusion of Mr. Fox, because it would have been im-
 possible to have admitted him without yielding to such division. It has
 been stated, that Mr. Pitt exerted his utmost endeavours to prevail on
 his Majesty to admit Mr. Fox; and, that having failed in this point, he
 offered Mr. Fox *carte blanche* as ambassador general to the continent of
 Europe. It being known that the nation wished for an united adminis-
 tration, or in other words, that it wished to see Mr. Fox in the cabinet as
 well as Mr. Pitt, and by no means the latter without the former: this
 being well known, the partisans of the new ministry found it necessary to
 begin their career with the most solemn asseverations that the fault of
 exclusion lay not with Mr. Pitt, who, they said, had " spent three quar-
 " ters of an hour in a most strenuous, though unfortunately useless ef-
 " fort, to overcome his Majesty's objections to Mr. Fox as a cabinet
 " minister." Hence the people were told, in terms by no means equi-
 vocal, that the fault of exclusion lay with the King; that it was not Mr.
 Pitt, but their Sovereign, whom they had to blame for the blasting of
 their hopes, and for the perpetuating of political animosities. This was
 not very decent language, especially from persons who were, at the same
 time, imputing to their opponents a want of respect for the will and plea-
 sure of his Majesty. The cause of the King's resisting the alleged
 strenuous efforts of Mr. Pitt was said (at first in whispers but afterwards
 aloud) to be that great and rooted dislike to Mr. Fox, of which his Ma-
 jesty gave so striking a proof when he caused his name to be erased from
 the list of privy councillors. It is become a fashionable trick to say or
 insinuate that the King has an unconquerable dislike to whomsoever the
 party insinuating wishes to keep out of power. The *Near Observer*, for
 instance, in speaking of Lord Grenville's return to power, says, that,
 " if appearances are not deceitful, there is an obstacle even *higher* than
 Mr. Addington's reluctance." This insinuation Mr. Long resents in a
 very spirited and becoming manner. " I never can endure," says he,
 " to hear the surmise so industriously propagated, and assigned also by
 " the *Near Observer*, as the cause of his Lordship's exclusion, that
 " ' there is an obstacle, if appearances are not deceitful, to the admis-
 " ' sion of Lord Grenville into office, even *higher* than Mr. Addington's
 " ' reluctance.' Indecent insinuation! Whom, I ask, whose talents,
 " whose acquirements, whose services would be advantageous to the
 " state, has the high personage referred to *ever proscribed*? Away then
 " with these shifts and pretences, *the refuge of every minister who*
 " *shrinks from his own responsibility.* It is most *unseemly, as well as*
 " *unconstitutional*, to give out that any thing ungracious can arise in the
 " quarter alluded to: in a quarter to which, from experience, the people of
 " this country look up for every thing which is becoming, just, and ho-
 " nourable; for every thing which is best calculated to promote their
 " interest, their happiness, and their prosperity." Excellent observa-
 tions! But Mr. Long little imagined, that they would apply with still

greater aptness and force to the conduct of a ministry of which Mr. Pitt would be at the head! The insinuation was, indeed, most indecent, and, as appears from the recent offer made to Lord Grenville, it was not more indecent than false; but, neither as to indecency or falsehood does it surpass the insinuation of a similar tendency, which the literary partisans, and, it is to be feared, some of the bosom friends, of Mr. Pitt are now throwing out with regard to Mr. Fox; for, it is a fact, which is well known to those who are much conversant in political and party matters, and which ought now to be made well known to every man in the kingdom, that his Majesty has no personal dislike, that he has no private or public objection to Mr. Fox, much less objections of a nature to outweigh in his gracious and paternal mind every consideration of political harmony and public good; and that, as to the erasing of that gentleman's name from the list of privy councillors, the act, so far from originating in the mind of the King, did not even *originate* in the mind of the minister by whom it was advised, but in that of a person, who, however respectable in point of private character and literary accomplishments, could, in his *official* capacity, be considered as nothing more, and he was at that time nothing more, than a writer of paragraphs for a weekly newspaper called the *Anti-Jacobin*! This person, towards whom I intend not the least disrespect; this person, and this person only (and the matter was never made a secret of) it was, who *started* the idea of cashiering the Duke of Norfolk; and, after the advice had been adopted and acted upon, with respect to the first duke and peer in the realm, the step that was taken with regard to Mr. Fox was a matter of course.* I am not *condemning* either him who gave, or him who adopted the advice and procured his Majesty's assent to act upon it: on the contrary, I, at the time, heartily approved of the erasure, and I am fully persuaded that the gentleman with whom the proposition originated was actuated by no other than public-spirited motives. It was however one of those measures which he, perhaps, would not again recommend, and of which I should not again approve. Hostility was pushed too far on both sides; and this was precisely one of those acts which every generous-minded man wished to see buried in eternal oblivion by that union which was prevented by the selfish and domineering ambition of Mr. Pitt. Of the wisdom or folly, of the justice or injustice, of the measure of which I have been speaking, the reader is not, however, now called upon to give or to form any opinion. The *origin* of that measure is all that he is required to attend to; and, the *fact* relating to it is very important to state, and that too, as I here have stated it, in the most positive terms; because it completely blows into air all the surmises and insinuations, relative to the disposition of his Majesty, that have been founded upon or connected with the circumstance of Mr. Fox's name having been erased from the list of the privy council; and because it no less completely destroys that other ground of

* The Duke of NORFOLK was dismissed from his post of Lord Lieutenant of the West Riding of Yorkshire. The cause of this arose at a dinner, given to celebrate the birth-day of Mr. Fox, when the Duke, it is said, proposed as a toast, "*Our Sovereign, the Majesty of the People.*" See his speech, *Morning Chronicle*, Jan. 25, 1798. Mr. Fox's name was subsequently erased from the Council-book, owing to his conduct at a meeting of the *Whig Club*, in the same year. See his speech, *Morning Post*, May 2, 1798. At this meeting, Mr. Fox is reported as having proposed the toast of "*The Sovereignty of the People of England.*" See, also, Mr. CANNING'S *Anti-Jacobin*, in which these measures of disgrace are recommended and recorded, pp. 94, 97, 201, 209.—ED.

monotonous clamour; to wit, the attempts of Lords Spencer and Grenville and Mr. Windham "to force Mr. Fox upon the King."—Having failed, as they soon perceived they had, in persuading the people, that the fault of exclusion lay with their Sovereign, and that Mr. Pitt almost shed tears of blood to soften the inflexibility of his Majesty's objection to Mr. Fox, the partisans of the new ministry veered short about, and began to accuse Mr. Windham and the Grenvilles, but particularly the latter, with an inconsistency little short of criminal, because they now refused to join in the ministry without the admission of Mr. Fox, a person with whom they had, for so many years, been engaged in a political warfare of the most violent and desperate kind. Nor did the accusation stop here: certain opinions and principles, or assumed opinions and principles of Mr. Fox, were displayed in all their terrors; and, the refractory statesmen were asked, if *this* was the man to whom they were all at once become so much attached. The word *Jacobin* was now and then half articulated; and, in one or two instances, these zealous partisans have gone so far as to call upon the people "to support their tried and faithful pilot, and their good old King, against a faction headed by a person notoriously devoted to disorganizing principles." Any thing at once so base and so preposterous as this never was before committed to the press. There always was amongst the creatures and close adherents of Mr. Pitt, a strange mixture of profligacy and cant: jobbers all the morning and methodists in the afternoon. There was a set that at one time went by the name of "Mr. Pitt's young friends," the least profound of whom would have put the *Tartuffe* to the blush: lads that would literally sing you "a smutty song to a psalm tune." But, to return to the exhortation to the people: The partisans of Mr. Pitt have told the people a hundred times, they have dinned it in their ears till they were tired of the sound, that Mr. Pitt, the person for whom they now demand support as the wisest and most upright statesman: they have told us, they have assured us, with reiterated declarations and almost with oaths, that Mr. Pitt exerted himself to the utmost to prevail on the King to admit Mr. Fox into the cabinet; not being able to succeed with his Majesty, Mr. Pitt did, they next told us, offer to Mr. Fox any post that he might choose in the diplomatic line, proposed to send him to the continent, with power to treat with whomsoever he pleased and upon his own terms: they themselves have, over and over again, expressed their *profound sorrow*, that his Majesty did not yield, upon this head, "to the earnest and sincere prayers of the nation put up by the mouth of Mr. Pitt;" and, now behold, they have the unconscionable assurance to tell us, that Mr. Fox is a man of dangerous principles, and totally unfit to be trusted in the cabinet! If this be so, if this be not an atrocious calumny, how shall we characterize Mr. Pitt? Did he really endeavour to prevail upon the King to admit Mr. Fox? Where then shall we look for his *sagacity*, or his *fidelity*? for, in one of these, if his partisans are not calumniators, he must be shamefully deficient. Will his friends say that he did not endeavour to bring about the admission of Mr. Fox? What then becomes of his *sincerity*? Thus these indiscreet partisans must make a recantation of what they have lately asserted and insinuated, with respect to Mr. Fox, or they leave their political hero a choice of nothing but different sorts of disgrace—It has, by many persons, been regarded as a grand error, in Mr. Pitt, to profess a desire to have Mr. Fox in the cabinet with him, and particularly to rest a defence of his conduct upon the

circumstance of his having earnestly endeavoured to prevail upon the King to receive Mr. Fox. This, say these persons, was doing for his rival what nothing else could have done : not so completely, perhaps : but the truth is, that there remained but little to be done ; the whole nation, as I said before, were heartily tired of the political Trojan war, and deprecated the idea of seeing it renewed. Mr. Pitt knew this ; and, though it is probable, that, with Lord Grenville and the other leaders of the New Opposition along with him, he would have set the public wish at defiance, and would never have pretended that he had urged the admission of Mr. Fox, without those gentlemen such defiance was more than he could, on any account, think it advisable to hazard, especially when he was about to take the government upon him, accompanied with six out of ten of those " weak and inefficient ministers," whom he had so often lashed and ridiculed, and whom he had been greatly instrumental in turning out, from the avowed motive of their being utterly incapable of conducting the affairs of the state ! No : thus to come in, without alleging that he had endeavoured to form a ministry of a different stamp, would have been to deprive his friends of every possible ground whereon to speak in his defence. In this situation, therefore, he was compelled either openly to declare that he despised the opinion and the wishes of the nation, or, to make such a justification as should, at the same time, amount to a solemn and un retractable declaration on his part of Mr Fox's fitness for the ministry. He saw clearly enough that he was cutting off from his partisans a most abundant supply of warlike materials, but he preferred distant defeat to an immediate surrender. Those partisans are, however, of a sort not to be easily disconcerted : they are such as hardly any minister will want, if he can condescend to make use of them. Mr. Addington was honoured with their support : support, indeed, at the expense of his sincerity and veracity, but it was, nevertheless, not rejected. He and his colleagues, for instance, explicitly declared, that they would, as to the cause of their making peace, never be a party to the plea of *pecuniary necessity* ; but, their partisans, out of doors, constantly and unequivocally urged this necessity in reply to all the facts and arguments that you could produce against the measure ; and when they were reminded, that this plea was rejected with disdain by their principals, they smiled in your face, as if it argued great inexperience in you to suppose, that ministers ever were sincere in their public declarations. Exactly the same course is at this moment pursued by the out-door partisans of Mr. Pitt, who have now no scruple to acknowledge their belief, that he never was so weak as to endeavour, *in good earnest*, to induce his Majesty to admit Mr. Fox into the Cabinet ! Can such men be called friends and supporters ? Can a minister, trusting to such support, long maintain his ground ? Assuredly he cannot ; and, if there were wanting indubitable proof of the transitory nature of his power, and of his own consciousness of the fact, he has recently furnished it in the boasting declaration made to the Parliament. " I will take no hint : you may get rid of my bill, but you shall not get rid of me." These words did not proceed from his confidence, but from his fear : they can be compared to nothing but the blustering noise of the plough-boy, as he goes trembling through the Church-yard at midnight. The House and the nation must and will get rid of him as Prime Minister, and in no other respect does any man that I know of wish to get rid of him ; but, since he has again assumed the reins of power, it is for the benefit of the country, that he should continue

to hold them till he is forced to resign them by a fair parliamentary opposition, conveying to his Majesty the deliberate sentiments of his loyal and affectionate people.—I should now make some remarks on several parts of Mr. Pitt's speech of the 18th instant, particularly on what he is reported to have said as to his being the champion of the royal prerogative. The passage relating to the praises formerly bestowed on him by the members of the Grenville family, is also worthy of attention, especially when considered in conjunction with what was said on that subject on a subsequent day. His defence of the character and consistency of his six colleagues who made part of the late "inefficient" ministry, ought not to escape notice; and the sarcastic comparison which he drew between himself and Mr. Addington ought to be so fixed in the memory as never to be forgotten.

AN

ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE VIEW

Of two Pamphlets, lately published, the one entitled "Cursory Remarks upon the State of Parties during the Administration of Mr. Addington, by A NEAR OBSERVER;" and the other entitled, "A Plain Answer to the Misrepresentations and Calumnies contained in the Cursory Remarks of a Near Observer, by A MORE ACCURATE OBSERVER."

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.]—The following articles make a tract of considerable length. But we deem them well worthy of the space they must occupy; because they are full of historical matter, and throw much light on the politics and the spirit of parties during the time when they were written. We have been obliged to recur to a date (Dec. 1803) beyond which we had already advanced, in order to collect these articles and make them consecutive.

MERELY as literary performances, these pamphlets are by no means entitled to particular attention; but, as developing the party views of the late and of the present minister, as discovering some of those secret wheels on which the interests and honour of the nation are made to turn, they are of great public importance. Such being their nature and use, it is evident, that some explanation as to their *origin* ought to precede an examination of the facts and arguments advanced in them.

That the Cursory Remarks could not be written without information, received, either directly or indirectly, from Mr. Addington, is pretty certain; because they state the very words of conversations, which took place between Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt only. The author of this pamphlet is a Mr. Bentley; or, at least, the proof sheets were carried from the bookseller's to Mr. Bentley, by whom, after their being corrected, they were sent back to the bookseller's. It is said, that Mr. Serjeant, one of the Secretaries of the Treasury, carried the materials from the minister to Mr. Bentley: for the truth of this fact, I will not answer: indeed I know nothing at all about it; but, I do know, that, on the 15th of October last, the Treasury had purchased seven hundred and fifty copies of the work, five hundred of which were cut close to the print, in

order to render them more convenient for conveyance by post. These facts make Mr. Addington a party to the Cursory Remarks: they do, indeed, make him answerable for every word of that pamphlet, as fully, to all intents and purposes, as if he himself had been the author, with his name inserted in the title-page.—The Plain Answer, as evidently, comes, if not from under the hand, at least, from under the eye, of Mr. Pitt. It is generally attributed to Mr. Long; but some persons give it to a Mr. Hunter, a relation of Lord Mulgrave's. For my own part, I believe it to be Mr. Long's; but, this is a matter of little consequence, seeing that it is next to impossible, that it should have been written, without the consent, and even without the aid, of Mr. Pitt.—Here, then, these two gentlemen are fairly before the public: Mr. Addington the accuser of Mr. Pitt, who appears as the defender of himself, and, in his turn, the accuser of Mr. Addington. To assist the public in making a just decision between them is my principal object, in the course of this view, and to that I should solely have confined myself, had they not introduced other political characters, with respect to whom it will be necessary to make some few remarks.

The grounds of the attack, made by the Near Observer, "on Mr. Pitt, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Windham," are thus stated, by the Accurate Observer:—

"The time, the manner, and the occasion, of their quitting their official situations; the promise given and withdrawn, of 'constant, active, and zealous support; the circumstances of the negotiation for the return of Mr. Pitt to office; and the general conduct of these persons in Parliament.'"

But these grounds are not fairly stated. The Near Observer does, indeed, attack all three of these gentlemen on the ground of their quitting office, and on that of their parliamentary conduct since; but Lord Grenville is not implicated in the charge relative to the negotiation for Mr. Pitt's return to office, and Mr. Windham is included, neither in that charge, nor in the charge of having given a promise of "constant, active, and zealous support," or, of support of any kind. We shall, however, as we proceed, observe many instances, in which this more Accurate Observer is extremely anxious to place Mr. Pitt in company, wherever he finds that gentleman in circumstances which show him to the least advantage; and, to this anxiety alone must be ascribed his including under one head, the conduct in Parliament of Mr. Pitt, and that of Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham. A more fair, clear, and natural division of the subject would, I think, have been that which I here propose to pursue; to wit: I. The time, the manner, and the occasion, of the late ministry quitting their official situations.* II. The promise, said to have been made by Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, to give to Mr. Addington their constant, active, and zealous support. III. The circumstances of the negotiation for the return of Mr. Pitt to office. IV. The conduct of the New Opposition in Parliament. V. Mr. Pitt's conduct in Parliament, since his retiring from office.

I. *The time, the manner, and the occasion, of the late ministry quitting their official situations.*

On this topic, the Near Observer states, that, at the time when the late ministry quitted his Majesty's council, the nation was fatigued and

* This was the Ministry of Mr. PITT, who quitted office in March, 1801, and was succeeded by Mr. ADDINGTON.—ED.

discouraged by the length and events of the war, and was deserted by every useful ally; that France had subdued the whole of the Continent of Europe, except Austria, Prussia, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, the three latter of which powers were arming against our maritime rights, and calling on us to wage a new war, while the attitude of our old enemy became every day more formidable to us, even upon our own shores; that the artifices of party, and the unhappy success of so many expensive expeditions, had entirely indisposed the country towards offensive operations, and that the mistakes and misfortunes in several instances, but particularly in that of the annulling of the treaty of El-Arich, had caused the highest distrust and dissatisfaction as to the conduct of the war, and the capacity of the persons entrusted with it; that an expedition was, indeed, prepared for retrieving our error in Egypt, and a fleet to assist our negotiations with the Northern Powers, but that no ministers could have been sanguine enough to expect their success, because that a British fleet had once before been sent to Copenhagen to *embolden* Lord Whitworth to sign a treaty of adjournment, at the expense of some implied and virtual concessions, which, in happier times, could never have been extorted from a British Cabinet, and because, as to Egypt, though it pleased Providence to bless his Majesty's arms with glorious success, it is impossible to deny the total incompetency of that expedition to its object, or to think that it deserved, or could have been crowned with victory according to human computation and probability.

"In this complicated predicament," says he, "of evil and despondency, with every part of Europe hostile to our interests, and preparing to annoy us; without a distinct end or remaining object in the war; our expeditions hopeless: our enemy flushed with insolence and success, and galled by recent insult and repulse; what hope or faint speculation of peace remained, what part of our affairs appeared irretrievable? I appeal to the memory of all the country; who am myself a witness of its situation and despair!"

On the indisposition of his Majesty the Near Observer dwells with peculiar emphasis, and expresses himself in language which one cannot help lamenting to see employed for a purpose such as that which he evidently has in view.

"I throw a veil," says he, "over the malady of our beloved Sovereign, who never gave pain to his subjects, but when they trembled for his life. But the future historian of this eventful era will make it his care to dwell upon a calamity, which heightened every terror in our circumstances, and more than redoubled every other calamity. It was *at such a moment*, that his Majesty's late ministers thought proper to retire from his service!"

The conclusion which he draws, or rather, which he says the world has drawn, from these assumed facts, is, that the late ministers, in resigning the reins of government, were actuated by "*despondency and apprehension*," and not by those considerations of duty and of honour, which, as they alleged, compelled them to resign, unless they could carry into effect the measure, which they had in view relative to the Catholics of Ireland, a conclusion which he, in several parts of his work, attempts to strengthen by insinuating, and sometimes asserting, that their resignation is, to this hour, "unaccounted for and unaccountable."

In his answer as to this point, the Accurate Observer begins by stating, that, as far as was consistent with their duty to their Sovereign, the late ministers did not hesitate to acquaint the public with the motives which had induced them to relinquish their situations:—

"Feeling," they said, "an incumbent duty upon them to propose a measure, on

“the part of government, which they thought of great public importance, and meeting with circumstances, which rendered it impossible for them to propose it, as a measure of government, they felt it equally inconsistent with their duty and their honour, any longer to remain a part of that government.”

This was the explanation, which, in substance, they gave repeatedly, both in and out of Parliament. Since, however, so much stress has been laid on the “*mysteriousness*” of the resignation, I think it right to insert here, at full length, the declarations, made, at the time, by Lords Grenville and Spencer, and by Mr. Pitt, the only persons, belonging to the late ministry, who, as far as I recollect, spoke in Parliament upon the subject.

LORD GRENVILLE said :—

“A painful duty yet remains for me to fulfil—to speak of myself. From this I will not shrink, as a due regard to my own character, as well as becoming respect to your lordships, call upon me to proceed. Some time ago, my lords, the noble lord who now sits near me (Lord Spencer), another noble lord who is not now present, but whose absence is only occasioned by severe indisposition (Lord Chatham), together with myself, and several of his Majesty’s servants in the House of Commons, thought it expedient that the benefits of the union should be rendered as great and as extensive as possible, by certain disabilities being removed, under which a great portion of the inhabitants of Ireland now labour. Imagining that this measure could alone be effectual if coming from the executive government, we felt it our duty to propose it to those who direct his Majesty’s councils. It was not deemed eligible, and we were unable to prevail. Our opinion of its policy remained unaltered, still thinking that that, and that alone, could establish the tranquillity and prosperity of the empire on a permanent basis, we considered ourselves as bound to retire. Accordingly, we tendered to his Majesty the resignation of our several employments, and he has been graciously pleased to dispense with our services. Thus, my lords, we only hold our offices till our successors are appointed.”*

“EARL SPENCER complained of the invidious and unfair constructions put upon the motives which had induced his noble friend near him, himself, and others of his Majesty’s late ministers, to think that it became them to resign their offices, and to feel that they could no longer serve their Sovereign and the State with advantage to the country, and honour to themselves. They had fully explained that they thought the fit opportunity offered for taking a particular measure, likely essentially to promote the combined interest of the United Kingdom. They found they could not be enabled to carry that measure, and therefore they begged his Majesty to accept their resignations. What there was of mystery in this, or what was believed, he was at a loss to imagine.”†

“MR. PITT begged the indulgence of the House for a few words, as much of what had been said seemed to be pointed personally at himself. He alluded to the insinuations of an honourable gentleman (Mr. Nicholls), respecting the Catholic question, which insinuations, he must assert, were wholly unfounded—on that point he earnestly wished not to be misunderstood. It was not very probable that he should have encouraged the proposition of any rumours prejudicial to his Sovereign’s fame, who through a long course of public life had uniformly experienced the gracious regard and indulgence of that Sovereign, for which he felt bound to him by every tie of duty, gratitude, and affection.—The rumours, indeed, which have been spread abroad, were so far founded, that it was upon account of the turn which the Catholic question took, the success of which he had conceived to be essentially necessary to the strength, prosperity and unanimity of the United Kingdoms, that he felt himself bound, in conscience and in honour, to give in his resignation. This much he would not hesitate to explain as to the motive of his resignation; but he trusted it must be looked upon as a new doctrine to assert that a minister was obliged to assign every motive which might influence his resignation. He must venture to believe that it never before was imputed as a crime to relinquish a high and honourable situation, which it was the ambition of his life and the passion of

* Speech, 10th Feb. 1801.

† Speech, 20th March, 1801.

“ his heart to continue to fill, as long as his exertions could contribute to the welfare of his country, because he felt that a further continuance in that situation had become incompatible with that conduct which the dictates of his honour and of his conscience prescribed. He would only add, that as to the merits of the Catholic question, and the propriety of the sentiments which he entertained respecting it, he would now say nothing more; he would rather leave the part he embraced in it to the more enlightened judgment of the country, and to the impartial decision of posterity. The early discussion and decision of that question he thought were incumbent upon those who, under the circumstances of the union, which they were so auspicious to effectuate, considered it as a measure of the utmost importance to the strength and tranquillity of the Empire. So strong was his conviction of the propriety and necessity of that measure, that he could not continue to remain a member of that government which deemed it inexpedient to entertain it. Whatever his future opinion and conduct should be respecting that question, when he no longer acted as part of the administration, that opinion and conduct, should be regulated by what had uniformly guided the tenour of his public life; first to take a cool, deliberate and conscientious view of the subject, and then adopt that decision which to him should appear best calculated to promote the strength, the unanimity, and the general welfare and prosperity of the empire.” *

What further explanation was necessary? What further explanation could be asked, or given? The Accurate Observer, does, however, add, that the question, upon which the ministers resigned, took, in its course, a very different shape from that which it originally bore; and that, had a similar difference of opinion existed, with respect to any *other* question attended by the same circumstances, the result would, in all probability, have been exactly the same. But, what shape the question took is of no importance here. The original cause of the resignation was the difference of opinion as to a measure relative to the Catholics of Ireland, and that cause was explained as amply, and, perhaps, more so, than the public had any right to expect. Indeed, who is there that recollects the publications of that day; who that recollects the controversy which was, for months, carried on, both in pamphlets and newspapers, upon the question on which the ministers resigned; who, when reminded of this controversy, can, without an abandonment of all pretensions to sincerity, affect to entertain a *doubt* as to the real cause of that resignation? What, then, must we think of the man, who, not only pretends to doubt on the subject, but who is indefatigable in his efforts to inculcate a belief, that the resignation arose from other, and most dishonourable motives? But, supposing, for a moment, that the Near Observer really entertained doubts, Mr. Addington could entertain none; he well knew, that he owed his elevation to his readiness to oppose the claims of the Catholics, and he well knows, that that is now the basis of his power: † what, therefore, shall be thought of him, who, under such circumstances, has lent his

* Speech, 16th Feb. 1801.

† A history of the Irish rebellion, lately published under the patronage of government, contains, amongst other things, the expression of an opinion, that the measure, commonly called Catholic Emancipation, ought to be adopted, and that it, or something like it, is absolutely necessary to the tranquillity of Ireland. It is confidently asserted, and I believe it to be true, that Mr. Addington, having discovered that he has given the patronage of the ministry to a work, the principles of which are directly contrary to those of that ministry, has lately had the author before him, at the Treasury, and has accused him of deception, observing, that he, Mr. Addington, “ came into power for the express purpose of preventing principles like those of the author from being acted on; and that he now held his place upon that tenure.” — If ministers cannot read themselves, they should employ somebody to read for them,

authority, the authority of his office, and the weight of government, for the purpose of circulating the hypocritical doubts, and base insinuations of the *Near Observer*?—Having stated the real cause of the resignation of the late ministers, it was unnecessary to say more upon the subject; but, the *Accurate Observer* has thought proper to show the absurdity of imputing to Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, motives of “despondency and apprehension,” and also, to contrast the reality with the false picture, which the *Near Observer* has drawn from the state of the country, in 1801.

“What?” says he; “is it probable, that ministers, who had seen jacobin principles gaining daily strength in Britain, Ireland in open rebellion, the fleet in a state of mutiny, the bank supposed to be insolvent, the kingdom threatened with famine, and a people murmuring against the load of taxes, and the war by which they were occasioned? Is it probable that ministers, whom these evils could not appal, should have yielded to feelings of despair, and begun to be apprehensive of our danger, at the moment when the malignant principles of jacobinism had been almost eradicated from the country which gave them birth; when they had accomplished a measure which they considered as the best hope of the future tranquillity of Ireland; when our fleets were triumphing in every part of the world (and at that instant preparing a dreadful stroke for a new foe); when public credit was completely restored, and the nation reconciled to the exertions, which the state of Europe called for at their hands.”

To which he might have added, and, though last, certainly not least, “when the price of provisions began to diminish, and when people were no longer apprehensive of famine.” In pursuing his remarks as to the *period* when the late ministers quitted their stations, he does not object to the accuracy of the statement, which his adversary has made as to the abject situation of the continent of Europe; but he very naturally expresses his surprise, that “a zealous partisan of a ministry, who had given their *sanction* to the subjugation of half of the continent, and to the absorption of the remainder in the enormous power of France, should love to dwell on those unfortunate events, and to adduce, as an instance of the *desperate* situation of the country under the late administration, a state of things which the present ‘successful, fortunate, vigorous, and prudent administration,’ have solemnly ratified or tacitly consented to!”—He denies that the war was become unpopular, and cites the Journals of Parliament in proof of its being less unpopular in 1801, than in 1795, 1796, and 1797.—As to the marks of incapacity in the persons entrusted with the war, which marks, the *Near Observer* says, the public had discovered in the history of the treaty of El-Arich, and in the convention of adjournment, signed by Lord Whitworth at Copenhagen, the *Accurate Observer*, after giving the true history of the treaty of El-Arich,* proceeds: “but if, indeed, the expe-

* On the 15th of December, 1799, the British government having reason to believe, that proposals would be made for the evacuation of Egypt by the French troops, upon condition of being suffered to return unmolested to France, sent instructions to Lord Keith not to consent to any such convention. The bad faith with which such engagements had been kept by the French government, and the danger which would arise at that particular period, from the return to Europe of so large a force, appear to be the motives which governed the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, in giving those orders. As soon as they learnt that, before the receipt of these orders, Sir Sidney Smith had concluded a convention, upon the terms of the return of the French troops to their own country, although without any stipulation to prevent their serving immediately in Europe, the British government sent orders to the Admiral not to obstruct the execution of this treaty.—Before these second orders reached Lord Keith, he had, according to his in-

dition prepared for the recovery of Egypt was incompetent to the object, if his Majesty's late ministers have no claim to the merit of that most happy and stupendous service,' I would ask, upon what are founded the pretensions of the present administration to it? Is it that the principal battle which was fought in the campaign, and which may be said to have decided the fate of Egypt, took place upon the very day that Mr. Addington became the First Lord of the Treasury? or that Lord Hobart opened the dispatches addressed to Mr. Dundas, giving an account of that glorious event?"—The treaty of adjournment, as it is called by the *Near Observer*, is thus defended by his adversary: "By the Preliminary Convention of the 29th of August, 1800, it was stipulated, that his Danish Majesty should *suspend his convoys*, until the conclusion of a definitive treaty. If, therefore, there was any extortion in this transaction, it consisted in our obliging our adversary, as a preliminary, to give up the object in dispute, until we should be enabled, with greater means in our hands, to treat with him for the final acquiescence in our demands." And, as to the inadequacy of the expedition under Admiral Parker, "the circumstance of its object being accomplished, with respect to one power, at the very sight of the British fleet, and to another, by the operations of a *detachment* from it, is not very favourable to the opinion that our author thinks it 'were unjust to dissemble.'"—Here the *Accurate Observer* is triumphant, and here, as a friend and defender of Mr. Pitt, he should certainly have stopped; but, not content with ascribing the victory of Copenhagen, the victory, by which, to borrow the words of his opponent, "the rostral column of our naval enterprise had been crowned;" not content with giving this great and deserved merit to the expedition, he unfortunately adds, that it "led to the convention, upon which the present ministers rest so much of their claim to applause;" but, says he, "whether, by this convention they obtained for the country all that we had a right to expect, is a question upon which *great difference of opinion exists*, but which it is now unnecessary to discuss."—Between those who think that our maritime rights, as formerly enjoyed, were not worth preserving, and those who think they were, great difference of opinion, as to this question, does certainly exist; but, though this difference exists between Lords Grenville and Hawkesbury, there is no such difference between Mr. Pitt and Lord Hawkesbury; for, as the advocate of the right honourable gentleman ought to have well remembered, Mr. Pitt gave to the convention of St. Petersburg an approbation as unequivocal and as strong as words could possibly express. "I shall not now," said he, "enter at large on the subject of the pacification with the Northern Powers, nor on that of the preliminaries of Peace with France; but they both have my *cordial approbation*. I behold them with the most *exalted satisfaction*; and, to whatever inferior criticisms either of them

structions, notified his former orders to the French General, the consequence of which was, the immediate renewal of hostilities. What then is meant by the violation of the treaty of El Arich? the whole responsibility to which the late ministers are subjected by this transaction, depends upon the policy of giving the orders of 15th of December, 1799. In discussing this question we must remember, that at this time the chief hope of the war rested upon the events of the continental campaign, which, in the quarter that would in all probability have been principally affected by the return of the French troops, was terminated in favour of the enemy, by a hard-fought battle, and which, at one period, was even considered as gained by our allies.

“ may be liable, I think, that, on the whole, they afford matter of great joy and exultation to the country, and entitle the government to its warmest approbation and *most grateful thanks.*” This declaration, which was made in Parliament, on the 29th of October 1801, for ever closes the lips of Mr. Pitt with respect to the convention with the Northern Powers; and, therefore, the insinuation thrown out, on this subject, by his defender, is not much less unfair than any of the numerous arts resorted to by his assailant.—The last point to be considered under this head, is, the charge against the late ministers for resigning their offices at the time of his Majesty’s illness. On this circumstance the Near Observer dwells with peculiar delight and self-gratulation. At “ such a moment,” says he, after describing his Majesty as “ indisposed and incapable of administering the affairs of his government;” at “ such a moment, his Majesty’s late ministers thought proper to retire from his service.” In answer to which the Accurate Observer states the well-known fact, that “ the ministers laid their offices at his Majesty’s feet, days and weeks *previous* to this most alarming and distressing event.” Indeed, there is no person, at all acquainted with the circumstances of the resignation, who must not well remember this fact; and, therefore, the Near Observer could have had in view to deceive the ignorant only. The basest of all calumny is that which relies for its success on the vices or the ignorance of those on whom it is intended to operate.—In this part of the discussion the Accurate Observer introduces a fact, with which I was before totally unacquainted, and which, I think, he would have done well to keep out of sight. By stating the simple truth, as to the *time* when the late ministers tendered their resignations, he had fully convicted his adversary of falsehood; of a gross ignorance of facts, or of wilful and base calumny; but, his zeal for Mr. Pitt would not suffer him to stop here, leaving that gentleman merely defended from the charge preferred against him, in that respect, upon no more than a *footing* with his late colleagues. This was not sufficient for the Accurate Observer, who uniformly seeks to confound Mr. Pitt with those colleagues, when his defence is weak, and to separate him from them, when he imagines it strong, or when he has any great virtue or the merit of any great measure to bestow. In yielding to this propensity, he has, in the present instance, endeavoured, with much more zeal than judgment, to give to the Right Hon. Gent. a trait of magnanimity not observable in the conduct of his colleagues. He says: “ But, my observation, which is not very distant, has deceived me much, if Mr. Pitt, *at the time of doing so*” [the time when he first tendered his resignation], “ did not make a distant offer, to retain *his* situation, until the war should be concluded, and the country relieved from its most pressing difficulties.”—This is strange, very strange, indeed! Strange, in any light, but particularly strange as a trait of *magnanimity*! The *end of the war*, indeed, was something definitive, but, till the country should be “ *relieved from its most pressing difficulties,*” was no period at all, it was what would never have an end. The question, then, comes: what reason was there that could induce Mr. Pitt to remain alone, which would not also have induced his colleagues to remain? If they and he retired, because they were bound “ *in honour and in duty*” so to do, when they could not propose the measure of Catholic Emancipation, how could he alone have remained, consistently with that honour and that duty? But, his advocate tells us, that to *his* remaining was attached the

condition, "that no attempt should be made, in the mean time, to "prejudge the important question, the difference on which had led to "his resignation." This is a very poor palliative; for, if the question could be adjourned, till after the end of the war, or till the farther indefinite period, when the country should be relieved from its most pressing difficulties; if the "important question" could be thus adjourned *sine die*, where are we to look for the "honour and duty," which *compelled* Mr. Pitt to resign, because the King would not allow him to propose that important question to Parliament? Besides, if we allow, that the *condition*, on which Mr. Pitt was willing to remain in office, would have saved *his* consistency, if we allow that *he* would thereby have obeyed the dictates of honour and of duty, the same reasoning will, most assuredly, apply to all his colleagues; and, why did he not, then, propose, that, upon the same condition, the *whole* of them should remain in office? Such a proposal would, indeed, have reduced the late ministry to the situation of first giving in their resignations, because they could not bring forward a question which honour and duty impelled them to bring forward, and then of re-accepting their offices, upon condition that that very same question should *not* be brought forward, till the end of the war, or till the country should be relieved from its most pressing difficulties! From this situation, exquisitely inconsistent and ridiculous as it would have been, Mr. Pitt was, it seems, preserved, by his offer "not being accepted;" and, it is truly surprising, that a pamphlet, written under his own eye,* should have made the confession of his having been thus preserved *against his will*.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register*, December, 1803.)

II. *The promise said to have been made by Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, to give to Mr. Addington their constant, active, and zealous support.*

On this point, the Near Observer states:—

"That the country felt all the hazard and difficulty of their [the new ministers'] situation; and the *courage and self-devotedness*, with which they had succeeded to the posts of danger, were the topics of admiration and applause. But, in obeying the commands of their Sovereign, they had felt and were deeply penetrated with, the impossibility of serving him and their country, in the great necessity of the time, if that vast mass of talents, information, and influence, over which Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville presided, were not only suddenly withdrawn from the support of his Majesty's government, but converted into an opposing, or even a neutral force. Whatever may be the difficulty and the delicacy (for they are extreme) of the point I am treating, I think it indispensable to speak with courage and with perspicuity; and I challenge the illustrious persons I have just named to controvert the fact or the spirit of a statement, which it is important to the present, and to the future ages, to place beyond controversy and dispute. I must take upon me, therefore, to aver, that his Majesty's most gracious offer of his confidence to Mr. Addington, could not have been, and was not definitively accepted, until a solemn authentic pledge of honour had been given by the late ministers, for their 'constant, active,

* Since the former pages of this View were written, I have received what I regard as satisfactory *proof* of Mr. Long being the author of this pamphlet.

“ *and zealous support.*’ I do assert that Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville did sacredly and solemnly enter into this exact engagement, and in this precise form of words. You think with Hamlet, ‘ she promises too much ! Oh ! but she’ll keep her word ! ’ ”

The Accurate Observer, that is to say, the advocate of Mr. Pitt, denies the facts here stated ; but, before we hear him, it seems necessary to make an observation or two on the self-contradiction of the statement of the Near Observer. In order to excite our admiration, or rather, to induce us to believe, that the people were struck with admiration, “ of the *courage and self-devotedness*, with which the new ministers had succeeded to the posts of danger,” he had before drawn a most woeful and disheartening picture of the state of the country in February, 1801, and, amongst all the other alarming circumstances, which he could find, or invent, he had added, that of the King’s indisposition, which has already been proved to have commenced after the late ministers tendered their resignations, and to have terminated before the new ones were actually in place ; so that, as to that point, these *courageous* and *self-devoted* persons, accepted of their places when his Majesty was perfectly well, remained out of them all the time that he was ill, and entered them after his recovery ! But, if we admit the truth of the charge which the Near Observer now urges against the late ministry, and particularly against Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville ; if we admit, that, though it was impossible, that those gentlemen should make a promise of giving uniform, unconditional, and unqualified support to their successors, yet that those successors might so understand them, and place reliance on them accordingly ; if we admit this, which is the least that the Near Observer demands of us, where are we to look for that “ *courage and self-devotedness*, with which,” he tells us, “ the new ministers succeeded to the *posts of danger* ? ” Where, indeed, are we to look for *posts of danger*, in a ministry who expected, and relied upon, the constant, active, and zealous support of “ that vast mass of talents, information, and influence, over which Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville presided ? ”

It will, hereafter, be seen, that this notion of a *pledge*, given on the part of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, appears to have been invented by the Near Observer, for the purpose of rendering odious their parliamentary conduct, subsequent to the time when Lord Grenville commenced a direct opposition, and when Mr. Pitt began to keep aloof from the ministers, showing himself, at last, in a sort of hostile neutrality. The Accurate Observer, therefore, in order to smooth the way for Mr. Pitt’s change of conduct, thus removes the obstacle of a promise of constant, active, and zealous support.

“ Mr. Pitt,” says he, “ undoubtedly, when he retired from office, felt convinced, that under the circumstances of the period, his Majesty had selected for his advisers persons, by whom it was probable, that the government of the country would be wisely and safely administered. He felt them, therefore, entitled to his support, and, as well as Lord Grenville, gave them his assurance of it. To give to any set of men a promise of constant support, *let their conduct be what it would*, is as inconsistent with every idea of public duty, as it certainly is with common sense or common honesty. Neither Mr. Pitt nor Lord Grenville ever gave, nor did Mr. Addington understand, that he had received, such promise. If, therefore, as the Near Observer so pompously avers, the assurance had been couched in the precise words, *constant, active, and zealous support*, it would have needed no sophistry to give to the promise a limitation. But, what is the real fact ? The words, which are quoted by our author, were made use of by Lord Grenville in a *speech* (20th March, 1801) in which he claimed for the new administration the confidence of the country, as consisting of men, who had constantly approved of the principles, upon which he and his colleagues had

“enjoyed the confidence, and received the support of the nation, and who had, both publicly and privately, professed their intention of continuing to act upon the same general system, which had been adopted by their predecessors. *As such*, his lordship said they should have his ‘constant, active, and zealous support.’ With respect to Mr. Pitt, it is not very necessary to inquire what were the particular words in which he conveyed to his successors his assurance of support; but, in this case, as in that of Lord Grenville, there was not only an implied, but an *express* limitation to the promise. And Mr. Addington could tell the *Near Observer*, that out of the *three points* which Mr. Pitt, upon this occasion, selected as essential conditions of his support, *two* are those upon which he has expressed his disapprobation of the measures of the present government.”—

What these *three points* were, the *Accurate Observer* does not tell us, nor is his silence of any importance, except as it is another instance of his desire still to keep up a distinction between Mr. Pitt and every other of his colleagues, Lord Melville excepted; and, it is truly remarkable, that, in both pamphlets, this last mentioned nobleman is introduced as seldom as possible.

The folly of supposing, that any two men whatever, especially two such men as Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, would make a solemn promise of constant and *unconditional* support of a ministry, is too great to be adopted by any one, however ignorant or prejudiced. But, there is positive proof *of the contrary*; for, both of these great persons, did, on every occasion when they spoke of their intention to support the new ministry, expressly state, as the condition of that support, that the new ministers should continue to act *upon the same principles* that had guided the conduct of their predecessors. Whoever will take the trouble to look back to the debates of February and March, 1801, will find, that this was the ground, on which both Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt asked for the support of Parliament in behalf of the new ministers; and that, it was on this very ground, that the new ministers were represented, by the Opposition, as being unworthy of the confidence of Parliament. A quotation or two from the speeches of Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt will place this point beyond all dispute.—“We go out of office with a pledge to support our successors *in pursuing the same measures, which we ourselves adopted and pursued.*”* Mr. Pitt, in defending the new ministers, against an attack of Mr. Grey, said that they were worthy of the confidence of Parliament, because, in them, “the *measures, the system, the principles, which Parliament had so often sanctioned, were to be retained and rigorously pursued.*”† Again, on a subsequent occasion, after the new ministers had actually entered on their offices, Mr. Pitt said:—“What is the complaint [made ‘by Opposition] now? That the persons who claim the support of the House, explicitly profess the *same principles* as those who have so long enjoyed that confidence. All I contend for is,” said he, after describing the new ministry, “that the House is bound by the best principles of policy, as well as by the true spirit of the constitution of this country, to *wait to see the conduct* of the ministers of the crown, before they withdraw their confidence.”‡—Now, unless we believe, that Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt made, and that Mr. Addington relied on, promises, made in private, to support him through thick and thin, while they were, in public, thus carefully qualifying every thing they uttered in

* Lord Grenville's speech, March 20, 1801. See *Morning Chronicle* of the 21st of that month.

† Speech, Feb. 16, 1801.

‡ Speech, March 25, 1801.

the shape of a promise of support ; unless we believe this, we must reject, as the most shameful of misrepresentation, the Near Observer's pompous account of a pledge, given to the present ministers, by Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt, of " constant, active, and zealous support." The Near Observer asserts, however, not only that such assurances *were* given by Lord Grenville to Mr. Addington ; but even that they were given *previous to that gentleman's acceptance of his office*, and were a principal motive for that acceptance ! This is so far from the fact, as to his lordship, that Mr. Addington had actually accepted his office, and signified his acceptance in more than one quarter, *before* Lord Grenville was informed, that such an appointment was even *in the contemplation of any person living !* His lordship can, therefore, have had no share whatever in persuading Mr. Addington to consent to replace Mr. Pitt : a resolution for which, indeed, many people believe, that very little persuasion was necessary. — *After* the formation of the new ministry, Lord Grenville declared publicly, and in Parliament, that he would support the new ministers *so long* as they adhered to the system of their predecessors. This limitation was not *implied*, as the Accurate Observer seems to suppose, but was, to all appearance, studiously, and certainly very distinctly expressed, as we have above seen by a reference to the debates. The Near Observer quotes from those very debates the words which contained the promise of support, but carefully suppresses those which immediately follow, and which contain the condition by which the promise was limited. This condition was *so very distinctly expressed*, that Lord Grenville's declaration, of the system on which he expected the new ministers to act, was more than once referred to at the time in both Houses of Parliament ; and was stated, as has already been shown, by the opposers of the old ministry as a sufficient ground for their withholding their confidence from the new ministry. The fact therefore is proved beyond dispute. And, as this condition was stated in the hearing of the new ministers, they are as much bound by it as if they had themselves expressed it : since, if they meant not to fulfil it, every principle of plain dealing and sincerity required that they should undeceive Lord Grenville, and reject a support publicly proffered on conditions to which they were not willing to agree. — The question, therefore, as to breach of faith, is open to the judgment of the whole world. The new ministers had publicly pledged themselves to the system of their predecessors, Lord Grenville and his colleagues had publicly declared, that they would, *on that condition*, give the new government their support, in such a course of measures as would, in that case, have been entirely consonant to the opinions on which they themselves have uniformly acted, both in and out of office. If the new ministers have performed their part of this contract, the new opposition is guilty of a breach of faith. If, on the contrary, the new ministers have not performed that engagement, on which all the rest was grounded, the breach of faith *rests entirely with them*. The only real question therefore is, have the present ministers, or have they not, departed from the system of their predecessors ? This question is already answered :—1st. By the notoriety of the fact itself ; as to peace, war, neutrality, negotiation, and finance ; in the desertion of allies, the surrender of conquests, the reduction of naval and military force, the abandonment of the Continent, and in one word as to every material question of domestic or foreign policy.—2ndly. By the open and public manner in which the ministers themselves daily boast of that departure, and take merit for it.—

3rdly. By the complacency with which they have always accepted, and even courted, the assistance of those who avowedly give their assistance on no other grounds, but on those of such departure.—And 4thly, By the lavish censures which they themselves now bestow, in all their publications, on the whole and every part of the system of their predecessors, and most of all by the malignant abuse of it, which is contained in the very pamphlet now in question.

It has been before observed, that the notion of a pledge of support was evidently invented by Mr. Addington's partisan, for the purpose of rendering odious the opposition, which, since the preliminaries of peace, has been maintained by Lord Grenville, and in some degree, by Mr. Pitt. But, before we come to the parliamentary conduct of these gentlemen, it is necessary to advert to a transaction of great weight in the present examinations, because to the result of this transaction, the Near Observer attributes, and not without too much appearance of truth, all the coldness and all the hostility, which Mr. Addington has experienced, or is likely to experience, at the hands of Mr. Pitt.

III. *The circumstances of the negotiation for the return of Mr. Pitt to office.*

This is a point of great importance, and, therefore, it will be proper to state, at full length, all that has, on both sides, been said upon the subject.

“So far,” says the Near Observer, “as I have had opportunity to observe, I think I may venture to assert, that the ministers maintained their usual good correspondence, and received the usual confirmations of support and friendship from Mr. Pitt till March last, and some time rather advanced in that month. Upon her Majesty's birth-day, in January, I have heard that some trifling form and solemnity confirmed the bond, and that Mr. Pitt, who dined with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, took occasion to declare, that he would come to town and give government his assistance in Parliament upon the first question of importance, and upon any which they might think required his support; but having been at a distance at that time, and unwilling now to make particular inquiries, I state it only as report. The friendship, however, continued till the period I have assigned. Nor can I state it as having been absolutely retracted or dissolved till about the third week in April, although there remained, in the interval, no appearances of its effect or existence. Very early in this month, it is well known, that a plan was in agitation for the admission of that right honourable gentleman, and some of his friends, into the Cabinet. As far as I have observed, this negotiation *originated with Lord Melville and was conducted by him*; nor do I at all fear being mistaken in stating, that the intentions and conduct of that noble lord were fair, honourable, and impartial. I have great satisfaction in saying so, because I know a contrary opinion prevails, and because a subsequent vote of his lordship's has a tendency to maintain and encourage that opinion. Those persons, however, who had the means of near observation, believed that the noble lord was almost as much hurt and disappointed at the extravagant proposition upon which the negotiation went off, as the ministers themselves were.—The war was now evidently approaching, and besides those personal habits of friendship, which at all times governed the mind of Mr. Addington, the great talents and popularity of Mr. Pitt, amongst the monied persons, must have rendered him a most desirable acquisition to any administration in which he would take a part.—I tread here, and I am very sensible of it, upon tender ground; I feel that I may be uttering things better liked in silence, but not better suppressed; for the public and posterity are interested in the truth, and have a right to know it. That I do not much mislead them, I appeal to Lord Melville himself.—In that negotiation, which his lordship conducted, I think it proper that it should be known, that there was no obstacle upon the part of the ministry to *his lordship's return*, with Mr. Pitt and other of his friends; I do not say upon a footing of equality with Mr. Addington and others of the present administration, but *beyond it*. It is

“proper, that it should be known, that the treaty did not go off (as has been pretended) on account of a want of a message from a quarter too high to be mentioned, a communication which would not have been wanting in due time, if the negotiation could have been brought to an issue upon the terms I have mentioned; but, that it broke off upon the *positive unalterable demand of Mr. Pitt himself, to bring back with him the Lords Grenville and Spencer*, with other noble and honourable persons, who had disapproved of every measure of the government, who were in the habit of personal incivility and disrespect, and who were averse to the whole spirit and principles of the administration.— We here see, that these recommendations, or rather dictates to the Sovereign, with which the session of Parliament opened,* these loud demands for the return of Mr. Pitt to the confidence of his Majesty, have been faithfully and honourably repaid.— Lord Grenville would replace Mr. Pitt in power, and it had been very *ungrateful* if Mr. Pitt had forgotten the obligation. Thus have these illustrious persons maintained unbroken the bands of their political connection, in spite of their difference of opinion upon the greatest political occurrences— and thus has Mr. Addington been deprived of Mr. Pitt’s friendship, notwithstanding every one of his measures has received his support and approbation!”

This is very plainly insinuating, that, from the beginning of the session of Parliament, in the month of November, 1802, there took place an understanding between Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, and, that the latter was to be “repaid” for his call in favour of the former by a place in the Cabinet, as soon as Mr. Pitt himself could obtain an entrance into it; and, though this insinuation is certainly most foul and unjust, yet, I must confess, that I never could reconcile either to reason or policy, the asserting, that Mr. Pitt was the only man capable of saving the country. Lord Grenville’s words were these: “there is but *one man* in the kingdom, to whom every eye is directed, to whom every heart is attached, as *alone* equal to rally the national force, as *alone* equal to weather the storm.” I have no doubt, that his lordship was perfectly sincere and disinterested in the delivery of this opinion; but, as I said then, so I say now, that I have no doubt of his having been greatly deceived. For, not only do I reject the humiliating notion of this kingdom’s containing but *one man*; not only do I believe, that there are many men better calculated for weathering the approaching storm (for it is not yet come); but I believe, that this storm never can be weathered with Mr. Pitt at the *helm*. As a *member* of an administration, he might do much; but as the chief director of it, he is, in my opinion, totally inadequate to the task which, in that situation, he would now have to perform. Whenever the return of Mr. Pitt to office has been the subject of remark, I have uniformly given it as my opinion, that we now stand in need of a system of politics and of political economy, totally new; and, as it is very evident, that such a system would never be introduced by Mr. Pitt, because the introducing of it would be to lay the axe to the root of his own fame, so I must, of course, be persuaded, that he is not the person to be minister in these times. Mr. Pitt, had he been again placed at the head of the Cabinet, would have had constantly in view the preservation of his system of funding, from which neither the stoppage of cash-payments at the Bank nor any other proof of his error would have weaned him. He would have continued war, or made peace, upon no other principle than that of the price of stocks. He was not the first inventor, not the father of the funding system, but that system is his adopted child; every wound

* Alluding to the close of the speech of Lord Grenville of November 23, 1802, and to that of Lord Temple of December 8, 1802. See *Register*, vol. ii. p. 1640 and 1737.

it receives touches him to the heart; his public reputation is interwoven with it; with it, therefore, that reputation must perish, and, to prevent which it is by no means unreasonable to suppose, that he would be inclined to risk much more than the nation ought ever to risk. He would soon have found out the "prudence" of making another peace; he would soon have discovered, that the main object of the war was again accomplished; again would he have talked of "husbanding our resources against another day of trial;" and thus would have ended the *second* punic war.—While, however, I dissent, as to this particular point, from the opinion of Lord Grenville, while I would much rather see his lordship minister than Mr. Pitt, I by no means yield to the insinuation of the *Near Observer*.

In answer to what this writer has asserted on the subject for the negotiation for Mr. Pitt's return to office, the *Accurate Observer* makes the following statement:—

"I now come," says he, "to speak of a transaction, upon which I particularly request the attention of my readers. I know that I tread upon delicate ground, but in treading it I shall not deviate from the path of truth. Upon a question interesting in itself, upon which curiosity had been much excited, and upon which, from the nature of it, little could be publicly known, the *Near Observer* seems to have thought that confident and positive assertion could not fail to make an impression. No species of falsehood is so certain of passing current upon the world, as that which has some degree of truth (however slight) for its foundation; and the misrepresentation of this transaction, however gross, appears to be the misrepresentation of a person who had the means (though certainly little of the inclination) of stating its circumstances with correctness and precision.—It is very far from my intention to set down all the particulars which have come to my knowledge upon this transaction, however well authenticated they may be. Indeed I should not have entered at all upon the subject, if it had not been for the purpose of correcting misstatement, and refuting and exposing calumny. I confine myself therefore within the limits of the *Near Observer's* misrepresentations, premising only that no farther circumstances with which I am acquainted, vary in any degree the general complexion of the transaction. If I have mistaken or misconceived any point, I call upon Mr. Addington, or any of his friends, to correct my error. Towards the end of March, or at the beginning of April, upon the eve of war, after it was distinctly known to Mr. Addington that Mr. Pitt strongly disapproved of some of the leading measures of his government, and after an overture had been made on the part of Mr. Addington, *too foolish, I had almost said, too insulting to be noticed*, a distinct proposition (originating, not, as has been insinuated, with Lord Melville, but *entirely with Mr. Addington himself*) was made to Mr. Pitt, the object of which was his return to the official situation he formerly held in the administration; and, as I understand, the arrangement was to have taken place whenever the negotiation then pending with France should have been brought to a conclusion. It was also signified, that vacancies would be made for the purpose of admitting Lord Melville into the Cabinet, and some other of Mr. Pitt's friends into different official situations. To this proposition Mr. Pitt replied, that he would not enter upon the question of arrangements, until he was distinctly informed by a message from the highest quarter, that his services were thought essential; that if so called upon, in spite of the precarious state of his health, he should not decline the offer of his best advice and assistance; that he was fully aware of the great and increasing difficulties of the country, and that he saw the necessity of a strong, vigorous, and efficient government. That if called upon by his Majesty, he should feel it to be his duty to propose an administration consisting principally of the members of *the present* and of the *late* government; that, in the general arrangement which he should submit for his Majesty's consideration, he should, if they assented, include the Lords Grenville and Spencer, but that he should *press no person whatever* upon his Majesty, only reserving to himself the power of declining the undertaking altogether, if he could not form such a government as would enable him, in his judgment, to conduct the affairs of the nation with a

“ fair probability of success. No *sine qua non* was insisted upon, as the Near Observer alleges, with respect to the admission of Lord Grenville, or of any other person, into the Cabinet. All that Mr. Pitt required was, that he should be at liberty to submit to his Majesty whatever he thought best for his Majesty’s service, unfettered by any previous condition, and he positively declined committing himself upon the question of particular arrangements, until his Majesty’s pleasure had been distinctly signified to him.—Such, I may venture to assert, was the substance and spirit of Mr. Pitt’s conduct through the whole of the transaction. What was that of Mr. Addington? In bringing forward the proposition of which I have spoken, he endeavoured to make it a preliminary, that Lord Grenville should not, in the first instance, be included in any arrangement whatever. On the grounds already stated, Mr. Pitt refused to listen to such an exclusion, or to any other particular stipulation previous to laying his ideas before his Majesty. How far, after knowing Mr. Pitt’s determination upon this point, Mr. Addington, for a time, felt, or expressed a disposition on his part to accede to it, I will not take upon me to assert; but it is, I believe, pretty certain, that after an interval of deliberation, and after consulting with his colleagues, he declared ultimately, that nothing could induce him to afford even the chance of admitting Lord Grenville into the Cabinet, and that this determination would allow of no change. His Majesty of course was not advised to send to Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Addington’s proposition fell to the ground. — If this be a correct statement of this transaction (and if it be not, I again call upon Mr. Addington or any of his friends to contradict any part of it), I ask what ground is there for describing it as a negotiation set on foot by Mr. Pitt for his return to office? What pretence is there for calling it a scramble for place? What foundation for the base insinuation, that to the disappointment occasioned by the failure of this negotiation, not to fair and honest opinion upon public grounds, is to be imputed the disapprobation which Mr. Pitt has at any time shown of any of the measures of the government? Mr. Pitt was invited (without any previous step taken on his part) to a negotiation, the professed object of which was, to place him at the head of the government; instead of impatiently grasping at office, he declined the proposal, because it was coupled with conditions inconsistent with what he felt due to his public situation, and with his views of the public service. With respect to the motives for his subsequent conduct, I have sufficiently answered all unworthy insinuations on that head already, by mentioning a fact which will not be contradicted — that Mr. Addington knew of Mr. Pitt’s decided disapprobation of some of his principal measures, before this overture was made.—Mr. Addington evidently wished for the assistance of Mr. Pitt to strengthen his government, and this desire increased with the difficulty of his situation. It is equally evident, that Mr. Pitt had no inclination, whether from disapprobation of their general measures, from objection to any of the steps taken in the negotiation with France, or from any other cause, to agree to take office merely as an accession to the present administration. Amidst the difficulties with which we are surrounded, many persons may naturally wish, that Mr. Pitt had lent his assistance to the government in any manner in which it would have been received; because the insufficiency of the present administration, in our critical state, is very generally felt, and because Mr. Pitt would have infused energy and vigour into their councils, and would have been a tower of strength to them at this perilous moment. But surely it was for him to appreciate the talents and qualifications of those with whom he was to risk his character, and to consider upon what terms he could return to office, consistently with his own credit and with the public interest. None can question his right to determine upon this point for himself.”

The differences in the two accounts of this curious negotiation, are, 1. The Near Observer states, that the negotiation “ originated with Lord Melville,” and he afterwards terms it, “ a negotiation set on foot by Mr. Pitt for his return to office;” whereas, his opponent declares (and he bids Mr. Addington contradict him if he can), that the negotiation “ originated entirely with Mr. Addington himself.” 2. The partisan of Mr. Addington asserts, that the negotiation broke off “ upon the positive unalterable demand of Mr. Pitt to bring back with him the Lords Grenville

and Spencer," and, it is afterwards stated, that the objection of Mr. Addington went to Lord Grenville alone; but, in contradiction to all this, the partisan of Mr. Pitt asserts, that, though Mr. Pitt did intend "to propose an administration consisting principally of the *present* and of the *late* government; though he did state, that, in the general arrangement, which he should submit for his Majesty's consideration, he should, if they assented, include the Lords Grenville and Spencer;" yet that, "he should *press* no person whatever upon his Majesty, only reserving to himself the power of declining the undertaking altogether;" that "no *sine qua non* was insisted upon, with respect to the admission of Lord Grenville or any other person;" and, that, as to the breaking off of the negotiation, Mr. Addington, after endeavouring to make the exclusion of Lord Grenville a *preliminary condition*, and meeting here with the direct refusal of Mr. Pitt, took some time to consult with his colleagues, and ultimately declared, "that nothing could induce him to afford even the chance of admitting Lord Grenville into the cabinet, and that this determination would allow of no change; and thus Mr. Addington's proposition fell to the ground."

Upon questions where the parties flatly contradict each other, it is impossible to come to a certainly correct decision, unless we are in possession of extraneous evidence. As to the first of these points, it is not only possible, but it really appears very likely, that *both* parties have, according to their best belief, spoken the truth; for, it will be observed, that Lord Melville was the go-between, the coupler, on this occasion; and, who shall tell us, that his lordship's anxiety to produce a junction so desirable, so necessary to the welfare of the nation, and so likely to form an irresistible rampart against the assaults of that "conspiracy for place," which he had discovered in the New Opposition; who shall assure us, that, for the sake of accomplishing objects so near his heart, his lordship did not act a part somewhat like that acted by Claudio and his companions with respect to Benedict and Beatrice. The Near Observer says, that the *negotiation* originated with Lord Melville, and the Accurate Observer says, that the *proposition* originated with Mr. Addington himself: both may be true: Lord Melville might, and I think he did, broach the subject to the minister, without the knowledge of Mr. Pitt, and thereupon Mr. Addington, from motives which are evident enough, made the proposition to which Mr. Pitt was, on certain conditions, willing to accede. If Mr. Addington had not regarded the negotiation as originating with Lord Melville, it is utterly incredible, that he should have countenanced the circulation of a statement to that effect; because, as the point was very material, he must have been certain, that such a statement would be contradicted, and that such contradiction would bring shame and disgrace upon his cause. Mr. Pitt's advocate sees this clearly enough; he perceives, that both accounts are, as far as relates to this point, substantially true; he knows, that Lord Melville was the go-between, and, one would think, that he must know, that his Lordship was the originator of the negotiation which, indeed, he does not deny, but only says, that the *proposition* made to Mr. Pitt originated entirely with Mr. Addington himself; but, he is very careful not to assert, that this proposition was made *by* Mr. Addington *to* Mr. Pitt, or that it was made, either directly or indirectly, *before* Lord Melville opened the subject to Mr. Addington. Such an evasive statement is unworthy of the partisan of Mr. Pitt, especially when its object is to fix the charge of direct and premediated falsehood

on a man, with whom, be he what he may, Mr. Pitt was willing to share the powers of the state.

As to the 2nd point, on which the assertions of these writers are opposed to each other, it does appear, that, Lord Grenville was *mentioned*, at least, by Mr. Pitt, as one of those whom he intended to introduce into the Cabinet. Such introduction was not, the Accurate Observer states, "a *sine qua non*," which I can very well believe, for Mr. Pitt has generally too much prudence to make declarations that have any thing definite in them; but, that, if he took an office himself, he would endeavour to have Lord Grenville with him, there can remain little doubt in the mind of any man, who, for a moment, considers, how desirable, and, indeed, how necessary, it would have been, to break up, or at least, cut asunder, the new opposition, the successful opposers of that peace, which was, at the time the Cabinet negotiation was going on, just about to terminate in a new and most vexatious and distressing war. Whether Lord Grenville would have been led over, in this manner, was another question; and, a question, which, I positively assert, has been safely answered in the negative. Of this, however, the ministers were not certain; and, though the silencing of Lord Grenville, and with him the most formidable part of the opposition in the House of Lords, was an object for which they would, probably, have made almost any sacrifice of national dignity or interest, yet the personal humiliation of themselves, which such a step would have produced, was what they appear to have been resolved never to consent to. Therefore they insisted, as a preliminary, that Lord Grenville should not be brought amongst them; and, as Mr. Pitt would make no stipulations of this sort, previous to his being called upon by the King, the negotiation was put an end to. There does not seem to be any thing in the difference of statement, as to this point, that can be fairly said to fix the charge of falsehood or misrepresentation on the Near Observer, who says, that the negotiation broke off "upon the positive unalterable demand of Mr. Pitt to bring back with him the Lords Grenville and Spencer;" and, his opponent says, that Mr. Pitt, having named the Lords Grenville and Spencer as persons whom he should propose, and having been asked by Mr. Addington to consent to a preliminary stipulation that Lord Grenville should not be brought back, *refused to enter into any stipulation at all*, and that, thereupon, the negotiation was broken off. It may not be rigidly correct to describe this as "a positive and unalterable demand on the part of Mr. Pitt, to bring back the Lords Grenville and Spencer; but, I am satisfied, that not one person out of ten will regard this description as *false*; and, if there has been, or is, any misrepresentation as to the fact, it is really, in my opinion, to be attributed to the *indefinite* manner, in which Mr. Pitt is said to have stated the terms, on which he was ready to make part of the proposed coalition. He did not, says his advocate, make the return of Lord Grenville a *sine qua non*. Why did he not? He would say nothing specifically, as to arrangements, till after he had been called upon to submit his ideas to the King. And why would he not? And, who can blame Mr. Addington for suspecting the worst? All that Mr. Pitt could be brought to say was, that, he should "propose an administration consisting *principally* of the *present* and *late* governments," and all that Mr. Addington could possibly discover, was, that his dear Pylades intended to take the far greater part of his power away from him, without thanking him for it; which intention, especially if the subject were, as it appears to have been, first broached to Mr. Ad-

dington by Lord Melville, was certainly such as no man could have patiently beheld, much less have suffered to be executed, and even have been himself instrumental in executing.

The points in dispute between Messrs. Addington and Pitt are, after all, less interesting to the public than are the facts relative to the disposition of Lords Grenville and Spencer. Both the writers, whose pamphlets it is my object to analyze and compare, have refrained from stating to their readers, whether, or not, these noblemen had consented to be included in the projected new, or, rather, patched-up administration. A stranger to the political history of the time alluded to, would, however, believe that they had so consented; for, to those who see through no other medium than the *Near Observer* and his opponent, the Lords Grenville and Spencer must appear as "lords in waiting," ready to enter any when, any where, any way, and for any purpose, that Messrs. Pitt and Addington might agree upon. The advocate of Mr. Pitt does, indeed, in speaking of these lords, make use of an hypothetical phrase: "*if they assented,*" Mr. Pitt stated, that he should include them. But, every one knows, that such phrases are mere expletives, introduced to give an air of decency to the proposition, in exactly the same way, and for the same purpose, that a minister, in presenting to the Commons a vote of credit, states, that, "*if the house should assent to it,*" the distribution of the money will be made agreeably to the estimate. This phrase, therefore, as applied to the proposal relative to Lords Grenville and Spencer, does not, in reality, express any *doubt* as to the disposition of those noble lords, who are, by these wrangling pamphleteers, represented in a light, which is extremely injurious to the character of these noblemen, especially when they are, by the *Near Observer*, stated to have looked upon a return to office with Mr. Pitt as *repayment* for the call which *they* made in his behalf, at the opening of the session of Parliament, and which call never was, at any time, made by Lord Spencer; and, as it is well known, that Lord Melville was, at one time, *actually taking some steps with a view to his being lodged at the Admiralty*, it is evident, that, *before* the negotiation broke off, Lord Spencer was well known to object to the proposition. But, I think it necessary to state here (and I call upon the partisans of either Mr. Addington or Mr. Pitt to contradict me if they can), *that neither Lord Spencer, nor Lord Grenville, ever, either directly or indirectly, signified his wish, or his consent, to make part of the proposed ministry.*

Why Mr. Pitt should be anxious to have with him the Lords Spencer and Grenville has already been suggested; but it is necessary to take some notice of the reason alleged by his advocate and eulogist, the *Accurate Observer*, that "Mr. Pitt had no inclination, whether from disapprobation of their general measures, or from objection to any of the steps taken in the negotiation with France, to take office merely as an *accession* to the present administration." He never was asked; it is not pretended, on either side, that it ever was proposed to him to take office as an "*accession*" to the present administration. The *Near Observer* declares, that Mr. Pitt, Lord Melville, and several other noble and honourable persons, the friends of Mr. Pitt, were, by Mr. Addington, proposed to be admitted, not upon an equality with himself, but *beyond it*. As this speaks loudly in favour of Mr. Addington, and as it has not been contradicted by Mr. Pitt's partisan, it is but fair to conclude that it is true. Mr. Pitt was never, then, asked to come in as an "*accession.*"

But, the reasons given for his objection so to do, appear to me to be far from satisfactory: these are, "his disapprobation of their *general measures*, and his objection to some of the *steps taken in the negotiation with France*." As it is the talent of Mr. Pitt so it seems to be that of his defender, to wrap himself round in terms which will bear any meaning, or, if necessary, no meaning at all. What is meant by *general measures*? Does this phrase mean measures in general? Or measures of a general nature? Or measures general in their effect? There is no catching him: he slips through your fingers like an eel; and then you stand and stare as I now do, knowing not what to say, or what to think. If, however, by "general measures" are meant, the great measures of the cabinet, such as the convention with the Northern Powers; the Preliminaries of Peace with France; the Definitive Treaty with that power; the great measures of Finance, and particularly the Consolidation of the Funds, which took place in the summer of 1802; if those were the "general measures" of the ministry, then, I say, that, instead of disapprobation, Mr. Pitt had bestowed, on *all* and on *each* of them, his unqualified approbation, sanctioned, in every instance, by a solemn vote! The Accurate Observer does, indeed, speak of Mr. Pitt's "approving of the treaty of Amiens, with all the *qualifications* which accompanied that approval;" and, for a sight of all these qualifications, he refers us to the parliamentary debates of the 3rd of November, 1801, a reference which we shall certainly save ourselves the trouble of making, when we reflect, that the treaty of *Amiens* was not concluded till six months after the date of the said debates. On the *Preliminary Treaty* Mr. Pitt did, indeed, make a very long speech, on the 3rd of November, 1801; and that he qualified his expressions one may, without any reference to the speech, venture to allow; for what expression did he ever utter without an accompanying qualification? But, is it fair to consider as qualified, that approval which is the general tenor of a speech, and which is, at last, confirmed by a vote? Mr. Pitt did declare that the preliminary treaty "afforded matter of *joy* and *evultation* to the country, and entitled "the government [that is the ministers] to its warmest approbation "and most *grateful thanks*." Yet we are now reminded of "all the qualifications which accompanied this approval!" — During all the discussions on the treaty of Amiens Mr. Pitt spoke only three times, once for the purpose of thwarting the new opposition by shortening the duration of the debates;* the second time to interrupt the argument of Mr. Windham by calling him to order in the midst of his speech;† and the third time to oppose an adjournment of the debate, because he was "ready to vote for the amended address, and because he was *perfectly satisfied* with the arguments so ably and *successfully* urged by his "noble friend," Lord Hawkesbury.‡ Where, then, are we to look for "all the qualifications," with which Mr. Pitt gave his approval to the treaty of Amiens? And where, too, are we to look for an apology to the writer, who *now* endeavours to make the world believe in the existence of such qualifications? Yet it is but too true, and it is a fact, which one cannot reflect on without sorrow, that the work of the Accurate Observer, went to the press from beneath the eye, and with the approbation of Mr. Pitt!

Nor will the other ground of Mr. Pitt's reluctance to enter the cabinet as an "accession," be found to be more solid; for though "some of

* See Debates, 3rd May, 1802.

† May 13, 1802.

‡ Ibid.

the steps taken in the negotiation with France," might be unwise enough, what objection could he have to them, which must not, at any rate, have been of weight greatly inferior to the objections, which experience had proved to exist against the general measures of ministers, which measures he had approved of? Why, too, it may be asked, as to all the measures, whether general or particular, to which he objected, did he never come to make his objections in *Parliament*, the only place where he could constitutionally give his advice; the place where *duty* to his constituents and his Sovereign bade him appear, and openly object to that which, in the conduct of ministers, he conscientiously regarded as objectionable? "His health." His health! Oh shame! That health, which would have permitted him to become minister, to attend the House of Commons and to debate five days in the week, besides attending to all his numerous and important duties out of the house; that health would not permit him to come to Parliament *once* to point out the dangers, to which the measures of the ministry were exposing the nation!—But, it seems, "that Mr. Addington knew of Mr. Pitt's decided disapprobation " of some of his principal measures, before this overture" [for a coalition] " was made."—*Mr. Addington knew of it!!* Without stopping, at present, to make an inquiry as to *what principal* measures took place between June, 1802, and March, 1803, we may surely be permitted to ask, *how* Mr. Addington came to know of Mr. Pitt's decided disapprobation of those measures? And whether this assertion does not most fully corroborate the suspicions, which many persons openly professed to entertain, of an improper, and even an unconstitutional, influence, having, for some time, at least, been exercised by the late minister over his successor; and whether, the "decided disapprobation" of the former was not expressed, the moment that the latter ventured to throw aside his leading-strings, and to attempt to support himself by his own strength? This was assuredly the fact; and December, 1802, was the time when the schism, or rather the coolness took place; but, the minister, finding war to be inevitable, "evidently wished," as the Accurate Observer states, "for the assistance of Mr. Pitt to support his government." This wish led to the negotiation of Lord Melville, and that negotiation to the rupture, which put an end, for ever, I hope, to a cabinet influence unchecked by even the appearance of responsibility.—So necessary, however, does the Accurate Observer regard the assistance of Mr. Pitt, in this time of difficulty and danger, that he wishes him to have condescended to enter the cabinet, upon almost any terms; "but," he adds, "it was surely for " him to *appreciate* the *talents* and *qualifications* of those, with whom he " was to *risk* his character. None can question his right to determine " upon this point for himself." Generally speaking this doctrine is perfectly just: in common cases no one would question this right: but, was this a common case? Was it not, in the month of March, 1803, somewhat late for Mr. Pitt to begin to appreciate the talents and qualifications of Mr. Addington, Lord Hawkesbury, and their colleagues? After having lived with the principal persons of them during half his life; after having, at the end of that time, publicly pronounced on them, individually and collectively, as men and as ministers, a lofty and premeditated eulogium; after having claimed and obtained for them the confidence of the Parliament and the country; after all this, it was, methinks, somewhat late to start doubts and objections as to their talents and qualifications, and to entertain fears of what *his character might suffer* in their

company; in the company of men, whom to have "*recommended to his Majesty's councils*" his advocate imputes to him as a merit! A merit, for having placed the power of the state, the honour of the crown, and the happiness of the people, at the mercy of those, with whom he is afraid to "risk" his own individual reputation! A merit for refusing to trust himself in the cabinet with those very men, whom he had introduced, whom he had intruded, whom he had thrust, into the closet of his Sovereign!*

* Since the former part of this appeared, there has been published, in some of the daily prints, a certificate, signed by the bookseller of the CURSORY REMARKS, stating that he has "not disposed of a *single* copy of that work by order, or on account of, *the Treasury*." Now, I ask Mr. Hiley Addington if it was candid to make this poor man sign such a paper? "*The Treasury!*" is it possible, that the "right hon. relation" can hope to ride off upon this? Will the bookseller solemnly declare, that no *civil-spoken gentleman* bought 750 copies of him in one, or, at most, in two bargains? Will he solemnly declare, that two book-binders' boys did not go down to the *General Post-Office*, some time in October last, loaded with *Cursory Remarks*?—The charge is called *libellous*. What! is it libellous to say, that the Treasury purchases pamphlets wholesale, and circulates them through the *General Post-Office*? Perhaps, then, Mr. Hiley Addington would deny that the *Treasury* purchased and circulated the *Vindication of the Convention with Russia*, a pamphlet containing a most false and fulsome eulogium on Lord Hawkesbury? Perhaps he would deny, that Mr. Shury was paid by the *Treasury* for printing the *PILOT*, a work, the stupidity and falsehoods of which soon sent it to the grave, but which, while it existed, was filled, one half with praises of the Addingtons, and the other half with the most loathsome abuse of Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham? Perhaps he would deny, that the *Treasury* had any share in circulating these publications; but I am sure he will not deny, that *he himself*, who was then a *Secretary of the Treasury*, had some hand in it; and, therefore, the evasive certificate, signed by the poor bookseller, will, with the readers of the *Register*, appear as just so much waste paper.—The Treasury not only does, but it *ought* to employ the press; and, the only question, in any case, is, whether it employs it properly, or not; a question, which, in the present instance, I have not agitated, having only stated the *fact*, and that for the purpose, not of reproaching the minister with having availed himself of the advantages of his office to circulate an attack upon his party opponent, but merely for that of throwing light on the subject, in the discussion of which I was engaged. How comes it, then, that my statement of this fact should not be noticed till *now*, it having been first made more than two months ago? And how comes it, too, that *my* statement only should meet with a denial, such as it is, while no notice whatever is taken of a similar statement made by the *Accurate Observer*, at the very outset of his pamphlet, where he not only says, that the *Secretaries of the Treasury* have assisted in the circulation of the *Cursory Remarks*, but that "they lend their name and authority to the principal statements it contains, and express their sense of the propriety of its publication?" The truth is, that Mr. Addington now begins to *feel*, that he cannot, without the support of Mr. Pitt, resist the force, which is, at last, both in and out of Parliament, gathering together against him; and, as he must be aware of the resentment that the *Cursory Remarks* have excited, and, in some degree, justly excited, in the breast of Mr. Pitt, he is anxious to exculpate himself from the imputation of having lent his aid to that publication; and, in this hopeful enterprise, a bookseller has not been thought unworthy of being pressed into the service!

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register, January, 1804.*)

IV. *The conduct of the New Opposition in Parliament.*

With respect to this part of the subject, if the answer had been silent, I should not have thought it necessary to include it in my examination ; for, the remarks, which the Near Observer has made on the parliamentary conduct of those gentlemen, who compose what has been called the New Opposition, always appeared to me to be so weak, and, indeed, so evidently absurd, as not to stand in need of an exposure. But, when a work, written with some talent, and, to all appearance, coming from authority, professes to be *an answer* to another work, it is very natural to conclude, that whatever is left not answered, is unanswerable. Therefore, as the pamphlet of the Accurate Observer is entitled “ A Plain Answer to “ the Misrepresentations and Calumnies of the Cursory Remarks of a “ Near Observer,” the author will, it is reasonable to suppose, be, by his readers in general, regarded as having, to the best of his knowledge and abilities, answered *the whole* of those misrepresentations and calumnies ; and, as he has, in reality, attempted to answer only that part of them which bear upon the character and conduct of his principal ; as this course (a course by no means either generous or just) has been pursued by the partisans of Mr. Pitt, it seems necessary that his omissions should be supplied. Yet, had he observed a strict silence with respect to the members of the New Opposition ; had he excluded their characters and their parliamentary conduct entirely from the discussion, I certainly should not have been the man to drag them into it. But, while he was reminding his adversary, that “ no species of falsehood is so certain of passing current in the world as that which has some degree of truth for its foundation,” he appears not to have forgotten another maxim equally true, that “ no malice is so likely to succeed as that which assumes the garb of friendship.” He has introduced the members of the New Opposition merely as creatures, or things, destined to the uses (sometimes not the most honourable) of Mr. Pitt : here, they serve, like his own Cinque-Port volunteers, to swell out his train, to be “ set up upon a hill to make a show ;” there, he considers them as regulars, and marches them on to meet the enemy : now, they are rolled before him in the capacity of a mantelet to cover his sap ; then, they are piled up into a parapet of sand-bags. Whatever be the character or form, in which they appear, for Mr. Pitt’s purposes, and for those purposes alone, do they seem to be employed ; and, when these purposes do not require that they should be defended, so far is the Accurate Observer from attempting their defence, that he often tacitly admits the justice of the censure, sometimes joins in, and improves upon, the misrepresentations, and, in one or two instances, adds to that calumny, which, agreeably to his professions, it was his duty to endeavour to refute. So that, in this part of my task, I shall have to answer both Mr. BENTLEY and Mr. LONG, who, though they have, like Peachum and Lockit, throttled, and would willingly strangle each other, can so far master their mutual hatred, as to co-operate most cordially against the members of the New Opposition. The Near Observer has

introduced seven of these gentlemen, namely, Lord Temple, Mr. Grenville, Dr. Laurence, Mr. Elliot, Mr. Canning, Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham; only the three latter of whom have been at all noticed by the Accurate Observer. *How* he has noticed them we shall see by-and-by; but, first, it is necessary to speak of those whom he has omitted.

Lord Temple is charged, by the Near Observer, with demanding places for his family: "Lord Temple demands places for his family," (insatiable family!) "and his family insist upon naming the King's ministers."—It was, surely, the duty of a writer, who professed to answer the whole of the *Cursory Remarks*, to contradict this false and malicious assertion; or, if it was regarded as a falsehood too barefaced to merit a serious contradiction, it was his duty to notice it as such, especially as he must have been aware, that the falsehood, though barefaced and base, was by no means one of those which the Addingtons valued the least. But, we uniformly find this writer ready to sacrifice any and every other person to the purposes of Mr. Pitt.—The Near Observer, in bringing his charge against Lord Temple, has omitted the *where* and the *when*; but, he, no doubt, alludes to the debate of the 24th of November, when his lordship made use of expressions, which were, by Mr. Sheridan, tortured into a demand of places for his family, but which neither contained nor would bear any such meaning. The New Opposition had, in the course of the debate, been accused of wishing for war, at any rate, in preference to peace, on any terms; a charge, the truth of which Lord Temple denied. "The object of our argument is," said he, "to open the minds of the people to their danger; to show them into what hands their country has fallen; and, to convince them, that, while it remains *in such hands*, there is no hope of success in war, nor of honour and security in peace. . . . Much remains to be done; and, *in other hands*, much may be done, not by engaging in a hazardous war, but by real firmness."—These are the expressions, which the Addingtons and Bragges have construed into a demand of places for the Grenville family; into a claim, on the part of that family, to name the ministers of the King! The Accurate Observer, who undertakes to answer misrepresentations and calumnies, ought, one would think, not to have passed over this part of his opponent's remarks. Nor, would it have been a departure from his office, if, in answer to the exclamation of, "insatiable family!" as applied to the Grenvilles, he had given his readers some account of the great merits, of the talents, the integrity, the long and eminent services of that family. And, having been forced upon this subject, he might and ought to have shown, that the Addingtons (I will not call them *a family*) and their endless train of hungry relations, have already possessed themselves of three times as much of the public wealth as the Grenvilles ever enjoyed; besides having debased the character and enfeebled the power of the government, by filling the public offices with persons, whom the people must despise, and towards the supporting of whom in upstart idleness and insolence, they cannot and they will not cheerfully contribute.

Mr. Grenville and Dr. Laurence are accused, by the Near Observer, of having cried incessantly for war, till war became evidently inevitable, and then, of having "turned suddenly as the wind."—The passage of the *Cursory Remarks* which I here allude to is as follows:—"Mr. Thomas Grenville declared, that there was no man more ready or more eager to vote for the address" [on the King's Message of the 8th of March], especially if it should be likely to procure *peace and tranquillity*;

“ and, Doctor Laurence professed his wishes were for *peace!!!* He expected it should be proved, that the war, if it must now be renewed, “ was indispensably necessary to the safety and honour of the Empire!!!” —If these expressions, these exact words, had been made use of by Mr. Grenville and Dr. Laurence, what inconsistency would they have discovered? These two gentlemen objected to the peace of Amiens for several reasons; but a principal reason was, that it gave us so small a hope of *lasting* peace and tranquillity; and, the address which, on the 13th of May, 1802, both of them voted for, advised his Majesty to adopt such measures as might tend to render *durable* the tranquillity, which he had, by so many sacrifices, graciously intended to restore to his people. Would it, therefore, have been turning like the wind, if the same persons, who, from such motives, voted for that address, had, from the same motives, supported the address in answer to the King’s Message of the 5th of March, 1803?—But, during the debate in question, neither Mr. Grenville nor Dr. Laurence expressed any *wish* either for peace or war. Their opponents in doors, and the vulgar without doors, anticipated much *triumph*, on their part, at the prospect of seeing a speedy end to that peace, which they had so strongly and so justly reprobated. But, they were careful to discover no such triumph, and to remind their hearers, that the principles, on which they had condemned the peace, had never warranted their adversaries in representing them as bent upon war. Mr. Grenville said, that “ he should cheerfully vote for the address, which he “ wished to see carried with perfect unanimity, because it would thereby “ be the more likely to convince the world that we were able and willing “ to defend our rights, which conviction was the means best calculated to “ produce a state of real peace and tranquillity.” Was this turning about? Was this “ shifting suddenly like a sail?”—Dr. Laurence stated his wish to obtain some information as to the grounds of the war; and trusted, “ that, when those grounds came to be publicly known, they “ would be found sufficient to *convince the world of the justice of our “ cause.*” He further observed, that, “ as to the desire, which he and “ his friends had been accused of entertaining, to plunge the nation in “ war, it never had existed for a moment; and, that one of the reasons “ why he disliked the peace was, that it evidently, directly, and rapidly “ tended towards the event, which had so soon arrived.”—Was this shifting suddenly about? And, with such means at hand, was the defence of Mr. Grenville and Dr. Laurence a task too laborious and too difficult for the Accurate Observer?

Mr. Elliot also is charged by the Addingtons with shifting suddenly about upon this occasion, and, together with Mr. Windham, with having opposed the Irish militia law, for the purpose of embarrassing the ministers, in their warlike preparations.

“ Both these gentlemen,” says the Near Observer, “ were now discovered to be “ adverse to the system and principle of militia forces altogether, an opinion “ which did not so much surprise the admirers of the constitution and of that “ constitutional force, upon any other ground, as because in their official situations, they had severally appeared the most zealous advocates and promoters “ of this species of army. Mr. Elliot, who now opposed recruiting the Irish “ militia at four guineas per man, was reminded by the Attorney-General for Ireland, that he himself (Mr. Elliot) had brought in a bill for recruiting it at six “ guineas; and Mr. Windham was put in mind that during the time he had been “ in office, the militia in England had been augmented to an unprecedented degree, and the militia of Scotland and Ireland instituted and begun!! Thus it

“ appeared, that it was not solely in the instance of the negotiations at Lisle, but in great general measures of domestic import, executive government and legislation, that the manly, consistent Mr. Windham, had not only lent his name, countenance, and authority against his opinion, but that he had even condescended to become the official instrument and organ of measures which he disapproved and condemned. It always remained, however, to be accounted for, both by this Right Honourable Gentleman and Mr. Elliot, why they felt themselves more obliged to declare their opposition at one time than at another; why they could submit their *docile consciences* to the hand of Mr. Pitt, and show such a restive spirit of mutiny under the guidance of his successor!!! It will be said, that they were in office at one time, and out of it the other; but, if this is an excuse, it follows, that to be neutral in things you disapprove, is less blamable than to be active in them; and that you may originate measures you condemn, but not suffer others to promote them, afterwards.” —

Here are misrepresentations and calumnies, an answer to which one might have reasonably expected from an Answerer, who assumes an appellation descriptive of great accuracy of observation. But, no: the defender of Mr. Pitt could, in the present instance, find no materials whereon to work! which is the more surprising as, in hunting through the parliamentary debates for facts wherewith to rebut the accusations against Mr. Pitt, he must have seen the speech, which Mr. Elliot made, at the time, in answer to these very misrepresentations and calumnies; for, they are, after all, a mere rechauffée of a dish, and a most disgusting one too, which had originally been served up from the Treasury Bench. —The debate, alluded to, was on the bill, passed last March, for granting a *bounty* of four guineas a man to such men as were willing to serve as militia-men in Ireland. To talk of the “ constitution ” and of “ constitutional force,” in such a case; to call men raised by bounty *militia-men*, requires no small portion of even that assurance, with which the Addingtons are so superabundantly gifted. But Mr. Elliot’s speech is so full and satisfactory as to every point, its sentiments have been so fully verified in the time which has already elapsed, and it contains such an useful lesson for the future, that I shall cite it almost entire.

“ He had,” he said, “ no objection to the adoption of the principle of a militia in Ireland. On the contrary, he had suggested the expediency of making the experiment by the establishment of a force of that description: a very moderate number; five or six thousand for example. He was, however, told from the bench opposite to him, that, if a militia in Ireland were to be formed by ballot, there would be so many substitutes, and at such large bounties, that the general recruiting service would be more impeded by that mode than by the restricted bounties specified in the bill before the House. This, he admitted, was an argument of great weight, but it amounted to a declaration that it was impracticable in Ireland to obtain a militia upon the genuine principle of a militia, which he could not help considering as a decisive objection against the institution. Accordingly, by the present bill, the principle of a militia was abandoned; for it proposed to raise 18,000 men, *not by ballot*, but by *bounty*. This force, therefore, had no other affinity to a militia than that it was to be raised in counties, and was to be commanded by officers nominally militia colonels. It would be strictly an establishment of fencibles. What were fencibles but corps raised within particular districts, and officered by gentlemen of landed property connected with such districts? The force, therefore, proposed to be raised, would be in principle nothing but a fencible establishment of the worst species, because formed on such terms of service as would *confine it entirely to Ireland*. If it was absolutely necessary, as some gentlemen had alleged, that a force of such numbers should be raised on the spur of the occasion, in order to co-operate with the regular army, why not raise a fencible force on a more enlarged footing of service, *applicable, for instance, to Great Britain and Ireland*? At the same time he acknowledged he felt almost insurmountable objections to that description of force; because it tended to produce a most injurious competition

" of bounties between the home and regular service; and if we adopted it, we
 " should be compelled (as we were in the late war), to raise the bounty for the
 " line to an amount which would not only render our army so burdensome in
 " point of expense, that the pecuniary means of the country would scarcely be
 " adequate to sustain it, but which was also calculated to produce, in other points
 " of view, the most prejudicial effects on the service. It had been observed, in
 " the course of the debate, that in the late war the militia had been most suc-
 " cessfully applied to the recruiting of the regular army. He was glad that mea-
 " sure had been mentioned, because he should have selected it as a complete
 " illustration of the truth of the argument he was stating. In the course of the
 " late war, so much of the population of the kingdom had been locked up in defen-
 " sive corps, that the recruiting service was so entirely suspended, that it was
 " found necessary to dissolve a considerable proportion of the local force to sup-
 " ply the alarming deficiency of the regular army. The expedient was certainly
 " not to be justified on any principle, but the urgency of the occasion. The emer-
 " gency, however, was pressing, and he felt that every tribute of public grati-
 " tude and applause was due both to the energy of the councils which devised
 " the measure, and to the patriotism of the officers who gave their co-operation
 " to it. But he believed it would not be proposed to adopt it as a general system
 " of recruiting. He was persuaded such a system would not be avowed. If in-
 " deed it was understood, that the colonels of militia were ready to lend their
 " regiments to the recruiting of the line, it might in a certain degree diminish
 " his objections to the present measure, though he could by no means bring him-
 " self to think, that a systematic application of the militia to the recruiting of the
 " line would be a judicious course of proceeding. However, he should not then
 " take up the time of the House by enlarging on that subject, since he was con-
 " fident such a system would not be asserted as practicable. Mr. Elliot next
 " adverted to a remark which had been made by his right hon. and learned friend
 " the Attorney-General of Ireland, and which he could not notice without some
 " apology to the House, as it had little relation to the merits of the present ques-
 " tion, being entirely an *argumentum ad hominem*. His learned friend had stated,
 " that he (Mr. Elliot) had expressed no disapprobation of laws of a similar tend-
 " ency while he sat in the parliament of Ireland. It was true that, while he was
 " in that parliament, one or two acts passed, authorizing a levy of volunteers by
 " bounty in argumentation of the militia. He had, however, always entertained
 " considerable prepossessions against that system of military policy, and experi-
 " ence had confirmed them. But his learned friend had really spoken, as if he
 " (Mr. Elliot) had been a principal instrument in forming the militia of Ireland.
 " Now the fact was, that he was appointed to the War-office in Ireland in the
 " summer of 1796, at which period the militia had been raised between two and
 " three years, and he found it armed, arrayed, and encamped. What did his
 " learned friend conceive he should have done in such circumstances? Did he
 " mean to suggest that he ought, from his place in parliament, to have proposed
 " the dissolution of the establishment in the midst of war? That he believed
 " would not have been thought a very safe or well-timed measure. But the case
 " was now widely different. On the conclusion of the late war, the militia
 " establishment of Ireland was disbanded, not disembodied, but actually dis-
 " solved; and the question before the House was, whether the institution was to
 " be revived in a shape calculated, at a most critical conjuncture, to cut up the
 " general recruiting service by the very root. He could not conclude without
 " making an observation on what had fallen from the Secretary at War, who had
 " imputed to him, that, after having sounded an alarm through the country, he
 " was now throwing obstructions in the way of the public service. He must
 " remark, that it did not very well become the right honourable gentleman to
 " reproach him with alarms, just at the conjuncture when his Majesty's ministers,
 " though rather late to be sure, began to participate in those alarms. He, how-
 " ever, avowed the intention of giving the alarm upon the present bill. He was
 " most anxious to impress parliament with a full sense of its dangerous tendency;
 " for, if there was a measure more calculated than another, to prostrate this
 " country at the foot of a foreign foe, it was surely that which, in the present
 " perilous crisis, should contribute to the annihilation of the recruiting means of
 " the empire. It had been insinuated both against his right honourable friend
 " (Mr. Windham) and himself, that they were now endeavouring to cast a damp
 " upon the ardour of the country. This was certainly a new charge against his
 " right honourable friend and himself. Nevertheless, it might be well founded.

" They might have changed their conduct. He trusted, however, they would be
 " found consistent. He believed, there were no two members of that House
 " more desirous of calling forth the mind and spirit of the country than his right
 " honourable friend and himself. But there might be a difference of opinion in
 " respect to the best mode of accomplishing that object. It was, he thought, a
 " part of true wisdom, as well as of genuine courage, to look at the impending
 " danger in its full extent. There was no piety in the delusion which covered it,
 " either from the parliament or from the people. In order to apportion our
 " efforts to the emergencies of our situation, we ought to know the full measure
 " of our peril. In the event of a fresh contest the country ought to be prepared
 " for great and trying sacrifices. He had never represented war otherwise than
 " as a great calamity, but he had stated, and he retained the opinion, that it
 " might prove a less dangerous, and certainly a more honourable predicament,
 " than a perseverance in a series of submissive councils. If the country was
 " roused to a full sense of the peril of its situation, and was made to understand
 " the real ground and principle of the contest (for he earnestly deprecated the
 " injurious policy of sliding the nation into a war in darkness and obscurity), he
 " was persuaded that we should find in the people that prudent, courageous, per-
 " severing, patient fortitude, which had carried this country through many
 " arduous and painful struggles. He was convinced that, with an adequate im-
 " pression of our danger, and a due consciousness of the justice and soundness
 " of our cause, we should, with one united effort, resolve, either successfully to
 " support the ancient fabric of our laws, rights, liberties, and independence, or
 " to perish under the ruins of an edifice, which no ingenuous or rational mind
 " could be anxious to survive; for beyond it there was no retreat, no refuge, no
 " consolation. It was matter of awful reflection, that if this country fell, the
 " last asylum of the civilized world was gone. These were the reasons which
 " induced him to wish that we should, as far as we were able, preserve the means
 " of the nation collected and unimpaired. It was a painful task to him to object
 " to any arrangement connected with the defence and security of the country;
 " but he did not make an exaggerated statement of his opinion, when he declared
 " that, if a board of French general officers had sat for the purpose of devising
 " the most effectual mode of sapping to their foundation the military strength
 " and resources of this empire, they could not, in his judgment, have contrived
 " a measure better adapted to the accomplishment of that object, than the reso-
 " lution contained in the report upon the table."—

Not much more than three months after this speech was delivered, and
 before the Irish militia were half got together, every intelligent man from
 that country, not influenced by a job, either in existence or in embryo,
 was ready to declare openly, that, unless the Irish militia were rendered
 transferable to England, they would do infinitely more harm than good;
 and, it can hardly be forgotten, that the same opinion was pretty distinctly
 expressed by Lord Limerick, in seconding the address to the throne,
 on the 22nd of November last. " With respect," he said, " to the
 " militia of Ireland, the wisest policy was, to employ them, partially, at
 " least, *in this country*. There might, indeed, exist an aversion, on the
 " part of the English and Scotch militia, to crossing the sea; but, he re-
 " peated his opinion, that, with respect to the Irish militia, they would,
 " if brought to this country, behave as well as troops possibly could."
 Now, every one knows, that his lordship, if he had thought it prudent to
 speak out, would have said, that the 18,000 men, raised in Ireland, at
 four guineas a man, under the name of militia, were of very little use: so
 little, in the opinions of some persons, as to render their *absence* some-
 thing truly desirable; nay, I have heard it declared, by a gentleman very
 well acquainted with the state of Ireland, and very deeply interested in
 its fate, that he should look upon his estates in that country as being
 much more valuable than they now are, if the 18,000 militia had never
 had arms put into their hands. When, therefore, one reflects, that of
 this body of men, eight or ten thousand might, by a bounty of seven

guineas a man, have been enrolled in the regular army, and, of course, sent to any part of the world, we are astonished at the assurance of those, who can, with the lesson of experience before them, still rail at the objections urged by Mr. Elliot and Mr. Windham against the measure in question.—But, the *Near Observer* says, that these gentlemen were now, and for the first time too, discovered to be “adverse to the system and *principle* of militia forces altogether.” Mr. Elliot began his speech not only by stating that “he thought it highly important that the *principle of the militia* should be *preserved and cherished*,” but he also said, that he “had no objection to the adoption of the principle of a militia in Ireland;” and, in the same debate, though Mr. Windham appeared to be more averse to a militia system than Mr. Elliot, he said, “that he did not mean, that there should be no militia at all; he only alluded to the proportion of it compared to the standing army, which he thought much more essential to the defence of the country, and which, therefore, he did not wish to see sapped by bounties given to raise recruits for what were called militia regiments.”—I have already observed that the passage above quoted from the *Near Observer* is a mere *rechauffée* of what was delivered from the Treasury Bench, on the 15th and 16th of March last. The Attorney-General of Ireland is, indeed, quoted by name, though the candid partisans of the candid Addingtons omitted to notice Mr. Elliot’s answer, which, as we have seen, contained a complete refutation of the charge preferred against him by that learned gentleman. The same sort of candour has been observed with respect to Mr. Windham, of whom it is asserted, in a repetition of almost the very words of Mr. Yorke, that he “in his official situation appeared the most zealous advocate of this species of army; that, during the time he was in office, the militia in England had been augmented to an unprecedented degree, and the militia of Scotland and Ireland instituted and begun.” Hence, it is concluded, that Mr. Windham lent his name to measures which he condemned; and, that he was ready “to submit his *docile conscience* to the hand of Mr. Pitt.” These are the words of the *Near Observer*. Let us now hear Mr. Yorke.

“He did not by any means complain of the hon. gentleman’s objections to this measure; he only complained that the right hon. gent. had made his general objections at a time, and upon an occasion, when these objections could lead to no practical conclusion. He complained that the right hon. gentleman, entertaining such opinions upon this subject as he now appeared to do, should, while he was in office, *have augmented* the militia to a degree heretofore unprecedented; for the right hon. gent. was at that time in a department (War-office) *immediately connected with the public force*. The right hon. gent. had not only *suffered* the militia in England to be so augmented; but, while he held an important office in administration, the militia of Scotland was formed, and he believed that of Ireland; and yet upon these occasions the right hon. gent. had *urged no objection*. But now, even if the right honourable gentleman’s objections should prevail (unless the parliament were to supersede all the militia laws at once), he stated them *for the first time*. When the bill, of which the present one was only a part, was before the House, and when, from the situation of the country, his objections could have been *more deliberately and maturely examined*, the right hon. gent. *sat perfectly silent*.”—

From the Addingtons or the Hawkesburys one might have expected to hear insinuations and charges like these, but, though “evil communications corrupt good manners,” from Mr. Yorke, I most assuredly, should not have expected them. As a cabinet-minister Mr. Windham might, in the cabinet, oppose the measures here spoken of; but, if his opposi-

tion proved unsuccessful, if he could not enforce his opinion against that of the rest of the council, will Mr. Yorke say, that it was his duty to resign his office, and to quit the cabinet? Of this, however, more hereafter. Mr. Yorke charges him with "having augmented the militia," and with having, "while in a department *immediately connected with the public force*, SUFFERED the militia of England to be augmented, and "that of Scotland and Ireland to be formed." Who, that is unacquainted with the nature of the office that Mr. Windham held, would not, from this representation, imagine, that Mr. Windham was the author, the first proposer of the augmentation of the militia in England, as well as of the establishment of a militia in Scotland and Ireland; especially as his office was that of *Secretary at War*. Mr. Yorke certainly could not intend to send forth to the world so gross a misrepresentation; and, yet one hardly knows how to account for his expressions in any other way, without imputing to him a want of even common discernment. Mr. Yorke knew; Mr. Yorke must know, for he was Secretary at War himself at the time when he made the above-quoted speech; he *must*, therefore, well know, that Mr. Windham, as Secretary at War, had no more to do with the augmenting or creating of militia forces, than the Lord Chancellor had. Mr. Yorke knew, that the management of the militia lay exclusively with the Secretary of State for the War Department, which office was then filled by Mr. Dundas, now Lord Melville; Mr. Yorke knew, that by Mr. Dundas and the Commander-in-Chief the whole of that branch of the public service was managed; that no official communication existed between it and the War-office; and that, except as far as his opinion and vote would go in the cabinet council, Mr. Windham had no more control over the measures alluded to, than the Emperor of China had. This being the true state of the case, let the world judge, whether it was fair and manly in Mr. Yorke to charge Mr. Windham with "*having augmented the militia*," and with having "*suffered the militia to be augmented and formed*." If he had preferred this charge against the late Lord Chancellor or Secretary at State for foreign affairs, it would not have succeeded, there would have been nothing for it to stick to; but, the appellation of late *Secretary at War* was charmingly calculated to take with the ignorant gaping crowd in the galleries. I would, however, put it to Mr. Yorke, whether the taking advantage of such a circumstance was worthy of him, or of any one who had the honour to reply to Mr. Windham; whether he thinks that Mr. Windham would have resorted to the use of such means; whether he does not now lament, that he has furnished the Near Observer with the materials of misrepresentation and calumny; and, finally, whether he can view, without feeling some degree of humiliation, the contrast exhibited in the conduct of Mr. Windham. — One point only remains. Mr. Yorke states, that Mr. Windham "*urged no objection*" to the militia measures adopted while he was in office. *Where* does Mr. Yorke mean? He cannot know, that he urged no objections in the cabinet; he must, therefore, mean, that he urged none in *Parliament*; and, I would, then, like to hear Mr. Yorke say, whether it was the custom, whether it ever has been the custom, whether an instance of that kind ever was heard of, for a member of the cabinet to oppose, in *Parliament*, a cabinet measure. But, Mr. Yorke goes further, and says, that, since Mr. Windham has been out of the cabinet, he has never opposed any militia arrangement *till now*. "Even," says he, "if the Right Honourable Gentleman's objections were to prevail,

he has now stated them for the *first time*." I hope Mr. Yorke's memory is very short; for, I should be sorry to suppose, that, when he made this assertion, he had not completely forgotten what passed upon the bringing up the report of the Scotch Militia Bill, on the 31st of May, 1802. The object of this bill was to enable his Majesty, in case of invasion, or any other great emergency, to augment the Scotch militia in the proportion of one-half. Mr. Elliot objected to the measure, for the same reason that we have seen him object to the Irish militia system; to wit, that it would tend to *destroy the recruiting service for the regular army*. The concluding words of Mr. Elliot's speech express opinions, which cannot be too generally inculcated, and to which it is, at this time, peculiarly useful to call the attention of the public.

"In the northern part of that country, too, through the spirit of clanship, and the hereditary attachment which prevailed there to particular families, there were means of recruiting which existed in no other parts of the empire. The establishment, therefore, of a large local force within so contracted a space was, he maintained, to *cut up by the roots the recruiting service of the army*. It was absolutely to frustrate and nullify the military resources of the country. The attempt to combine a considerable augmentation of the local force with the recruiting service of the army was, he asserted, *an incongruous system*. It was to present inducements to men to stay at home, at the same time that invitations were held out to them for enlistment for general service. A premium was offered with one hand against the bounty which was tendered with the other. For these reasons, he had always thought the original institution of the Scotch militia an injudicious arrangement; and he was sure its augmentation would be a perseverance in a very injurious error. It might, perhaps, he said, that the number of men proposed to be added was not large. For the extent of the country, however, he alleged, it was not inconsiderable. It might probably be stated, that the measure was not to be carried into effect, unless in case of the danger of invasion, or some pressing emergency. To that he should answer, that it was not evident that it would be necessary even in the event of invasion, to increase the militia; for if a considerable portion of transferable force was in the kingdom in such an exigency, it would be as applicable for the purpose of defence as a local force. But if such a measure should prove requisite, the intervention of parliament might then be used; and if it was not sitting, it could be convened soon enough to give its sanction to the measure. The bill, however, did not limit the measure to the event of invasion, but extended it to *any other great emergency*, which words vested in the government a complete discretion on the subject. A *great emergency* might, for instance, be the commencement of a war, *the very conjuncture at which he should most deprecate such a measure*. In short, he desired to be understood as objecting to the principle of the arrangement, since it led to a system, which was fundamentally vicious, and which appeared to him to be directly the reverse to that which, in the event of a war, it would be expedient for this country to adopt."*

Now, I ask any observing and impartial man, whether these opinions have not already been verified? We are giving from 35 to 50 guineas for recruits for the Army of Reserve, recruits to do little more than stay at home; and, we have, during nine months of exertion, raised, out of fifteen millions of souls, about *nine thousand* recruits for the regular army, seven thousand of whom have, in one way or another, each individual of them cost the country fifty guineas, at the least farthing, previous to his joining a regular regiment!—But, what did Mr. Windham say, upon the occasion alluded to? He said,

"He concurred with everything that had been advanced by his honourable friend (Mr. Elliot), but thought he had not gone far enough. Not only any clause of the bill, but its whole principle ought to be opposed; as it went to lay out the force of the country in a defensive instead of an offensive army. He did not wish to see the militia *totally extinguished*; yet he thought, that instead of increasing its numbers, it ought to be reduced *below the old establish-*

"ment, both in Scotland and England, and never to be augmented except in cases of emergency. To one consideration he would particularly call the attention of the House: every compulsory force employed in raising men must necessarily increase the difficulty of voluntary recruiting, as it takes away the fair competition, and thus raises the bounty; as appeared in the late war, where it rose to fifteen guineas, instead of one guinea, the usual price formerly given. The reason of this was evident: it was absolutely necessary to allow the employing substitutes. People in certain circumstances gave any price for substitutes, rather than serve themselves; the consequence was, that the premium for substitutes was known to be enormously high, and of course the price of recruits for the regular army was raised in proportion. From these and many other considerations, he was a decided foe to the militia system; he considered a regular army as the most proper and best defence of the country."*—

This debate took place, as I have before observed, on the 31st of May, 1802. Mr. Yorke was present at the time; and, which is singular enough, scarcely opened his mouth in reply. He was, as yet, little schooled in the ways of the Addingtons and Hawkesburys: he was, as yet, incapable of charging Mr. Windham with having, as Secretary at War, "augmented the militia," or with having "suffered it to be augmented." Still, as I have already declared, I would fain believe, that, when Mr. Yorke did, on the 16th of March last, accuse Mr. Windham of having then objected, "for the first time," to the augmentation of the militia; I would fain believe, and I must believe, that when Mr. Yorke made this assertion, he had totally forgotten the occurrences of the 31st of May, 1802; but, I never can believe, that it is reconcilable either to that dignity or that manliness of character, which I always look for in Mr. Yorke, to have so spoken in Parliament as to have furnished the sentiments, and almost the very words, wherewith a Treasury hireling has dressed out the most shameful calumnies.—It should be observed, that the object, which this writer has in view, in misrepresenting the conduct of Mr. Elliot and this part of the conduct of Mr. Windham, is, to inculcate a belief, that the objections which they made to the militia system arose from their desire to embarrass the ministers, and to retard, if not obstruct altogether, the warlike preparations of those wise and vigorous gentlemen; and, it must be confessed, that the language made use of by Mr. Yorke, and by others in the same debate, evidently led to such a conclusion; but, that this conclusion was false, that it was a most gross error, or most malignant misinterpretation, no doubt can, I think, be entertained. Their objections arose from their anxious desire to prevent the source of the recruiting service from being dried up; and, who will now deny, that it would be happy for the country, if that desire had been gratified? Who, that looks at the bloated accounts of volunteer corps, army of reserve, and militia, and compares them with the meagre skeleton returns of the regular army, the only army on which we can *safely* rely for defence, and on which we can *possibly* rely for offence; who, that makes this comparison, and that considers what may be the fatal consequences of a protracted and inglorious war, can help sorely lamenting, that the opinions of Messrs. Elliot and Windham did not prevail, that their advice was not followed, and that they had not the power to prevent, as well as the sagacity to foresee, and the integrity to foretel, the effects of the system to which they objected?

Here I close my observations on that part of the *Cursory Remarks*, which contains misrepresentations and calumnies that the Accurate Ob-

* See Debrett's Parl. Register, May 31, 1802.

server found it too troublesome or too difficult to answer. In observing upon the remarks, which relate to Mr. Elliot, I have been obliged to include those, which, on the particular subject of the militia force, relate also to Mr. Windham.—I should now proceed in my analytical and comparative view of the two pamphlets, as far as they relate to the parliamentary conduct of Mr. Canning, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Windham; but, for want of room, I find myself compelled to defer it to my next.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register*, January, 1804.)

Mr. Canning, Lord Grenville, and Mr. Windham are, as I have before observed, noticed by the Accurate Observer; but, how he has *defended* them, what sort of “*answer*” he has made to the “*misrepresentations and calumnies*” uttered against them by the Near Observer, we are now about to see.

The attack upon Mr. Canning is made in such a way as to render it almost impossible to exhibit it here in the shape of extracts: yet, I shall, as far as is consistent with a due regard to the reader’s patience, keep to the Near Observer’s own words. He wishes to propagate a belief, that, though Mr. Pitt approved of, or, at least, defended in Parliament, all the principal measures of the ministers, particularly the peace, *his sincerity was rendered very questionable* by the conduct of his personal friends, and the members most attached and devoted to him by the habits of private life, who, in this respect, took the liberty of disclaiming him for their leader, and who indulged in every species of rancour, malice, and hostility, against the person who, at his own recommendation, had been chosen as his successor. After having drawn, from the conduct of Mr. Pitt’s personal friends, of whom Mr. Canning is placed at the head, a conclusion, that

“The public could not be brought implicitly to believe, either that the acceptance of the new ministers itself, or, at any rate, the credit and popularity, which they had acquired by the late happy events, had been altogether agreeable to Mr. Pitt;” after this he proceeds in a strain of interrogation, as follows: “If I were as certain of not giving offence, as I am free from intending it, and of being as little suspected of a flattery, as I am incapable of meaning one” [This is the true Addington cant], “I would venture to ask of Mr. Canning himself, for whose *agreeable* talents and *private* worth I have as much respect as any man, whether it were possible for these inferences and conclusions to have escaped his own good sense and sagacity? Whether he did not feel, that he was throwing a suspicion over the candour and sincerity of Mr. Pitt? and in case that any possible measures of the present ministers, at any future time, might compel the conscience of Mr. Pitt to withdraw his promised support from them, and to take an active part in opposition to them, whether he did not perceive that he was undermining and destroying beforehand the conviction and credit of the country, in the compulsion of his right honourable friend’s conscience? Whether he did not perceive that he was exposing that late, contingent, constrained, and possible opposition to the suspicion of system, preconcert and policy?—I would ask of Mr. Canning whether it were not too great a submission of his rare talents and acquirements, to appear a mere partisan and stickler for the House of Grenville?—I would ask

“ of Mr. Canning (for whom I repeat that I entertain a considerable degree of respect and good-will), whether in the deference and distinction with which he has always affected to treat his noble friend Lord Hawkesbury, he was pleasing the old ministry? and whether his personalities towards Mr. Addington did not lead him in these civilities to mortify Lord Grenville? But if his regard for Lord Hawkesbury could conquer the fear of offending Lord Grenville, why might not his regard for Mr. Pitt have overcome his antipathy to Mr. Addington? I would ask whether he could feel no repugnance at becoming the instrument (I will not say the machine) of other persons? If the delicacy of his feelings were quite satisfied as to the justice, the honour, or the decency of being the organ of their hatred, their fury, their pride, disappointment, and rancour, against persons with whom he had long lived in habits of political and private intimacy, for whom he had professed friendship and esteem; against Mr. Addington, the bosom friend of his patron, and against Lord Chatham, his brother?—I would ask of Mr. Canning, whether he felt no scruple or compunction for himself, whether he had no respect or mercy for the feelings of Mr. Pitt, when he consented to become the chief of the satirists and scoffers of a cabinet, of which Lord Chatham was the president? and I would ask him whether he had been juster to himself, and to his own political character, than we have seen him to the sensibility of his friend and patron, when he condescended to become a hero of squibs and epigrams, a leader of doggerel and lampoon, a power in the war of abuse and invective, an instrument of Mr. Windham, and an auxiliary of Cobbett?”

In another place Mr. Canning is accused of suddenly shifting about in favour of peace, at the time when the King's message of the 8th of March last was delivered to the Parliament, and, the proof of this is cited in the following words, taken from his speech of the 8th of December preceding: “ The message has excited throughout the country the greatest anxiety and alarm.” Taking these words, as in the case of Doctor Laurence and Mr. Grenville, even in their detached state, how can they be interpreted into an expression of a desire to preserve peace? And, if such were their true meaning, how do they discover any sudden shifting about in Mr. Canning, who, whatever he might have thought, certainly never *spoke* against the peace with France? But, his words above quoted will bear no such construction as that, which has been attempted to be put upon them. They make *part* of a sentence in a speech which contained not a single word about the expediency of peace or war, but the sole object of which appeared to be to impress upon the minds of the House the necessity of obtaining *information* as to the cause of so important and so unexpected a measure as that which had just been announced to them. “ Never,” said Mr. Canning, “ I venture to assert, “ was so important a measure proposed on such grounds as those which “ are made the foundation for the present address: alarm and anxiety “ are excited, and the grounds of this anxiety and alarm are carefully involved in obscurity.”* Was it fair, was it candid in the candid and pious Addingtons, to select out of this sentence the words “ *anxiety and alarm,*” and to make them apply to Mr. Canning's feelings with respect to the prospect of war? Was it consistent, I do not say with sentiments of honour, but with principles of common honesty, to garble a sentence in such a manner and for such a purpose?

To have exposed a misrepresentation so gross and so base as this, would not, one would think, have been too much to expect from one, who professed to be so very Accurate an Observer, and who undertook to give an *answer* to all the misrepresentations and calumnies in the ministerial pamphlet. But, we shall, in pursuing our examination a little further,

* See Debates, March, 9, 1803.

find that, in what he has said of Mr. Canning as well as in what he has said of others, the Accurate Observer goes no further than the interests of Mr. Pitt require him to go. The charge which the Near Observer brings against Mr. Canning may be reduced to three points: first, that of acting as the under-handed agent or tool of Mr. Pitt; second, that of being a mere partisan and stickler for the house of Grenville; third, that of being the "instrument of Mr. Windham and the auxiliary of Cobbett." Let us hear what the Accurate Observer, the defender and eulogist of Mr. Pitt, and the professed friend of Mr. Canning; let us hear how he answers these misrepresentations and calumnies.

"Mr. Canning," says he, "is complimented most deservedly for rare talents and private worth, but he is accused, not with a very good grace, by the author of the *Cursory Remarks*, and without any proof, with libelling those whom he opposes. He is also represented as having become the 'instrument of other persons.' Mr. Canning appears to have felt very strongly the incapacity of the present ministers, and particularly of Mr. Addington; to have considered them as acting upon no system whatever, and, as well as Lord Grenville, to have founded his opposition upon this ground; and to have taken an active and a consistent part in endeavouring to enforce this opinion. No pretence whatever is stated for representing him as acting under the control of Lord Grenville, which would not equally have applied to any other eminent statesman, in whose opinions he had coincided, and who had taken the same line as himself. It is a novel doctrine which pervades the whole of the *Cursory Remarks*, that if a person supports the administration, he is supposed to act from the purest and most disinterested motives; but if he opposes their measures, he is looked upon as the instrument of others, or as acting under the influence of the meanest and the basest passions.—The insinuation that Mr. Canning's conduct gives the opposition which Mr. Pitt may have made, or may hereafter make, to any measure of Mr. Addington, 'the suspicion of system, preconcert, and policy,' is unworthy of a serious answer. What would our author have said of preconcert and system, if instead of taking different lines (and not without a good deal of dissatisfaction towards each other on that account) Mr. Pitt and Mr. Canning had adopted the same systematic course of opposition? — This is not the first time that such insinuations have been thrown out, and the friends of Mr. Addington (or at least those who professed to be so) never ceased attempting to excite in his mind doubts of the sincerity of Mr. Pitt; Mr. Canning is asked whether he did not feel that (by his conduct) he was throwing 'suspicions over that sincerity?' a point upon which he is said to have 'exculpated Mr. Pitt with great eloquence, but imperfect success.' Mr. Canning attempted no exculpation whatever from such a charge. He treated it as reflecting disgrace upon those alone who could harbour such a sentiment, and rejected the base imputation with scorn and contempt. It was not enough for these pretended friends of Mr. Addington, that Mr. Pitt disapproved highly of Mr. Canning's parliamentary conduct. It appeared as if nothing short of creating an irreconcilable enmity between these men could convince them of Mr. Pitt's sincerity."

And this is "an answer to misrepresentations and calumnies!" An answer which, except that it denies that Mr. Canning's conduct amounts to a proof of Mr. Pitt's insincerity, is no answer at all; and, it is very evident, that it was solely for the purpose of making this denial, that Mr. Canning was even named by the Accurate Observer. This generous defender does, indeed, slightly remark, that no pretence is stated for representing Mr. Canning as a mere partisan and stickler for the house of Grenville; but, as to the third point, as to the charge of being "a leader of doggerel and lampoon, a power in the war of abuse and invective, an instrument of Mr. Windham, and an auxiliary of Cobbett;" as to this the Accurate Observer leaves the public to conclude that no answer can be given. In the passage last quoted, the Near Observer alludes to the poetical *jeux d'esprit*, which appeared in vol. iii. of the Political Regis-

ter, and many of which were, from their excellence, attributed to Mr. Canning. Of that which comes to me without a name I cannot, of course, know the author, except by accident; and, therefore, I cannot say, that *none* of the articles in question were written by Mr. Canning; but, I can with perfect truth declare, that, while I *know* that several, and those of the most admired, were *not* written by him, I do *not know*, nor have I ever heard, except by way of mere guess, that any one of them, or that any article whatever, whether verse or prose, that has, at any time, appeared in the Register, *was* written by him. Mr. Long could not, indeed, be certain of what is here stated; but, when he sat down to answer all the misrepresentations and falsehoods of the Near Observer, he might, surely, have taken the trouble to obtain from Mr. Canning himself correct information as to the state of this fact, a precaution which he has, in no instance, neglected, with respect to the charges preferred against Mr. Pitt. Besides, as Mr. Canning was accused of being a brother instrument *with me*, Mr. Long, though he could not positively assert that I was not an instrument of Mr. Windham, might have asserted that *he knew* that I was not to be made an instrument *of the late ministry*, and might have left his readers to conclude therefrom, that, it was not very likely for me to become an instrument of a single member of that ministry, especially after he was out of place; or, he might safely have averred, that, if this really was the case, my disposition was precisely contrary to that of all the writers, with whom *he* had ever been acquainted. — But, to return to Mr. Canning's public and parliamentary conduct; in what part of it do we perceive that slavish devotion to others, which the Addingtons have so calumniously attributed to him? Was his devotion to Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham discovered in his avoiding both to speak and to vote on any of the questions connected with the peace? Was his devotion to Mr. Pitt discovered in his speaking and voting in favour of Mr. Patten's motion? His conduct on these occasions needs merely to be referred to, in order to answer the misrepresentations of the Treasury pamphlet; but, this was, it seems, too laborious a task for the Accurate Observer. — The truth is, and it is a truth with which both Mr. Addington and Mr. Long were well acquainted, that Mr. Canning disapproved of the peace upon the same principles as Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham, but that, previous to the last general election, he held his seat by such a tenure, that he could not, without a breach of faith, act *against* the ministry in Parliament, especially while they were supported by Mr. Pitt. After the election, when he found himself released from those obligations which had kept him silent, he, of course, acted for himself; and, accordingly, while we see him faithful to his friendship for Mr. Pitt, we also see him too independent to follow his friend, where he thinks him in the wrong, as in the instance of Mr. Patten's motion. — Was it too much for the Accurate Observer to state these facts? Or, did he think that the statement was by no means necessary to the vindication of Mr. Pitt? This gentleman, however, who has, by certain time-serving critics (of whom I shall speak hereafter), been highly extolled for his *candour*; this "Accurate" and candid Observer does allow, that Mr. Canning possesses "agreeable talents and private worth," but, in estimating his *useful* talents and *public* worth, the reader has no other standard than that which is furnished him in the fact, which this candid person was the first to communicate to the world; to wit; "that Mr. Pitt *highly disapproved* of Mr. Canning's parliamentary conduct," a fact, the publishing of which,

might serve to clear Mr. Pitt from the charge of insincerity, but, which, in the opinion of Mr. Pitt's eulogist, at least, could not be intended to render any great service to the character of Mr. Canning, who has, on this occasion, good reason to exclaim, in the words of his own elegant poem :—

“ Give me the avow'd, the erect, the manly foe :
 “ Bold I can meet,—perhaps may turn, his blow :
 “ But of all plagues, good Heav'n, thy wrath can send,
 “ Save, save, oh! save me from the *candid friend!*”

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register*, January, 1804.)

The parliamentary conduct of LORD GRENVILLE is now to be examined. The *Near Observer*, which, the reader will bear in mind, is the name assumed by the partisan of the present Treasury, begins his attack upon his lordship's conduct by endeavouring to persuade the world, that his opposition to the peace was unjustifiable, because he himself had proposed *similar terms of peace*, during the negotiations at Lisle. But, the prefatory remarks must first be noticed. “ The retreat,” says he, “ of the late ministers, was regarded, both by the government of France and the neutral powers of the continent, as a virtual confession of the inability of the country to persist in the war, so that, they had the misfortune to retire, and the new servants of the crown to succeed under the imputation, that the former possessed no ability of making peace, and the latter no means of continuing the war. It was even believed that the late minister had been long divided upon this point, an opinion which subsequent events appear to have justified.”

It is not necessary to contradict this gross and shameful falsehood, but it would not be right to transcribe it without bestowing on it a mark of reprobation. “ Under these fatal impressions ” (continues the hireling of the *well-meaning candid ministry*), “ under these fatal impressions of the public mind, both at home and abroad, was Lord Hawkesbury obliged to submit to the first overtures of a treaty, which appeared to all men almost impossible to be obtained upon any terms *short of ruin and disgrace.*” I am forcibly stopped again here, to ask every true and honest man, who remembers the state and feeling of the country in the month of April, 1801, just after the battle of Copenhagen, whether the slave of the *well-meaning ministry* has not here promulgated another most gross and shameful falsehood? Whether, on the 14th of April, 1801, the very day on which London was illuminated in honour of the deeds of our fleet in the Sound; whether, on that day, the day on which Lord Hawkesbury * gave in his first project, it did really “ appear to all men almost impossible for England to obtain peace upon any terms *short*

* The first overture for a *parley* was made by Lord Hawkesbury, on the 21st of March; but, the first *mention* of terms was made on the 14th of April, the day after the news of the victory of Copenhagen was received. — For proof of these facts, as well as for a specimen of diplomatic prostration, see the authentic papers, *Register*, vol. iii. pp. 1179, 1180, 1181, and 1183.

of ruin and disgrace?" The Near Observer proceeds: "It is fresh in the recollection of the public, that, upon the peace, a difference of sentiment immediately appeared amongst the late ministers, so serious and important as not only to confirm the opinion of there having long existed a schism in their cabinet upon that question, but to make it appear for ever impossible for them to act again in any political union whatsoever." This has constantly been the course of the Addingtons. DIVIDE AND GOVERN, is their maxim; a maxim upon which they have steadily acted, and the folly, the selfishness, the ambition, and the blind animosity of others have most efficiently favoured their views. Was there ever before heard of such an impudent sort of reasoning? because the members of the late cabinet differed widely in opinion, as to the peace made by their successors, we are to conclude, not only that there had long been a schism in that cabinet, but that it is impossible for them ever again to act together for any political end whatsoever; and, in a subsequent part of the pamphlet, we are told, that it would be scandalous" and "profligate" in them so to unite, save and except it were for the righteous purpose of supporting the Addingtons and Hawkesburys: in that case, the end would sanctify the means!

We now come to the passage relative to the negotiations at Lisle.

"The unfortunate negotiations at Lisle," says the Near Observer, "confined and circumscribed every project or overture the new ministers could hazard. Could Mr. Addington propose terms less favourable to Buonaparte, than Lord Grenville had offered to Barras and Reubell? Would France, now that one half of the Continent lay prostrate at her foot, by the Treaty of Luneville; mistress of Egypt; and stirring up a confederation of Kings from the bosom of the North, accept conditions less glorious or profitable, than we had offered her at the moment of one of her revolutions, while the powers of Europe were unbroken, and ready to renew the war at our side? The projet of Lisle, therefore, was a circle, out of which the successors of Lord Grenville could not tread."

The answer, which the Accurate Observer has made as to this point, is as follows:

"I cannot agree, that France was mistress of Egypt, during our negotiation at Amiens; nor, if I did, could I consider it as a reason why we should have accepted less advantageous terms. Neither can the 'confederation of kings from the bosom of the north' be justly stated as placing us under a disadvantage in that negotiation, for that confederation may be considered as having been dissolved by the glorious victory at Copenhagen, obtained a very few days after the first overtures for peace were made. As little can I agree that we were entitled to more favourable terms than those which we were willing to have accepted from France at Lisle, because (it is said) we treated 'at the moment of one of her revolutions.' The terms were offered previous to the revolution alluded to of the 4th September, 1797. It was that revolution which broke off the negotiation. Instead of the powers of Europe 'being ready to renew the war at our side' they appeared to have deserted us. The Treaty of Leoben* had been signed, and that of Campo Formio was about to be concluded. The stoppage of the Bank had created consternation and embarrassment, and the mutiny in the fleet had spread around us general despondency. The circumstances and situation of the country were totally different at the periods of our negotiations at Lisle and at Amiens, and that difference was certainly not in favour of the former period. I cannot see therefore, why the 'basis of the Treaty of Amiens,' is to be considered as necessarily 'traced at Lisle,' or why 'the projet of Lord Grenville was a circle out of which his successors could not tread.' These assertions are made chiefly to prove the incon-

* The Treaty of Leoben was signed 18th April, that of Campo Formio 17th Oct. 1797.

"sistency of Lord Grenville in offering the projet and in disapproving the Treaty. From this charge he exculpated himself very ably and successfully on the discussion of that treaty."

So far the Accurate Observer is perfectly right ; but his refutation is by no means so clear as his facts would have enabled him to make it. Lord Hawkesbury's negotiation with France began, as I have already stated, on the 14th of April : then, and not till then, was the first proposition made. The news of the battle of the 21st of March, when General Abercrombie was killed, when the "Invincible Standard" was taken by LUTZ, and when the fate of Egypt was, in a great measure, decided ; this news had not, indeed, been received when the first projet was delivered in by Lord Hawkesbury ; but, it was soon afterwards received, and the complete reduction of the French force was expected to take place, it did actually take place, and the news of that reduction was received in France, at least, before the preliminaries were signed. And, to prove, that, even at the time when the *first* proposition was made, the expedition to Egypt was *not* regarded as being "*totally incompetent to its object ;*" to prove that its success was *not* contrary to "*all human computation and probability ;*" to prove that the final conquest of that country from the French was *not* "*the consequence of a series of unhoped-for victories,*" the Accurate Observer might have quoted the words of Lord Hawkesbury's own projet, which, as I have said before, was delivered in to Mr. Otto on the 14th of April, some weeks *before* news was received of the victory of the 21st of March. "If," says the projet, "authentic information should be received, previous to the signing of the preliminaries, of the *evacuation of Egypt* by the French troops, or of a *convention concluded to that effect*, his Majesty will not hold himself bound to subscribe to the above conditions in all their extent."* If this was the language of ministers previous to the news of the victory of Alexandria ; if this was their language at the beginning of the negotiation, is it consistent with *candour* for them now to assert, that, to the end of that negotiation, France was considered as the "*mistress of Egypt*?"

With regard to France having "*stirred up a confederation of kings from the bosom of the North,*" the Accurate Observer truly states, that the confederation, if it was one, might be considered as dissolved by the battle of Copenhagen, the intelligence of which was received *before* Lord Hawkesbury made his first proposition to Mr. Otto ; but, if it was not dissolved on the 14th of April, it surely was completely dissolved by the death of the Emperor Paul, and by the Convention, the much-boasted convention with Russia, which was concluded on the 5th of June, 1801, four months *before* the preliminaries of peace were signed, and several weeks *before* Lord Hawkesbury *receded* from his first proposition. What pretence, therefore, is there for classing the "*confederation of kings*" amongst the dangers, which the ministers had to encounter in a continuation of the war ? What pretence is there for citing the state of Egypt and the dispute with the Northern powers as circumstances that rendered our situation in 1801 worse than our situation in 1797, when the battles of Aboukir and of Camperdown were, as yet, not won ; when, of course, the enemy's maritime power was, as yet, considerable, and when there was actually a mutiny in our fleet ? What resemblance is there between the circumstances of the two epochs ; and what pretence is there, then,

* See Register, vol. iii. p. 1181.

for saying, that "the project of Lisle was a circle out of which Lord Hawkesbury could not tread?"

Lord Grenville fully proved the falsehood of assertions of this sort, in his speech of the 3rd of November, 1801. But, indeed, none but the basest of advocates, pleading to the basest of tribunals, would have attempted such a mode of defence. How was Lord Hawkesbury bound by the project of Lord Grenville? It was a hundred times acknowledged by the late ministry, that the rupture of the negotiations at Lisle was a fortunate circumstance: and, yet a project delivered in during that negotiation was to be a circle out of which their successors could not tread! Besides, how happens it, that, the *other* plans of the late ministry did not become circles out of which their successors could not tread! How came those successors to have *boasted*, even in the very pamphlet before us, of acting upon principles and in a mode diametrically opposed to the principles and modes of their predecessors? How, for instance, came Lord Hawkesbury to solicit an interview with a Commissary of Prisoners, so contrary to the practice of Lord Grenville; and how came he, at once, to assume a supplicating tone better suited to a petty dependant republic than to the King of Great Britain? How came his partisans to *boast* of this shameful act of degradation? And how came the stock-jobbers to applaud him to the skies? The project at Lisle, though made under circumstances such as we have seen, and though *never justified* by any body, but upon the ground of hard necessity; that project retained the Cape as well as Ceylon; it secured Portugal from loss either in commerce, in money, or in territory; it provided a real and complete indemnity for the Prince of Orange; it made no sacrifice of any ally of Great Britain; whereas the peace of the Addingtons and Hawkesburys has sacrificed them all, and has left us not a friend upon the face of the earth. But, after all, and to conclude this part of the examination with a fact, which seems to have been entirely overlooked by every body, the project of Lisle was never taken into consideration in the negotiations of either the preliminary or definitive treaty. The First Consul of France, with a frankness which really does honour to himself, and which has certainly done much good to his cause, has published the whole of the papers relative to both these negotiations; and, from one end to the other of these papers, the project of Lisle, the project which was "a circle out of which Lord Hawkesbury *could not tread*," is never dwelt upon, it is never referred to, nay, it is never so much as once *mentioned*, or even *alluded to*, by either of the parties!* And, yet the slave of the candid Addingtons has been instructed to tell us, that it was a circle out of which they could not tread! Thanks to Buonaparte, we are now made acquainted with what was so sedulously hidden from us: we now know, that the project of Lisle, which was, in both Houses of Parliament, described as the insurmountable obstacle to a peace, such as the New Opposition contended for, was never so much as brought into view, during the whole course of the negotiation.

The next point, on which the Addingtons have misrepresented Lord Grenville, is, *the language* made use of by his lordship in speaking of the conduct of the ministry. "Notwithstanding," say they, "that, so *early* as the treaty concluded with the Court of St. Petersburg,

* All these papers are correctly inserted in the Register, vol. iii. from p. 1179 to 1208; and from 1657 to 1910.

“5th June, 1801, the great talents of Lord Grenville had been employed upon a speech and a pamphlet, in which he endeavoured to oppose, discredit, and censure with every species of *acrimony* and *contempt*, those ministers, to whom he had so *lately* engaged his “constant, active, and zealous support,” the public were astonished at “his censure of the preliminaries of peace.” Before I remark on what is advanced here and in other parts of the pamphlet as to the language of Lord Grenville, I must contradict the falsehood, which I have just transcribed, and which has been passed over in silence by the *More Accurate Observer*. It is said, that “so *early* as the Convention with Russia, the *5th of June*, 1801, Lord Grenville’s talents had been employed upon a speech and a pamphlet, &c.” Now, *before* the Convention with Russia was ratified, Parliament had *adjourned*; that Convention never was laid before Parliament till the next November; and the speech made by Lord Grenville on the subject, which speech he afterwards published in a pamphlet, was not delivered till the *13th of November*, ten days *after* the discussion of the preliminaries of peace! The object of this falsehood evidently is, to bring the commencement of his lordship’s opposition as near as possible to the time, when it is pretended he gave an unconditional promise of “constant, active, and zealous support;” and, it is an object by no means unworthy of the *well-meaning* Addingtons and Hawkesburys.*

* This act of foul aggression, on the part of the Addingtons and Hawkesburys, authorizes, and even calls for, the relation of an anecdote, which, though I have often had sufficient provocation, I have hitherto forborne to communicate to the public.—Very soon after the Convention of St. Petersburg was concluded, a pamphlet was prepared in defence of it. This pamphlet was entitled, “A Vindication of the Convention, lately concluded between Great Britain and Russia, “in six letters, addressed to ———.” It was published *before* the meeting of Parliament, and was obviously intended to prepossess the public mind against every objection that should be urged to the compact which it was intended to vindicate. So far, perhaps, there was little to find fault with. But, who will believe, that this pamphlet, which was, to all intents and purposes, a ministerial publication, and which was *paid for out of the public money*, contained a deliberate, high-wrought eulogium on Lord Hawkesbury, who was held forth as his country’s *best-hope*, and as possessing all the talents, all the coolness, all the wisdom, all the *statesman-like virtues* of his “*noble Sire*;” who will believe, that this pamphlet was written under the *dictation* of that “*noble Sire*” himself? When I say *dictation*, I do not mean, that the pamphlet was written at the *suggestion* of Lord Liverpool; I do not mean to say, that he furnished the *hints*; but I mean to say, that with his own lips, he dictated the statements, the opinions, the arguments, and the very words of it; and, I have further to say, that his lordship and Lord Hawkesbury himself read, and, in some instances, corrected, the proof sheets! The proof sheets of a pamphlet, which contained a fulsome eulogium upon themselves, and which they and their under-officers assisted to circulate, and that, too, at the *public expense*!—But, this is not all. The *well-meaning* Jenkinsons chose to attribute the pamphlet to a Mr. Ireland, Vicar of Croydon, in Surrey. Under his auspices it went to the press, and, out of the proceeds (which came *principally from the Treasury*) he received a *sum of money*. Whether it was for *this* or some other great public service; whether for this or some other act of disinterested patriotism and loyalty; whether it was for his politics or his piety, I know not, but Mr. Ireland soon after became a Doctor of Divinity and a *Prebend of Westminster*.—This part of the anecdote relative to Dr. Ireland I should have suppressed; but, since the Doctor has thought proper to introduce, with great officiousness, into the library of the Reading Society of his parish, a work the sole object and tendency of which is to *misrepresent, calumniate, and vilify* Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and every other person who has stood conspicuously forward in opposition to the measures, by which the present

As to the "*acrimony and contempt*," with which his lordship is said to have treated the ministers in his speech on the Russian Convention, the speech itself, published from his own notes, may be consulted: and, if in that edition of it, or in any report of it which has been made in the newspapers, or elsewhere, one single phrase can be found to warrant the charge here brought against it, I will allow the *Near Observer* to have been the instrument of fair and honourable men. That speech will be read with pleasure, and will convey instruction; it will serve as a guide to future statesmen; it will be consulted as one of the works on the public law of Europe; long, very long, after the persons, *all* the persons, who made the disgraceful instrument which called it forth, shall have sunk into the oblivion of contempt, or shall be remembered only in the execrations of Englishmen. I *heard* that speech; and, well do I recollect the real candour, the gentleness, the mercy, the compassion, with which his lordship treated his opponents; but, not one word did I hear, not a look or gesture did I see, expressive of "*acrimony or contempt*."—In another part of his pamphlet, the *Near Observer* renews the charge relative to Lord Grenville's *language*. "It would not," says he, "be doing even the little justice I am able, to the subject I am treating of, if I were to omit, that the *style and language* of opposition was *much degenerated* in the new hands to which it had transferred itself. The late minority, though it had been treated as a low contemptible faction of levellers and jacobins, never dealt in abuse and incivility so largely

ministers have steeped the country in disgrace; since the Rev. Doctor has made this use of the influence which he possesses over his parishioners, it is fitting that those parishioners, as well as the whole kingdom, should be made acquainted with such circumstances as may serve to elucidate the motives which have given rise to the zeal that he displays against the opponents of ministers. It must not be objected to my complaint against Doctor Ireland, that he has not the power to *prevent* the publication in question from being circulated by the Reading Society of his parish; because *he himself purchased the pamphlet for the Society*. The publication, which I first met with in the house of one of his parishioners, is entitled *Elements of Opposition*; it was published by the same bookseller who published the *Cursory Remarks*; it consists of *garbled* passages from my writings and from the speeches of the New Opposition members, together with comments calculated to *pervert* the meaning of the text, and to misrepresent the conduct, to disfigure the motives, and to defame the character of the persons spoken of, whose *private* as well as public actions are most falsely and basely misrepresented. Such is the work which Doctor Ireland has circulated, and is yet circulating, amongst his parishioners. How far he does, in this instance, act in conformity with the dictates of that superior piety, by which the adherents of the *well-meaning* ministry profess to be governed, I shall not attempt to determine; but, I hope, he will be able to find some leaf, some little morsel of blank paper, in the dull and vile pamphlet alluded to, whereon to write these few words, for the information of the people of Croydon: "Mr. Cobbett, who is so frequently mentioned in the enclosed pages, has written *many* pamphlets in defence of his King and of his countrymen, in vindication of the character, the conduct, the laws and the rights of England; of these pamphlets he has circulated more than *half a million*, in a foreign land; and, never did he ask for, or did he accept of, *a sum of money*, no, nor of one penny, from any ministry or any government. Mr. Cobbett is a *Surrey* man; and, he wishes those amongst whom he was born, and in the participation of the hardest of whose labours his youth was spent, to know, that he never has pocketed of their earnings one single farthing, in the whole course of his life." To this Doctor Ireland may add, that I have known the whole history of *his* pamphlet for *more than two years*, and that the facts came to my knowledge under no promise of secrecy, either expressed or *implied*. Let him add this, and then leave his parishioners to make a comparison between my character and his.

“ as the great aristocracy which had now succeeded to their place. “ *Absurd, incapable*, and grosser epithets were liberally applied to his Majesty’s councils and ministers, and by no member of either House more frequently than by Lord Grenville.” Again, in another part, he speaks of “ the *aggressive* and *unrelenting* opposition, the *asperity*, *malevolence*, and *rancour*, of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, since the failure of THEIR *negotiation* in April last.” As far as relates to Lord Grenville, was there ever any thing so detestably base as this latter insinuation? Of this I shall speak more fully, after I have examined the charges of *using gross language*, and of pursuing the course of *unrelenting opposition*.

But, previously, let us hear, as to the first of these charges, the *defence* of Lord Grenville which the Accurate Observer has had the goodness to make. “ The use of expressions,” says he, “ more harsh and severe than the occasion justifies, on which they are applied, is *always objectionable*. It always manifests ill-humour, and *always bad taste*. But, it is an evil which carries its own remedy along with it; for, it tends more to defeat than to forward the purpose it is meant to promote.” The reader will readily acknowledge, that all this is very true, but he will hardly believe that this is the “ *answer*,” which a more Accurate Observer has given to this part of the misrepresentations and calumnies of the Near Observer. The charge is not *denied*; and, the Answerer merely adds to what I have last quoted, that the Near Observer uses *fouler* language than Lord Grenville, and Mr. Sheridan still fouler than either of them, though that gentleman stands high in the opinion of, and has even the honour to be praised by, the great and noble Mr. Henry Addington. But, as a defence of Lord Grenville, this amounts to nothing; and, therefore, the readers of the Accurate Observer are, as to this point at least, left to believe, that his lordship’s conduct cannot be defended, a belief which they will the more readily adopt, as the language of Mr. Sheridan seems to have been introduced for the sole purpose of furnishing a palliative comparison. And, was this acting the part of one who undertook to answer misrepresentations and calumnies? Could not the Accurate Observer have denied, as I now positively deny, that Lord Grenville has ever, during the whole course of his present opposition, made use, in parliament, of language unbecoming his rank and character? Could not the Accurate Observer have challenged his opponent to produce proof of a single instance of the contrary? Could not the Accurate Observer do this *because* Lord Grenville’s censures were bestowed on a measure which Mr. Pitt approved of; for this reason was it, that Mr. Long could not find in his heart to allow, that “ *absurd*” and “ *incapable*” were *not* epithets “ more harsh and severe than the occasion justified?”

The charge of pursuing “ a systematic and unrelenting opposition” has been frequently made against Lord Grenville and his friends; but, in support of this charge nothing like proof has ever been produced, though the More Accurate Observer appears to have flinched from the task of making a defence. The Near Observer has, however, some associates in the preferring of this accusation against Lord Grenville, namely, the two reverend and sapient gentlemen, who are the editors of that epitome of all that’s stupid and all that’s slavish, commonly called “ *The British Critic*,” in which work, for the month of December last, they have published what they term a *review* of the Plain Answer of a More Accurate Observer, which “ *review*” consists of a *page and a*

half of unconnected superficial observation, written, apparently, with no other view than that of obtaining or preserving the patronage of Mr. Addington, without abandoning the chance of again profiting from the patronage of Mr. Pitt. In this pursuit Lord Grenville is, of course, given up. Speaking of the statement, which the Accurate Observer has given of *the terms*, on which Lord Grenville promised ministers his support, these "reviewers" say: "Although even these terms must be understood with some qualification, we cannot help thinking, that so *early*, so *vehement*, and so *systematic* an opposition (commencing, if we mistake not, even *before* the peace of Amiens) was hardly compatible with this" [Lord Grenville's] "declaration" [made in the House of Lords on the 20th of March, 1801], "nor could have been justified by any measures of government, but such as should have been *manifestly corrupt in their motive*, or *alarmingly dangerous in their tendency*." It is a newly discovered doctrine, that opposition to ministers, that even strong and persevering opposition, is not to be made, unless their measures are "*manifestly corrupt in their motive*, or *alarmingly dangerous in their tendency*." But, leaving this point, as matter of opinion, to the judgment of the reader, let me ask these Reverend Critics, whether they think, that any two pupils from the school of the much-abused Jesuits could have framed a sentence better calculated to deceive the reader, without a positive falsehood on the part of the writer, than the sentence which I have here quoted from their work? "*So early, so vehement, and so systematic an opposition.*" *How early, how vehement, and how systematic*, they do not say. If they "*mistake not*," however, this vehement and systematic opposition began *before* the peace of Amiens. And, will they contend, that it was *possible* for them to make a mistake as to this fact? Will any man in England believe, that they did not well know, that Lord Grenville never opposed the ministers during the session of parliament which ended on the 2nd of July, 1801? Is it not within the recollection of every one, that his lordship and all his former colleagues supported the new ministers to the end of that session? Is it not equally notorious, that the next session *began* with the discussions on the peace with France? Is it not evident, then, that the opposition of Lord Grenville *could* not "*commence before* the peace?" And, again I ask, will any man believe, that the Editors of the British Critic were ignorant of this fact? But, they will say, perhaps, that the preliminary treaty was not the peace of *Amiens*, and, it is the peace of Amiens, of which they speak, as having taken place subsequent to the commencement of Lord Grenville's opposition! Nay, reader, start not! I assure you they are very capable of attempting to take shelter under a subterfuge like this; and though, in such an attempt, they would be puzzled to account for the phrase, "*if we mistake not*;" yet are they not men to be disconcerted. For the persons who have written and published a "review" of the pamphlets of the Near and Accurate Observer, to affect *ignorance* as to the fact *whether Lord Grenville opposed the preliminary treaty, or not*, would, I am aware, require no moderate stock of brass; but, I am also aware, that it is no moderate stock of that commodity which these gentlemen possess. In short, their remark, which I have above quoted, clearly means, and it was clearly intended to mean, and to convey to the mind of the reader, that Lord Grenville's opposition to the ministers was not only *vehement* and *systematic* from the beginning, but that it began even *before* the ministers

made peace with France; than which a more barefaced falsehood never was uttered, much less published under the sanction of two Reverend Divines.* The truth is, that neither Lord Grenville, nor any one of the New Opposition, has ever made a systematic opposition to the ministers. Have the persons composing this party ever, since the present ministers came into power, opposed a tax? Have they ever, except in an instance too glaring to be passed over, availed themselves of any of the numerous opportunities for opposing and exposing the minister upon subjects of finance? Have they ever uttered a word against the granting of the enormous supplies which he has called for? Did they oppose him upon the important questions of armament, or of war? Have they opposed any augmentation of force, by land or by sea? Have they not, in short, on all occasions, gone before the ministry in demanding resources and authority to be deposited in his Majesty's hands, or, in other words, in the hands of the ministry; that ministry whose slaves are now instructed to revile them for making a "systematic and unrelenting opposition?" How profligate, then, must be the writer, who has not scrupled to assert, that Lord Grenville "has *uniformly and undistinguishingly* condemned and opposed *every* measure of Mr. Addington's administration?" And where shall we find words to characterize those, who have employed this writer and circulated his work?

There remains only one falsehood, to which it is necessary to advert, namely, that the opposition of Lord Grenville arose, in a great measure, from *his disappointment at not being admitted into the cabinet in April last*. The Near Observer, in one part of his pamphlet, attributes the

* These Divines are Messrs. Nares and Beloe, whose titles and offices I shall not attempt to describe, seeing that they possess beneficence upon beneficence till they really swallow up as much as would well maintain ten country clergymen and their families. Neither as critics should I think of characterizing them, were it not, that, as their work is yet read, probably, by seven or eight hundred persons, amongst whom there may be some of the readers of the Register, it becomes, perhaps, my duty, to furnish a standard whereby men may be able to estimate the value of those opinions, which are, particularly on political topics, promulgated in the pages of the British Critic; and, this I shall do by the relation of a fact, which I am certain these fathers in literature as well as religion will not deny. This is it: Just after the appearance of the first edition of Mr. Walter Boyd's pamphlet on bank-notes, the Critics in question regarded it, or, at least, they declared that it was, *unanswerable*, and that it was "*in vain to endeavour to argue against it*." (I use their very words, I believe.) But, in a few days afterwards, they received a summons from the Treasury, whence they were supplied with such *arguments*, that, when their next reviewing pamphlet appeared, not only was Mr. Boyd's pamphlet found *not* to be "unanswerable;" not only was it *answered*, but the author was treated rather roughly for having written it! In speaking of *arguments* supplied by the Treasury, I wish to be literally understood. Their "review," as it was of course called, of Mr. Boyd's pamphlet was *actually furnished them from the Treasury*; and, though the opinions it contained were *diametrically the reverse* of those which the Reverend Critics had expressed, after having read the work, they very docilely inserted it in their review pamphlet, and published it to the world as *their own*! Many gentlemen are, as well by the *extraordinary* church preferment of these critics as by their confident and pompous manner of writing; many gentlemen, particularly in the country, possessing ten times the knowledge and talents of Messrs. Nares and Beloe, are by these means imposed upon; but, it is to be presumed, that the fact here related, in pointing out the *sort* of merit in which these reverend persons surpass the rest of their brethren, will embolden their readers to judge for themselves, and no longer rely, without examination, on statements such as that which I have above quoted, respecting the conduct of Lord Grenville.

opinion which Lord Grenville gave in his speech of the 23rd of November, 1802, that Mr. Pitt was the only man capable of saving the country; this opinion the Treasury slave attributes to a previous agreement made between Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt, according to which agreement the former was to be "*repaid*" by a seat in the cabinet, as soon as the latter could get into it himself. In pursuing this calumny, the slave observes, that "*since* the failure of *their* negotiation in April, Mr. Pitt " and Lord Grenville have exercised every species of aggressive and unrelenting opposition against those ministers, who had been the objects "*of their primary recommendation;*" and, in another part of the pamphlet, a hope is expressed, that Lord Grenville will "*release* Mr. Pitt from an *unprofitable contract,*" which militates against the return of the latter to power! Never was there a statement, never were there insinuations, so replete with falsehood and malice! For, *first*, Lord Grenville (and this statement applies also to Lord Spencer and Mr. Windham) never had any thing to do in the "*recommending*" of Mr. Addington or his colleagues; who, on the contrary, had, as I have before stated, actually accepted of his office, and signified his acceptance in more than one quarter, *before* Lord Grenville was informed, that such an appointment was in the contemplation of any person living. *Secondly*, as to the "*contract*" made between Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt and "*their negotiation*" in April last, Lord Grenville never was consulted; by Mr. Pitt or any other person, on the subject of that negotiation; nor did his Lordship ever, either directly or indirectly, signify either *his wish*, or *his consent*, to make part of the proposed cabinet; and, in short, he had nothing at all to do with the negotiation. If these are facts (and that they are I am sure neither Mr. Addington nor Mr. Long will deny), the public will be at a loss to determine, which is the greatest calumniator, the writer who has represented Lord Grenville as *a party in the negotiation of April last*, or he who has left his readers to conclude that this accusation is *unanswerable*.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register, March, 1804.*)

The charges which the Near Observer prefers against Mr. WINDHAM, on the score of his parliamentary conduct, are, first, his opposition to the militia system; second, his inconsistency in first calling for war, and then, when war became inevitable, declaring, all of a sudden, that it was his wish to preserve peace; third, his remaining in office during the negotiations at Lisle, to which, as it now appears, he was always opposed.

The charge respecting the militia system was fully refuted in a former part of this Analytical and Comparative View. But, it may not be amiss to add a remark or two to what was said, especially when we take into view some recent transactions. "In pursuing the subject," says the Near Observer, "we shall have the misfortune to see Mr. Windham in full fruition "*of his vow*, and the kingdom replunged into a war, which no policy, no human prudence, no moderation, no forbearance, could avert. Shall we find him consistent then? Shall we behold him arraying the forces,

“balloting the militia, calling out the volunteers? Will he impose silence upon the factious by his eloquence, banishing delays, and conquering obstacles by the vigour of his mind, giving the lesson and example of public virtue, and acting the glorious part of a patriot statesman, the disciple of Burke?” Then, when this writer comes to speak of Mr. Windham’s conduct after the declaration of war, comes the passage, which has been quoted before, and to which I beg leave to refer the reader. — To the passage, which I have here cited, and to other corresponding parts of the Treasury Pamphlet, the More Accurate Observer has given the following answer, which, as far as it goes, is fair and pertinent enough :

“He” [Mr. Windham] “is accused of that, which, at a moment like the present, would be little short of treason. He is charged with impeding and obstructing the national defence. Shall we behold him, it is asked, arraying the forces, balloting the militia, calling out the volunteers? Yes, I reply; we shall behold him amongst the foremost in *arraying the forces*, not certainly in balloting the militia, or in calling out the volunteers; but why? because he does not consider those to be the most efficient modes of arraying the forces. But in objecting to the measures brought forward by the government, he proposed others which appeared to him better calculated to attain the object which was in view; and he did not leave a shadow of pretext for the foul detraction of the Near Observer. Are we really to think, that Mr. Windham did not wish to put forth the best energies of the state for our safety and preservation, because he did not approve the plan of the ministry; or, because, perhaps, he might not think, that they knew very well how to carry their own plan into execution?”

That the balloting of the militia to a number beyond the old establishment, and that the calling out of the volunteers, was not, in reality, to array the *forces*, is now pretty evident; seeing that the volunteers are, at the end of seven or eight months, found to be “*totally inadequate to the object of their institution*,” while the great advocate of the militia, the gentleman who, of all others, most differed from Mr. Windham on the subject, has *now* discovered, that, without reducing the militia to its old number, that is to say, to the very state which Mr. Windham wished to keep it in, we cannot keep up our regular army. Precisely what measures will, as to these points, be, at last, adopted, it is impossible to say; but, as far as events have gone, they have fully proved, that to “array the forces,” in reality, would have been to do exactly what Mr. Windham recommended. If his advice had been followed, that advice which was so shamefully misrepresented by Mr. Yorke, by the Addingtons, and by their hirelings; if that advice had been followed, we should now have had, in Europe, a regular army of 130,000 effective men, a militia of 30,000, and an armed peasantry, in every part of the country, ready to assist, in case of invasion. We should have heard nothing of committees of corps; of elections of officers; of armed parliaments; of “small-bounty” men; of drilling regulations: in short, we should have heard not a word of all, or any of, the vexatious nonsense that now puzzles the heads and harasses the bodies of people of every rank and description; to say nothing of the enormous expense, to which the country is subjected, on this account, and which, by Mr. Windham’s plans, would have been, in a great part, at least, avoided.

The next charge, to wit, that of having called for war, till war became unavoidable, and, then, becoming, all of a sudden, an advocate for peace, is no better founded than the former. Upon this point the words of the Treasury writer are as follows :

“ The discussion of these transactions has led me somewhat past the period of his Majesty’s message of the 8th of March, in which the necessity had been announced of adopting measures of precaution, with regard to France; which proceeding of the ministry, and the subsequent armament they proposed, so far from producing that unanimity of parties which might have been expected, and which at first it appeared to have affected, only exasperated and laid bare the depth and foulness of their rank and mortified ambition. Will it be believed, that upon this occasion, the ‘ war faction *’ (to use the phrase of the First Consul of France) which had treated every moment of peace as a compromise of the national honour and security, which had incessantly urged, railed, and attempted to intimidate the government into immediate war, now turned, suddenly as the wind, and shifted their principles like a sail? Let us hear the language of the manly consistent Mr. Windham! ‘ He hoped that it would not be supposed that the opposers of the peace would be foremost to propose the renewal of hostilities! the very reverse would be found to be the legitimate result of the principles they had embraced; they had chiefly opposed that peace because its terms put the country out of a condition to go to war again. There were no persons holding his opinions who could contemplate the renewal of war without serious alarm.’ ”

The passage here quoted as Mr. Windham’s is not what he said. It is said to be taken from the very speech which the Receiver-General of

* “ They were styled *bloodhounds* in a print which is in the *exclusive interest of Mr. Pitt.* ” — Yes, this print, the *TRUE BRITON*, certainly is in the exclusive interest of Mr. Pitt, speaking of it as the tool of a minister, or great party man; but, this print, as well as its partner, the *SUN*, are under the control of Messrs. Long and Rose, particularly the latter; and, as long as those gentlemen saw a likelihood, or even a probability, of Mr. Pitt’s joining the ministry, and, of course, of their return to place and profit, the *True Briton* and the *Sun* were as completely devoted to Mr. Addington as they were to Mr. Pitt. In complete proof of this assertion it is only necessary to quote the very passage here alluded to by the *Near Observer*: “ Unlike an ex-war minister, and his little band of *bloodhounds*, we are not the advocates for war, much less for *eternal war*, but we are prepared to defend, to the last drop of our blood, the rights and independence of our country. If we are thus, then, to fight for our all, we surely may be allowed to express a wish to be conducted in the field by those leaders whom we love. Let Mr. Pitt, Mr. Addington, Lord *Hawkesbury*, Lord *Melville*, and a few others whom we could name, direct the affairs of the nation, and we shall think not only our safety ensured but our victory certain.” The article from which this passage is extracted was inserted in the *True Briton* of the 7th of March last, just about the time that the peace negotiation was set on foot. It was, at the time, attributed to the “ right honourable relation; ” but whether it came from the Addington or the Pitt faction is, as to the present point, of no consequence at all; seeing that the *True Briton* was, at that time, devoted to the “ well-meaning ” ministry; and, therefore, the phrase “ *bloodhounds*, ” and the base charge against Mr. Windham of being the advocate for “ *eternal war*, ” must not now be represented as exclusively imputable to the friends of Mr. Pitt. — It is, however, perfectly true, that the most venal prints in England, or in any part of the globe, Dublin only excepted, are those which espouse the cause of Mr. Pitt. The *True Briton* of the 7th of March, 1803, says: “ The *uprightness* of the intentions of the present ministry, the *real love* they bear their country, the principles which they have uniformly practised, and, a similarity of mind and sentiment *identify* them with the man [Mr. Pitt], to whom the eyes of the nation are, at this moment, anxiously turned, &c.” Now, who can read this, and compare it with the continued, the incessant attacks on ministers, which have been made in this *True Briton*, ever since the negotiation for peace broke off; who can view such an instance of versatility and baseness, without holding in abhorrence the slaves by whom it is exhibited to the world? Such, however, is, unfortunately, the taste of Mr. Pitt. It has always been his policy to surround himself with creatures and tools. In certain states of society and public affairs, such policy may, and does, succeed; but, ere this day two years, Mr. Pitt will find, that it is entirely unsuited to the present times: he will find, that efficient support is not to be purchased with money.

Cornwall so glaringly misrepresented, and which misrepresentation was noticed at the time, both in the House of Commons and out of it. But, more of this by-and-by: let us pursue the quotation:

“ It is too recent in recollection for it to be necessary for me to relate with what sentiments the public received this new creed of the most serene and pacific war-faction, and it might be thought to be out of the scope of the present topic, to advert to the surprise and astonishment which General Buonaparte is said to have manifested upon discovering the long mistake and misapprehension under which he had lived with regard to it.—I cannot, however, pass over this point altogether, because I am of opinion that the language now held by the new opposition had a considerable effect upon the negotiations which were carried on from this period, with increased activity and interest, and assumed a tone exceedingly categorical and decisive. Doubtless, it is impossible for me, or any other individual, to prove that the First Consul had not originally fixed his resolution, and that he had not been always altogether determined upon war. In this case it must be admitted, that he derived not his first motive from the extraordinary language of Mr. Windham and his colleagues. But I shall then contend, that this language must have operated to encourage and confirm his intention, which neither Mr. Windham nor any other person can deny, might positively have wavered, or have finally given way. The first Consul, in his memorable Exposé to the legislative body, had expressly stated, that ‘ this country could find no ally upon the continent, and that without allies, and single handed, she was unable to sustain a war with France.’ I believe this defiance was received with indignation by every Englishman, and by Mr. Windham among the rest; I had once thought, even more than by the rest. I believe too, that it was resented not more for its audacity, than its falsehood, and that there did not exist at that time a single individual who was not prepared to contradict and disprove it. How then must it have satisfied and delighted the First Consul to learn, that as soon as the King’s message had taught us to think in earnest upon the subject, and as soon as a distinct appearance and approach of war had become visible in England, even those statesmen who had most invoked and provoked it, were become sudden converts to his opinion, and openly declared the truth of it! With what transports must he not have heard M. Otto translate from the debates in the English papers this express statement of Mr. Windham, that ‘ he could not contemplate the renewal of hostilities without serious alarm, and that he had chiefly opposed the peace because it had put the country ‘ out of a condition to renew the war?’—

In answer to this, we may first ask, with the Accurate Observer, what pretence there is for representing the renewal of the war as “ the fruition of Mr. Windham’s vow?” The charge of being a standing advocate for war, and even for “ *eternal war*,” was made against him by the “ well-meaning” minister, and, indirectly, by the Lord Chancellor, during the early part of the discussions on the peace, a charge which he instantly and explicitly denied, repelled, and refuted, without, however, preventing them and their hirelings from repeating the charge, with just as much confidence and unconcern as if its truth had been admitted. And, how shamefully false is it to say, that Mr. Windham had “ treated every moment of peace as a compromise of national honour and security!” Is it not well known to every one, that the address, which Mr. Windham and his party proposed and voted for, on the discussion of the peace of Amiens, advised certain negotiations to be immediately entered into, in order to explain the ambiguities of that compact, and to “ preserve the peace, which his Majesty had concluded?” At the opening of the next session of Parliament, on the 23rd of November, 1802, after it became apparent, that France intended to continue her conquests in peace, as well as in war; after the transactions in Switzerland, and, indeed, after every thing, worth speaking of, that was made the subject of complaint,

in his Majesty's declaration of war; after all this had taken place, and while the ministers appeared ready to submit to as much more, Mr. Windham endeavoured to convince the House of Commons, that it was the wiser way to hold all that remained in our hands, in order not to begin the war at a greater disadvantage. His words were these: "We are a little cured of the mania, in this country, which was only an octave higher, when we were told, that those who advised the war were men delighting in blood, while those who opposed them were lovers of humanity. Not being in an official situation, I am not sufficiently informed to advise particularly; but, on such a question, I think, we should weigh well in what situation we shall be when the war shall come upon us; for, come it will, and sooner than I wish to say. I think it would be the wiser way to anticipate the blow. *We should not let out of our hands any of the means which accident or precaution has left in them for another war.*"* This passage has been quoted by the Near Observer; but, that venal slave, so well worthy of the "well-meaning" Addingtons and Hawkesburys, has taken special care to stop at the word "*blow,*" and not to insert those which are here distinguished by Italic characters, and, on which, as the reader will, at once, perceive, turned the whole force of the passage, as far as related to the contrast, which the Near Observer was drawing.—In referring to declarations imputed to Mr. Windham, relative to the reluctance of himself and his friends to hasten into a war, it will be right, first, to hear what the More Accurate Observer has said in his defence. "Mr. Windham gave, as one of his reasons for objecting to the peace, that its consequences would put us out of the condition to renew the war, which he thought would soon be necessary. He disapproved of dismantling our fleet and disbanding our army, because he thought much time would not elapse before it would be necessary to equip the one, and recruit the other. There is no inconsistency in endeavouring to avoid peace when we had large naval and military establishments on foot, and to *hesitate* in declaring war when those establishments had been let down. As little inconsistency is there in *objecting to the immediate ground of war,* and in thinking that many occasions had been passed over, on which ministers had been called upon to take up arms."—This reasoning is clear and correct enough; but an allusion is made to facts that never existed; for, Mr. Windham never "*hesitated* at declaring war," nor did he ever "*object to the immediate grounds of the war,*" though he certainly might have done it, and with perfect consistency. For my part, I always thought that the war was unavoidable; but, that the alleged grounds of it were the very worst that could have been selected. The rupture began on our part, and we made the first movement, upon a pretext which is now notoriously false. The war is grounded upon no great, no generous principle; but, in the eyes of the world, is, and ever will be regarded, as proceeding from the selfish and base desire of retaining an island, which we had, by solemn treaty, contracted to give up; and, when the ministers are called to an account for the deeds of their ministry, which, if this nation is to remain free, they must be, at no very distant time, the having embarked us in a war with the opinion of every honest and honourable foreigner against us, will not be regarded as the least of their of-

* See Speech, 23rd Nov 1802

fences. But, be this as it may, Mr. Windham, being convinced that the war was not to be avoided, never did, on any occasion, "*hesitate* at declaring war," and never did urge any "*objection to the immediate grounds,*" on which it was declared. The passage, which the Treasury writer has misrepresented, is to be found in Mr. Windham's speech of the 9th of March, 1803, during the debate that took place upon the King's message. The moment the rupture was announced the newspapers began to anticipate great exultation, on the part of Mr. Windham, and of all those who had opposed the peace; but that gentleman, and those of his party who spoke upon the occasion, took care to warn the House against founding any such expectation upon the opposition which they had made to the peace.

"It has," said Mr. Windham, "been asserted, that *war is my first wish*; but, I am, at present, in no state to say, I can be in no state to say, whether war would be expedient, or not; if it were necessary to come to an opinion, no conclusion, as to the sentiments of those who were the most vehement opposers of the peace, could be drawn as to their opinion now. That they should be supposed to be *glad* of what was now announced, that they *exulted* at it, and would *catch with impatience* at any prospect of the renewal of war, would be a conclusion as false in reasoning as unfounded in fact. The very reverse might be the case; for, he, who was a strenuous opposer of the peace, and who saw abundant reason to adhere to his opinion, might not be ready to conclude that war could be made with advantage *now*, when we had lost so much by the peace; and, therefore, the persons entertaining the same opinions that he did would think this a very serious matter."

Mr. Windham had, previously to this, frequently expressed his opinion, that a peace like that of Amiens would break the spirit of the country, and would, in every respect, tend to disqualify it for war, when war would be rendered necessary.* Was there, then, any inconsistency, was there any turning "*suddenly as the wind,*" any "*shifting principles like a sail,*" on the occasion above referred to? And, would not any men upon earth, the Addingtons and Hawkesburys excepted, have been ashamed to encourage and to circulate so flagrant a misrepresentation and for so base a purpose? The truth is, that the Treasury slave never would have thought of applying his torturing talents to this speech of Mr. Windham, had not the example been given him by Mr. Sheridan, who seized hold of it as one of those means whereby to make a display of his "*true English feeling,*" which admirable quality appears, by-the-bye, to have been quite dormant during the present session of Parliament. Mr. Windham, in explanation, positively declared, that he had expressed no such sentiments as those attributed to him by Mr. Sheridan; and, in a few days afterwards, a letter to that gentleman was published, in this work, in which the misrepresentation of Mr. Windham was clearly insisted on, and in which the consistency of his misrepresenter was proved to be of a most doubtful complexion: yet, in the face of all this, the *Near Observer* takes the exploded falsehood and serves it up afresh to those foul feeders, those swine in politics, the supporters and partisans of the present ministry.—From the date of the King's message, announcing the prospect of a speedy rupture, to the moment the Treasury hireling was instructed thus to calumniate Mr. Windham, what single word, or act, on the part of that gentleman, or his friends, was there to warrant the charge against

* See Speech of 4th of November, 1801.

them of "throwing every *obstacle* in the way of *officering the militia* ;* "of *discrediting our constitutional army altogether* ; and of preaching up "*humiliation and despondency* ?" Let those who recollect (and who can have forgotten ?) the zeal and ability, with which Mr. Windham and the gentlemen who acted with him justified the going to war ; let those who have witnessed the perseverance, with which he has, ever since that day, been endeavouring to *strengthen* the hands of the government ; let those who have observed, that it was owing to him, and to him alone, that the army of reserve produced one single regular soldier, and that it was any thing more than a mere militia ; in short, let those who have beheld the indefatigable zeal, which, in spite of all the popular odium excited against him by his cunning and cowardly opponents, he has, for these three years past, employed in the service of his king and country ; let those persons form, if they can, an adequate idea of the atrocity, which dictated this charge of "*preaching up humiliation and despondency.*"

The remaining charge against Mr. Windham relates to his conduct respecting the negotiation at Lisle.

"During these discussions" [the discussions on the peace of Amiens] ; "Mr.

* This alludes to what passed in the debate of the 18th of March 1803, in the House of Commons, and of 31st of that month in the House of Lords, upon the subject of the bill for admitting, into the militia regiments, officers from the half-pay of the army ; and the statement of the *Near Observer*, relative thereto, is a striking instance of the effects produced by the "*candour*" of your "*well-meaning*" men. Lord Folkestone was the first person who opposed the bill. He said, and very truly, that if there were not qualified persons enough in the country to officer so large a militia, it was a sufficient proof, that the militia ought to be smaller, for, that to officer it with unqualified persons was to change its nature, was to adopt an entire departure from its constitutional principle. But his lordship had a still better argument against the Secretary of War [Mr. Yorke], to wit, that the bill was, as far as it went, in complete contradiction to that famous code of militia law, which had been passed by the Parliament no more than nine months back, and *which was framed by the Secretary himself*. That code, which filled up nearly a hundred pages of the statute-book, professed to have in view the removing of all the *abuses* which had crept into the militia system during the preceding war, and the settling of the system upon a permanent basis. One of these *abuses* was, the admission of unqualified persons to be officers in the militia, the very abuse which the bill of which we are speaking was about to revive!!! And, it is for opposing: indeed, it was hardly opposing: it was merely hesitating upon a bill like this, that the gentlemen so hesitating are accused of "*throwing obstacles* in the way of *officering the militia!*" But, the baseness of this part of the Treasury writer's conduct cannot be justly estimated, till we see *who* were the persons, in the two House of Parliament, that spoke against the bill. It will be observed, that the writer imputes the "*obstacles*" to the New Opposition, and to Mr. Windham in particular. In the House of Commons the opposers of the bill were, Lord Folkestone, Mr. Bastard, and Mr. Mitford ; in the House of Lords, Lord Caernarvon, Lord Rolle, Lord Radnor, and Lord Cawdor. A majority of these noblemen and gentlemen have constantly been on the side of the ministry ; and, during the whole progress of the bill, neither Mr. Windham nor any member of the Grenville family uttered a word against it. Let the public judge, then, of the character and views of those, by whom Mr. Windham and his friends have, on account of what passed in Parliament, relative to this bill, been accused of "*throwing obstacles*" "*in the way of officering the militia, and of discrediting our constitutional army*" "*altogether.*" I cannot dismiss this subject without observing, that on *this* occasion, also, the Treasury hireling seems to have done little more than copy the misrepresentations of Mr. Sheridan, who, by way of answer to Lord Folkestone, gave vent to his "*true English feeling,*" and drew forth marks of approbation (from the galleries, I mean, of course), which Madam CINDERELLA, or even his friend CARLO, would not have despised.

“Windham,” says the *Near Observer*, “made an *important confession*, that he had always disapproved of the project offered by Lord Grenville to the French Directory; and had always censured those negotiations in his mind, to which, as a member of the Cabinet, he had outwardly lent his name, credit, and responsibility, and which he had *constantly defended in Parliament*. Neither did this confession appear officious, but indispensable; for Mr. Windham felt the glaring inconsistency of opposing the peace, and approving of the project. He knew that the basis of the treaty of Amiens, was traced at Lisle; he knew that it had been made more favourable for this country, under circumstances more unfavourable; he knew that his colleagues had not hoped to obtain the whole of their project; and that in every negotiation something must be sacrificed, and something conceded from the conditions of the overture. He knew that if it were contended, that he and his colleagues would not have departed from their project in a single tittle, it followed that it had not been a project, but an ultimatum; and that a courier had been more properly charged with it, than a minister plenipotentiary. Before therefore he would venture to condemn Lord Cornwallis’s treaty, with just regard to his own character, he took care to disclaim and disavow his part in Lord Malmsbury’s negotiation. Do I condemn the right honourable gentleman for this conduct? Not certainly for leaving all the honour of the negotiations at Lisle to Lord Grenville; not certainly for protecting his own reputation; although, in so doing, he showed little regard for that of his noble colleague, in the late Cabinet and present Opposition, whose inconsistency he was cruelly holding up to derision; but I confess, I am at a loss to conceive, what greater necessity existed now for his censuring the peace of Amiens, of which the guilt and reproach (if there were any) did not attach and were not imputed to him, than he could discover in 1797, when his just portion of the opprobrium of the negotiations at Lisle was openly fixed upon his head. I have heard this gentleman applauded by his friends to the very echo, for his consistency and manliness of conduct. Doubtless, by the side of Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham has some advantage; but positive qualities are neither dependent upon comparisons nor contrasts,—nor is a man therefore a dwarf because he happens to stand by a giant. As Mr. Windham is now at the head of a party, and of a great political principle, it is fitting to inquire a little into the truth and warrant of a title so high and so rare!—Is it consistent (with what is it consistent) to oppose a measure in the Council, and approve it in the House of Commons? To appear for peace and condemn it; to defend negotiations and lament them; to think war only can save the country, and be part of a ministry eternally straining after treaties? Is it consistent to have been silent at Lisle, and vociferous at Amiens—to be neutral in power, and violent out of it—to conceal opinions as a minister, and promulge them as the head of a party?—Are these the qualities and distinctive marks of a man of place—a man of time—a man of circumstances—a man of convenience,—or the masculine, firm, consistent, unalterable character of Mr. Windham?”

Previous to any remarks of mine upon this part of the *Treasury pamphlet*, it will be right to lay before the reader those of the *More Accurate Observer*, which, as far as they go, are perfectly just.

“Of Mr. Windham,” says he, “who, it is well known, objected strenuously to the treaty of Amiens, it is said, that since he quitted his office, ‘he has made the important confession that he had always disapproved the project offered by Lord Grenville to the French Directory.’ It is then asked, ‘Is it consistent to conceal opinions as a Minister and promulge them at the head of a party?’ Certainly Mr. Windham can seldom be reproached for *concealing opinions*; and I had always believed that his disapproval of the attempt to treat at Lisle had been very generally known, even while he was in the cabinet; but I have no difficulty in saying, that it may be justifiable to conceal opinions as a Minister, which there may be no impropriety in avowing publicly when that restraint is removed, which is imposed upon a member of the administration differing from his colleagues. It cannot be supposed that the members of the Cabinet Council are unanimous upon every question which is there decided, and it would be unfit that each member should retire because he may disapprove of the particular measure which is adopted. If he really thinks that by continuing a member of the Cabinet, under such circumstances,

“ he is more likely to forward his general public purposes, than by quitting it, every consideration of conscience and of honour calls upon him to remain, and it is his duty to resign his opinion upon the particular question, on which he differs.”

So true is this, that the present ministers have been in an almost continual state of disagreement, yet none of them have, on that account, thought proper to resign their situations. The reader will not, I am sure, have forgotten, that the Naval Abuse Bill, which the ministers had brought into, and passed through, the House of Commons, was reprobated by the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords, as the most consummate effort of tyranny. Yet nobody resigned. The first Lord of the Admiralty still held, and still holds, his place. The principle laid down by Lord Hawkesbury, in the debate upon Mr. Patten's motion, was this: “ that those who agreed, or disagreed with ministers were always understood to do so, upon a *general system*. It was not to be expected, that all should approve every particular point. They were to overlook minor differences for the sake of giving effect to the general scheme of measures and conduct of which they approve.”* Nothing can be fairer than this principle, which was well and opportunely laid down, and which produced an effect upon the House and upon the Public extremely unfavourable to Mr. Pitt. What is there, I would ask, that renders this principle inapplicable to the members of a Cabinet? Is their duty more, or is it less, sacred than that of members of Parliament? From what consideration, then, is it that “ concealing opinions” is laudable in the latter, and criminal in the former? Is it said, that the treating with France at Lisle changed the general system, upon which Mr. Windham had entered the Cabinet? If it be so said, I reply, that the change was not completed, it was not *accomplished*; and, that the argument cannot apply, because it is impossible to know that Mr. Windham would *not* have left the Cabinet, if a treaty had been concluded upon the basis of the project, of which he disapproved.—When a Cabinet Council meets, is it to be supposed, that all the members are, before a measure is adopted, of the same opinion respecting it; or, is it not well known, that they discuss the subject, and finally determine, as in the Parliament, by the majority of voices? With this fact in view, we must, in case we adopt the reasoning of the Near Observer, conclude, that, after every division, the majority ought to retire from the ministry; an absurdity too gross to be suffered for a moment.—But, it is asserted, and positively asserted, that, while Mr. Windham “ condemned the negotiations in his mind, he *constantly defended them in Parliament* ;” and, if this were worthy of censure, what must we say of those members of Parliament, who support ministers generally, and measures particularly, that they disapprove of? The comparison, however, is not fair; for the measure agitated in Parliament, if in the shape of a law, is not yet adopted, and therefore, to support it against a man's opinion may tend to *produce* a bad measure; whereas to support a cabinet measure can have no such effect, as far, at least, as that measure itself is concerned. The member of Parliament, who supports a parliamentary measure, of which he internally disapproves, assists, if the measure has not as yet received the sanction of Parliament, in doing against his opinion, that which it is in his power to assist in preventing being done; but, a cabinet minister, by defending, in Parliament, a mea-

* See Debates, 3rd June, 1803.

sure which he opposed in the cabinet, only endeavours to make the best of an evil, the existence of which it was not in his power to prevent. Every man, when he enters the cabinet, when he becomes one of his Majesty's ministers, knows, that his office is not merely to devise and execute measures, but, as far as he is able, to support and defend them in Parliament. This is the usage of the country; it is an implied condition upon which he accepts of his appointment. When, therefore, a measure has been adopted by the majority of the cabinet, it has, as to all its binding qualities, been adopted by the whole cabinet, every member of which, if he be able, and if there be a necessity for it, is bound to *speak* in its defence, as well as to endeavour to carry it into execution. Not only, then, would Mr. Windham have been fully justified in publicly defending the negotiation of Lisle, while, in his mind, he condemned it; but, had such defence, from the absence of other ministers, or from whatever cause, become necessary, it would have been his bounden duty to have made it to the utmost of his ability. All this, however, is arguing for argument sake; for, the fact is, that, as there never was any necessity for Mr. Windham's defending the negotiations of Lisle, so, notwithstanding the positive assertion, that "he *constantly defended* them in Parliament," he *never did*, from first to last, utter one single word in their defence!* So that, this fact, which was discovered through a recent "important confession;" this fact, whereon the Treasury slave has founded his charge; whence he has inferred, that Mr. Windham is "a man of place, a man of time, a man of circumstances, a man of convenience and of docile conscience;" this fact turns out at last, to be a naked unqualified falsehood, invented, purchased, and circulated, for the purpose of misrepresenting and calumniating the character of Mr. Windham, a purpose which, I am sorry to say, seems not to have been too base for the mind of the More Accurate Observer, who, with the smooth tongue of a panegyrist, has taken care to withhold from the person panegyricized all those public virtues, which he possesses in so eminent a degree, and of which, upon such an occasion, it was peculiarly proper to dwell.—

"I should," says he, "have thought, that even those who objected most to the opinions of Mr. Windham, would have seen in him much to admire. His *courage* and his *manliness*; his acquirements as a *scholar*; his manners as a *gentleman*; the *acuteness* and *ingenuity* of his mind, and the *general disinterestedness* of his conduct.—A 'Near Observer' might easily have discovered that an aversion to every thing that is mean is a striking feature of his character.—Much as I admire the character of Mr. Windham, I shall never point to *prudence* and *discretion* as his most prominent virtues. Inferior men who possess more of these qualities, will often have great advantages over

* This falsehood respecting Mr. Windham's having *defended* the negotiations of Lisle is repeated in another Treasury pamphlet, entitled, "*A Plain Reply, &c.*" where, in referring to Mr. Windham's conduct, the writer says: "*It is stated*, that he stood up in defence of the measure" [the negotiation] "in Parliament." Yes; "it is stated;" that is true enough, but it is stated falsely, and by no one but the Near Observer. This PLAIN ANSWERER has also *his* statements: he states, for instance, that Lord Temple, fearing to offend his constituents, gave, at first, "his *assent* to the preliminaries of peace, than which a more barefaced falsehood never found its way into print. The author of this "Plain Answer" is a perfectly "well-meaning" man; full of all sorts of cant, overcharged with professions of candour, and as is usual with his sect, he concludes with "a distinct avowal, that there is not a single fact adduced by him which is not founded in the *strictest truth*," thus binding up his faggot of falsehoods with a withe of the same sort.

"him. Upon all important political questions, he forms his own judgment *without any reference to that of others*; and, when he most disagrees in the sentiments of *the public*, his *chivalrous* nature seems to impose it as an obligation upon him the more to press and urge his own opposite opinions. Those opinions also he appears to me often to *push to extremes*. I know not whether the conduct of Mr. Windham be calculated to render him generally popular, but I know, that no man deserves more credit than himself for an *honest* and *conscientious* discharge of public duty."

Yes, a very worthy creature: a mighty good sort of a man: as "well-meaning" a man as need to be: and, as for honesty! as honest and conscientious as the tinman-minister himself! Never, during the whole time that he was in office, either robbed the army of its pay, or went to bed till he had done his day's work!—This is a most excellent character for a footman, and, perhaps, it might suffice for a butler. But, Mr. Windham has other and higher qualities: he has "courage and manliness;" he has great "acquirements as a scholar;" he has "acuteness and ingenuity of mind," and, "generally speaking, he is disinterested." These are all very good in their way, but, though they are always desirable in a gentleman, they are not the qualities which one would select as objects of praise, when one was engaged in defending the character of a legislator and a statesman: on such an occasion one would dwell upon his *wisdom* and *public virtue* generally; and particularly upon his *penetration*, his *foresight*, his *perseverance*, his *prudence* and *discretion*. So far, however, from pointing out these qualities in the gentleman, who is the subject of his pretended defence, the More Accurate Observer has thought proper to insinuate, that he has very little prudence or discretion, adding, that, "upon all important political questions, he forms his own judgment *without any reference to that of others*, and, when he most disagrees with the sentiments of the public, his *chivalrous* nature seems to impose it as an obligation upon him the more to press and urge his own opposite opinions, which he appears often to *push to extremes*." That is to say, right or wrong, he follows his own will, becoming obstinate merely in proportion to the resistance he meets with, and ending, at last, in wildness and extravagance: in short, a perfect Don Quixote in politics. The conclusion is, that, though a very worthy private gentleman, and though he might not do much harm in the Parliament House, he is totally *unfit to be admitted into the Cabinet*. That is the point aimed at: thither tends every word of this double-faced defender: here is the object never lost sight of by the partisans of Mr. Pitt. The readers of the *Register* will recollect, that, in the month of August, 1802, the *True Briton* contained a *panegyric* upon Mr. Windham, so much like that which is above quoted, that there can be little doubt of its having proceeded from the same pen, especially when we take into view the connection between the proprietor of that print and the late Secretaries of the Treasury. On that occasion also, he was complimented for his virtues in *private* life, but, his defender *candidly* acknowledged, that he was not "a *safe politician*," because he was apt to "push his opinions to extremes," the very words that the More Accurate Observer now makes use of; and, I am fully persuaded, that Mr. Long was the author of the article, to which I have here referred. Nor has Mr. Pitt himself at all times been able to refrain from throwing out hints of the same nature and tendency. I shall not easily forget the glee with which he broadly hinted at the *wildness* of Mr. Windham's pro-

position relative to the reduction of the militia,* a proposition which, at the end of only eight months, he himself adopts, adopts in the true sense of the word, for he fathers, and actually brings it before the Parliament as his own! On that occasion he took precisely the course pursued by his friend the More Accurate Observer: "I know," said he, "the *warmth* and *noble ardour* of my right honourable friend; I know that "no one burns more than he does with *enthusiastic zeal* and *disinterested patriotism*; I know, that there is no *sacrifice* either in *fortune* or in *person* that he is not perfectly ready to make for the service of his country;" to which he might have added, "but, I well know, that *these* are qualities, which, unaccompanied with others, so far from recommending my right honourable friend as a *statesman*, will directly tend "to make people distrust his judgment, and, of course, to keep aloof from "his opinions and his advice." This he might have added, for, most assuredly, this was what he meant.—Without, however, laying much stress upon the conduct and language of Mr. Pitt himself, with regard to Mr. Windham, it will not, I am sure, be thought unfair, if, in order to remove the misrepresentations of the More Accurate Observer; if, in defence of the character of a gentleman, to whom he has denied every quality of a statesman, I sometimes refer, by way of illustration, to the conduct of the person, whom he has represented, not only as the first of men, but, as "the *only* man capable of saving this country." And here it would, if we had time, be, by no means, impertinent to ask, how this country, after having been so long under the guidance of this first of men, came to *want saving*? Leaving this hint to be improved on by persons of more leisure and of minds better adapted to the unravelling of knotty points, I proceed to inquire of Mr. Long, where he can show me an instance of a want of *prudence* or *discretion* in the conduct of the gentleman, whom he has, as far as his ability would go, robbed of those qualities? To human beings it is not given to talk and act, and *never* to err. I set up no such preposterous claim in behalf of Mr. Windham: still less am I disposed to assert, that he is not chargeable with imprudence or indiscretion, according to the sense in which those words are but too often accepted. In a country, as was once before observed, where, for twenty years past, such infinite pains have been taken (unintentionally, without doubt), by those to whose hands the public affairs have been committed, to eradicate every sentiment of national honour; where the love of military glory is stifled by low and selfish propensities; where the people look to the Bank in place of the arsenals for protection; in such a country caution will ever be the first, and courage the last, quality, that will be generally desired in a statesman. A want of discretion will be regarded as much worse than a want of zeal, ability, or even integrity. Discretion is, I allow, a most essential quality; but, it is *real* discretion, and not that spurious sort of it, which is much more worthy of the name of indecision or pusillanimity, and with the effects of which we are *now* so severely and so justly scourged.—As a proof of Mr. Windham's want of prudence and discretion, his being "unpopular" has been first assumed and then produced; but, allowing, for argument's sake, that he is as unpopular as Mr. Long and the "right honourable relation" would have him, what does that prove? Why, not that he wants prudence and dis-

* Speech of June 23, 1803. See Register, vol. iii. p. 1837.

cretion, but that he does not possess *that sort*, which creates popularity; for, if we make popularity the criterion of prudence and discretion, Mr. Sheridan has long been the most prudent and discreet man in England, with the single exception of the prudent and discreet Thomas Paine. But, as to popularity, there are different sorts of that too; the lowest, that which has been obtained in such abundance by Messrs. Sheridan and Paine, is drawn from the ignorance and factiousness of the country; the next worst kind is extorted from selfishness and cowardice, and this falls to the share of the Addingtons and Mr. Pitt; while to Mr. Windham and persons like him there belongs only that applause which is bestowed by *real* loyalty and patriotism, under the control of good sense. That, in the present state of public feeling, the sort of popularity possessed by Mr. Pitt is the best calculated to serve himself, I am quite ready to grant; but, that it is also the best calculated to serve the country, must, I think, be very much doubted by all those, who look upon that country as standing in need of being "*saved*." If I am asked, what a minister would be able to effect without extensive popularity; I cannot positively answer; but, in my turn, I ask: *What has Mr. Pitt effected*, in an administration of twenty years, having, during the far greater part of the time, a power over the country as absolute as that of the potter over the clay? Has he succeeded in providing for the security and in enhancing the glory of his country; or, has he merely advanced his own consequence and power? Besides, the question is not, what a statesman of high principles and *little* popularity would be able to effect; because, I contend, that the statesman of high principles would have *great* popularity, were there no statesmen of low principles, were there none such to under-bid him with the people.—In some things, as I said before, there is no denying, that Mr. Windham may be deficient in point of prudence and discretion. I am, for instance, ready most freely to allow, that Mr. Windham had not the prudence to abandon a gentleman, who had rendered essential services to the government, and to vote for his being vexed with a groundless prosecution, merely because a contrary line of conduct would have prevented the loss of some trifling portion of popularity. Mr. Windham, when he retired from office, had not, I allow, the discretion to make an offer of remaining, without his colleagues, and to form part of a ministry, who came in upon a principle which he professed to hold in abhorrence. Had Mr. Windham advised the ministers to make peace; had he defended and extolled that peace when made, he certainly would not have been discreet enough to withdraw his councils and to stand aloof from those ministers, the moment the evils of the peace became apparent; and, finally, when the short-lived pacification was turned into a war, exciting discontent and provoking a vote of censure, Mr. Windham assuredly would not have had the prudence to move the previous question, thereby avoiding the reproach of opposing the government, at the same time that he left them exposed to public scorn, and that, too, principally for being unable to extricate themselves from difficulties, into which he himself had assisted to lead them. Mr. Windham, "disapproving of the principal measures of Mr. Addington," never would have had the prudence, not only to conceal his disapprobation, from September to June, but also to consent, in the meantime, to enter the cabinet with that same Mr. Addington; and, if he had so completely subdued his feelings and disguised his opinions for so long a time, I am sure he would not have suffered them to break forth just *after* the failure of a negotiation for his return to place.

Mr. Windham, whenever, unfortunately for his country, his health shall not, for a long period, permit him to attend his duty in Parliament, will not, I am afraid, through the means either of prudence or discretion, be able, all at once, to take upon him the arduous duties of a cabinet minister, including those of a member of Parliament. Yes, I allow, that Mr. Windham, thinking it right to move for an inquiry relative to the insurrection in Dublin, would not have had the prudence to advise his partisans to vote for the motion, while he himself shrunk from the discussion. All this, and more too, I am ready to allow; but, while I thus unequivocally and unreservedly acknowledge, that, in these respects, Mr. Windham would have discovered a want of prudence and discretion, it will, I hope, be permitted me to state certain other cases, in which he has, or would have had, a sufficiency of prudence and discretion. He was too prudent to be an advocate for parliamentary reform at all, and, if he had been, I am persuaded he never would have broached principles and opinions that would afterwards have been pleaded as an example to, and in justification of, persons accused of high treason, persons brought to trial, too, under his own administration. Mr. Windham would not have had the imprudence to name Mr. Addington and his colleagues for ministers, still less likely is he to have had the indiscretion to eulogize them severally and jointly in the Parliament; but, had he done so, certain I am, that he never would, at a subsequent epoch, have pretended to entertain doubts of their fitness to act in a cabinet with himself. Mr. Windham did not defend either the preliminaries of London or the treaty of Amiens, and, of course, he was not so short-sighted and indiscreet as to expatiate with high-sounding praise on the provision relative to *Malta*, as being wisely calculated to conciliate all parties, and "to prove to Europe a *lasting bond of peace*;" nor did he consign himself to everlasting ridicule, by extolling the "establishment of the infant republic of the *Seven Islands*," "as an acquisition of an importance to this country, not inferior to the *possession of Malta itself*." Mr. Windham, had he been minister of finance, would have been too prudent to obtain from the legislature an act to release the Bank from the penalties attending its advancing money to the government without the sanction of Parliament. In such a measure Mr. Windham would have seen the distant cause of paper depreciation, of the destruction of public credit, and of ministerial independence of both the Parliament and the Crown. Well knowing, that the existence of the State is inseparable from that of the Church, Mr. Windham would never have procured a law to alienate, in part, the property of the latter, thereby undermining one of the principal pillars of that constitution, to preserve which we are now called on to spend our last shilling, and to shed our last drop of blood. Mr. Windham is, by Mr. Pitt, said to be warm, sanguine, and enthusiastic in his pursuits; but, I will venture to say, that he would have been too cautious and prudent to have boasted prematurely of the wondrous effects of a "solid system of finance," and afterwards have converted that system into an instrument of destruction to a fund, on the alleviating operations of which he had pledged his own fame and the faith of the country. Mr. Windham, convinced of the truth of the maxim, that "honesty is the best policy," would have been too prudent to call upon Parliament to impose what is called a restriction upon the Bank, but which is, in reality, a protection to the Bank in withholding payment of its promissory notes; and, if, in a moment of accumulated difficulty, he had been prevailed upon to adopt

so unwise and so fatal a measure, which he had afterwards handed down to a feeble creature that he himself had chosen for his successor, will any man believe, that, at a moment when that feeble creature was sinking under the growing burden so placed upon his shoulders, and when members from every part of the House were ringing in his ears the depreciation of his paper and the diminution of their fortunes; will any man who knows Mr. Windham believe, that, at such a moment and under such circumstances, he would have sat a *silent*, and, apparently an *indifferent*, not to say a *gratified*, spectator of the scene? To conclude; the More Accurate Observer has spoken of the "*chivalrous nature*" of Mr. Windham; and, if by chivalrous he means, generous, faithful, and brave, the epithet is assuredly the most fit that could possibly have been chosen; but, if he wishes to convey an idea of that empty vanity, that braggart enthusiasm, which is inspired by Cockney wine and hyperbolical praise from the lips of hired singers, then I call upon him to point out the time when Mr. Windham could so far forget his rank and his character.

I should now enter on my last proposed point; to wit; *the parliamentary conduct of Mr. Pitt*; but want of room obliges me to defer it till my next, for which, indeed, I am not sorry, as the delay will afford me an opportunity of introducing some remarks on the **PLAIN REPLY**, and on the pamphlet of Mr. **WARD**.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register, March, 1804.*)

V. *Mr. Pitt's conduct in Parliament after his retiring from office to the night of Mr. Patten's motion inclusive.*

During the remaining part of the session of Parliament, which was far advanced at the time when Mr. Pitt ceased to be minister, it is well known that he gave the new ministers his unqualified support. The next session opened with the discussions on the preliminary treaty with France and the convention with Russia, of both which measures he expressed his perfect approbation, and, indeed, there is little doubt of his having been consulted, in every stage of the negotiation of both those compacts. The Parliament, during the winter of 1802, was seldom honoured with his presence; but, he appeared in his place, while the discussions upon the Definitive Treaty were going on; and, when the final question, relative thereto, was put, he sealed his approbation by his vote in favour of the ministers. After this he disappeared for the rest of the session, which closed with the month of June. The summer of 1802 was spent by the members of Parliament in attending to their elections; by the ministers in reducing the army and navy, and in surrendering our conquests; and, by the Consul of France in augmenting his army and navy, in making new conquests, and in answering, with suitable disdain, the numberless attempts made by ministers to crawl into his good graces. The new-modelling of the German Empire, the annexing of Piedmont to the republic of France, the renewed and direct interference, on the part of the Consul, in the affairs of Holland,

and the still more direct and more violent interference in the affairs of Switzerland, had all taken place previous to the meeting of Parliament, at which time, too, it was clearly understood, that the ministers, after having long wavered between resistance and submission, after having dispatched, to the conquered colonies, orders and counter-orders, and counter-counter-orders, had finally resolved to yield up every thing but Malta, which was only retained because the mode of surrender could not be satisfactorily adjusted; but which, it was, by some persons, apprehended, would prove a new cause of hostility. Such was the state of things when Parliament met, on the 23rd of November, 1802. Mr. Pitt never made his appearance in the House of Commons, till the 23rd of the ensuing month of May, when he came down to defend the ministers upon the question of an address to his Majesty, in consequence of his message and declaration relative to the war with France. In the previous part of the session much business had been done, many important subjects had been discussed, and several laws, deeply affecting the interests of the public weal, had been passed: yet, Mr. Pitt appeared not: even the message of the 8th of March, announcing the hostile preparations of France, and the prospect of a speedy rupture, was not sufficient to bring him to Parliament. On the 23rd of May, he gave his cordial support to the address, in a long and animated speech; which speech, however, breathed very little friendship for the ministers; but, on the contrary, seemed studiously to avoid every topic of praise, and even to prepare the way for that negative kind of censure, which he passed on their conduct on the 3rd of June, when he moved the previous question upon the motion for positive censure, proposed by Mr. Patten. It was on that day that he openly broke with the ministers: from that day they appeared to have numbered him amongst their enemies: and, accordingly, from that day, their partisan, the *Near Observer*, seems to have received instructions to commence the work of retaliation.

The charge of the *Near Observer* against Mr. Pitt is made in a very irregular way; we find its parts scattered from one end to the other of the pamphlet; it is a skirmishing, bush-fighting sort of warfare; but, the substance of all the parts collected together may be expressed in one sentence, thus: "That Mr. Pitt recommended the present ministers to the King, and prevailed upon them to accept of their places; but, that previously to their doing so, he promised them his *constant support*; that he did support them, up to the day, when the memorable negotiation for his return to power was broken off; but, that, from that time forward, from the time when Mr. Addington refused to surrender at discretion, Mr. Pitt commenced a most foul and rancorous opposition, and, in the course of that opposition, showed himself to be 'selfish, malignant, profligate, corrupt, unprincipled, and perfidious.'"—Hard words, to be sure; and, certainly, if applied without qualification, very unjustly applied to Mr. Pitt; but, since they have been applied to him, one cannot help being pleased to hear them proceed from the mouths of the Addingtons and Hawkesburys, from the mouths of those, whom he had cherished, only because they were little and low; only because they suited him as instruments, whereby to keep from all participation in power those persons of whose talents and whose influence he was jealous.

That Mr. Pitt did on the 3rd of June last, in moving the previous question upon Mr. Patten's motion, commence an opposition against the ministers is certain; nor can it be denied, that he has continued that

opposition ever since. The question to be decided, therefore, appears to be this: whether his opposition arose from that pure sense of public duty, by which he professed, and still professes, to be actuated; or, from the motive, to which it is ascribed by the hireling of the Treasury, that is, malice against Mr. Addington for refusing to give him *carte blanche* in surrendering the government into his hands? This is the question, upon which those who wish duly to estimate the conduct of Mr. Pitt have to decide. It has, by Mr. Bentley, by Mr. Long, by Mr. Ward, and by several others, been so entangled with circumstances, so choked up with digressions of censure on one side, and of panegyric on the other, that after having read their productions, we really lose sight of it altogether; and, in order to arrive at any thing like a rational conclusion, are obliged to return to the point whence we first started on the inquiry. Here, then, confining our view to the main point before us, we hear the *Near Observer* charging Mr. Pitt with having commenced an opposition out of revenge, which revenge arose from his not being able to re-possess himself of his former place upon his own terms. This is the charge, unequivocally alleged, and maintained by a show, at least, of fact and argument; but, receiving much greater support from the internal evidence afforded by the circumstances of the case: for, if we know that a man has been in negotiation for a place in the cabinet, if we know that the negotiation has been broken off on account of a disagreement as to the terms, if we know that before the negotiation he never openly disapproved of the measures of ministers, and if we hear him openly disapprove of those very same measures after the negotiation, do we not fairly, do we not naturally, nay, do we not almost necessarily, conclude, that his opposition arises from his disappointment? Every man of common sense and common sincerity, to whom this question is put, will, without hesitation, answer, yes. Mr. Pitt and his partisans seem to have been fully aware of the truth and the force of this observation; and accordingly, the two writers, who alone are in this respect worthy of notice, have endeavoured to point out "motives for his conduct more probable than those of mortification and disappointment." But, the zeal of Mr. Long and Mr. Ward, though the former had, doubtless, all the aid which Mr. Pitt himself could afford him, has been insufficient for the purpose. The internal evidence of the case is too strong; it is of too simple and too convincing a nature to be overset, to be shaken, or even to be, in the slightest degree, affected, by any thing short of well-established facts, instead of which we find, in the writings here spoken of, a reliance upon hints, conjectures, and insinuation, and some of these stated with so much reserve and obscurity, that we are compelled to guess at the literal meaning of the writer, as well as at the object of his allusions. Let us hear Mr. Long's list of justificatory reasons.

"It will not be difficult to suggest motives for Mr. Pitt's conduct *more probable* than mortification and disappointment. A person, not blinded, like the *Near Observer*, by his aversion to the late minister, may, perhaps, think that it is *just possible*, that some difference of opinion with Mr. Addington upon the general subject of finance; that some difference as to the management of our foreign affairs; that some difference in particular as to the conduct of ministers in the negotiation with France, may have operated on Mr. Pitt's mind. He may have thought the representation of our financial resources on the 10th of December last was not perfectly correct; though afterwards he may have thought it of little avail to revive or to comment upon a statement made in contemplation of peace, when war had been declared. He may have thought that the necessary steps to conciliate foreign powers had been omitted, that

"alliances had been neglected; He may have thought that though the hostile spirit of the First Consul of France was sufficiently manifest, yet that from the treaty of Amiens to the breaking out of the war, that spirit had been met in a manner more likely to invite and encourage, than to counteract and resist it. He may have communicated these opinions, or at least some of them, to his Majesty's ministers, and he may have found that they were either rejected as ill-founded, or unattended to altogether."

To this Mr. Ward has added nothing, except *words*. He has taken up precisely the same suggestions, and has given to them that cumbrous amplification, which, together with an affectation of dignity in the manner and of candour in the sentiment, illustrated occasionally by far-fetched similes expressed in new-fangled phrases, constitute that which, in the frivolous cant of the day, is denominated the "gentlemanly style." But, does Mr. Long think that mere suggestions, and does Mr. Ward think that mere words are sufficient to resist the potent circumstances, the strong circumstantial evidence, to which they are here opposed? We know that Mr. Pitt never openly expressed his disapprobation of any of the measures of Mr. Addington, before the latter refused to admit him into the cabinet upon his own terms; and we also know, that *after* that refusal, he commenced an open opposition, grounded upon the measures which Mr. Addington had adopted previous to the refusal. These are facts; this is presumptive proof; and is this to be met by "probabilities?" Are we to disbelieve our own senses; are we, at once, to abandon all the principles, according to which we have been accustomed to judge, because Mr. Pitt is the defendant? Is there one law, one moral and politic code for him, and another for other men? And if there is not, let me ask Mr. Long or Mr. Ward, what would, under circumstances similar to those of this case, have been their decision, with respect to the conduct of any other man? Would they have considered mere suggestions, mere probabilities, as forming a satisfactory answer to a charge founded upon circumstances so convincing?

But supposing Mr. Long's suggestions to be, in reality, *assertions*. Suppose, that he means to say, and ought to be understood as saying, that a "difference of opinion with Mr. Addington," upon several subjects, *positively did* "operate on the mind of Mr. Pitt;" suppose Mr. Long to mean, not that Mr. Pitt "*may* have" disapproved of such or such a part of the conduct of ministers, but that he *positively did* disapprove of that conduct. Having adopted this supposition, let us, then, inquire a little into the nature of the subjects upon which Mr. Pitt differed in opinion with Mr. Addington, and discover, if we can, what were the grounds of this difference; because, if we should find that the subjects are of an unimportant nature, or that the disapprobation of Mr. Pitt was unreasonable and unjust, we shall by no means be inclined to admit, that his entertaining such disapprobation is a proof of his not having commenced an opposition from motives of mortification and disappointment. — Mr. Long deals so much in general terms that one can hardly fix upon any thing that he says. It is, however, pretty clear, that he wishes to have it understood, that Mr. Pitt differed in opinion with Mr. Addington upon subjects of finance generally, and that he particularly disapproved of the Doctor's "representation of our financial resources on the 10th of December, 1802." As to the *general* subject of finance, it is impossible for us to know, or even to guess at, what were the grounds of Mr. Pitt's disapprobation; nor, indeed, would it be very easy to conceive how it was possible for any grounds of this sort to exist, seeing that, up to the end

of the session of Parliament which closed in June 1802, Mr. Pitt not only approved of, but openly supported, every one of Mr. Addington's measures of finance; and I know of no financial measure whatever that was adopted between that time and the evening of Mr. Patten's motion. "The representation of the 10th of December, 1802," is particularly mentioned by Mr. Long, as being disapproved of by Mr. Pitt. But, though that representation was certainly fallacious, though it was proved to be so at the time, though it showed the vanity and incapacity of the Doctor, yet, it cannot be regarded as a cardinal political sin, a sin of so heinous a nature as to make a man's dearest friends shun him, as if he were infected with the plague; not certainly a sin of a magnitude to induce members of parliament to desert a minister. The Doctor over-rated his means: he estimated the surplus of the Consolidated fund at 7,800,000*l.*, and actually inserted it at 6,500,000*l.*, whereas, as it was then foretold, and as it now has been proved by experience, he should have estimated it at between 4 and 5 millions. But, was it fair for Mr. Pitt to desert a minister, and a minister who depended on him too, for a cause like this? Was it for Mr. Pitt to resent so deeply the making of an over-estimate? Was it for Mr. Pitt, above all men living, to punish so severely the crime of playing off a financial deception? The Doctor's fallacious statement was, it is true, published in a pamphlet, at the expense of the public, and transmitted to our ministers at all the foreign courts: and was not the fallacious pamphlet of George Rose published and circulated in the same manner? The Doctor's receipts have fallen short of his calculations; and did not Mr. Pitt's receipts frequently fall short of his calculations? And, were he to return to office, aided by his trusty Empson and Dudley, would not his receipts still fall short of his calculations? Does it not, then, require an uncommon degree of hardihood for Mr. Long to hold forth the incorrectness of the December statement as a reason for Mr. Pitt's opposing the Doctor at all, and especially for commencing, on that account, an opposition, which had been delayed till six months after that statement was made?

The next subject of Mr. Pitt's disapprobation of the measures of ministers is, their mismanagement of our foreign affairs, and particular mention is made of their having neglected to form continental alliances. How much any ministry, in any period of our history, could have done in this way, in the space of eight or nine months, Mr. Long has not told us: indeed, it was impossible that he should; but, it was, "under existing circumstances," his duty to endeavour, at least, to show, that there was a *possibility* of obtaining a hearing, upon such a subject, in any one court of Europe, after the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, that treaty in which Britain basely abandoned her most faithful allies, and prostrated herself to the earth before her rival: it was Mr. Long's duty to show, not that there existed the means, not that there was a likelihood (that would be asking too much of him), but it was his duty to show, that there was a *possibility*, of forming continental alliances, in nine months after the disgrace and infamy of Britain had been signed and sealed in that treaty to which Mr. Pitt gave his unequivocal approbation and support. I know, that there prevails, with Mr. Pitt and his defenders, a strong desire to inculcate a belief, that he did not *entirely* approve of the peace with France nor of the convention with Russia: Mr. Long everywhere carefully avoids any avowal that Mr. Pitt did give to those measures, or either of them, his decided approbation; and in one place he speaks of

“ all the *qualifications* which accompanied Mr. Pitt’s approval of the “ treaty of Amiens.” But, where? will he be so good as to tell us *where* we are to look, to what speech, or what action of Mr. Pitt we are to refer, for a sign of *all* these qualifications, or any one of them? At the very first appearance of the preliminary treaty of peace, Mr. Pitt declared that it “ afforded matter of *joy* and *exultation* to the country, and entitled the “ government [that is the ministers] to its warmest approbation, and “ *most grateful thanks.*” When that treaty came to be discussed, he made a long and elaborate defence of it, interlarded with occasional sarcasms upon those by whom it was thought to be of an injurious and dangerous tendency. During all the discussions on the definitive treaty, he never opened his lips but for the purpose of approving of that compact, or of thwarting and attacking the persons who disapproved of it; and, at the close of the first day’s debate upon the address proposed by the New Opposition, he rose to oppose an adjournment, because he was “ ready “ to vote for the amended address, being *perfectly satisfied* with the arguments so ably and *successfully* urged by his noble friend, Lord Hawkesbury.” Where, then, as it was once before asked, where are we to look for “ all the qualifications,” with which Mr. Pitt gave his approval to the treaty of Amiens? And, where, too, I again ask, are we to look for an apology for those, who *now* endeavour to make the world believe in the existence of such qualifications? It is not necessary for me to say, that I have no partiality for the miserable inefficient creatures, with whom Mr. Pitt found it convenient to fill up the offices of the state; but I have a partiality for truth and fair play, and certain I am, that every honourable man will agree with me, that nothing ever was more foul than for Mr. Pitt *now* to attempt to get rid of the share of that shame which is due to the makers and advisers of the peace; and, at the same time, to blame his associates for not having since accomplished that, which, as was repeatedly foretold at the time, the peace itself must necessarily render them unable to accomplish.

The third ground of Mr. Pitt’s disapprobation is stated to be, the manner in which the last negotiation of France was conducted. We are told by Mr. Long, that the ministers exhibited a want of firmness; that they should have transported those “ accredited spies,” the French military commissaries, with indignation, from our shores. Several other instances of pusillanimity are pointed out; and, indeed, the readers of the *Register* and of the Parliamentary Debates, will find that these instances were all pointed out, and commented on, with just severity, more than *eight months* before Mr. Pitt thought proper to let the world know that they had attracted his attention; and, if they were not of importance enough to bring him down to the Parliament for a day or two, though he was in town, and was *ready to become minister* in the earlier part of the session, will any one allow, that it is fair to urge them as a ground of that opposition, which he commenced in the month of June, against the very men, in conjunction with whom, provided his own terms were acceded to, he was ready to re-enter the cabinet? But, the main objection, we are told, that Mr. Pitt had to the conduct of ministers, with respect to France, was, their having *delayed too long* the opening of negotiations for an arrangement with regard to Malta; and we are even given to understand, that he, from the first, disapproved of that part of the treaty which related to that island. Upon this point let us hear both his defenders.

“ Without entering,” says Mr. Long, “ into the merits of the peace of Amiens,

“it was not difficult to perceive, at a *very early period*, that it could only be preserved by a firm, manly, and uniform system. We should not, in the first instance, have entered into stipulations respecting the future state and government of the island of Malta, without the full authority and consent of those powers upon whom the execution of those stipulations depended; but, in every point of view, we should have adjusted the final settlements of that island, the only difficult point the negotiation presented, *with our conquests in our hands*. We should have insisted that the restitution of those conquests should have been accompanied on the part of France with pacific dispositions and pacific measures. In no case should our conduct have been submissive. If we had manifested this determination *at the beginning*, and acted upon it throughout; if we had adopted that system of precaution and firmness so strenuously *recommended by Mr. Pitt*, and upon which, in the discussion of the preliminaries of peace, he represented our security to depend—who is there who can say *the war might not have been avoided?*”

Mr. Ward, after stating those obstacles to the execution of the articles respecting Malta, which, so early as the month of March, 1802, were stated in the *Political Register*, and which were, much more minutely and with infinitely greater ability and effect, displayed by Lord Grenville in his speech on the definitive treaty, proceeds thus:—

“Yet these glaring defects in the most important stipulation of the whole arrangement; that upon which France was known to be most obstinate, most irritable, and most ready to quarrel; that upon which, finally, she has quarrelled; they signed the treaty, knowing it could not be executed, as a man signs a bond which he knows will lodge him in a gaol. Even this might possibly have with prudence been repaired, had they been more intent upon the duration of the peace, than the temporary importance of having achieved it. Had they applied themselves with fidelity and zeal to the correction of their errors, and frankly avowed the original obstacles; had they set themselves to work *ON THE INSTANT with their antagonist, animated with an equal love of peace on his side; it is possible they might have new modelled the article, and all might yet have been well*. But no: they dreaded all farther altercation; they dared not hazard the reputation they had acquired; their advantage was immediate, the danger contingent. The consequence was what might be expected: *the dreadful mine has since exploded!*”

Now, as to the signing of the article relative to Malta, which act Mr. Ward, in another place, ascribes to “*infatuation beyond all mental power to conceive;*” we may surely ask, whether he who defended and applauded the treaty must not also have laboured under infatuation, unfortunate in any man, but peculiarly so in a second “*Camillus,*” another “*Cato,*” he who is “*to save the city and restore the tottering state?*” Am I told, that there were circumstances regarding Malta, obstacles to the fulfilment of the article, which the ministers hid from Mr. Pitt? My answer is, that they could not hide them from Lord Grenville: his lordship saw them all, and, if Mr. Pitt had not the advantage of timely information from that quarter, he had similar information from Mr. Windham, in his place in the House of Commons. So that, there is no refuge here: either he saw the obstacles, or he wanted penetration and judgment; or, as Mr. Ward has it, he laboured under “*infatuation beyond all mental power to conceive.*” But, it is to the *remedy*, which we are desired to believe Mr. Pitt would have employed, and which he disapproved of the ministers for not employing, that I wish to direct the reader’s attention. This remedy was, we are now told by his partisans, “*a firm, manly, and uniform conduct; a system of precaution and firmness; no surrender of conquests till we had finally adjusted and settled the difficult points in the arrangement; the ministers should have set themselves to work on the instant;*” and, if they had thus acted, “*all*

might yet have been well," says Mr. Ward, and "who is there that can say," asks Mr. Long, "that the war might not have been avoided?" And was not this remedy prescribed by the New Opposition, in their proposed address of the 13th of May, 1802? Did they not, in that memorable, that prophetic address to their Sovereign, expressly state their apprehensions from "the numerous subjects of clashing interest and *unavoidable dispute*, which the treaty had left entirely unadjusted;" and did they not, as "a necessary consequence of their sincere wish for the permanence of the public tranquillity, earnestly recommend to his Majesty's wisdom the *pressing* necessity of arranging, by *immediate and amicable discussion*, those points of essential interest, for which no provision had been made in this negotiation?" Did they not here prescribe the very remedy, which we are now requested to believe that Mr. Pitt wished the ministers to adopt? Did not Mr. Pitt, vote *against* this address; and did not his Caledonian colleague, with that truth and modesty for which he is so famous, ascribe it to "*a conspiracy for place*?" Was Mr. Pitt so "*perfectly satisfied*" of its impropriety, that he was willing to dispense with any additional information that might be directed from an adjournment of the discussion? And shall we now be told, that the non-adoption of this remedy is a valid ground for his opposition to ministers? Shall we tamely and silently listen to this unbearable affront to our understanding, merely because it is offered in the behalf of Mr. Pitt?

Thus, then, I think, the grounds of Mr. Pitt's pretended disapprobation of the measures of ministers sink from beneath him; and, as to the only efficient cause of his opposition of the 3rd of June, 1803, we are naturally led back to the failure of the negotiation for place; to that "mortification and disappointment," than which Mr. Long tells us any person unblinded by passion might have suggested motives "more probable," but which motives, notwithstanding all the stimuli and all the advantages, under which he must have written, he certainly has failed to suggest. Were we, however, to allow, that Mr. Pitt did disapprove of the measures of ministers, and that he had no act or part in producing that which was the object of his disapprobation, we naturally ask, how it came to pass, that that disapprobation was, for so long a space of time, confined to his own breast? The session of Parliament began in November, and he never made his appearance in the House till the latter end of May. If he did really differ in opinion with his protégé upon the general measures of finance; upon the mode of conducting our foreign affairs, and especially upon that in which the negotiation with France was conducted, why did he not come to the Parliament and say so? Why did he reserve the expression of his disapprobation, till it was too late, as to the purposes of preventing the evils he is said to have dreaded, to disapprove with any effect? If he thought that the ministers ought to have "set themselves to work *on the instant*," to adjust and settle the affairs relative to Malta, why did he not come and tell them so, on the 23rd of November, while we were yet at peace, and while too, there was, probably, yet time to retain some of our conquests, which were afterwards surrendered? If the deceptive financial statement of the 10th of December was of an importance sufficient to be now cited as a legitimate cause for commencing an opposition against the minister, whom he had thrustured into office, whom he had recommended to the Parliament, whom he had eulogized, to withhold confidence from whom he had stigmatized as "repugnant to

common sense and common justice;" if that statement was of a nature so momentous, why did he not appear in his place, at the time, or as soon after as might be, and correct it, seeing that his health permitted him to come to town during the Christmas recess, and seeing that by the month of March he was stout enough to encounter the toils attached to the office of prime minister. Before he joins in the clamours of the Jews and the Jew-like citizens, who were duped by the fallacious statement, let him satisfactorily account for his not having imitated Lord Grenville in exposing the fallacy, while yet there was time, in spite of all the efforts of the Treasury hirelings to stigmatize him as endeavouring "to decry the resources of the country and encourage the hopes of the enemy." Then was the time for him to speak, and not having spoken then, it is excessively mean to join in what is now become the popular cry, but what was at that time, unpopular.—But, though he did not come to Parliament, though he disguised from the public, from his sovereign, and his constituents, the disapprobation he entertained of the measures of ministers, he did, we are told, freely and distinctly express that disapprobation *in private*. Mr. Long tells us, that "he may have communicated his opinions to the ministers, or at least some of them, and he may have found, that they were either rejected as ill-founded, or unattended to altogether." And Mr. Ward, who is more *full* upon this part of the subject, as, indeed, he is upon most others, obligingly gives us the following curious information :

"I repeat it, and it cannot be too often impressed upon the world, that from the winding up of the peace of Amiens, no full or fair communication concerning foreign affairs was made to him, so as to draw from him the full benefit of his advice, an advice which *was ever ready* when frankly desired. Partial communications may indeed sometimes have been made ; and opinions hastily obtained may have been half acted upon, and then thrown aside. The warmth that he may once or twice have kindled may have been ever kept glowing, until it reached the Continent : but there it was sure to be marred, dissipated, frozen, and lost. It becomes me not to mention particulars which I have no authority to detail ; but if this be true, it accounts for the strange vicissitudes of hot and cold ; the orders and counter-orders ; the rashness and submission, ' Like the poor cat i' the adage, letting I dare not wait upon I would,' that mark the memorable summer of 1802. However this may be, I aver, that after the treaty of Amiens, Mr. Pitt's last care of those who were now to show that they could stand alone, was confined almost exclusively to plans of finance. For this he laboured by *night and by day* ; for this he *sacrificed* his *leisure* and his health ; and for this he met with the same return that attended most of his other labours, little gratitude, an attempt to change them, their unskilful execution, and their consequent loss."

So then it appears, that Mr. Pitt was still generous enough to lend his assistance in managing the affairs of the nation ? It appears that he still was, in some degree, at any rate, consulted and obeyed ? Without stopping here to exhibit in their full view the natural consequences of such an unconstitutional influence, such a clandestine mode of conducting the government, of ruling both king and people without even the chance of incurring responsibility ; without giving way to the fulness of our indignation, we must all concur in rejoicing that the juggle, by which we and our sovereign were to be handed backward and forward from the Pitts to the Addingtons, and from the Addingtons to the Pitts, the one just keeping us in tow till the other had refitted and were ready to receive us ; we must all, whatever be our politics or our party, unless we were to be sharers in the seizure ; we must all rejoice, that this juggle, which Mr. Dundas might well and truly have called " a conspiracy for place ;" yes,

we must all most heartily rejoice, that this detestable juggle has been blown into air, and that, too, by the very means which were intended to secure its duration, by that very negotiation which was set on foot for the purpose of bringing Mr. Pitt back to take his turn at the helm. This leads us to the point of the question, here we come to the conclusion of our inquiry, and here we find Mr. Pitt ready and willing, provided his terms were acceded to, to enter the cabinet, to join and to co-operate with the men, of the whole of whose principal measures, foreign and domestic, he disapproved, but the leaders of whom he was willing to keep in place and in power, upon condition that he participated with them; and, not being able to obtain the share that he coveted, we find him seizing on the first opportunity that offered for commencing against them an opposition of the kind best calculated to render them contemptible and odious in the eyes of the world, and we see him restrained from open and violent hostility only by the fear of giving offence in that quarter where he wished to supplant them.

To those who have followed me through this long, and I am afraid tiresome discussion, it remains for me to apologize for having trespassed so much on their indulgence, and also for having so widely separated the several parts of this "Analytical and comparative View;" but, it was out of my power to be more brief, and when it is considered, that the pressing of this my own matter forward must have caused the exclusion of some of the productions of my correspondents, I am certain that the delay will be readily excused.

WM. COBBETT.

PAPER ARISTOCRACY.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—Hitherto Mr. COBBETT's English writings have been in opposition to Mr. PITT's system of funding; but, while he opposed that system, Mr. COBBETT still clung to the main principles of the statesman, because he agreed with him in his views of the French revolution and its probable consequences; but we now come to the time when he found it necessary to look towards other men, in the hope of seeing such a Ministry as would make an attack on the Pitt-system of funding. It will be seen, that this drew him into the company of Parliamentary Reformers, and that, then, he began to write in favour of a Reform, as the surest and safest means of destroying the funding system, the effects of which he dreaded as much as he had done those of the French revolution. In September, 1804, an election for Middlesex, at which Sir FRANCIS BURDETT and Mr. MAINWARING were candidates, drew from him these remarks, in answer to the objections put for thagainst Sir FRANCIS BURDETT by the Government candidate:—"The objections to him, as a member of Parliament, must be confined to his political principles and views, and for the evidence of these, we are referred to his former conduct. To such a standard I object, on many accounts. It tends to revive the political animosities of the late war, and to divide us into parties bitterly hostile to each other, at a time which imperiously calls for a union of all hands and hearts in defence of our country and of that monarchy. under which alone our liberties can exist. This standard, too, is no longer applicable. The times are widely altered since Sir FRANCIS BURDETT first became a political character, and even since his former election for Middlesex. The tide has turned: from popular enthusiasm it has run back to despotism: Buonaparte's exaltation to the post of Consul for life began the great change in men's minds, which has been completed by his more recent assumption, and which not only removes the danger before to be apprehended from the prevalence of notions in favour of liberty, but tends to excite apprehensions of a different kind; to make us fear that, by the means

“ of the immense and yet growing influence now deposited in the hands of the Minister by the funding and bank-note system, we may, in fact, though not in name, become little better than slaves, and slaves, too, not of the King, but of the Minister of the day, who threatens to exercise his authority alike over King and people.”—On breaking from Mr. PITT, he placed his hopes on Mr. Fox and his associates, but being disappointed here, he then saw no means of ridding the country of the Pitt-system, but in a *Radical* Reform of the House of Commons. The article on “ PAPER ARISTOCRACY ” which follows this, is an attack on the stock-jobbing “ interest,” the growth of the Pitt-system ; and the papers which follow, are a series of letters to Mr. PITT, in which the author gives all his reasons for opposing him.

Amongst the great and numerous dangers to which this country, and particularly the monarchy, is exposed, in consequence of the enormous public debt, the influence, the powerful and widely-extended influence, of the monied interest is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it necessarily aims at measures which directly tend to the subversion of the present order of things. In speaking of this monied interest, I do not mean to apply the phrase, as it was applied formerly, that is to say, to distinguish the possessors of personal property, more especially property in the funds, from persons possessing lands ; the division of the proprietors into a monied interest, and a landed interest, is not applicable to the present times, all the people who have any thing, having now become, in a greater or less degree, stock-holders. From this latter circumstance it is artfully insinuated, that they are all deeply and equally interested in supporting the system ; and, such is the blindness of avarice, or rather of self-interest, that men in general really act as if they preferred a hundred pounds’ worth of stock to an estate in land of fifty times the value. But, it is not of this mass of stock-holders ; it is not of that description of persons who leave their children’s fortunes to *accumulate* in those funds, where, even according to the ratio of depreciation already experienced, a pound of to-day will not be worth much above a shilling twenty years hence ; it is not of these simpletons of whom I speak, when I talk of the monied interest of the present day ; I mean an interest hostile alike to the land-holder and to the stock-holder, to the colonist, to the real merchant, and to the manufacturer, to the clergy, to the nobility and to the throne ; I mean the numerous and powerful body of loan-jobbers, directors, brokers, contractors and farmers general, which has been engendered by the excessive amount of the public debt, and the almost boundless extension of the issues of paper-money.—It was a body very much like this, which may with great propriety, I think, be denominated the *Paper Aristocracy*, that produced the revolution in France. Burke evidently had *our* monied interest, as well as that of France, in his view ; but, when, in another passage of his celebrated work, he was showing the extreme injustice of seizing upon the property of the Church to satisfy the demands of the paper aristocracy of France, he little imagined that an act of similar injustice would so soon be thought of, and even proposed, in England, where clergyman and pauper are become terms almost synonymous. He had been an attentive observer of the rise and progress of the change that was taking place in France : and he thought it necessary to warn his own country, in time, against the influence of a description of persons, who, aided by a financiering minister, who gave into all their views, had begun the destruction of the French monarchy.—Our paper-aristocracy, who

arose with the schemes of Mr. Pitt, have proceeded with very bold strides; theirs was the proposition for commuting the tithes; theirs the law for the redemption of the land-tax; theirs the numerous laws and regulations which have been made of late years in favour of jobbing and speculation, till at last they obtained a law compelling men to take their paper in payment of just debts, while they themselves were exempted, by the same law, from paying any part of the enormous debts which they had contracted, though they had given promissory notes for the amount! Their project for commuting the tithes was of this sort. All the tithes, small as well as great, *belonging to the Clergy*, were to be sold to the owners of the houses and land subject to such tithes; or, if the owners did not choose to purchase them, they were to be sold to other persons, as fast as such persons could be found. From the property of the Church these tithes were to be changed into property of the nation, and the Clergy were to receive, each of them according to his merits of course, a stipend from "his Majesty's confidential servants," payable, not in assignats, like the stipends of the constitutional clergy of France, but in paper, according to the old saying, "as good as the Bank," though, perhaps, not very readily convertible into gold and silver, or even into brass. This project failed, and for the failure we have to thank his Majesty much more than any body else, not even excepting the bishops, who, if we may judge by their conduct with respect to the bill for what is called the "redemption of the land-tax," had not the permanent interests of the Church so closely at heart as one might wish. If Mr. Pitt and his paper aristocracy had succeeded in their project for commuting the tithes, they would have strengthened themselves not only by the apparent security which the funds would have derived from so much property being in a manner brought to the account of the nation, but much more by the influence which such a change would have had upon the Clergy, who, feeling their very existence to depend upon the preservation of the paper-system, would necessarily have been its advocates; and thus the Bank and Lloyd's would have had a zealous agent in every parish in the kingdom, in every nook and corner, where, even on days of religion and rest, twenty people were likely to be assembled together.—That the commutation of the tithes would have been followed by a similar measure with regard to the glebe, the parsonage houses, and other property of the Church there can be no doubt, especially when we consider what has, with so little opposition, been done in that way in the law for the redemption of the land-tax, which law I regard as the first direct and open blow aimed at the Church and the ancient nobility. Much has been effected of late years, in England as well as in France, by an artful selection of terms; the mass of mankind always being much more taken with the *word* than with the *thing*. Hence, while France was fighting for Robespierre alone, she was animated with all the enthusiasm of "*liberty and equality*;" hence the poor fools that live even within a hundred yards of Threadneedle-street most religiously believe that the Parliament has passed a "*restriction*" upon cash payments at the Bank; and hence few persons have ever supposed, that the "*redemption of the land-tax*" means a seizure, made by the government, of a part of every man's estate. First a law was passed to render the land-tax perpetual. Who ever heard before of a *perpetual* tax? Yet so this tax was made. That being done, the tax was rendered saleable; the proprietor of the

land having the preference as a purchaser. Had the measure stopped here it would have been less mischievous; but, in order to create as many purchasers as possible, in order to bring as great a sum as could be brought to the account of the Exchequer, and thereby prop the paper system, the effect of entails was removed as to private estates, while the collegiate and church establishments were let loose from those bonds which had heretofore preserved their possessions entire. That a farmer should sell one field out of ten, or a tradesman one tenement out of ten, in order to clear the other nine from the land-tax, was a matter of little consequence: the tenth field or tenth house would fall into the hands of other persons in nearly the same rank of life: no heir would be injured, no establishment weakened, by the sale. But, in suspending, for this purpose, the effect of entails, the heads of noble families were enabled, were invited, were tempted, and, in some cases, were obliged to alienate part of those estates, which they had received entire from their ancestors, and which should have descended entire to their heirs. Tom Paine and Joel Barlow, had they clubbed their talents in forming a scheme for sapping the foundations of the privileged orders, could have devised nothing at once more plausible, more popular, and, as far as it goes, more effectual than this law, which transferred to brokers and jobbers no inconsiderable portion of estates, several of which had descended from ancestor to heir from the Norman conquest to the administration of Mr. Pitt. The fields and the houses of farmers and tradesmen were divided, perhaps, amongst other farmers and other tradesmen; and, it is possible, though not very likely, that a considerable part of the land-tax of the nobility was bought up by themselves, or, that whether by purchase from one another, or from the other classes, the class of nobility gained, upon the whole, nearly as much property as it lost. This is barely possible; but what can, in this respect, be hoped with regard to the Church? Here the property does not descend in families; here the proprietor is merely a tenant for life; here, unlike the case of the nobility, it is impossible for one part of the order to gain by the loss of another part; here whatever is taken away never can return; and, therefore, the establishment is by so much robbed, impoverished, and weakened. This alienation and transfer of part of the property of the Church affords a clear illustration of that which is, in most instances, very dark and complicated, namely, the operation of the funding and paper system upon house and land. The country people wonder how it is that all the old gentlemen's families are dropping off, one by one, and that those which remain are completely out-shone by the new gentlemen, from whose gilded footmen they learn that their masters were, but a few years ago, butchers, bakers, bottle-corkers, or old-clothes-men, and that, in fact, they are not, as to *visible* profession, much better now. At this the country people stand gaping with a mixture of amazement and curiosity; whereat some footman more profound and eloquent than his fellows, informs them, with sonorous voice and solemn accent, that the circumstance, at which they seem so much surprised, arises from the astonishing prosperity of the country. Upon which the country people gape still wider, not being, for their very souls, able to discover how that prosperity, which elevates bottle-corkers to country-gentlemen, should reduce country-gentlemen to bottle-corkers! But, the talkative footman, who, perhaps, begins, by this time, to grow impatient at their stupidity, flatly tells them, that, as he wants no dispute about the matter, those who

differ from him in opinion may walk out of the hall; and, as country people love good things as well as town's people, it is most likely that the far greater part of them will stay. This mode, however, of arguing with the belly instead of the brain I do not approve of; and, therefore, if the country people will listen to me only for a minute, I will endeavour to explain to them the cause of this phenomenon. The prosperity, of which they hear so much, does not extend its influence to *all* the people in the country. Its sphere is, indeed, rather confined, and it would be, I fancy, difficult to find many of its beneficial effects beyond the circle of the paper aristocracy. The country gentleman, who wishes and endeavours to live independently upon his estate, is obliged to pay to the government, for the support of the funding system, so great a portion of the revenue of that estate, that he has not enough left to live upon in the style in which his ancestors lived; and, in order to support that style, he sells part of his patrimony; once broken into, it goes piece by piece; his sons become merchants' clerks or East India cadets; his daughters become companions or lady's women to the wives of those in whose service the sons are embarked; the father, seeing his end approach, secures a life annuity for his widow; some speculator purchases the tottering old mansion; and thus the funding system swallows up the family. Generally applicable as this remark is, obvious as are the effects in every part of the country, the cause is not so distinctly seen as to render illustration unnecessary. What one loses another gains: the land all remains, belong to whom it will: howsoever much some classes may lose, there is no loss upon the whole; and there is room for contending, that birth, honour, and virtue gain as much wealth in some places as they lose in others. But, the instance of the Church sets this question at rest: from the Church part of the real property has been taken: not part of its revenues: not part of its annual income: but, part of its house and its land has been taken away, sold, and the money applied to the payment of those who have made loans to, and other bargains with, the government: and the Church possesses less than it did by so much, and it never will regain that which it has thus lost, or any portion of it. The same may be said with regard to the alienation, which, at the same time, took place, of the real property of the collegiate establishment, not excepting hospitals and other charitable foundations, part of the property of some of which was thus alienated for the purpose of supporting the funds, while the persons living within the walls of such hospitals and colleges were compelled to have recourse to the parish rates in aid of their income, which, by the depreciating effects of the paper-system, had already been reduced to a pittance, in many instances too small to afford them bread. Was this? Need I ask it? Was a scene of things like this ever contemplated by the liberal, the pious and benevolent founders of colleges, schools and hospitals; or by that government in whose wisdom and justice they confided for a due execution of their bequests? None of this alienated property will ever return to any of these foundations; and, though we cannot say that it is impossible for the property, alienated in the same way from noblemen's and gentlemen's families, to return; yet, there can, especially when we cast our eyes over the country, be but very little doubt upon the subject. Let it be observed, too, that there is now another land-tax; and, if the present gentleman should have a war to conduct for only a few years, I have, for my part, very great fears, that another *redemption* will take

place; that another slice, and that a large one too, will, in the same way, be taken from the property of the ancient nobility and the Church. My fear may, perhaps, be groundless; for the circumstances of the times are different: men have now seen what a destruction of the nobility and clergy finally leads to, and they have not *now* to fear, that an opposition to any measure of the minister, be it what it may, will be attributed to motives hostile to the monarchy itself; a fear which certainly facilitated, during the last war, the adoption of many measures which never could have been carried without the aid of that or some equally powerful cause.—The influence which the paper aristocracy has had, and has now more than ever, in politics, may easily be seen by a reference to the list of the present House of Commons. Indeed, for them and them alone, war appears to be made and peace to be concluded. The disasters of the last war, and, finally, the total failure of its avowed objects, which were “*indemnity* for the past and *security* for the future,” were all to be ascribed to the interests of the ‘Change having been consulted, in preference to the interests of the nation. The measures of the war were determined on at Lloyd’s. “Give us trade, and we will find you money,” was the cry. The traffic went on very prosperously for a while: for several years there was nothing but boasting: the war could be carried on “for ten years without any material inconvenience to the country:” or, it was, at least, so asserted by Mr. Pitt, who declared, at the same time, that he never would make peace till the balance of Europe was restored, and till we could obtain indemnity for the past and *security* for the future. Whether he kept his word as to the former, let the kings of Naples and Sardinia, let the Queen of Portugal and the Stadtholder, let the Hans Towns and Hanover and the Princes of Germany tell; and, with regard to the promise of “*security* for the future,” if we want any one to vouch for its observance, we must all at once have imbibed a degree of incredulity hitherto totally unknown to our character. The balance of Europe was not restored: on the contrary it was completely overturned. We had obtained no indemnity for the past. We left ourselves without any security for the future. Two years of the ten were not expired; yet Mr. Pitt recommended peace; assisted in making peace; openly defended peace; and for what? In order to “husband our resources:” or, in other words, to preserve the funding and paper system, weighed in the balance against which, the honour and the safety of the country, the liberties of the people and the stability of his Majesty’s throne, were light as a feather.—But, year after year, as the paper itself increases in quantity, the paper aristocracy seems to gather strength and boldness. Its love of rule, as well as its spirit of hostility to the known, legitimate, established and ancient orders of the kingdom were amply displayed in its proceedings relative to the LLOYD’S FUND for the rewarding of meritorious soldiers and sailors. There was great objection to such a fund, the largesses of which were to be bestowed by, and at the discretion of, persons officially unknown to either the army or the navy; but, when an attempt was made to draw into this fund, and to place at the disposal of its aspiring committee, all the collections made in all parts of the country, the rivalry between Lloyd’s and St. James’s became more apparent and more evidently dangerous. There was something audaciously unreasonable and bold in this attempt: something that argued a consciousness of strength too great to be overcome, if not too great to be thwarted by any power in the state. Yet,

this might have been borne ; but, the censure, not to say abuse ; the severe reproaches and malignant insinuations, put forth, in the public prints, upon this occasion, against the nobility and clergy for not subscribing to the fund, can never be forgotten, and, politically considered, ought never to be forgiven. It was not enough for them, a self-created club of jobbers, brokers, and dealers in paper-money, to arrogate to themselves the office of collecting all the patriotic offerings of the country ; to erect themselves into judges of the merits of the fleet and army ; and, finally, to assume the functions of sovereignty in bestowing rewards upon soldiers and sailors ; all this was not enough, their partisans must take upon them to judge also for the nobility and clergy, to reproach them with lukewarmness in the cause of the country, because their subscriptions fell short of what was expected ; because they did not bring every pound they could borrow, and give it up to be disposed of at the pleasure, and in the name of, the committee at Lloyd's, thereby strengthening the interest and increasing the influence, which was already too powerful for them to contend with, and under which they were daily and hourly sinking !—Of a similar nature and tendency has been, and is, the conduct of the Paper Aristocracy relative to the recent election for the county of Middlesex. Not content with coming forward and unreservedly stating, that with their money they are resolved to procure a person, whom they fix upon, to be elected a member of Parliament for the county, which person openly promises to be “ a devoted instrument ” in their hands ; not content with acting up to the letter as well as the spirit of this resolution, they accuse, not only the gentleman who opposes their candidate, not only his immediate friends and active supporters, but also all the party with whom he has acted in Parliament ; all these, including a vast majority of the talent, birth and public character of the country, they have the modesty to accuse of disaffection and disloyalty ; and one of their partisans, who, in his fierce cat-a-mountain style, describes the young noblemen who canvassed for Sir Francis Burdett, “ as sprigs, or rather, *excrescences* of aristocracy,” tells the public, that this support given “ to the *jacobin* candidate ” will enable them “ to appreciate the effects of that broad-bottomed administration, which so “ many persons of consequence, and so many more of no consequence, “ so lately combined to form,” and which formation, be it remembered, Mr. Pitt's partisans have solemnly declared, that he used his utmost endeavours to effect, and for his not being able to effect it this very writer has *blamed* the King ! But consistency is no part of the creed of a sect, who, in their quality of saints, claim, upon the argument of their renowned predecessor, Ralpho, a privilege which is wisely denied to the wicked, namely, of unsaying what they have said, and unswearing what they have sworn, just as often as convenience requires.—It is not till of late years, however, that saintship has been united with money-changing. The money-changers of old times seem to have been almost the only class of persons who patiently and silently submitted to rebuke. When their tables were upset, they shook their ears probably, but they appear to have made neither resistance nor clamour. Whether it be that the changer becomes bold in proportion to the worthlessness of the thing to be changed, or that, from its union with saintship, the trade has been exalted, I now not ; but, certain it is, that our money-changers, though utter strangers to gold and silver, have a most plentiful stock of brass, as they have fully evinced in every stage of the proceedings relative to the

Middlesex election, and more especially, I think, in their last meeting at the Freemasons' Tavern, with Mr. Henry Thornton at their head. Of the resolutions passed at this meeting it is necessary to say nothing, the object of them being the same as that of the original combination; I cannot, however, refrain from admiring one sentiment of Mr. Thornton relative to the proposed subscription; to wit; that "the distant parts of the country looked often with anxiety to the metropolis, and expected from the *great public virtue* of the more opulent and *enlightened* classes in the county of Middlesex such sacrifices as might be necessary to repress the evils, to which it was subject, and to protect the constitution." Now, though the "great public virtue" of directors, contractors, brokers, and jobbers of every description; though the great public virtue of those persons who have inundated the country with promissory notes for which the possessor cannot demand payment, and who have left us coin scarcely sufficient to carry on the daily traffic for the necessaries of life; though persons of this description should have a monopoly of the public virtue as well as of the public wealth, and though it should be perfectly consistent with the rules of modesty for Mr. Thornton and his friends to consider themselves as the most *enlightened* class of the county of Middlesex; though all this this should be right, I never can agree, that the people in the distant parts of the country look with any degree of anxiety to Mr. Thornton and his friends for the "protection of the *constitution*." The people in the distant parts of the country have no anxiety at all upon the subject: they see Mr. Thornton and his friends subscribing, or, as he calls it, making sacrifices; and, if they have any anxiety about the matter, it arises from the fear, that a remuneration for those "sacrifices" will come out of their pockets.—Mr. Thornton all along makes his cause the cause of the government, or ministry, and charges Sir Francis Burdett with inconsistency in his language and conduct relative to Mr. Pitt. "He has been used," says Mr. Thornton, "to inveigh particularly against Mr. Pitt, whom he has held up to the utmost abhorrence of the people; yet, if we may believe the speech of the gentleman who nominated him, he was one of those who laboured night and day, as they term it, to form an administration on a broad foundation; that is to say, an administration of which this very Mr. Pitt was to be a member!" And, what inconsistency was there in this? Were we not, all of us; or, at least, did we not all profess to be, for an union of *all parties*, in order that all political animosities should be buried, and that the enemy should see that he had the whole force of an undivided people to meet? Was not this the language of the nation at the time when the change of the ministry took place? Was it not the language of those who disliked as well as those who liked Mr. Pitt? Or, will Mr. Thornton insist, that every one who professed a wish for an union of parties, and who did not like Mr. Pitt, was a canting hypocrite? Besides, if a ministry upon a broad foundation had been formed, Mr. Pitt, though "a member," would not have been the *master* of it. Disapproving of Mr. Pitt both as to person and system, Sir Francis Burdett would naturally prefer him in a situation where he would have the least degree of power that it was possible to pacify him with; and, cordially joining Sir Francis in disapprobation, as to the *system* of Mr. Pitt, my wish respecting the new ministry was the same, as I have more than once or twice unequivocally expressed it. So long ago as the winter of 1802, I gave it as my opinion, that Mr. Pitt never ought again to be at the

head of a ministry : the same opinion, with some of the reasons whereon it was founded, was repeated in December, 1803 ; and, again, with additional reasons in the month of May last ; yet, I was for a coalition of all the men of talents of all parties, doubtless including Mr. Pitt ; and, I have not, on this score, at least, ever been accused of inconsistency. Indeed, the language and conduct of Sir Francis Burdett, with regard to Mr. Pitt, present no inconsistency ; and the subject appears to have been introduced by Mr. Thornton in order to give an indirect blow at the whole of the Opposition, especially those persons who disapproved of the juggle, by which the present ministry was patched up.—This “ enlightened ” gentleman does not make use of the word *jacobin*, nor that of *jacobinism*, but he labours hard to inculcate the notion, that the election has, on the part of Sir Francis Burdett, been conducted upon jacobin principles, and that “ his supporters are, *unhappily*, associated with men “ of the worst description, with men from whom arise *our chief domestic danger*, and the triumph of Sir Francis, therefore, would be the triumph “ of anarchy over law, and of democracy over the British constitution.” This is, from the ministerialists, at least, the first we have heard, in so official a manner, of “ *domestic dangers*.” Mr. Addington and his colleagues repeatedly boasted, and I believe with perfect truth, though not with much decency, that, under their sway, the people were become unanimous ; that they had, as it were, but one soul, as to their attachment to the constitution, and their resolution to defend it at the risk of their lives. Whence has arisen, then, the disaffection, and the domestic dangers, of the consequences of which Mr. Thornton is so apprehensive ? Mr. Thornton himself, in speaking in defence of the peace of Amiens, (for what ministerial measure has he not spoken in defence of ?) said, that it had “ destroyed all discontents and rendered the people unanimous.” Since when, I ask therefore, have these “ domestic dangers ” again come to light ? With all due submission to this bank director, our chief domestic danger does not consist in the machinations of democrats or anarchists, but in the *excessive quantity of bank-notes*, which, if a stop be not put to its increase, will, I am fully persuaded, produce effects fatal to our liberties and to the throne of our sovereign. This is the great cause of all our troubles and disgrace. It is, in fact, the cause that we are now at war. “ Pay your bank-notes in specie,” said the Moniteur at the breaking out of the war, “ and then we will believe in your ability to continue the contest.” Here we have, in a very few words, the opinion upon which the French cabinet proceeds in the war against us ; and, I think, that there is no man in his senses who will venture to question the soundness of the opinion. If we continue to humour this paper-aristocracy ; if they continue to issue million upon million of their paper ; or even, if they are much longer skreened from the payment of what they already have afloat, we must sink beneath the enemy, without his firing a shot at us. He has nothing to do but to stand where he is, now and then showing us an aspect somewhat more menacing, till the paper system shall have brought us to the point at which we must arrive, and at which he well knows we must arrive, in the course of a very few years. Nay, if an invasion were to take place at this time, our “ chief domestic danger ” would arise from the excessive quantity of bank-notes. Does any man believe, that, if the enemy were landed in any considerable force, bank-notes would pass, especially near the enemy, in payment for provisions ? Most assuredly they would not ; and the confusion that

would ensue can hardly be conceived, much less described. Lord Grenville, during the last session of parliament, suggested the adoption of some measure of precaution against this danger ; but, by way of *answer*, he was reminded, that he formed part of the ministry when the bank restriction bill was passed ! Precautions there are none adopted yet : the minister seems to be as much averse from making preparations against this contingency as some men are from making their wills : volunteers, men and horses, and even carriages, he is preparing in abundance, but not a word about money ; though every man of the least reflection must perceive how extremely dangerous our situation will be, in case of actual invasion, if money, I mean *real* money, be not prepared in a considerable quantity for the payment of the army and the fleet.

LETTER I.

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT,
ON THE
CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF GREAT BRITAIN.

All the grounds of distinction are now at an end, and the honest and wise men of all "parties mean the same thing, and ought to lay aside and "forget old names, and become one party..... For my own part, "I have no quarrel to names and persons, and would join in any just "measures to save the kingdom ; and will oppose, to the utmost of my "power, all who will not."—TRENCHARD'S Letters of Cato, No. 10.

INTRODUCTION.

SIR,—Nothing is either more common or more true, than the observation, that, in order to provide an adequate remedy for evils, whether moral or political, it is necessary, first to inquire into and, if possible, ascertain, the causes whence they have proceeded ; and, I trust, that, when it is considered what must, in the present instance, necessarily be the objects of inquiry, it will be thought in no wise improper, that I address myself to you ; not only because you are the first minister of the King, and, of course, are responsible for measures now to be adopted, but also, because you have, from your long and uncontrolled possession of power, contracted a deep responsibility with respect to the past.

In estimating arguments, relating to any subject, and particularly to measures and events, in which the writer has taken no part, personal considerations with regard to him ought never to intrude ; but, Sir, this intrusion, so inimical to the cause of truth and of justice, experience has convinced us that nothing can prevent in the case of political discussions ; where, though the reasoning have no possible connection with the character, conduct, motives, or views of the reasoner, though the door be barred against them by every principle according to which men, in other cases, form their judgment, intrude they will ; and powerful indeed must be the talents of him who can with safety bid them defiance !

Greatly and justly diffident in this latter respect, feeling the full weight of the task I have ventured to encounter, and being, therefore, anxious to avoid the assaults of any extraneous adversary, I shall, I hope, be excused, especially when some recent transactions are taken into view, if, previous to my entering on the important subject before me, I endeavour to guard against the foul hostility of personal considerations, whatever degree of conviction my reasoning may have the good fortune to produce.

It is now, Sir, ten years since I first took up the pen with an intention to write for the press, on political subjects; and the occasion of my so doing is too curious in itself, as well as of too much importance as to the sequel, not to be described somewhat in detail. At the memorable epoch of Doctor Priestley's emigration to America, I followed, in the city of Philadelphia, the profession of teacher of the English language to Frenchmen. Newspapers were a luxury for which I had little relish, and which, if I had been ever so fond of, I had not time to enjoy. The manifestoes, therefore, of the Doctor, upon his landing in that country, and the malicious attacks upon the monarchy and the monarch of England which certain societies in America thereupon issued through the press, would, had it not been for a circumstance purely accidental, have escaped, probably for ever, not only my animadversion, but my knowledge of their existence. One of my scholars, who was a person that we in England should call a Coffee-house Politician, chose, for once, to read his newspaper by way of lesson; and, it happened to be the very paper which contained the addresses presented to Doctor Priestley at New York, together with his replies. My scholar, who was a sort of republican, or, at best, but half a monarchist, appeared delighted with the invectives against England, to which he was very much disposed to add. Those Englishmen who have been abroad, particularly if they have had time to make a comparison between the country they are in and that which they left, well know how difficult it is, upon occasions such as I have been describing, to refrain from expressing their indignation and resentment; and there is not, I trust, much reason to suppose, that I should, in this respect, experience less difficulty than another. The dispute was as warm as might reasonably be expected between a Frenchman, uncommonly violent even for a Frenchman, and an Englishman not remarkable for *sang froid*; and, the result was, a declared resolution, on my part, to write and publish a pamphlet in defence of my country, which pamphlet he pledged himself to answer: his pledge was forfeited: it is known that mine was not.—Thus, Sir, it was, that I became a writer on politics. “Happy for you,” you will say, “if you had continued at your verbs and your nouns!” Perhaps it would; but the fact absorbs the reflection: whether it was for my good, or otherwise, I entered on the career of political writing; and, without adverting to the circumstances under which others have entered on it, I think it will not be believed that the pen was ever taken up from a motive more pure and laudable. I could have no hope of gain from the proposed publication itself, but, on the contrary, was pretty certain to incur a loss; no hope of remuneration, for not only had I never seen any agent of the British government in America, but was not acquainted with any one British subject in the country. I was actuated, perhaps, by no very exalted notions of either loyalty or patriotism; the act was not much an act of refined reasoning, or of reflection; it arose merely from feeling, but it was that sort of

feeling, that jealousy for the honour of my native country, which I am sure you will allow to have been highly meritorious, especially when you reflect on the circumstances of the times and the place in which I ventured before the public.—Great praise, and still more great success, are sure to operate, with young and zealous men, as an encouragement to farther exertions. Both were, in this case, far beyond my hopes, and still farther beyond the intrinsic merits of my performance. The praise was, in fact, given to the boldness of the man, who, after the American press had, for twenty years, been closed against every publication relative to England, in which England and her King were not censured and vilified, dared not only to defend but to eulogize and exalt them; and, the success was to be ascribed to that affection for England and that just hatred of France, which, in spite of all the misrepresentations that had been so long circulated, were still alive in the bosoms of all the better part of the people, who, openly to express their sentiments, only wanted the occasion and the example which were now afforded them.—From this time (the summer of 1794) to the year 1800, my labours were without intermission. During that space there were published from my pen about twenty different pamphlets, the whole number of which amounted to more than *half a million* of copies.* During the three last years, a daily paper, surpassing in extent of numbers any one ever known in America, was the vehicle of my efforts; and, in the year 1800, I might safely have asserted, that there was not, in the whole country, one single family, in which some part or other of my writings had not been read, and in which, generally speaking, they had not produced some degree of effect favourable to the interests of my country. But, there were some services, of which I must claim the right of making particular mention, and the first of which relates to the order, given by Mr. Dundas, for bringing in American vessels “for *adjudication*.” This measure, which it seemed impossible could have been conceived in a cabinet of statesmen; this order, worthy only of the mind of a low, and a very low, lawyer; this order, from which no good could possibly arise to any body but the greedy speculators who had fitted out privateers for the express purpose of profiting from its equivocal meaning; this order, for the effects of which the people of England have already paid 600,000*l.* smart-money, and have, probably, nearly as much more to pay; this at once foolish and outrageous measure, coming in aid of the animosity engendered during the revolutionary war, and nourished by the pecuniary stipulations of the treaty of peace, was within a hair’s breadth of deciding the American government to yield to the loudly-declared voice of the people in uniting their arms to those of the French Convention, and that, too, at the critical moment when Holland was first taken possession of by the republican arms. A treaty was negotiated with Mr. Jay; it was approved of finally, and war with America was happily avoided. But, far other exertions than those of the two cabinets were necessary to secure the conciliatory object of that treaty. The writings, the meetings, the

* The readers of Mr. Cobbett’s writings know their *effect*, but very few are aware of the extent of their sale. We shall take other opportunities of showing this; but, to corroborate the fact stated above, we quote from the eighth volume of the *Porcupine*, p. 320, a note at the end of a pamphlet entitled the *Cannibal’s Progress*, a translation from French works giving a detail of the proceedings of the Revolutionists. It is this: “Of this pamphlet upwards of a *hundred thousand* copies were printed and sold in the United States of America.”—Ed.

debates, upon the subject, lasted nearly a twelvemonth, during which all the resources of art and ingenuity, of talent and of perseverance, were brought into action. The state, the whole society, were shaken to their very centre. The government was greatly at a loss how to act; by the papers which have been since published, it clearly appears, that the President Washington was, for some time, upon the balance whether he should ratify the treaty or not; and, the question for carrying it into effect was, in the lower House, at last decided in the affirmative by the casting vote of the Speaker. If that question had been lost, nothing could have prevented America from joining France in the war; the French faction would have rapidly gained the ascendancy, and the government must have yielded to its dictates to save itself from destruction. In the whole of this controversy I took an active part; and, at the same time, lost no opportunity of giving the people a just notion of what they had to expect from the fraternity of France. I know how to make allowance for the overflowings of gratitude and of friendship, and for the expressions of applause attendant on success. I pretend not, therefore, to be entitled to all the merit which was awarded me (in America, I mean) as to the result of the contest; but, I certainly was in the front rank of those by whom the victory was achieved. The importance of that victory to England, it would, perhaps, be difficult to render intelligible to the mind of Lord Melville, without the aid of a comparison; and, therefore, it may be necessary to observe, that it was infinitely more important than all his victories in the West Indies put together, which latter victories cost this country thirty thousand men and fifty millions of money.—You will recollect, perhaps, Sir, that there were, during the last war, certain dispatches of the French minister, Fauchet, intercepted at sea by our cruisers, and sent back to America. The person, who jumped overboard and saved them from being sunk, has, I believe, been liberally rewarded by government. He deserved it. But those dispatches, which, by the exposition that I gave of them,* so materially contributed to turn the tide of popular opinion against France, would, had it not been for me, have produced very little effect. My exertions on this occasion were such as hardly to be credited, if they were fully described, and the effect they produced cannot possibly be conceived by any one who was not a witness of them.—I shall mention one more instance of the effect of my exertions; one that I can never reflect on but with something more than pride. Several vessels, in consequence of General Maitland's famous evacuation of Port-au-Prince, arrived in the Delaware with French Royalists on board, under the flag of his Majesty. From sinister motives of some persons, a fearful representation of their numbers, and the number of their armed negroes, had been made to the Governor, and, by him to the President. Whereupon, without a moment's hesitation, the Upper House of Congress proceeded to pass a law to prevent the landing of these unfortunate people; and, if the law had passed and been executed, it was not easy to see how they could have avoided perishing. In this extremity the Royalists had, by means of their friends, applied to the British Minister, who, with that zeal which marked the whole of his conduct, applied to the government on behalf of these unfortunate persons, but could obtain nothing whereon to build even a hope of success. In the mean time, indignant at the injus-

* *The New Year's Gift*; see page 85, in this volume.—ED.

tice, the cruelty, and the baseness of thus repelling these people by an *ex post facto* law, and that, too, out of pure fear as to what barely might happen, and without any previous examination or inquiry into the truth of the facts alleged, I had taken up the cause of the Frenchmen, and had reprobated, in terms, perhaps, not the most mild, the intended measure of the government and the Congress. And here, Sir, give me leave to exhibit to you a specimen of mercantile baseness, such as I imagine you have never yet seen. The merchants and shopkeepers, several of whom, when I began to write, I found in French cockades, and who were ready to stone me to death for writing against Frenchmen, now came to my house in crowds to scratch their name from my list, *because I wrote in favour of Frenchmen!* They were frightened; and you know, Sir, very well, that if they are once put into a good fright, all ideas of liberty and law instantly vanish from their minds. Solomon describes the fool's wrath as being extremely dangerous; but woe unto him who hath to sustain the wrath of a coward! Even this, however, did not deter me from my purpose. The Frenchmen, finding that they had no other hope, sent their friends to me to consult as to the measures to be taken. On the Saturday the bill had been read three times in the Senate, and had been ordered to the lower-house. On the Sunday I procured an accurate statement of the number and description of the persons on board, together with a sort of certificate from the commander of each ship. These I conveyed to the President on the Sunday night, and sent copies of them to a member of the lower-house of Congress the next morning. Proceedings were immediately stopped; an official examination was ordered by the President; it was found that there was no danger; the Frenchmen were landed; and my merchants and shopkeepers, who would have crucified me only two days before, now came sneaking to thank me for having saved their city and their country from disgrace.—I will weary you with no more particular instances. This is merely a specimen of the exertions I was continually making for six years, during the whole of which time, I can truly say, that I lived not for myself or my family, but exclusively for my country and my King. I enjoyed nothing that the world calls pleasure; fortune was entirely neglected, and personal safety but very little attended to. When I began to write, the prejudice, the hatred, against England were so great, that scarcely any Englishman would publicly own his country. If asked of what country he was, his answer was evasive; he came from "the old country," or he called himself an Irishman or a Scotchman; for *English* was the hated epithet. Of the violence, the rage of the times, no man not upon the spot, can form an adequate idea; but some conception of the dangers that I must have been exposed to may be conveyed by the fact of the people having, in their fury against yourself, hanged, and afterwards beheaded, the marble statue of your father! It was in the midst of a scene like this, Sir, at the time that the Philadelphians were tearing down the image of King George II. from the walls of the church which he had founded for their fathers; it was at that time that I exhibited the pictures of all the Royal Family of England in a window* exactly opposite that very wall, and there I determined to exhibit them, and did exhibit them, till their name was once more honoured in the city. Mr. Long would have called this "indiscreet and

* See an extract from the Preface to *Censor* in this vol. p. 8.—ED.

chivalrous:" but, Sir, there are times and seasons when to venture every thing but character is the very height of discretion; and, indeed, discretion, as to such circumstances, consists in knowing when to venture, and when not to venture. The sequel proved that I was discreet. I succeeded in my object far beyond my utmost expectations. I met every adversary that appeared against my country; defended it against every accusation; exposed its secret, and chastised its open enemies; emboldened its friends to speak, and "stilled the madness of the crowd." In that city, where, when I started on my career, an Englishman was ashamed to own his country; where my life had been a hundred times threatened unless I desisted to write against France; where the name of his Majesty was never mentioned unaccompanied with some epithet too foul and calumnious to repeat; in that city I lived to see a public celebration of Lord Nelson's victory over the French, and to be serenaded with the tune of "God save the King!" What a change! Certainly not to be entirely ascribed to me. But it was a change which I had a considerable share in producing; I stayed the mischief; I prevented that which would have prevented us from profiting from the events which time was hastening along. My American friends give me all the credit of this change: I claim no such thing; but I know that I deserve, and that I shall have, the lasting gratitude of both countries. The services, of which I have been speaking, have not ceased their operation: they are still active: the people of America cannot, even if they would, forget what they have learned against France; nor, which is, indeed, of more importance, will they again be silenced with regard to the merits of Great Britain. The time of my writing will be looked back to as a memorable epoch, not only in American politics, but in the political mind of America. I untied the tongue of British attachment: by an extraordinary exertion I broke the shackles in which the public mind had been held from the commencement of the revolutionary war, and once more opened a way for the workings of nature and of truth.

Now, Sir, though, upon my return to England, I expected no reward for these services; though I never either received or asked for or wished for any, yet I might, without being too unreasonable, have hoped, that, if my services should happen to be publicly commended, I should escape an assault from a press under the control of that government, in defence of which I had so zealously and so disinterestedly laboured: I might have hoped, that, though an orator were, by way of rhetorical figure, to award me a statue of gold for my services across the Atlantic; even in that case I might have hoped that a tool, yea, a very slave, of the Treasury would not dare to style me an *American* and a *traitor*.* These are wrongs not easy to justify or to palliate; especially when they come without provocation; and certain I am that I never gave any, except that of refusing to become brother-slave; a refusal which arose not only from my dislike to the situation itself, but from a conviction, which has been since fully confirmed by observation, that the pen of a slave seldom produces effect. — From my arrival in England to the preliminaries of peace, or, at least, during a part of that time, I endeavoured to support a daily paper in which endeavour, from various causes I failed; but, however awkward I might appear in a scene to me entirely new, I think it will not be pre-

* The *True Briton* newspaper, conducted by one HERIOT.—ED.

tended, that, in my diurnal print, there was any departure from those principles of loyalty and patriotism, which I had inculcated and practised in America.

At the preliminaries of peace a new question in politics arose. I remained upon the old ground; you departed from it. The Treasury writers have accused me of "deserting Mr. Pitt, whom I had so highly extolled, and of going over to Mr. Fox, whom I had so severely censured." And thus I am, by way of allusion, charged with a crime almost as heinous as any that man can commit. But, to desert, a man must first be enlisted, and, if I might be said to be enlisted, it was in the cause of which I regarded you as the champion; and not in your personal service. It is very true, that, while in America, and immediately after my return to England, I did highly extol you; but, Sir, it must be evident to every one, that this my conduct arose from my regarding you as the great asserter of the cause of my country and of monarchy. You were always defended and applauded by me as the person, who was at the head, who was the rallying point of all those, who were opposed to the principles and the natural consequences of the French revolution. In the course of my proposed inquiry I shall, I think, show, that want of true information (a deficiency that will need no accounting for, when my then situation, not only as to place, but as to various other circumstances, is considered) misled me; that you were not the champion of the cause of monarchy, and that it was chiefly owing to your wrong system of policy that that cause was finally ruined. But, to justify my *desertion*, as it is called by the Treasury writers, there needs no inquiry into your measures during the last war. Your conduct relative to the peace, contrasted with your declared principles and avowed object as to the war, are all I require to prove, that, in ceasing to be your eulogist and in becoming your assailant, my conduct has exhibited a perfect consistency. In supporting you, Sir, what was the object I had in view? Some of your liberal partisans will probably say, a good round sum of money. But, be that as it may, what was the object which I professed to have in view? for, here, if any where, must be found the marks of desertion. What, then, was this object? It was, Sir, that which you professed to me, as well as to every man in England and in Europe, upon several occasions during the war, and particularly, in your speech made in the House of Commons, on the 7th of June, 1799. In that speech you declared, that we were in circumstances which forbade us to stop short of "an adequate, full, and rational security;" that the war might be carried on for any length of time, "without the creation of new debt;" and that it would not be difficult "to provide taxes for eight years." . . . "We shall not," said you, "be satisfied with false security. War, with all its evils, is better than a peace, in which there is nothing to be seen but injustice, dwelling with savage delight on the humbled prostrate condition of some timid suppliant people." . . . "The time to come to a discussion of a peace, can only be the time when you can look with confidence to an honourable issue; to such a peace as shall at once restore to Europe her settled and balanced constitution of general polity, and to every negotiating power in particular, that weight in the scale of general empire, which has ever been found the best guarantee and pledge of local independence and general security. Such are my sentiments. I am not afraid to avow them. I commit them to the thinking amongst mankind; and, if they have not been poisoned by the

“ stream of French sophistry, and prejudiced by her falsehoods, I am sure they will approve of the determination I have avowed, and for those grave and mature reasons on which I found it.”—I, Sir, had not been poisoned by the stream of French sophistry; I did approve of the determination that you avowed; I not only approved of it, I applauded it, I exulted at it, as my American friends will remember to their present mortification. But, Sir, because I highly extolled you for this noble determination, and for the inexhaustible pecuniary means that you had provided for carrying it into effect, was I to continue to extol you when you broke a determination so solemnly avowed, and that, too, under the pretext of husbanding those pecuniary means? Because I highly extolled the Mr. Pitt of June, 1799, was I bound to extol the Mr. Pitt of November, 1801, when he called upon the country for its lasting gratitude towards those men who had negotiated the preliminaries of peace? It is a well-known and undisputed fact, that you yourself, Sir, directed those negotiations; that it was at your suggestion they were undertaken; that in every stage you were consulted; and that no stipulation was made without your consent and approbation. But, if there were any doubt upon this point, there can be none as to your open conduct with regard to the measure, in which you did not merely *acquiesce*, which you did not merely approve of and support, but which you declared to be such as to afford matter of *exultation* to the country, and to entitle the ministers “to its warmest approbation and *most grateful thanks*.” And, Sir, did consistency call upon me to extol you after such an eulogium upon a compact in which all your principles had been abandoned, and all your promises falsified? Will any one say, that the peace of Amiens “re-stored to Europe her settled and balanced constitution of general polity?” Will any one pretend that the peace of Amiens gave us “indemnity for the past and security for the future?” To ask the questions seems like a sort of mockery. Will it be said, that you were unable to carry on the war? Then Mr. Fox was right; for it was a peace of necessity. But, if this was the case, then comes your other difficulty; for, I was deceived by your statements of 1799, to say nothing about the more elaborate statements of your Secretary Mr. Rose, whose official pamphlet came forth to aid the deception. I believed you, when you so confidently and so solemnly declared, that “the war might be carried on for any length of time without the creation of new debt,” and that “it would not be difficult to provide taxes for eight years;” and, though I saw you, in two years afterwards, make a peace, in which not only all your avowed objects of the war were abandoned, but by which the ancient honours of the country were surrendered; though I saw the balance of Europe remain completely overset; though the enemy seized state upon state even during the negotiations; and though I clearly saw and explicitly foretold that England itself would be exposed to that constant and imminent danger, of which every man is now feelingly sensible; in spite of all this, was I still to adhere to you, still to extol you, on pain of being stigmatized as a political deserter! Will any one, even in the purlieu of Downing-street and Whitehall, attempt to maintain a position so repugnant to reason? Because you, either from choice or from necessity; impelled either by your interest, your ambition, or the consequences of your errors, changed your course in politics, throwing aside all the principles which had induced me to follow you, was I bound to change too? Is the mere *name* of Pitt (for there was little else left), sufficient to com-

pensate for the absence of every thing that we desire to find in a minister, and is it entitled to political allegiance from all those who have once expressed their attachment to the principles with which it has been, but no longer is, connected? Is there any one who will pretend, that you are not only so great as to have a right to abandon your principles, without exposing yourself to censure, but to render it a duty in others to abandon theirs for the sake of yielding you support? Is there any one who will venture to urge a pretension so offensive, so insulting to the feelings of the world? And, if not; if it be not insisted, that every man who once supports a principle of yours, becomes by that act solely your bondsman for life, then, I think, if *desertion* be a proper word to employ, it will be allowed that I did not desert you, but that you deserted me.

But, though thus deserted, I might, say your friends, have avoided going over to your political opponent. Here, too, Sir, I shall, I hope, find very little difficulty in showing, that, though, in this case, the path pointed out by reason and by honour, by loyalty and by patriotism, was strewn with thorns, I have, in no single instance, deviated from it.

I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, Hants, Sept. 24, 1804.

LETTER II.

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT,

(Political Register, October, 1804.)

“As for eternal enmity, I detest the idea; and, if I have an eternal enmity, it is against the partisans of a principle so detestable.”—
LORD GRENVILLE’S Letter to the Marquis of Wellesley.

SIR,—Though the doctrine of *never-ending adherence* would be, as far as relates to his own case, very agreeable to every man who has once been the object of support or of praise; though there is not a country in the world, and scarcely a rank of life in any one country, where men would not, almost without exception, anxiously desire to retain the suffrage which they have, at any time, been able to acquire; though this doctrine would necessarily be of catholic convenience, few will deny, that to you it would be far more convenient than to any other person in this kingdom, and, perhaps, than to any other person in the whole world. To all those, who have ever divided the voices of any portion of the people; to all those, who have ever been the object of contending voters, from the lowest to the highest, from a Chairman of Sir Brook’s committees to a member of Parliament, it must be of some importance to have a claim to a perpetuity of all the support they have heretofore received: how valuable then, or, rather how far beyond all valuation, must this claim be to you! To you, who have been prime-minister for twenty years; who have had, during that time, pass through your hands seven hundred millions of money; who have had a majority in the Parliament

ever since the year 1785 ; and, who, owing to the peculiar nature of the times and the alarm which prevailed for the safety of the throne, have, first or last, had the support of nineteen-twentieths of the people ! Only establish this claim, therefore, and you are safe from every assailant upon earth, except Buonaparte : let your measures be what they may, nothing internal can ever shake your power ; and, if we could be prevailed on to subscribe to the doctrine which is above described, and which your partisans openly teach, you and your noble associate might (Buonaparte's good pleasure being obtained) rule over us to the end of your natural lives ; and might, for aught I can see to the contrary, bequeath us at your death, upon the principle that those who had already so cheerfully submitted to your delegate, could have no reasonable objection to submit to your legatee. But, Sir, to this doctrine I do not subscribe. At a period not far removed, a great majority of your former supporters will, I trust, be found to reject it with disdain ; and, acting upon those public principles, which I am now proceeding further to develop, I feel confident, that they will cease to boast of the honour of being your partisans, the lifeless pageants in a political show, at the moment that their country is on the verge of destruction.

Having, in the preceding letter, proved, that, in ceasing to adhere to you, I departed from no principle that I had ever entertained, or professed to entertain ; that, to the cause of which I had regarded you as the champion, I remained firmly attached after you had totally forsaken it, together with all your openly and solemnly declared objects and determinations relative thereunto ; that, it is you who are, in this respect, chargeable with defection, and that, to borrow an illustration from your newly and miraculously acquired science, it was not, in this case, the soldier that deserted his general, but the general that deserted his army, or, all that part of it, at least, which was not composed of mere mercenaries, and which could not be inveigled to follow him after he had abandoned the cause it had taken up arms to maintain : having, and in a manner which I cannot help believing to be incontrovertible, established this point, it is my intention, next, to examine into the charge of *going over*, as it is called, to join with Mr. Fox ; first unequivocally avowing, that, as far as a person like me can with propriety be said to join with a great political leader, I have joined with Mr. Fox, insomuch as he, together with Lords Fitzwilliam, Spencer, Grenville, Mr. Windham, and the other distinguished persons that are co-operating with him in Parliament, are acting upon those principles that I have *always* professed, and are endeavouring, if I correctly judge of their views, to procure the adoption of those measures, relating as well to our internal as our external policy, without which I am, for the reasons I have heretofore given and in these letters propose more elaborately to give, sincerely convinced that England will, at no far-distant day, become a colony of imperial France.

In those political regions, where it is the established custom to consider every question merely in a personal light ; where all political writers are regarded as bondsmen to one master or another ; where the abject votaries cry, " Away with the measures and give us the men ;" in those regions of servility, obduracy, and wilful blindness, so far am I from expecting to produce conviction, that I do not even hope to be understood. But, amongst those who retain a due respect for principles ; those who claim a right to think for themselves, and acknowledge the same right in others ; those, who, to use a very strong, though, in this

case, not inapplicable phrase, still "dare say that their souls are their own;" amongst such persons it will, in order to come at a just notion as to my going over to Mr. Fox, be thought not unnecessary to inquire, whence I have gone and whither; that is to say, from what cause or what principle I have departed, and to what cause or what principle I have gone; in what cause or on what principle it was that I was opposed to Mr. Fox, and in what cause or on what principle it is that I now have joined with him.

My career as a writer began with the *French Revolution* and the subjects closely connected therewith. Mr. Fox's political life naturally divides itself, for consideration, under five principal heads, corresponding with five great events of the country; to wit: the *American war*, the *India Bill*, the *Regency*, the war against the *French Republic*, and the *Present War*.

As to the first of these, in which you, treading in the steps of your father, co-operated with Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, and, I believe, Mr. Windham, I, with the knowledge, which peculiar though accidental advantages, have enabled me to acquire, have no hesitation in saying that I should have differed from you all. The *India Bill* I never read: I confess myself almost totally ignorant of the question in dispute; but, unless Mr. Fox's bill* would have made a job of India, and rendered an extensive and valuable colony a mill-stone round the neck of England; unless it would have created in Leadenhall-street a set of sovereigns the rivals of the House of Brunswick; unless it would have powerfully assisted in impoverishing the landholders in England, in order to carry on wars for the enriching of upstarts to come and thrust them from their fields and their mansions; unless its tendency was to expose us to the cruel mortification of beholding

"The wealth of climes, where savage nations roam,

"Pillag'd from slaves to purchase slaves at home;"

unless these were the consequences, to which Mr. Fox's India system inevitably tended, I think it would, at this time, be very hard to show, that it could have been so injurious to the kingdom as that which was adopted in its stead. On the *Regency*† question I also confess my ignorance, and I hope it is one upon which no circumstances will ever arise so pressing as to induce me to submit my crude notions to the public; though, I cannot help thinking, that, the present is, of all others, the season for men of learning and of talents to bring forward, through the means of the press, some principles, that may, if the necessity should come, prepare our minds for the discussion; and, thereby prevent the adoption of any hasty, unadvised measure, any measure of "existing circumstances," any hazardous "experiment," any popular innovation, that would tend to efface from the minds of the people the remnant of that reverential awe, which they once entertained for the kingly office, and which, though less amiable, perhaps, than personal attachment to the sovereign, is assuredly not less conducive to the permanent security

* Mr. Fox's India Bill was proposed and lost in 1783. Mr. Pitt's was carried in 1784.—ED.

† The Regency question arose in 1788, when the King first became deranged; and it was, whether the Prince should assume the powers of King? Mr. Pitt was minister and opposed it; Mr. Fox, leader of the opposition, espoused it; but they were so long in debating it, that, in 1789, the King recovered and the question dropped before any bill could be passed.—ED.

of the throne. Upon neither of these subjects, especially as connected with the public character or conduct of yourself or of Mr. Fox, did I ever attempt to enter, so far, at least, as to express any thing bearing the marks of a deliberate opinion.

The French Revolution, then, or, to render the object more definite, the *last war* waged by England against France, was the cause, and the only cause, in which I stood opposed to Mr. Fox; he maintaining that the war was neither just nor necessary, and I endeavouring to maintain that it was both necessary and just. And here, Sir, I might, if I chose, revoke my opinion upon a plea much more satisfactory than any which you have brought forward, or can bring forward, for the revoking of your opinion with respect to Mr. Addington and Lord St. Vincent, particularly the former, with whom, previous to your recommendation of him to the Parliament, you had lived in habits of intimacy even from your childhood. My utter inexperience and my youth would form no feeble apology for adopting and pursuing an error, especially if that error evidently arose from a laudable feeling; and, though, generally speaking, twenty-eight years* of age is not very young, yet a person of that age must be regarded as a young politician, if he be only then beginning to *read*, and even to *talk*, as well as to write upon politics, which was literally the case with respect to me. But, this plea, as well as that which might fairly be founded upon the circumstances connected with my local situation, which exposed me constantly to hear the expression of wishes hostile to the warlike efforts of my country, and which, therefore, naturally wedded me more closely to the cause in which she was at war, and, of course, led me to defend and applaud the man by whom the measures of that war were principally directed; all these grounds of apology I explicitly forego and disclaim; distinctly declaring, that, with regard to the French revolution itself, as well as with regard to the justice and necessity of the last war with France, I still retain all those principles, as to which I was, both during and since the war, opposed to Mr. Fox.

The peace came: the war was no more: and why did not my opposition to Mr. Fox cease, when the cause of that opposition ceased to exist? In the first place, if men continue to act at all, they must *oppose*, or, *co-operate*; and, after an opposition, especially of long duration and of great warmth, there must, amongst men not blessed with the singularly happy disposition of the Hawkesburys and the Castlereaghs, be both time and circumstance to produce co-operation. In the next place, the cause of opposition had not ceased. Considered as to political principles and opinions, a peace always must be inseparable from the war that it has put an end to; because the terms of the peace are the result, though, as is proved, I think, by the present case, not always the natural result of the war. I continued opposed to Mr. Fox, because Mr. Fox continued to oppose the principles upon which I had so long been acting; because he approved of the peace upon the very ground that he had always disapproved of the war; because he maintained that the peace was absolutely necessary to the country, and was a necessary consequence of the war;

* Mr. Cobbett must have been *thirty-three*, or very near it, when he wrote his first pamphlet; but he never seemed sure of his own age, and, therefore, we some years ago obtained an extract from the Parish Register of Farnham, by which it appears, that, with two brothers older than himself, and one *younger*, he was christened in April, 1763. This, however, does not weaken the argument above.—ED.

while I was fully persuaded, and most earnestly endeavoured to prove, that it was not. With respect to you, Mr. Fox was completely triumphant. He had constantly told you, that the necessary consequences of the war would be, an extension of the dominion and an increase of the power of France, confirmed by a disgraceful peace on the part of Great Britain.—And, Sir, that either the peace of Amiens was *not necessary*, or that Mr. Fox's predictions were *fulfilled to the letter*, is, I think, a proposition, which will never admit of dispute. The ostensible ministers; those persons in whose behalf you demanded “the most grateful thanks of the country” for the peace they had made; those persons did, indeed, in words, “disclaim the plea of necessity:” yet, your immediate successor, the once “able” but now “imbecile” (I use your own epithets) Mr. Addington, declared that “peace was necessary in order to husband our resources against another day of trial;” while his worthy and now your worthy colleague, Lord Hawkesbury, in most manfully denying that it was “a piece of necessity,” did, with not less discrimination than candour, acknowledge that it was “a necessary peace;” while Lord Levison Gower, declaring the peace to be “a capitulation for safety,” gave it his cordial support; and, while you, in the same breath that you “thanked God that we were yet far, very far indeed, from the end of our pecuniary resources,” did, nevertheless think it advisable “to keep those resources for the purposes of *defence* “and *security*, and not lavish them away in a further continuation of “the contest, with the *certainty of enormous expense*, with the hazard of “*making our relative situation worse*, and without obtaining *so great a degree of security*.”* Not to appeal, therefore, to the scores, the hundreds, of pamphlets, essays, and speeches, which were written, or delivered, in defence of the peace, and in all of which, whether coming from your friends or from the old opposition, the plea of necessity was, in some guise or other, strenuously urged; not to appeal to any of these, suffer me to ask you, Sir, what sort of compact that peace must have been, which would have given us a *less* degree of security than we have enjoyed since the peace of Amiens; the peace that merited the “most grateful thanks of the country?” And, if even your imagination can conceive no state of greater insecurity; if merely to provide for our defence became, in ten months after the peace was concluded, an object “quite sufficient to occupy the whole of every man's mind;” if such be our present situation; such the immediate consequences; the clearly foreseen and repeatedly foretold consequences, of the peace which you secretly made, or, at least, openly defended and extolled, what but necessity, what but the last necessity, what but an absolute inability to continue the war another month, can possibly be pleaded in justification of your conduct? Here, then, Sir, is a dilemma, from which there is no getting loose. Lord Belgrave may again pour forth his soul in expressions of gratitude, “upon casting his eyes on the vessel of state, having “weathered the storm, and riding in triumph and *security* in her native “port;” Mr. Canning may again treat the stock-jobbers and contractors (amongst whom, upon the occasion alluded to, too many persons of high rank and reputation had, as I observed at the time, the weakness to mix) with a versification† of his lordship's halcyon ideas; and the younger

* Speech of 3rd November, 1801.

† Mr. CANNING, in 1802, wrote a poem, lauding Mr. PITT as the saviour of the nation, one stanza of which is as follows:

George Rose, with a degree of piety and delicacy truly worthy of the stock whence he sprang, may again call upon the congregation to "hallow the day that gave you birth;" still, in spite of the dignified attachment of those who become partisans merely because it is awkward to be nothing; in spite of that generous gratitude, which, though inspired merely by personal favours, is so powerful as to extend, in its operation, to the public conduct of the private friend, even if that conduct be in direct hostility to the principles professed by the grateful party; in spite of that hardy adulation, which nobly pushes on to its object, amidst the unanimous hisses and scorn of mankind; in spite of all these, Sir, this grand dilemma will for ever remain: either the peace of Amiens, a peace in which every one of your avowed objects of the war; in which the balance of Europe, the independence of its states; and the tranquillity and security of Great Britain, were all abandoned; either such a peace as this was made without any necessity for it, or all Mr. Fox's predictions relative to the result of the war were completely fulfilled.

To prove that this notion has not arisen from a *revised* consideration of the subject; to prove that no *recent* change as to parties has produced its promulgation, I have only to quote the words, which I published more than two years ago, and, of course, immediately after the conclusion of the peace. "It must be allowed, that, if either the existence, or the conduct, of the war did not really render such a peace necessary; if the situation of the country was (which I deny) such as, 'upon the whole and under all the circumstances of Europe,' to render the peace of Amiens advisable; then, it must be allowed, that those who opposed, in all its stages, the prosecution of the war; were, by far, the wisest politicians." Thus it was, then, that you and Mr. Fox appeared in my sight at the conclusion of the peace. He still as widely as ever differing from me as to the war, and differing from me also as to the necessity of the peace; but, being, at the same time, perfectly consistent with himself; while you differed from me full as widely as Mr. Fox did, and while this difference arose from your having turned your back upon those principles, and having flatly falsified those promises, which had before induced me to agree with you. Mr. Fox triumphed over the cause that I had espoused; a triumph which few persons felt more severely than I did. To be disgracefully beaten, at the end of seven years of such exertions as I had made, was well calculated to increase my hostility to the chief of the Opposition; but, by him I had not been deserted; by him the cause had not been abandoned; him I could not accuse of inconsistency; and, in short, whether the peace was a measure of necessity, or whether it was not, it was impossible not to perceive that it stamped him your superior as a statesman: if the former, greatly your superior in discernment, if the latter, not less your superior in political integrity.

Shall I be told, that my disappointment, and, of course, my anger against you, in consequence of the peace, was owing to my own folly; to my over-sanguine disposition; for that your promises must, of course, have been made with an implied reservation as to the effect of subsequent

"Who, when terror and doubt thro' the universe reign'd,
 "While rapine and treason their standards unfurl'd,
 "The heart and the hopes of his country maintain'd,
 "And one kingdom preserv'd, midst the wreck of the world."

events? In your defence of the peace you had an eye to these promises. "There were times," said you, "during the war, in which government hoped to be able to drive France within her ancient limits, and even to make barriers against her further incursions; but, in this we were disappointed; it became, then, necessary, with the change of circumstances, to change our objects; for I do not know a more fatal error, than to look only at one object, and obstinately to pursue it, when the hope of accomplishing it no longer remains." This was delightfully received by every weak and mean man in the country. It was the very language of that "prudent young man" Lord Hawkesbury, and was echoed from alley to alley, from counter to counter, through every department of the 'Change and the Bank. But, Sir, was not this; in good truth was it not a most miserable attempt to preserve consistency? "There was a time in which the government *hoped!*" What! was it thus that "the aspiring blood of Lancaster dropped! I thought it would have mounted!" When the "*government hoped!*" You should have said, there were times, during the war, when *I said*, when *I declared*, when *I vowed*, when *I most solemnly pledged myself*, without reservation or qualification, that *I*, and not that indefinite thing called the *government*, never would make peace with France, till I could obtain "an adequate, full, and rational security; till such a peace could be made as would restore to Europe her settled and balanced constitution of general polity, and to every negotiating power in particular, its due weight in the scale of general empire." Having said this, you should have proceeded to confess, that events had frustrated your purpose, that your declaration was rash, and that you hoped to be forgiven. Forgiveness, from me, would have been readily granted; but, I never would have put it in your power again to mislead, again to disappoint, again to disgrace either myself or my country. A part, however, and a very material part, of your promises, remain to receive even the sort of justification that I have here been noticing: I mean your promises relative to the pecuniary resources of the country; which promises were, as I have before stated, backed by a very elaborate publication, under the name of your secretary, Mr. Rose, and which publication was printed at the public expense and transmitted, in French as well as English I believe, to all foreign courts where we had resident ministers, or other diplomatic agents. These promises were, that, in June 1799, not two years before the negotiation for peace was humbly solicited of a Commissary of Prisoners; such were our pecuniary resources, that "war might be carried on for any length of time, without the creation of new debt, and that it would not be difficult to provide taxes for eight years." Now, Sir, as to this promise, no change of circumstances in the war can possibly avail you aught. You were not the master of warlike events, though you had much to do in producing them; but, of the purse of the country you were the absolute master. All its means were at your command, and the extent of those means was a mere matter of calculation; a point to be settled by the counting of fingers. Yet this promise too was broken; this full and specific and deliberate declaration was contrary to truth; and, Sir, it is beyond the powers of sophistry here to obtain for you any other choice than that which lies between wilful misstatement and inadequate knowledge. The truth is, however that your partisans attempt no apology; they frankly give up the point; and, with a modesty and morality peculiar to themselves, upbraid me with perverseness

for having confided in your declarations and promises; a species of reproach which is exceedingly mortifying, and against which, therefore, as I think you will do me the justice to acknowledge, I have, since the preliminaries of peace, taken every precaution in my power to guard both myself and the public.

But, still your partisans insist, that all this is no justification for my having joined Mr. Fox. Some of them allow, because they have not the face to deny it, that I was fully justified in opposing you; but, they say I should have done it "upon *independent* ground;" by which they mean that I should have stood alone; and that, though I might have a right to attack you, I was also to continue to assail your opponents. This doctrine, which is precisely that which was so earnestly inculcated by Mr. Addington's partisan, in the "Cursory Remarks," is not less convenient to a minister than the doctrine of never-ceasing adherence; for if, by any means, no matter what, he can keep his opponents in a state of constant, or even *occasional*, hostility to each other, great indeed must be his imbecility if he fails to give a good account of them one at a time, a practical demonstration of which was given in the shameful state of parties during the administration of the person last named, a state of parties the effects of which the nation will long have to lament. It is curious, too, that while this doctrine of "*independent* opposition," as it is at once drolly and artfully denominated, is held forth as an essential in the political character; while eternal enmity is to exist amongst all those, who have ever differed from each other, and who are now opposed to the minister, an exactly opposite doctrine is held and acted upon with respect to all those who will support the minister. If you will but stand and vote on the side of the minister, you may be cordially reconciled to men with whom but yesterday you were in open and violent hostility; while, to persons, together with whom you are in opposition to the minister, you must not be reconciled, though there has been time and circumstances more than sufficient to soften your asperity: nay, so preposterous is the whole of this set of principles, that, if there be a person from whom you have ever differed in the whole course of your life, you must not, in opposition to the ministry, agree with him upon any point as to which you never disagreed with him; whereas, in favour of the ministry, you are not only released from this restraint, you are, not only as to new questions, at liberty to agree with those from whom you formerly differed, but, as hath been lately most strongly exemplified, you are at full liberty to agree with them upon the very same questions as to which you have not barely disagreed with them, but as to which you have actually delivered your opinion against them, and have given to that opinion the sanction of a vote!

To those who may relish this doctrine I leave it as a guide: me it does not suit: I am, and ever have been, of opinion, that a party is only to be opposed by a party; a ministry by an opposition, uniting, if possible, all those who are not on the side of the ministry; and that, in order to render such an union efficient, not only all private prejudice but every minor public consideration, ought to give way. Under the influence of this opinion, thoroughly convinced that you never ought to be prime minister again, and suspecting (what has since proved true), that the open operation of a scheme for your return to the helm was at no great distance, I began, so early as the month of June, 1802, to suggest the necessity of a new-modelling and combination of parties. "The ques-

“tion of peace or war is now at an end ; and as the Old Opposition do not stand committed on those other great objects of public consideration which will hereafter present themselves, there are five modes of conduct which lie open to their choice ; first, they may act in a detached body, as they do at present ; secondly, as the allies of some other party ; thirdly, as neutrals ; fourthly, they may set up a sort of armed neutrality ; fifthly, they may divide, and, in the quality of mercenaries, be opposed to each other, without any diminution of that mutual regard and that love of country, which the virtuous Swiss are said to entertain at the very moment when they are plunging the bayonet into each other’s breast.” This was not directly pointing out what I wished the Old Opposition to do ; it was not directly saying, “Join the New Opposition, or you too will become insignificant ;” but, that such was the suggestion intended to be conveyed no one can doubt. From this time, however, to the renewal of the war, such was the disjointed state of parties, so completely were the great public men detached from each other, that there appeared no means whereby to endeavour to accomplish a change for the better. The war awakened the leading characters who are now opposed to you, not only to a sense of the dangers of the country, but, which was not of less importance, to a due sense of that situation, in which, by the influence of their mutual dread of appearing to be the first to concede, they exhibited the consummately ridiculous spectacle of great men, become, through *pride*, the battling puppets of a mere underling, and one, too, from whose name “imbecility” was inseparable ! This was too humiliating, too shockingly degrading, long to be endured. Their opposition soon began to assume a milder tone : this change was succeeded by marks of mutual reconciliation, though, as yet, by no evident approaches towards an union of action : for, Sir, it falls to the lot only of the happy few, such as those of whom you lately spoke under the denomination of *Noses*, to change all at once ; to open the mouth with a bite, and close it with a kiss ; to lick the hand that yet sweats with the labour of lashing them. At the meeting of Parliament, however, in November last, it was evident, that, in spite of all the arts of the ministry, and of others, whom it is not now worth while to mention, a co-operation in Parliament between the Old and New Oppositions was at no great distance.

From the moment that I perceived even a glimmering of hope, that an union of the great men of the country might be accomplished, I lost no opportunity of endeavouring to enforce the necessity of it, and to put to silence those by whom it was opposed ; and, finally, I had the pleasure to hear Mr. Fox and Mr. Windham once more publicly exchange the name of “friend.” Still, will your partisans say, that I was to stand aloof ? You were, at this time, propping occasionally, and occasionally undermining the ministry which you had erected, and which had brought upon the country so many and such dreadful mischiefs. Your conduct was, with me, an object of hostility scarcely inferior to theirs ; both tended greatly to increase the dangers of the country. Yet, I’ll warrant that your partisans will maintain, that your conduct, be it what it might, could be no inducement for me to turn towards Mr. Fox, notwithstanding there was no other way left of coming at even a chance of effecting such a change of measures as I regarded absolutely necessary to the safety of the state. Besides, Sir, when, of two rivals, one sinks, the other naturally rises in the same degree. Mr. Fox had, in my estimation, and, I believe, in the

estimation of the world (for America I will answer), taken an amazing vault above you at the epoch of the peace of Amiens; and, I think, it will hardly be contended, that, when your conduct between the peace and the renewal of the war came to be calmly and conscientiously surveyed; when I saw you, first keep aloof from the Parliament, without any alleged public reason for so doing, and with the obvious intention to avoid giving support to, and thereby incurring any responsibility for, measures which you yourself had advised and even dictated; when, as the embarrassments of Mr. Addington increased, I saw you, who had kept from the sittings of parliament under the pretext of ill health, hastening to the Treasury, negotiating for place, and quite able and willing to take upon you, in conjunction with Lord Melville, the whole business of the state; when, in consequence of the failure of that negotiation and of the exposure that ensued, I was enabled clearly to view and correctly to judge of your conduct at the time when you retired from office; when I discovered, that, after having prevailed upon your colleagues to retire, because his Majesty would not consent to the measure of Catholic emancipation, you offered to remain in office *yourself*, for an indefinite term, without such consent being obtained, though you afterwards explicitly declared in Parliament, that the want of such consent was the sole cause of your resignation; when, in putting all these circumstances together, and finding in the negotiations for place, no mention of, nor any allusion to, Catholic emancipation, reason compelled me to conclude, that your real object in resigning was, to get rid of your intractable colleagues, to court the people by a peace, and to swim along in "peace and plenty" with just such a ministry as that you have now formed; when, in passing over scores of minor political transgressions, and hastening to the close of this climax of cardinal sins, I saw you (to repeat almost my own words relative to your conduct upon Mr. Patten's motion, as viewed in connection with your negotiations for peace with Mr. Addington), when I saw you ready and willing, provided your terms were acceded to, to enter the cabinet, to join and to co-operate with the men, of the whole of whose principal measures, foreign and domestic, you have since declared your disapprobation, but the leaders of whom you were willing to keep in place and in power provided you amply participated with them; and when I saw you, not being able to obtain the share that you coveted, seizing on the first opportunity for commencing against these men (men whom you had collectively and individually recommended to the Parliament) an opposition of the kind best calculated to render them contemptible and odious in the eyes of the world, being evidently restrained from open and violent hostility, only by the fear of giving offence in that quarter where you wished to supplant them; when I had seen all this between the conclusion of the peace and the breaking out of the war, I think, it will hardly be contended, that the interval could fail to produce a powerful bias towards the person who had so long been your rival, and without a co-operation with whom there appeared little prospect of making a successful stand against the strides of your ambition and the destructive tendency of your projects.

With the question upon the address to the King, in answer to his notification of the declaration of war, my opposition to Mr. Fox ceased. New questions arose, questions entirely new both to him and to me; questions whereon to side with him clashed with no opinion I had ever delivered, no wish I had ever expressed, but was perfectly consistent with all those

principles of party co-operation, and with all those notions of public duty which I had constantly entertained and had frequently expressed, particularly where I had had occasion to speak of the conduct of Mr. Burke, Mr. Windham and others, in joining you during the last war. As to the more *personal* assaults upon Mr. Fox; general censure, unqualified reproaches, harsh imputations, cutting sarcasms, these are the weapons with which writers fight, especially in times and upon occasions such as those here alluded to: besides, if, at a time like that of the conclusion of the peace, when not to be stung to the soul would have argued a total want either of sense as to the present or of sincerity as to the past; if, at a moment, when, smarting under the mortification to which an unmerited confidence in your declarations and promises had exposed me; if, at such a moment, I treated with too much personal severity our triumphant opponent, your partisans, Sir, are certainly not the persons to complain, nor am I the person at present to be censured. Mr. Fox might, indeed, if such could possibly have been the case, have subjected himself to the imputation of meanness in *coming over to me*; but, it would be an inconsistent sort of reasoning to insist, that, having once been too *personally* violent against Mr. Fox, when writing upon a subject upon which we had long been directly opposed, I am thereby bound to stand aloof from, nay to abandon, a *public* cause already espoused, lest, in supporting that cause, I should also support Mr. Fox. To inculcate such a principle may be attempted, but it is too inconsistent and perverse not to be instantly rejected by every sensible, candid and disinterested man.

Thus Sir, I have, I hope, shown, that, in "going over," as it is called, to Mr. Fox, I have departed from no principle that I ever either acted upon or professed; and that (to repeat my proposition), though, in this case, the path pointed out by reason and by honour, by loyalty and by patriotism, was strewed with thorns, I have, in no single instance, deviated from it. Had I chosen the tone of apology instead of that of justification, I should not have been at a loss for superabundant precedent to keep me in countenance; precedent not sought for in the conduct of those leeches of the state, who hang on through all the vicissitudes of sickness and of health; who are transferred from minister to minister, like the lumber of a ready-furnished lodging, and who pass from occupant to occupant as an incumbrance attached to the possession; not of these, Sir, but of yourself I might have cited the example. As to the doctrine of never-ending adherence, I might have asked, how, consistently with that doctrine, you could have ceased to adhere to Mr. Addington and Lord St. Vincent, whom you had so strongly recommended to the Parliament and the nation, of whose capacity for conducting the national affairs you had so strongly censured the Opposition for doubting, and the latter of whom you had described as a person whose name alone was a guarantee for security against all attempts of the enemy; I surely might have asked, how you could, upon the principle now set up in your own behalf, not only cease to adhere to those persons, not only become their assailants, but affix to their names, names which you bade us consider as synonymous with wisdom and safety, every epithet expressive of their incapacity and of your contempt. I might, with respect to joining with persons from whom one has heretofore widely differed, have inquired upon what principle it was that you joined with Mr. Dundas and Mr. Eden soon after the close of the Ame-

rican war; with the Duke of Portland, the Lords Fitzwilliam and Spencer, and Mr. Windham, at the beginning of the last war; only four months ago with six of those persons who are at this moment in the cabinet with you, and whom you had included in the description of that mass of "incongruity and imbecility," from which you professed your wish to deliver the nation; and, finally, with Mr. Fox himself, without whose co-operation that laudable and patriotic wish could never have been accomplished. If any thing more than the last-mentioned circumstance had been necessary to afford a fair inference that you yourself deemed Mr. Fox worthy of the confidence of his Majesty and the Parliament, I might have appealed, not, perhaps, to your public declarations, but certainly to declarations that you solemnly made, and that were repeated by your confidential friends as well as by all the public writers in your interest, who circumstantially described the long efforts you made for the purpose of introducing Mr. Fox into the cabinet, and who, in their anxiety to defend you against the imputation of duplicity, forgot a much higher duty, and scrupled not to lay the *blame* upon the King, though they now have what I must call the profligacy to reproach me with an abandonment of principle, because I have joined "citizen Fox," because I have joined that very person, your earnest desire and strenuous efforts to introduce whom into the cabinet formed the only ground upon which they attempted to make an apology for your conduct. And, Sir, as to that eternal resentment which your adherents now represent as the indispensably necessary consequence of personal hostility, need I, in opposition to so diabolical a principle, have gone further than your offer, nay, I will call it not only your distinct offer, but your invitation and even your solicitation to Mr. Tierney to keep that place, of which, upon his refusal, Mr. Canning, with a condescension equal to your magnanimity, thought proper to accept? To these and many more instances I might have referred, if I had not chosen to stand upon the intrinsic merits of the case; if I had not disdained the thought of recrimination, and if (without any affectation I say it) I had not felt, that, in the eyes of those whose good opinion I most esteem, your example would afford no justification for me.

Here, Sir, fully aware that I have already but too far transgressed the bounds of more than ordinary patience, I should put an end to this letter; but, there is one point, which, left untouched, would leave incomplete a subject, to which, I trust, I shall never have occasion to return: I mean the circumstance of my now opposing you, whom, in my repeatedly-expressed wish to see an union of the *great men of all parties*, I must, of course, have included amongst those whom I desired to see in power. Granted: that inclusion was a matter of course: to deny it would be either a subterfuge, or a vapid insult. But, Sir, without particular references, I may safely appeal to the memory of all those who have thought my writings worthy of perusal, that, since the peace of Amiens, nay, since the preliminaries of that ignominious and fatal compact, not only have I never spoken of your return to the *prime* ministry as an event to be wished, but that, whenever the subject has been agitated, I have positively declared my dissent from such wish. The truth is, Sir, that, having, as far as the compass of my mind will permit, carefully and impartially considered the nature and tendency of the whole of your system; having arrived at a thorough conviction, that that system points directly, and is proceeding with hasty strides, to the subversion of

the Church, the ancient Aristocracy, the Throne, and, of course, the Liberties and Independence of England; and, not less firmly convinced, that your system is, and must remain, inseparable from your possession of the first place amongst the servants of the King, I thought it my duty to endeavour to prevent your return to that place. Thus thinking, my opposition has been decided, but it has, I trust, also been fair. I never have had recourse, and never shall have recourse, to any of those arts which have been but too often employed against myself. I have never wilfully and deliberately misstated any fact; I have never, except from want of talent, made use of a sophistical argument, or intentionally left a false inference to be drawn; and I never have, on any occasion, addressed myself to, or wished for success from, the vice, the ignorance, or the prejudice, of any description of people. The uniform intention, and I will add the uniform effect, of my writings, have been, and are, to counteract the efforts of the enemies of monarchy in general, and of the monarchy of England in particular, under whatever guise or denomination those enemies have appeared; to check the spirit and oppose the progress of levelling innovation, whether proceeding from clubs of jacobins, companies of traders, synagogues of saints, or boards of the government; to cherish an adherence to long-tried principles, an affection for ancient families and ancient establishments; to inculcate an unshaken attachment to the person and office of the King, an obedience to the laws, a respect for the magistracy, a profound veneration for the church, and a devotion of fortune and of life to the liberties and glory of the country.

To the weariness which a letter of such length, and upon such a subject, is calculated to produce, I will not add by a ceremonious conclusion; being well aware too, that, if, for having said so much relating to myself, the apology with which I set out, and which was founded upon the great importance of the discussion on which I am about to enter, be not thought sufficient, no other apology can be found. I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c.,

Botley, Oct. 4, 1804.

WM. COBBETT.

LETTER III.

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT.

(Political Register, October, 1804.)

*Teach him, that states of native strength possess'd,
Though very poor, may still be very bless'd;
That TRADE'S proud empire hastes to swift decay,
As ocean sweeps the labour'd mole away;
While self-dependent pow'r can time defy,
As rocks resist the billows and the sky.—GOLDSMITH.*

MARKS OF NATIONAL DECLINE.

SIR,—Before I proceed to trace back to its causes the decline of Great Britain, it will very reasonably and naturally be required of me, to show that the effect itself is not a mere creature of imagination; to point

out what it is that I regard as the marks of that decline, of which my proposition necessarily supposes the existence. And, here, Sir, I am not unaware of the hostile feeling that I have to encounter. Men are naturally averse from every thing which tends to the establishing of disagreeable truths. No bearer of sad tidings was ever yet greeted with a welcome; every one turns from the assurance of his dangers with an anxiety proportioned to their magnitude; it is the universal desire that the evil hour should be the last. But, as the bankrupt by shunning his books only hardens the grasp of the bailiff; as the patient who rejects the probe defers nothing but the possible alleviation of his agony; so the people, who shut their ears against the proofs of their national decline, thereby hasten the downfall which they dread, and which from this cause more than from any other they finally experience.

To enumerate all the marks of our decline would require a volume of no moderate bulk. It will be sufficient to point out a few of those which apply more immediately to the present situation of the country; and the first of which is, the *Predominance of Wealth*. I am not complaining that people love money; that they prefer it to every other thing; that virtue and talents and even beauty are nothing when weighed against it: this complaint has always existed, and always will exist, as long as there are poor and rich people in the world. I am not speaking of individual riches as they affect the relations between man and man, but as they are now connected with what is called the wealth of the country; as they affect the public mind, and as they influence the national counsels. In a well-constituted and healthy community, or state, individual riches are always held in subordination to higher endowments, and the public wealth is rendered subservient to the liberties and glory of the nation; whereas in states that are hastening towards their fall, every other endowment yields to the possession of riches, and the nation's liberty and glory only serve as sacrifices to the preservation of its wealth.—To talk of the decline of a nation which is daily augmenting its exports and imports, its manufactures in every branch, its turnpike-roads and canals, and the metropolis of which annually receives an addition equal in extent and population to a considerable city, while the people even to the lowest rank are clad and fed better than at any former period; to talk of the decline of such a nation will, to those who do not reflect, appear utterly incomprehensible. But, whoever has duly considered what it is that constitutes the greatness of a nation, what it is that raises her high in the world, what it is that secures her independence, will not derive much consolation from the Custom-house books, or from any other of the usually enumerated signs of public prosperity; and, though his philanthropy may be gratified at seeing the poor eat whiter bread than formerly, his patriotism will certainly be mortified at the reflection that, in numbers three times greater than formerly, they eat it at the hands of the parish.—In estimating the prosperity of nations, we erroneously proceed upon the principles and maxims according to which we estimate the prosperity of individuals. We can form no idea of national decline which does not resemble that of a man's decline in business; and, thus, always involved in our trading notions, it appears to be a perfect absurdity to consider the decline of a nation as pointed out by the predominance of its wealth. Hence all the delusive hopes which were entertained, and held forth to the people, during the last war with France, that the enemy must soon be subdued, because he was ruined in his finances. Year after year, Sir,

proceeding upon the maxim of that profound thinker Lord Auckland, you buoyed up the spirits of the people by depicting the declining circumstances, the approaching bankruptcy, the inevitable ruin, of the enemy, while the London makers of false assignats were urged on with as much eagerness as if the salvation of the world had depended upon the success of their labours. They did succeed; the much-desired bankruptcy arrived; the enemy was, according to your notions, *completely ruined*. The sequel need not be described. Yet even the peace of Amiens, in every article of which we fell prostrate before this declining, this bankrupt, this ruined enemy; even that compact did not remove the delusive confidence in the effects of wealth; and, when the aggrandizement of France and its fearful consequences were held forth to view, you referred us, with a triumphant smile somewhat partaking of a sneer, to "the *immense wealth* of this country, which was more than sufficient to counterbalance all the "acquisitions of France." Your opinion was generally adopted; it was exactly consonant to the trading notions of the people; it was an homage paid to commerce and riches, and, therefore, it was sure to be graciously received. This opinion naturally grew out of the previously adopted error of applying to the affairs of nations the principles according to which we judge of individual prosperity. In every state of life we see that wealth gives power, and, as we know that power gives security, the deduction is, that in order to provide for our security, we have only to amass wealth. Facts have proved, that, as applied to nations, the leading position is false. But, of this there required very little reflection to convince us. Men of shallow minds, much too shallow to be employed even in the secondary departments of the state, do, indeed, always talk of the affairs of a nation as of those of a shop or a farm; and we have heard, from some of that numerous tribe of small lawyers who inhabit the Treasury Bench, speeches upon a treaty of peace or upon a declaration of war, which, with a change of the names of the parties and of places, might have done exceedingly well for a trial at the Westminster Sessions or at Hicks's Hall. These loquacious gentlemen do not seem to observe the wide difference that exists between the nature of national wealth and that of the wealth of individuals. The latter gives power, but it gives power only as long as it is itself protected by the power of the state, that is to say by the government and the law, or, in one word, by the magistrate, who defends the rich against the physical force of the poor. To render, therefore, the reasoning upon individual riches applicable to the wealth of nations, we must first discover some extraneous power, by which each nation is protected in the exclusive possession of all the wealth which it has amassed. Amongst individuals wealth gives power and power gives security, but this is only because there is another and greater power which secures the wealth; and, as there is no such power to superintend the wealth of nations, the rich nation is no more secure than the poor one; nay, it is much less secure, being placed in a situation similar to that in which a rich man would be without the protection of the magistrate, presenting to the plunderer the strongest of temptations with the weakest of obstacles.—It is not the mere possession of the wealth that we are to regard as a mark of national decline; but the estimating of that wealth too highly, and particularly the confiding in it as a means of preserving ourselves against the assaults of a warlike enemy, a sort of confidence that was never yet entertained by any nation not in the last stages of its degradation.

Another mark of national decline is the total want of a military spirit in the country : the aversion which men have to the profession of arms, and the consequent difficulties of raising an army. I think I hear you exclaim : " What ! a want of a military spirit in the country, when I have 480,000 volunteers !" I can make allowance for the esprit du corps, and also for a colonel's swelling out his muster-roll ; but, I must be excused, if I reject the volunteer establishment as a proof of a military spirit, and even as a proof of personal bravery. I do not say, or insinuate, that the volunteers are not as brave as the rest of their countrymen ; but, I deny, that their having entered into volunteer corps is any proof of their personal courage, and, in a national point of view, I regard the establishment as a striking proof of a want of a military spirit. Whence did it originate ? Mr. Addington told us, in the loyalty and patriotism of the people. He knew better. All of us knew, that it principally arose from the dread of the ballot, a dread so deeply engraven on the minds of the people, that it will be very long before it be worn out. From this cause the ranks were filled, and replenished, till the passing of the parish-officer-project bill, which, by removing the dread of the ballot, has removed about one-half of the volunteers from their corps ; and, when the bill comes to be thoroughly understood in every part of the country, it would not be at all surprising if the 480,000 men were to be reduced to 50,000, leaving nothing but those who have assembled merely to play at soldiers, and who have not the most distant idea of ever marching ten miles from their homes. The simple fact is, then, that, of 480,000 men, capable of bearing arms, 300,000, at least, entered into volunteer corps from the dread of being forced to enter a more effective service, a service *more military*, and this too at a moment when they regarded the independence of their country as being at stake ! If this be not a proof of the want of a military spirit, what proof can be given ? The men are excusable for many reasons ; and the ministers who had recourse to the measure have been justified upon the ground of necessity. They could not, it is said, get men in any other way. If true, this fact only strengthens the position for which I am contending. But, the original cause of the volunteer system is to be sought for in the spirit of trade. The minister, who was by no means deficient in that cunning which is usually found in a mind like his, saw in the adoption of a scheme, which would produce the appearance of vigour and security, while it left the mechanics and manufacturers at the command of their employers, the means of preserving his place for a year or two longer. It was a scheme perfectly congenial with the presumption as well as the avarice of the traders, who, at the same time that they saved, as they thought, the expense of a regular army, grasped at whatever authority was to be obtained amongst the volunteers. They regarded the volunteer force as an army entirely their own : raised for the protection of their warehouses and their banks : upon this army, therefore, of which you so soon put yourself at the head, all the praises and honours were lavished : thus a system purely defensive was erected, and Britain became an island besieged. — Of all the marks of national decline, none is so unequivocal as that disposition which leads a people systematically to stand upon the defensive and wait for the attack of a threatening enemy. They first endeavour to purchase tranquillity at the expense of their honour ; and, failing in that, forced at last into war, their best hope is to escape being conquered and yoked. Look back over the history of the world,

Sir, and say, if any such people ever long preserved their independence! —The resentment of such a people, their bitter reproaches against their enemy, are not occasioned by his insults, but by the compulsion they are under to meet him in arms: even their deeds of valour, if they perform any, are to be ascribed to a feeling very different from that which it is necessary for a nation to entertain in order to preserve its honour, and to make it respected in the world. “A people rising unanimously in arms, for the defence of their homes,” you seem to regard as the most noble of spectacles; but, it would be much nobler, it would argue much greater courage and much less fear, if only a part, and, proportionally, a very small part, were to rise, while the rest remained tranquilly at home. When the domestics, in some play or romance that I have read, after long disputes as to whose duty it is to enter a haunted chamber, settle the matter by agreeing *to go all together*, this “unanimous rising” is, if I remember right, by no means attributed to an excess of bravery. The bull, when attacked, marches forth alone, leaving the herd to graze in tranquillity; while the timid flock, if they venture to make a show of resistance, never fail to make it in a body.

The want of a military spirit is naturally accompanied with an indifference for national honours, for the distinctions which perpetuate those glorious deeds, which, by means of such distinctions, are handed down from father to son. Of this indifference, Sir, as prevalent in this country, we have a melancholy proof in the conduct of the government, the parliament, and the people, respecting the surrender of the *honour of the flag*, and the still more ancient and still higher honour of the title of *King of France*.* What avails it to talk of the heroic deeds of Nelson, since they could not prevent the dishonour of the flag, under which they were performed? For it must never be forgotten that to give up an honour once enjoyed is to be dishonoured. The title of King of France, together with the Lilies, you denominated “a harmless feather;” a term aptly descriptive of that indifference the existence of which I deplore, and which is a sure and certain mark of the debasement of the national mind. “A harmless feather, the preserving of which ought not to stand in the way of so great a blessing as peace!” If peace were necessarily so great a blessing, why did you go to war? Was it to preserve your honour and dignity? Strange indeed, then, that in order to put an end to the war, you should give up the greatest honour, the most glorious meed, that the nation ever won! “A harmless feather!” Why, all honours and titles and dignities are, then, harmless feathers! Did you go to war

* The title of King of France was first assumed by Edward III. of England, and Buonaparte stipulated, at the conferences at Lisle, in 1796, that it should be abandoned. The style and titles of the King of England were altered, in consequence, by a royal declaration issued on the 1st January, 1801. We take this short account from MILLER, p. 293:—“In the new heraldic arrangements the fleur-de-lis was omitted, and the title of King of France was expunged, and the royal dignity was, in future, to be expressed in the Latin tongue by these words: ‘*Georgius Tertius, Dei Gratia, Britanniarum Rex, Fidei Defensor*, and in the vernacular language, ‘George the Third, by the grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith.’ On the same day, the great seal of Britain was delivered up, and defaced, and a new great seal for the empire was given to the Lord Chancellor. A new standard also, combining the crosses of St. George, St. Andrew, and St. Patrick, was hoisted amidst the discharge of artillery in each of the three capitals of England, Scotland, and Ireland.”—ED.

to preserve the constitution ; or, to use a term of more definite meaning, to preserve the throne ? Still more strange, that, for the sake of returning to “ the blessings of peace,” you should yield, as a harmless feather, one of the brightest honours of that throne ! an honour which contributed not a little to the exciting and the preserving of that national pride and confidence by which it was originally achieved, and on which, let Custom-house politicians say what they will, both the throne and the country depended for security. The memory of the conquest of France, recorded upon our coins, and every where else where the armorial bearings of our sovereign appeared, was one of the most powerful incentives amongst the common people. First or last, every son asked of his father an explanation of the meaning of the title of King of France ; that generally led to a relation, more or less correct, of the valorous deeds of Englishmen in former times ; and the impression thus received was communicated to the next generation.

“ This story shall the good man teach his son ;
 “ And Crispin Crispian shall ne'er go by,
 “ From this day to the ending of the world,
 “ But we in it shall be remember'd.”

Shakspeare, alas ! did not contemplate the possibility of times like the present. He never imagined that the lilies, won at Agincourt, would one day be bartered for the privilege of vending bales of goods ! Had the surrendering of this the greatest of all our honours been condemned by the nation ; had it been decidedly reprobated in Parliament ; had it been the sole work of a minister ; then there would be some hope that it was no indication of national decline. But, Parliament passed the matter over as if it were too trifling to meddle with ; and, I do not remember that any one, except my insignificant self, spoke of it, in print, at least, as a subject of regret.—I am aware, that, amongst the smooth little clerks of Downing-street, this notion of the great effects of national honours will be regarded as an excellent subject of ridicule. They laugh at the idea of high sentiments in the minds of low men ; but, not to say that the common people are not the *lowest* of men, and though it be not supposed that their notions of national honour are very refined, it may safely be asserted, that upon their minds those honours have a greater effect than upon those of any other class. Do we not always see them the first and the loudest in rejoicings at the victories won by the arms of their country ? Their joy and their pride, upon such occasions, are greater than those of any other description of persons ; because, uninformed as to the various circumstances of the event, they see the glory unclouded by any reflections upon the cost or the consequences, or upon the general character or conduct of the parties concerned.—Whoever carefully traces loyalty and patriotism to their source, will, I am persuaded, clearly discover, that neither of them can long exist where national honours are a subject of indifference. Turn over the page of history, and then say, whether those princes who have been the greatest warriors have not also been the greatest favourites, more especially of the lower classes of their subjects. Many of them have been cruel tyrants, the constant practisers of all manner of vices ; but military glory, endearing the possessors to the hearts of the great mass of the people, have, almost without exception, enabled them to despise the opinions of the more reflecting and criticising few. This general propensity may,

an does, in certain cases, prove injurious to the humbler virtues and to individual freedom; but most assuredly it is the principal means of preserving national independence, which will ever be the first object with wise legislators and statesmen. The mere personal attachment to the sovereign, founded upon his practising those virtues which are met with in every rank of life, must necessarily be confined to the breasts of a few, and comparatively speaking, a very few indeed of his subjects. In truth, such attachment partakes not of the nature of loyalty. Loyalty is a firm and immovable adherence to the King as king, and not as a man: it is shown in a reverence for his title and office; in a prompt and cheerful obedience to his commands; in a devotion of life, if called for, in his service: and it arises, amongst the mass of his subjects, from an habitual, an hereditary persuasion, that the King is the repository of all that is necessary to the preservation of the national character, in which the heart of every man, however humble his condition, tells him that he has a share.—And, as to the other great public virtue, patriotism, which, when it exists in its proper degree, is a principle of the mind as strong and as uniform in its effects, as a love of kindred or of life itself; whence does it arise? Not from the desire to get a contract or a job, like that of the patriotism of Sir Brook's committees: not from anxiety for the funds, like that of the patriotism of Lloyd's and the Bank: not from an affection for the earth, the mere dirt, for the dirt is still dirt, whatever be its geographical description. In the minds of the great and the rich, the principle of patriotism may be strengthened by considerations of individual interest; but, amongst the common people, the fighting part of the community, the prospect seldom extends beyond food and raiment; food and raiment, indeed, of a coarser or finer sort; but, after all, food and raiment are every thing that any soil, under any government, can possibly give them. It is true, that every man has an instinctive attachment to the spot where he first drew his breath; but, his country may be conquered without at all interrupting the indulgence of this grovelling feeling; and, as to mere appellation, in that respect, even Rome herself has lost nothing. No, Sir; in none of these has the virtue of patriotism its foundation, but in that anxious desire, which every man of sound sense and honest nature has, to see preserved untarnished the reputation of that country which he is obliged to own, whose name he can never shake off, from whose calamities he may possibly flee, but in all whose disgraces he must inevitably share. What, for instance, induced me, when so far distant from my country, voluntarily to devote myself to her cause? Her commerce? I neither knew nor cared any thing about it. Her funds? I was so happy as hardly to understand the meaning of the word. Her lands? I could, alas! lay claim to nothing but the graves of my parents.—What, then, was the stimulus? What was I proud of? It was the name and fame of England. Her laws, her liberties, her justice, her might; all the qualities and circumstances that had given her renown in the world, but above all her deeds in arms, her military glory. Had she then been, as she now is, bereft of the principal symbols of that glory; had she then been, as she now is, dishonoured in the eyes of the world, a by-word and a reproach amongst the nations, very different, indeed, situated as I was, must have been my feelings and my conduct; and, even now, did I entertain the thought of her sinking into a mere money-mart, a mere work-shop, or a factory for traders; did I not hope, did I not, as I do, confidently hope (the causes of her decline first swept away) to see her

regain her former greatness, it would, with me, be a matter of perfect indifference, who owned her soil, or who ate the produce.

It would be tedious to dwell upon every striking mark of national decline: some, however, will press themselves forward to particular notice; and amongst them are: that Italian-like effeminacy, which has, at last, descended to the yeomanry of the country, who are now found turning up their silly eyes in ecstasy at a music-meeting, while they should be cheering the hounds, or measuring their strength at the ring; the discouragement of all the athletic sports and modes of strife amongst the common people, and the consequent and fearful increase of those cuttings and stabbings, those assassin-like ways of taking vengeance, formerly heard of in England only as the vices of the most base and cowardly foreigners, but now become so frequent amongst ourselves as to render necessary *a law to punish such practices with death*; the prevalence and encouragement of a hypocritical religion, a canting morality, and an affected humanity; the daily increasing poverty of the national church, and the daily increasing disposition still to fleece the more than half-shorn clergy, who are compelled to be, in various ways, the mere dependents of the upstarts of trade; the almost entire extinction of the ancient country gentry, whose estates are swallowed up by loan-jobbers, contractors, and nabobs, who for the far greater part not Englishmen themselves, exercise in England that sort of insolent sway, which by the means of taxes raised from English labour, they have been enabled to exercise over the slaves of India or elsewhere; the bestowing of honours upon the mere possessors of wealth, without any regard to birth, character, or talents, or to the manner in which that wealth has been acquired; the familiar intercourse of but too many of the ancient nobility with persons of low birth and servile occupations, with exchange and insurance-brokers, loan and lottery contractors, agents and usurers, in short, with all the Jew-like race of money-changers; the loss of the spirit of independence, which is perceivable in the almost universal willingness and even eagerness, with which the higher classes seek to lean upon the Treasury, and with which the lower classes throw themselves upon the higher in the character of parish poor, thus forming the whole nation into a string of political mendicants, cringing to the minister of the day for a portion of that which he has drained from them in taxes.—Upon these and many other infallible marks of national decline it would be useless to dwell; for, indeed, why need we look for any other mark than that which is exhibited in our situation considered relatively to France? When I am shown the numerous turnpike-roads and canals, the amazing manufactories of Manchester and Birmingham, the immense extent and riches of London, I see indubitable proofs of enormous individual wealth; but no proof at all of national *wealth*, which, properly understood, is only another word for national *power*. Of what use are all these riches, unless the nation is more powerful in consequence of them? And, in estimating her power, we must not, like those profound statesmen Lords Castlereagh and Hawkesbury, count the number of her ships, seamen and boys, and also of her soldiers, militia, and volunteers, compared with the numbers of her own forces of former times and former wars, and conclude, that, because we find the present numbers greater, the nation must now be more powerful than she was in those times. Power is a relative endowment: nor, in speaking of the power of a nation, must we consider it relatively to the power of the nations of the world promiscuously, or in

general; but to that of her neighbours, and especially of that particular nation, who has long been known as her rival and antagonist. I may easily beat a child or an old man; I may mow down whole crowds of cripples; but, am I yet able to encounter the man who is my equal in age, health, and size, and with whom I have fought in all the stages of life, from infancy up to manhood? This is the question which every man will put to himself in order to satisfy his own mind as to the fact, whether, in point of bodily strength, he has, or has not, declined. And, as to his neighbours, if they see him suing for a cessation of the combat, under the pretext of a necessity for "taking breath," and of gathering strength "against another day of trial;" if they see him submitting to the grossest of insults rather than make that trial; and, when at last compelled to it, if they see his utmost hope, his "glory," confined merely to the preservation of his existence, must they not conclude that he is a fallen and still falling man? It was, therefore, Sir, with great pain and with no small degree of shame, that, I heard you, in your defence of the peace of Amiens, join in the boastings with respect to the secure state and proud attitude of England, when compared with the "degraded nations of the continent;" and when I heard you exult over the fall of Tippoo Sultan as "one of the events which had given the greatest consolidation to our strength!" But, Sir, it was not a comparison between England and Holland, or between England and Spain or Sardinia, that could afford triumph to any man of common sense; the comparison to be made was one between *England* and *France*; between the combatants who had been *opposed* to each other, and not between those who had been *fighting on the same side*, the comparison in the latter case being merely of a negative kind, and yielding only the miserable, not to say base consolation, that, while our companions had been stripped of their garments, and, in some places, of their skin, we had escaped without any other loss than that of our badges of honour, our trident and our lilies!—And here, Sir, I will, for a minute, interrupt the thread of my observations, in order to do what I should have done before, namely, remove, in advance, the objection which will, by the small lawyers and petty statesmen of Downing-street, be urged against my arguments founded on the *loss* of the lilies, seeing that we *threw them away* during the war, or, in the words of the Poet-Laureate, "indignantly scratched them from the shield;" and this, for the sake of easy comprehension, I shall do in the recital of a fable. "The beaver," says Æsop, "which is a very timid though laborious animal, has a certain part about him for the obtaining of which he is often hunted down and killed. Once upon a time, as one of these creatures was hard pursued by the dogs, and knew not how to escape, recollecting within himself the reason of his being persecuted, he, with *great resolution*, bit off the part which his hunters wanted, and threw it towards them." Whether this answered the purpose of the poor beaver, we are left uninformed, but ours it certainly has not answered; on the contrary, it seems only to have rendered our hunters more keen in pursuit of the carcass. The moral, which Croxall has added to his fable of the hunted beaver, is singular enough: "Indeed," says he, "when life is pursued, and in danger, whoever values it, should give up every thing *but his honour* to preserve it."—To return to the boasting comparison; it was not the defeat and total overthrow of Tippoo Sultan that we should have heard of; it was the overthrow of Buonaparte, or, at least, of the

reduction of his power to within such limits as would have rendered it not so obviously dangerous to England. What was the defeat of Tippoo Sultan to the people of this kingdom? The best purpose it could possibly answer was to ensure the tranquillity of colonies the most distant of any that the mother country possesses, the most expensive to her, as is now clearly proved by the accounts submitted to Parliament, and the least subsidiary to her native strength, to say nothing about the many ways in which it enfeebles her. How, then, could the fall of Tippoo, which has been followed by war upon war ever since, be placed in the balance against the immense addition which, at the time of peace, had been made to the solid power of France, that power which now enables her to keep us in a state of siege?

In answer to observations upon the decline of the nation, we are always reminded of the fate of former gloomy predictions upon the same subject; and, that patient gentleman, Sir John Sinclair, has taken the pains to collect together passages from twenty or thirty authors, who have, at various times, predicted the "ruin" of England from the effects of the national debt. I shall, in the course of these letters, take an opportunity of showing, that the far greater part of what the most of these authors regarded as the ruin of their country, did, pretty nearly in the time and manner predicted, take place; and that, in many instances, the consequences apprehended were mitigated or prevented altogether, by the measures which their predictions produced. But, unless it be pretended, that, because some past predictions have not been fulfilled, no future ones, relative to the fall of a nation, can be fulfilled, this mode of answering cannot be very satisfactory, at least, until it be shown, that the circumstances, under which former gloomy predictions were made, were similar to, or of a nature still more dangerous, than the circumstances of the present times. It is not my intention here to enter into the subject of the paper-money system; that system will be treated of as a cause, and not as a mark of national decline; but, I cannot forbear just to notice how weak that argument in favour of the funding system must be, which is built upon the failure of the predictions of those who thought they foresaw a national bankruptcy in times when a measure like that of "bank-restriction" had never entered into the mind of man. What resemblance was there, in this respect, between those times and the present? Never till within these eight years was there a scarcity of coin known in England. Till then paper was merely an auxiliary currency. Till then there were no notes under five pounds, now there are in the kingdom notes down to a value so low as that of a depreciated sixpence. Yet, it is with these facts before his eyes, and without a single instance in the history of the world of an extensive degraded paper currency having recovered from its degradation, that Sir John Sinclair has thought proper to produce predictions of a century ago, and from their failure (without proving it) to argue that the present predictions, relating to the same subject, are false!—It is, however, precisely in the same way that we are answered, when we insist upon the political dangers and decline of the country. We are told that such apprehensions have been before expressed over and over again; but, no mention is made of those apprehensions, which, at different times, have proved well founded, nor any acknowledgment of the fulfilment of certain predictions, in part if not in whole. The decline of the country has been insisted on and its subjugation (always conditionally) has been predicted; and, because it has

not yet actually been subjugated, we are hence bid to conclude, that it has not declined, and that it will not fall. But, unless the persons who have made this conclusion insist that the fall of this kingdom is an absolute impossibility, it behoves them, before they press their conclusion upon me, to show, as in the case of the paper-money system, that the nation has ever before been placed in circumstances equally dangerous to those of the present. When they have shown me this; when they have referred me to a time that saw England without an ally upon the continent, and France in complete possession of all the coast of Europe from the Baltic to the Gulf of Venice, particularly that of Flanders and Holland, countries without whose perfect independence as to France it was a fixed maxim with English statesmen that England could never be safe: when they have shown me the time that the threats of France held the whole people of England in a state of bodily requisition for the mere defence of their native soil, totally uncertain of the moment when they should be called on to inundate their fields, to burn their houses, and to destroy their cattle, lest they should afford succour to an invading French army: when they can point to the time, that, in a war with France, the utmost hope expressed by Englishmen was to be able to defend their wives and their fire-sides, and, that, so great was their terror, that they publicly implored the Almighty to save them from being "swallowed up quick:" when, in short, they can show me a time, since the battle of Hastings, since the day when an army of Frenchmen invaded England, defeated an army of Englishmen, conquered the country, enslaved the people, and dishonoured their language and their name; if, since that day, any other can be shown me when England stood in such awe of France as she does at this moment, then will I acknowledge that my anxiety for the safety and honour of my country may have augmented its dangers and disgrace; but, if no such instance can be shown me, I shall remain sincerely convinced, that we are in a fearful state of national decline, and, under that conviction, together with the hope of contributing in some small degree towards the application of a remedy while yet there is time, I shall proceed to develop the causes of that decline.

I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c.,

Duke Street, Oct. 25, 1804.

WM. COBBETT.

LETTER IV.

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT.

(Political Register, November, 1804.)

" Dans les moments d'opulence, dont on a joui, on s'est enivré de sa prospérité, on s'est fait des idées chimériques de sa puissance; on méprise ses voisins parce qu'ils sont moins riches; on croit avoir droit de les dominer, ou du moins de les traiter cavalièrement. Soit ambition, soit vanité, ignorance, qualités qui s'associent merveilleusement; on forme, sans qu'on s'en aperçoive, des entreprises au-dessus de ses forces. De là les emprunts et toute cette adresse admirable par laquelle on parvient à se faire un très-grand crédit. Mais, comme les hommes ne sont jamais assez sages pour se corriger par une expérience, on ima-

“ *gine des banques pour que le papier tienne lieu de l'argent qu'on n'a pas, et bientôt on soutiendra, que le crédit est la source de la puissance d'un état. Vaine ressource! La richesse imaginaire des banques disparaît, et, quand on est arrivé au dernier degré de mollesse, l'on songe à défendre le commerce par la voie des armes.*” *—CANTILLON, as given by MABLY.

PAPER-MONEY SYSTEM.

Sir,—Having, in the preceding letter, pointed out what it is that I regard as marks of our national decline, I intend, in the present, to speak of what appears to me to have been, and still to be, the primary cause of that decline, namely, *your* Paper-Money System.

But, before I enter upon this subject, it seems necessary to revert for a minute, to notice, as relating to the degrading surrender of the Lilies, a circumstance, which, from the wish to avoid a digression, was omitted in the foregoing letter. It was there stated, that the surrendering of this greatest of all our honours was passed over by the Parliament, as a matter too trifling for the representatives of the people to meddle with; but, as I, at the same time, referred to the sentiment which you delivered in Parliament, upon the subject of this “harmless feather,” it would be wrong to quit the subject without stating some few particulars relating thereto.

The “harmless feather” sentiment was expressed by you in the debate of the 10th of November, 1797, upon the address to the King in consequence of his submitting to the Parliament the papers relating to the then terminated negotiations at Lisle. The manner of expressing this sentiment is of importance: the words must not be viewed alone; but, in connection with the rest of the sentence, of which they make a part. “They” [the French plenipotentiaries] “now required that we, whom they had summoned to treat for a definitive treaty, should stop and discuss preliminary points: they led the conferences to vague and secondary matters: they insisted that his Majesty should resign the title of King of France, a harmless feather at most which his ancestors had so long worn in their crown: they demanded restitution of the ships taken at Toulon, or a compensation, and a renunciation of any mortgage which this country might possess on the Netherlands for the loan guaranteed to the Emperor.” Thus, the title of King of France, was not only a “harmless feather,” but it was huddled in amongst objects merely pecuniary, and, consequently, vile; objects which would not be worth contending for in arms; items which would not have been disgraced by being found in the day-book of a loan-jobber or a Jew. To

* “In times of great wealth, people become drunk with prosperity, and give way to chimerical notions of their power. They despise their poorer neighbours, and assume the right of treating them rudely, if not with tyranny. Whether it be ambition, vanity, or ignorance, qualities which assort marvelously, they form, without perceiving it, enterprises beyond their strength. From this comes borrowing and all that astonishing address by which great credit is acquired. But, as men are never wise enough to benefit by experience, they invent Banks, through which paper is made to serve instead of the money which they have not, and then they contend that *credit* is the source of a nation's power. Empty resource! Yet, when such bubbles burst, and all is sunk in luxury, we find dreamers who would appeal to arms for the protection of commerce.”

the introducing of the "harmless feather" the appearance of incident was studiously given. It seemed to drop, in passing on to more important matter. No deliberate opinion was stated; but, enough was said, to prepare the nation for the surrender, which, if necessary, upon any future occasion, you were desirous to make. Your object did not escape observation, nor did your sentiment pass unnoticed. Doctor LAURENCE said: "The Chancellor of the Exchequer has called his Majesty's title of King of France a harmless feather. In my opinion, Sir, no ancient dignity, especially one which has for so many centuries shed lustre on the English crown, ought to be considered as a mere light unsubstantial ornament. It is bound up indissolubly with the honour of the nation. If we suffer that feather to be plucked, I fear that three other feathers, closely connected with that crown, and won in the same glorious wars, will soon follow; after which who shall say that the crown and the throne itself will long be secure? A great nation can never safely submit to be disgraced. I wish the house to carry their recollection back to the time of Edward the Third, when these honours were achieved. Of that time it was that we had the first regular and full records of the proceedings of Parliament. Whether it was from the peculiar favour of Providence, that we might have always before us an example to fix our steady and wavering courage, in moments of terror and trepidation; or, whether it was from the veneration of our ancestors for this sacred relic, which they preserved with religious care, while they suffered less precious monuments to perish; but, so the fact is, that the first traces of the deliberations and conferences of these houses are of that epoch, and exhibit a situation of the country, far less favourable than the present, in every thing but the spirit of Englishmen." Sentiments like these were not, however, suffered to go forth without something to hang upon them and to destroy their effect. Mr. WILBERFORCE, who immediately followed Dr. Laurence in the debate, said: "I should not have offered a word upon the subject, if it had not been extorted from me by the learned gentleman who has just sitten down, and who, while he strenuously recommended unanimity, has made use of language very likely to produce the directly contrary effect. I am sorry the learned gentleman did not follow the example of my right hon. friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who purposely waved the subject introduced by the former. To introduce that question, and to make it a subject of discussion, at a time when all should be harmony and unanimity, is, in my mind, exceedingly improper; and, therefore, I protest against what has fallen from the learned gentleman." You are said to have cheered this, Sir; to have called upon the house to hear it. They heard it but too patiently; and, the enemy did not fail to profit from the discovery which, by this means, he must necessarily have made. He did not demand of you the surrender. But, is there any man in the world, who believes, that you did not make it in order to avoid that demand? or, that, if the demand had been made, you would not have yielded to it? Yes, Sir, your sentiments, supported by Mr. Wilberforce, were adopted, and acted upon too: the harmless feather was given up; but, the surrender, though varnished over with seeming indifference, has not answered the purpose intended: it has not, for one moment, slackened the pursuit of the foe: it has, on the contrary, rendered him more keen; it has emboldened him to make demands which he would not, probably, otherwise have thought of; and, to use

the words of Dr. Laurence, who shall say, that, after the plucking of this feather, "the other three feathers, or even the crown itself, will long be secure?" I know, Sir, that this will excite only a sneer amongst the Excise-office and Custom-house politicians; but, neither their sneers nor the excessive "honesty" of Mr. Wilberforce's constituents can, in the smallest degree, alter the facts before us; and these are, that, for the space of more than four hundred years, the Kings of England bore the title and insignia of Kings of France; that this honour never was lost by the crown of England till the administration of William Pitt; that, for a hundred and fifty years down to the same administration, English seamen had seen the Dutch flag bow before them, a circumstance of which every sailor in the fleet was personally proud; and, that, it was during that administration, that the modern English first acknowledged, in acts if not in words, their fear of the French.

These are facts which nobody can deny, and which nothing can disguise from the world. It behoves us, therefore, to inquire into the cause of this change in our circumstances and character; and, by no means to content ourselves with vague reflections upon the state of the world in general, connected with the decrees of Providence, or the doctrine of chance. "From the fatality of the times," said you, "and the general state of the world, we must consider our lot as cast by the decrees of Providence, in a time of peril and trouble. I trust the temper and courage of the nation will conform itself to the duties of that situation. We ought to be prepared collectively and individually to meet it with resignation and fortitude, &c. &c."* In this respect, it must be acknowledged, however, that you were not quite singular in your tenets, the same having before been held by Mr. Addington; and, though it may, I am aware, be contended, that he imbibed them in your school, it cannot be denied, I believe, that he has the merit of being the first openly to promulgate them. "That the extent of the territorial power of France is," said he, "a matter of regret is unquestionable. It cannot but be matter of regret; but, it is a lot which we have not the power of controlling; we are not to presume to say, that the bounty of Providence is to be dispensed in the way most consonant to our wishes. We ought to be contented with the conviction, that we have abundant means of providing for our security in a separate state and condition."† Now, whether this doctrine be merely derived from Dr. Whitfield; whether it descended from Mr. Addington to you, or from you to Mr. Addington, are questions which I shall not presume to determine; but, it is a doctrine, to which I can never be induced to subscribe. It is, indeed, precisely that of the frail spouse, who justified herself upon the ground, that, if her helpmate was born to such a "lot," it was not the fault of his wife. Suppose Ireland, for instance, were to become (which God forbid!) an addition to the territorial power of France; should we be silenced by an observation from the minister, that it was our "lot?" That Providence was the dispenser of the favour; and that "it was not for us to say how such favours should be dispensed?" I will not say that we should not; for after what we have seen, no degree of silent submission ought to astonish us. But, certainly, this way of

* Speech on the Address to the King relative to the present war. 23rd May, 1803.

† Speech of 14th May, 1802, on the Definitive Treaty of Peace with France.

defending the conduct of ministers is of modern invention. Time was when the conduct of such persons was judged of by the state of the country, and by its relative situation in the world. It was the custom, and the wise custom, to judge of the tree in this, as in other cases, by the fruit; and, if it bore not good fruit, to hew it down. It is not for a minister, particularly for a minister of twenty years' standing, to lay the blame upon the times and the seasons, nor upon the people; for, in such a space of time, it is for a minister to form the minds of the people, and to give a proper direction to their pursuits. It is not for a minister, who, for twenty years, has had all the honours and revenues, all the rewards of every sort, and for every rank of life, at his absolute command; it is not for such a minister to complain of the "lot" of the nation, or to seek shelter under the decrees of Providence. No:

"The fault, good Casca, is not in our stars,
"But in ourselves that we are underlings."

The land is the same, the air is the same, the people are the same in race and in size, that they were when you first became minister. We have so often been told about the earthquake, the volcano, the burning lava of the French revolution, that some of us seem, at last, to have taken this figure of speech in its literal meaning, and to believe, that, in good sooth, our power has been crippled by some convulsion of nature. What else can have rendered us so self-complacent amidst the daily and hourly demonstrations of our decline; amidst the insults of an enemy whom we formerly despised; amidst the cutting sarcasms, the audible hisses of the world? At what former period of our history were English ministers, the personal representatives of a King of England, hunted over the continent of Europe, driven out of state after state where they had sought refuge? "It is the lawless power of our enemy which occasions this." True; but when, till the administration of Mr. Pitt, could our enemy boast of such power? I could, and, were it of any use, I would, fill volumes upon volumes with declamation against the insolence and tyranny of France. "Insolent scoundrel as long as you will, good Robin, but where were *you* when he thus vilified your master and rifled his caskets?" That is the question. The insolence and injustice of the enemy no one denies; but, every one regrets that we have not the power to prevent or to punish them; and, that we have it not, what are we to blame but the measures of the minister; of the man who has had the uninterrupted command of all the resources of the nation ever since the happy time that we had the power to prevent or to punish such insolence and injustice? Will it be pretended, that these rules of judging are not applicable to the measures of a minister, who has to contend with an enemy in a revolutionary state? Dangerous argument! Only admit it to be sound, and, in that very admission, you, in the name of national glory, call upon the people of every state, your own not accepted, to revolt! For, if a people, by overthrowing their government, and by placing themselves in a revolutionary state, necessarily become more formidable to all their enemies, and, of course, more secure against their attacks, is there but one, and is not that one an obvious and unavoidable inference? But, the fact is not so. Revolutions do not necessarily render nations more formidable to their neighbours; which has been amply proved by the revolutions of the last hundred years, during which time several states have been nearly, and some entirely, conquered and enslaved, in conse-

quence of attempts to change the form or the powers of their respective governments. It would, indeed, be absurd to admit any such exception, as is here supposed, from the rule whereby to judge of the measures of a minister of any country. Nor can we suffer the blame to be thrown upon the people, of whom such minister conducts the public affairs; notwithstanding an attempt of this kind was made by one of those writers, who took upon himself the arduous task of maintaining the consistency of your conduct in defending the peace of Amiens. "The people," said he, "were to blame. They would no longer support the war." To say nothing of the well-known falsehood of this particular assertion, there always occurs here a difficulty, which can never be well gotten over; for when we are told that the minister would have done this thing or that thing, but, that the people would not enable him to do it; that they would not, in the necessary manner or degree, second his efforts; when we are told this, we always ask, whether, in spite of this disposition in the people, the minister still kept his place, and, of course, had a majority in parliament? If we are answered in the affirmative, we reject, as downright nonsense, the notion of his measures being obstructed by the people; for, if we did not, we must necessarily conclude, that he held his place and preserved his majority by means that would merit an epithet very different indeed from either honourable or honest. The very possession of the place of prime minister implies that the possessor has power and influence sufficient to take any lawful measure, to the execution of which the resources of the nation are adequate. If, therefore, he fail to take the measures necessary for the safety and honour of the country, it must be for want of resources; or, for want of resolution or wisdom sufficient to induce him to exert, for proper purposes, the power and influence attached to the place which he fills; and must not, by any means, be ascribed to untowardness on the part of the people. In truth, the persons who set up a defence upon this ground, have moved so long in the vortex of the minister, have so long leaned upon him for support, that no idea of his quitting his place seems ever to enter their minds. What the writer above alluded to meant, was, not that you had not power quite sufficient for the continuation of the war; but that you could not have continued the war much longer, without risking your place, and, which was, perhaps, of still greater weight with him, without risking his place too; a thing not to be thought of any more than one would think of the end of the world. "You did," he said, "all that was possible for a minister to do." That is to say, all that it was possible for a minister to do without risking his place; which this advocate has been so long accustomed to regard as a moral impossibility, that he does not take the trouble to say one word thereupon, though it is evident that his reasoning can have no other basis.

Sometimes, when I hear your partisans railing against Sir Francis Burdett, and insisting that his past conduct ought to operate as a total disqualification for the future, I observe, "All this may, in your opinions, be very right, gentlemen; but if it be, upon what principle do you now extol Mr. Pitt, who offered a very high situation to Mr. Tierney; that Mr. Tierney who was apparently far more intimate with O'Connor than Sir Francis Burdett was; that Mr. Tierney who was the distinguished public advocate of O'Connor; that Mr. Tierney whom you yourselves, while yearly receiving a pension from Mr. Pitt, represented in figure, and denominated in words (falsely and slanderously without doubt), as

“ ‘ the lowest fiend of hell.’ Upon what principle is it, I say, that you “ now rail against Sir Francis Burdett, in the very same breath that you “ extol the minister, who has placed, or who has endeavoured to place, “ a very important department of the state in the hands of Mr. Tierney?” To this question, Sir, the answer uniformly has been: “ Why, can you “ blame Mr. Pitt for strengthening his ministry? He wished to have “ had the Grenvilles and the Windhams; but, if he could not gain them, “ can you blame him for seeking the aid of others in support of his go- “ vernment?” Thus says Swift, in describing the perseverance of the fly: “ Drive him from a bed of roses, and instantly he skims away, and finishes his meal upon an excrement!” It is obvious that these answerers have laid it down as a principle, that the first and greatest duty of a prime minister is, to keep his place; that, to this consideration every other ought to give way; that, of whatever cannot be accomplished, without risking his place, the accomplishment is to be regarded as morally if not physically impossible; and that, as the principle applies to measures of prevention as well as to measures of enterprise, a minister, if charged, for instance, with the loss of Ireland, would, in his justification, only have to show, that he could not have preserved it, without the adoption of such measures as would have risked the loss of his place!

Such being the fair and necessary deduction from the premises, by which the decline of a nation is imputed to the follies or the vices of the people, those who are not content with that deduction must again be referred to “ the decrees of Providence;” and those who are of opinion, that the effect must be sought for in sublunary causes, will, perhaps, be indulgent enough to give me an impartial hearing, while I endeavour to show, that the primary cause of our national degradation is the Paper-money System. But, this must be deferred till my next: in the meantime, I beg leave to recommend to your notice the motto of this letter, whence you will perceive, that some of my opinions, at least, are neither singular nor novel.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke-Street, 15th Nov. 1804.

LETTER V.

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT.

(*Political Register, December, 1804.*)

Ye friends to truth, ye statesmen, who survey
 The rich man's joys increase, the poor's decay,
 'Tis yours to judge how wide the limits stand
 Between a splendid and a happy land.
 Proud swells the tide with loads of freighted ore,
 And shouting folly hails them from her shore.
 Yet count our gains. This wealth is but a name
 That leaves our useful products still the same.
 Not so the loss. The man of wealth and pride
 Takes up a space that many poor supplied;

The robe that wraps his limbs in silken sloth,
 Has robb'd the neighb'ring fields of half their growth ;
 Around the world each needful product flies,
 For all the luxuries the world supplies :
 While thus the land, adorn'd for pleasure all,
 In barren splendour feebly waits the fall.—GOLDSMITH.

 DIGRESSION.

CORN-BILL—ENCLOSURES—THE POOR.

SIR.—Amongst many disadvantages of conducting a discussion in Letters, separated from each other, as to their time of appearance, there is one peculiar advantage, namely, the occasional opportunity, afforded the writer of digressing into those parts of his subject, which derive additional interest from the circumstances of the day ; an advantage of which I am now about to endeavour to avail myself.

After having, in the foregoing letter, signified my intention to show, that the primary cause of our national decline, and the consequent superiority of our enemy, was to be sought for in *your* Paper-Money system, I was proceeding first to describe the nature of that system, and then to trace it to its several consequences. But, the dearth of bread and the other necessaries of life having unhappily become a topic of much greater public interest than any other, this appears to be a favourable time to obtain a patient hearing upon those all-important subjects, the Corn Bill, New Enclosures, and The Poor.

If I meant to confine my observations to the corn-bill now in existence, I should think it necessary to dwell upon the particular circumstances under which that bill was passed ; but, as such is not my intention, I shall, for the present at least, leave those circumstances aside, and enter at once upon the principle, on which, according to the report of the Committee of the House of Commons, and also according to your speech thereon, the bill was introduced, supported, and, finally, passed into a law.—In the report, which was recommitted, and which was, in its finished state, laid before the House of Commons on the 14th of June last, the Committee profess to have in view to introduce such a measure as shall contribute to the producing of such an ample supply of the different kinds of corn and grain as may be sufficient for our consumption. “ This supply,” say they, “ cannot be expected without a considerable surplus, in plentiful years, above the demand of the home market ; it, therefore, becomes desirable, that the grower should have such a ready sale for that surplus by exportation, and bounty if requisite, as may remove all apprehension of his not being able to obtain from a glut of the commodity at the home market, such a price for that surplus as will afford him an equitable profit for his labour, industry, and capital employed in the production. It appears, then, to your committee, that the surest mode by which an ample supply can be expected, is to endeavour to secure an uniform and reasonable price to the growers.” Do pray, Sir, read this last sentence over again, and say whether you understand what it means. The surest mode of *expecting* a supply ! But, it is agreed, I believe, that your bright geniuses are exempted from the observance of all vulgar rules ; otherwise it would be quite impossible to account for the tolerance which the House showed with respect to this report.—After a short and not

very clear statement as to the operation of the corn-bill of 1791, the committee express their full confidence, "that, by due encouragement to the agriculture of the country, and by bringing the Crown and Waste Lands into cultivation, the product of the growth of the corn in the United Kingdom will afford a regular and ample supply for its consumption." What, in the name of common sense! What do they mean by the *product* of the *growth* of *corn*? Do they mean the money that the crop produces at market? And that that money will purchase "a regular and ample *supply* for the consumption of the kingdom?" What, then, do they mean?—But, let us come to the close of that part of this report, where, if any where, we are to look for the principle of the bill. "It appears to your committee, that the price of corn from 1791 to the harvest of 1803, has been very irregular, but upon an average (increased in a great degree by the years of scarcity), has, in general, yielded a fair profit to the grower. The casual high prices, however, have had the effect of stimulating industry, and bringing into cultivation large tracts of waste land, which, combined with the two last productive seasons, and other causes, have occasioned such a depression in the value of grain, as it is feared will greatly tend to the discouragement of agriculture, unless maintained by the support of Parliament."—Loath as I am to detain you, Sir, I cannot refrain from imploring your attention to the style of these lawgivers. Their favourite figure of rhetoric seems to be *tautology*. Common men would have been content with either of the two phrases, "*upon an average*," or, "*in general*;" but those gentlemen take them both. Again; I, for instance, should have said, "unless *maintained*, or rather, *supported*, by the *power* of Parliament;" and not "*maintained* by the support;" that is, *maintained* by the *maintenance* of Parliament.

But the style is a mere trifle when compared to the matter of this report. First we are told, that, in order always to have plenty of corn in the country, we must labour to raise taxes to pay the farmers for sending corn out of the country after every plentiful season! It would seem to require no common portion of faith to swallow this doctrine; but, what then shall be said to the context? The premiums, the consequent regular prices of corn, and the constant plenty, are represented as the inducements to agricultural industry; but, directly afterwards we are informed, that it is the *casual high price* which has had the effect of stimulating to that industry. Then, as to waste lands, we are told, that great tracts were brought into cultivation in consequence of the casual high prices; though, just before, we find the *equalizing* of prices represented as likely to cause still more waste lands to be cultivated. But, that which merits most attention, is, their confession, that, without any aid from Parliament, "the price of corn has been such as, upon an average, to yield a fair profit to the grower." Well, then, what did they want more? They wanted to *equalize* it. To equalize it? What, for the sake of the people; or of the farmer? Let us stop, however, and see your view of the subject. "The design of these regulations, is, that scarcity shall be avoided; and, for this purpose it is provided, that corn shall *constantly* acquire such a price, as will be a sufficient encouragement to promote its growth. We have lately seen the quarter of wheat at 118 shillings, and this arose from the deficiency; but, the best means to avoid the deficit, is, *never* to admit this department of agriculture to remain without a sufficient compensation." Here, Sir,

you repeated, in language more correct and intelligible, the substance of the report of the committee, passing over the circumstance of new enclosures, which I also shall lay aside for the present.

In the conclusion of their report, the committee adopt, from Anderson, the argument from *experience*; and they evidently would, if they had not been short of time or something else, have stated, that, previous to the passing of the corn-bounty law in 1688, corn was, upon an average, dear; that, from 1688 to 1755, during the operation of that law, corn was, upon an average, cheap; that, since 1755, when the law became permanently obstructed, corn has been dear, though there has been scarcely any exportation; that, *therefore*, exportation tends to render corn plenty at home, and that, of course, as a premium tends to encourage exportation, the granting of such premium is the way to render corn plenty, and to prevent scarcity and high price. This argument is, in my opinion, worth nothing at all. The effects, to which our attention is directed, are all to be fairly ascribed to causes, with which the corn-bounty was in no wise connected. The troubled state of the country during the forty years preceding the revolution; the tranquil state between that time and the year 1755, during which period agriculture was the principal occupation of the country, and the depreciation of money was gradual and slow; the constantly-increasing relative encroachments, which, during the last half century, commerce has been making upon the agricultural population and labour, and, especially, the reluctance, which, within the last eight or ten years, has existed to grant long leases, a reluctance that has arisen from the rapid depreciation of money, now become visible to the most ignorant and unobserving land-owner; these are causes quite sufficient to account for the high price of corn in the first and second period, and for the low price in the middle period, above mentioned, without having recourse to any supposed influence of the premiums for exporting corn; and, therefore, the measure, by which those premiums have been revived, must be tried entirely by the reason of the case.

Stripping the report of the committee of its rhetorical embellishments, and taking their meaning, as farther explained by yourself, the argument whereon the corn-bill was passed into a law, may be thus expressed: "That a bounty on the exportation of corn greatly promotes agriculture; that it encourages the farmer to raise greater quantities of corn than he otherwise would raise; that this produces a general plenty which prevents prices from ever rising high; that thus corn is rendered cheaper, *upon the whole*, than when its price is allowed at times to sink very low, while at times again it must rise as disproportionately high." To make good this argument, the advocates of the bounty inform us, that a market for every commodity must always exist, otherwise that commodity will not be provided. To this I answer, that there always does exist a market for corn, and quite a sufficient one too, in the home consumption. But, the reply is, that there should be a market open beside the home market; otherwise the farmers, from the fear of overstocking that market, will always keep it scantily supplied. Good God! that the tillers of the land should draw from that land *less than they are able to draw from it!* that they should forbear thus from any consideration would be wonderful enough; but, that their forbearance should arise from a fear of rendering corn low-priced, when they well know that the price of every other thing is regulated by that of corn, would be truly

astonishing. From a country well settled and governed no corn ought ever to be exported; because, it is a proposition firmly established, and universally admitted, that the multiplication of the human species is always in due proportion to the means of subsistence; nor will it be denied, that the tendency of the human species to multiply is much greater than the rapidity with which it is possible to increase the produce of the earth for their maintenance. Population is frequently checked by the deficiencies of agriculture, but agriculture never can, except from very singular circumstances, be checked by the deficiencies of population; or, in other words, by the want of a demand for corn.

It follows, then, Sir, from this important fact, which seems to have wholly escaped you and the other advocates for the corn bounty, that an ample market, and full encouragement, are always afforded to the farmer, without the aid of any trading regulation whatever; and, therefore, as far as I can discover, all that can, after this, be said, in defence of the bounty, is, that though the principle of population affords sufficient encouragement to the raising of corn, the bounty affords additional encouragement. In answer to this, every one would, without hesitation, say, that there can be no use in over-doing a good thing. Why, if a sufficient market is provided for corn, would you interfere to disturb the natural order of things? In this general presumption against the bounty there is no little weight; but, if any man will examine the particular circumstances of the case, with only a moderate degree of attention, he will find that the advocates for the bounty have spoken completely without thought, in ascribing to the bounty the power of *increasing the production of corn*.

The intention of the bounty is to prevent the price of corn from ever falling so low as otherwise it would often naturally do. If this purpose be not answered, the law fails of its object. If it be answered, it will either raise the *average* price of corn, or it will not. The advocates of the bounty, and yourself amongst the rest, sometimes express yourselves as if you thought it would not; for you are not very consistent with yourselves on this point, sometimes endeavouring to recommend your doctrine by the popular promise of *average cheapness*; though at other times it suits your purposes to exhibit the opposite face of the subject. But, of this we may rest perfectly satisfied, that, if the bounty does not raise the average price of corn, it is impossible it can encourage the production; and, on the other hand, if it lowers the average price of corn, it must, of necessity, discourage the production. These are propositions which you will, surely, agree to. You will admit, that the bounty raises to a certain degree the average price of corn. This high price, you say, would so encourage the raising of corn, that we should have a considerable quantity to export, which would bring us a good deal of money in all good years, and would, by inducing the farmers to raise larger quantities upon an average every year than they now do, by sowing more every year than they now do, save us from scarcity in all bad years. These, then, are the advantages, which you set against a permanent high price of provisions, and a permanent check to population.

But, let us consider how far these effects can be produced by the bounty. And, here, Sir, suffer me to call your attention to one very obvious principle; to wit, that *common competition*, which regulates every trade, and of which it is truly astonishing that you should appear so unable to perceive the effects. This high price of corn necessarily raises the profits

farming stock and labour somewhat above the ordinary rate of profit in other employments. This, as necessarily creates a competition. The demand for farms becomes greater. The landlords let their lands higher, till farming profit comes down again to a level with the profit of the general business of the country. Here, then, we are again, as to the stimulus to agricultural industry, in the very situation we were in before. Nothing is more certain than that the landlords have it in their power to prevent the profits of the farmers from ever remaining, any long time, above the lowest that is consistent with the nature of their business; that is, the rate of profit common in the same country amongst other business equally respectable and pleasant. But, surely, no man, in his sober senses, will say, that the farmer is, even in the smallest degree, more encouraged, when corn is high than when it is low, if his profits are always the same; nor can the bounty, as will hereafter be shown, produce any advantage to the landlord himself.

Thus far, Sir, I have done little more than transcribe the arguments of another writer upon the corn-bill,* who concludes this part of his essay in the following words. "It is astonishing what a different course of reasoning men often pursue on subjects exactly similar, without seeming at all to perceive their own inconsistency. On running over in one's mind some of the acts of the British Legislature, how many cases does one find, where it has acted, and still acts, on a principle directly the reverse of that, on which it established this bounty-law; cases, which are as vehemently applauded by the common tribe of politicians, as is the bounty-law itself! Why should wool, for example, have been always subject to a system of laws, absolutely and immediately contradictory to the principle of the corn-bounty? Why, if a bounty upon the exportation of corn be so favourable to the production of corn, should not a bounty on the exportation of wool be favourable to the production of wool? Why, if the exportation of corn have such an effect to produce plenty of corn at home, should not the exportation of wool have an effect to produce plenty of wool at home? How has it been, that, while the legislature has so often encouraged the exportation of corn, it has always prohibited the exportation of wool with so much severity? Why are such inconsistencies still allowed to disgrace our intellects? What difference can be pointed out between the case of wool and that of corn? If it be said, that we have not enough wool

* *Literary Journal*, vol. iv. No. 4, for October, 1804.—The essay, here particularly referred to, appears in the shape of a critique upon Anderson's pamphlet, recommending a bounty on the exportation of corn; but, it contains, in fact, a complete refutation of all the arguments advanced by all the writers in favour of a bounty-law. The work, in which the essay is to be found, does great credit to its conductors; and, operating in conjunction with the *Edinburgh Review*, it will not fail, I should think, soon to rescue literature from the intolerable disgrace of being, even in appearance, subjected to decisions such as those that are drivelled out through the paltry pages of the *British Critic*, and similar publications. As to some points, and those not unimportant ones, I widely differ in opinion with the *Edinburgh Reviewers*; and, for reasons that I may soon find an opportunity of stating, I am afraid that the long arm of Downing Street has reached them, and communicated to them its palsying effect. But, they are men of talents; their writings discover great research, acuteness, and profundity; of course, they are not, for a moment, to be put in comparison with those things called Reviews, which are mere fulsome common-place eulogiums, written either by the authors themselves, or by their friends, and the admission of which is frequently paid for.

" to answer our occasions ; neither have we enough corn, as is clearly
 " acknowledged by the avowed intention of the corn-bill. If it be said,
 " that wool is the material of one of our most important manufactures ;
 " corn is the most important material of all our manufactures. If it be
 " of importance that the raw material of any of our manufactures should
 " be got cheap, surely it is of importance that what is the great material
 " of them all should be got cheap. If it would be unwise to suffer our
 " wool to go to foreign nations to enable them to rival us in that branch
 " of manufacture, and thereby increase their population and their strength,
 " is it not more unwise to suffer our corn to go to them, by which their popu-
 " lation and their strength is more immediately increased ? Why, if grant-
 " ing a bounty on exportation be really so effectual a means of producing
 " plenty, and creating riches, do we not establish a bounty on the exporta-
 " tion of every thing which we value ? Why do we not grant a bounty
 " on the exportation of sheep and oxen ; butter and cheese ; ale, porter,
 " and spirits ? Why not on tables and chairs, and all other articles of
 " furniture ? Why not on carriages ? Why not on horses ? Nay, to
 " go higher, why, in order to increase population, not grant a bounty on
 " the exportation of men and women ? Why not especially grant a
 " bounty on the exportation of such classes as we have most need of,
 " soldiers, for example, and sailors ? As for politicians, we have such
 " a supply of them, the very best in their kind, that we have no occasion
 " for exportation, unless it be as a security against any decay in the
 " numbers or breed." Upon which latter score, I think, my friend must
 be perfectly at ease, if he only just casts his eye upon the innumerable
 fry of " young friends " that your return to power has once more brought
 into clear water. Women, indeed, you do suffer to be exported, Sir ;
 and, you appear to have no objection to the exportation of men, pro-
 vided that they are *farmers' labourers*, while you have severe penalties
 against the exportation of button-makers and weavers ; and, this, too,
 at the very time when you are passing a law to raise taxes upon us to give
 to the farmers, in order to enable them to increase the quantity of that
 article, which cannot possibly be increased without a previous increase in
 the number of those labourers !

Though I am persuaded, that the arguments above advanced must
 appear conclusive in the mind of any intelligent man, yet, it may not be
 altogether useless to take the subject in another view, somewhat closer
 connected with matter of fact.

It has been already observed, that, in defending the principle of the
 bounty law, you and its other advocates are not always consistent with
 yourselves ; sometimes seeming to consider the effect of the bounty as a
 reduction, and sometimes as an increase, of the average price of corn.
 Various, indeed, are your self-contradictions upon the several parts of
 the subject ; but, there is one position, which seems to be, and which
 must be, constantly insisted on, and that is, that the effect of granting a
 bounty upon the exportation of corn is to increase the quantity of corn ;
 or, to state it with greater precision, *to cause to be produced, upon the
 whole, more corn than would be produced if the bounty were not granted.*
 This position you must maintain, or confess at once that your object is
 to lessen the quantity of corn consumed at home. That you will not do
 the latter is certain ; and, that you cannot do the former it will, I think,
 cost me but little trouble to prove to the perfect satisfaction of any ob-

servicing individual, who is any thing more than a mere dabbler in the science of rural economy.

At an age when my chief occupation was to hobble over the clods by the side of the plough-horses, I remember, that I used to wonder how it happened, that the land produced enough, and only enough, for all the animals that fed on its produce. My mind did not penetrate so far as the human species : it found quite sufficient to be astonished at in perceiving, that there was always just horses enough to eat the hay, and just hay enough for the horses ; just meadows enough for the cattle, and cattle enough for the meadows ; sheep enough for the downs, and downs enough for the sheep. If I rambled into the forest or over the common, I never found a blade of grass to spare, and yet there was always enough to maintain all the various kinds of animals that fed on it, though they belonged, perhaps, to a thousand different persons, every one of whom wished to feed thereon as many animals as he could, and though there was no active law to regulate the conduct of those persons. Such astonishment was natural enough in a boy of nine or ten years old ; but, it would not be bearable at an age when the mind ought to be in the full exercise of its faculties. Yet, Sir, there appear to be persons, and those persons calling themselves politicians, and taking upon them to govern the people too, who seem not to be able to perceive, that there is any principle by which is preserved the due proportion between population and subsistence ; between the number of mouths in a country, and the quantity of corn with which those mouths must be fed ; or, in other words, between the sustenance requisite for the people, and the *producing capacity* of the land.

The persons who have thought, or, rather, who have talked and written, upon the subject of the corn bounty, may be divided into four classes ; and, in describing their several notions relative thereto, I shall, I think, succeed in establishing the position, *that granting a bounty on the exportation of corn, never can cause to be produced, upon the whole, more corn than would be produced if the bounty were not granted.*

The *first class* of these politicians seem to think, that the *producing capacity* of the land always exists, and in the same degree too ; or, in other words, that *all the land* will bear equally well *every year*, if it be but *sown* ; and, of course, that the quantity of corn produced depends, barring only the different effects of different seasons, entirely upon the quantity of land that is sown. This class, therefore, in which I should expect to find, for instance, Mr. Long, Mr. Huskisson and George Rose, look, from their Custom-house habits, to an exportation bounty as an infallible inducement to the farmers to sow more land, and produce more corn. " Oh, oh ! " say they, " they won't raise corn, won't they ! Give " them a bounty for exporting it, and they'll sow corn enough every " year ; and, then, after a bad season, as the price will be too high to " admit of exportation, we shall keep the produce of the whole harvest " at home, which, in such case, will, from the inducement of the bounty, " be greater in quantity than it would have been if no such inducement " had existed." This, I should suppose, is exactly their course of reasoning.

The *second class* look a little deeper. In their trips to Walmer, or elsewhere, they perceive great numbers of fields that do not bear a crop every year ; that are not sown every year ; that are, in short, *fallows* or

lays.* Both of these mean land which is suffered to lie all the year round, or two or more years, unsown, in order that it may recruit its strength; in order that, after having been impoverished, if not quite exhausted, it may recover its producing capacity. Nor are these resting fields few in number. The next time you make a military survey, Sir, only take out your pencil, note down the number of fields that you pass, making a cross for every fallow or lay, and, unless your route be, like that of Major Sturgeon, within the smoke and the reach of the manure of the metropolis, you will surely find, a cross for every fourth field, and you will, of course, be convinced that one-fourth part of the arable land is, upon an average, lying at rest; lying unsown for the purpose of recovering its producing capacity. The fact is, perhaps, that, taking all the kingdom together, more than one-third of the arable land is in this state; but, that has nothing to do with the principle we are discussing.— Upon the slightest attention to this circumstance of fallows and lays; fields not having the capacity of producing; fields out of which all the ploughing and sowing in the world would not produce a crop equal in quantity to the seed, to say nothing of the sustenance required for ploughmen, sowers, harrowers and horses; upon the first and most slight attention to this circumstance, the mere Custom-house notions must have vanished from your mind. Not so, indeed, was it with Lord Carrington and your far-famed Board of Agriculture; nor yet with the wise and modest Grand Jury of Yorkshire, who *presented* the yielding of tithes to the Clergy and the want of a General Enclosure Bill, at a time when one-third of their already-enclosed fields were in a state of fallow or lay for the want of a sufficiency of manure to give them the capacity of producing corn! Of these miserable follies, however, you, Sir, must long ago have been weary. Yet, pardon me if I think that you appear not to have completely disentangled yourself from them. You perceive clearly enough, that all the arable land must, each part in its turn, have rest, and that, some of it must rest for several years at a time; but, you seem to have a sort of confused notion of giving to the farmers the ability of supplying this deficiency of nature. From the whole of your speeches upon the subject of the corn bounty, it is evident, that you think that it is possible to add to the producing capacity of the land by throwing, through the means of high prices, more money into the hands of the farmer, because the farmer will, thereby, be enabled, not to purchase perhaps, but, somehow or other, to get more manure upon his land; and this seems to be the highest point at which you have arrived.

The *third class* of politicians, however, carry their reflections further. They inquire whence the extraneous capacity of producing corn, that is to say, manure; they inquire whence it comes; and they soon trace it back either to horses, cattle, sheep, and hogs; or to the pits of chalk, clay, marle, or sand. (I leave out *tillage* here; but the same arguments will apply to it.) Let us, therefore, say they, encourage the breeding of animals, and the digging and mixing of soils; and, in order thereunto, let us secure a good price for corn, that the farmer may be enabled to expend more upon these objects, so evidently necessary to the increasing of the producing capacity of his land. They perceive clearly that an

* The distinction between a *fallow* and a *lay* is this: the former is a field lying to rest, but, during the time that it so lies, it is ploughed once, twice, or three times: the latter is also a field lying to rest, but it lies without being ploughed.

increase of labour must precede this other increase. There must be labour to dig and mix the soil, and labour to tend the animals, before the pits and the animals can communicate any portion of productive capacity to the fields; and, therefore, say this class of politicians, give the farmer the means of procuring more labour, and these means he will find in the high price of his corn.

But, the *fourth class*, in listening to the opinions of the third, are astonished that, when they were tracing back one sort of manure to the bowels of the earth, they did not trace the other sort back to its surface; that in tracing back soils to the pits, they did not trace back bestial manure to oats, hay, roots, grass, and fodder; and, that, from the additional quantity of feed absolutely necessary to the existence of dumb animals, they did not trace back the increased labour of man to an additional quantity of food, that is to say of corn, not less necessary to his existence; for who is there so blind as not to perceive, that labour must always be *preceded* by sustenance? Trivial expressions frequently lead to important errors. We talk every hour of our lives about a man's "earning his bread before he eats it," though nothing is more true, than that he must eat it before he earns it; which corresponds with the saying of the country people, that "ploughing comes out of the cupboard and the manger." If I am asked, "How, then, could agriculture ever have begun?" I answer, that man had subsistence before it began. God made the fruits of the earth, the beasts, and the birds, before he made man. Man was a hunter and lived upon wild animals before he cultivated the ground. When colonies have been settled, the colonists have always lived for years upon the produce of other countries. Indeed, it is a self-evident proposition, a clear and unalterable law of nature, that labour must always be *preceded* by sustenance. "How, then," some one will say, "has the agriculture of any country ever increased, if the increase of corn be always *previously* necessary?" I answer, that there are two distinct causes of the increase of corn, *labour* and the *seasons*. An abundant season, that is to say, a season which communicates to the land an extraordinary portion of the producing capacity, has the same effect that a very great addition to the quantity of labour would have; that is, it causes an increase in the quantity of sustenance; this increase instantly causes an increase in the quantity of labour, labour brings manure, and manure adds to the producing capacity of the land. In this way it is, that the agriculture of a country is increased; and, as I think, that even George Rose himself will not pretend that the corn-bounty will have any influence upon the seasons, my argument remains entirely unshaken by the fact of a progressive increase of the agriculture of a country.

Thus, then, Sir, it appears; that, as far as human means are concerned, to cause to be produced, upon the whole, more corn than is now produced, it is not sufficient that we plough more land and sow more seed, but, that, *previous* to such an addition to our ploughing and sowing, we must add to the producing capacity of the land; that, to add to the producing capacity of the land, we must previously obtain more manure; that, to obtain more manure, we must previously obtain more labour; that, to obtain more labour, we must previously make an addition to the sustenance of the people; and, that, therefore, as the sustenance of the people is corn, the exportation of corn never can add to their sustenance; and, hence the regular, the natural, and necessary conclusion that *the bounty granted to encourage an exportation of corn never can cause to be produced*

upon the whole more corn than would be produced if the bounty were not granted.

This view of the subject, Sir, which I cannot help hoping will experience no disadvantage from its simplicity, will greatly assist us in determining what must be the real effects of a bounty-law, or any effective law, for the exportation of corn. We have seen that it cannot cause a greater quantity of corn to be produced than would be produced without it; and we know, that by causing some corn to be sent out of the country, it must prevent that corn from being eaten in the country, and must thereby, in whatever degree it is effective, operate as a check to population, having first produced that want and misery, without which population never is or can be checked. But, let us trace this evil more minutely through its progress.

I shall suppose myself a farmer with twenty arable fields, five of which are fallows or lays, that is, they are lying to rest, in order to recover their producing capacity. It is now the time to begin ploughing for the next seed-time. I consider whether corn is likely to be plenty or scarce; and, having arrived at a conclusion upon that subject, I look at my fields; some, perhaps, I find to be quite exhausted, some to have a little of the producing capacity in them, and some a great portion of it. I then go to work, and put into exertion whatever degree of this capacity I think will best suit the demands of the year, and, of course, contribute most to my advantage. If I think corn will be very dear, that is to say very scarce, I bring into exertion as much as I possibly can of the producing capacity of my fields; if I think corn will be very cheap, that is to say very plenty, I suffer a great portion of this producing capacity to remain unexerted. "That is the very thing we want to prevent," say you, "we want to prevent you from being thus deterred, by the prospect or probability of a plentiful harvest and of a glutted market, from sowing so much land as you otherwise would sow; we want to prevent you from ever being induced thus to neglect your fields, to throw away their producing capacity." I do not neglect them, Sir; I look at them by day, and think of them when I commune with my pillow. You do not see them lying waste. Their hedges are kept up; their gates carefully fastened. I well know their value; and that that value is daily and hourly increasing. No, Sir, I do not *throw away*, and no prospect of plenty or of any thing else will ever induce me to throw away, even the smallest portion of their producing capacity. I do not throw this precious quality away, but I *reserve* it to be exerted at a time when its exertion will be more advantageous to me than at present; and that time is when unfavourable seasons, or other causes, have rendered corn more scarce than it now is: in short, the producing capacity is hoarded up in my fields, upon the same principle, from the same motives, and with the same effect, that the produce itself is afterwards hoarded up in granaries and store-houses; and, excuse me, Sir, if I cannot help thinking, that the persons who imagine a high price at home, or a bounty on exportation, to be necessary to prevent me from *throwing it away*, discover a mind very little superior to that of those, who suspected and accused the corn-dealers and meal-men of throwing their corn and flour into the Thames, in order to keep up the price of those commodities! But, if the ports had been open; if an exportation bounty-law had been in force; and if the people had seen ships loaded with corn and flour sailing down the river, destined to Spain, Portugal, or elsewhere, it would not have been without

good and sufficient cause that they would have complained. So would it be with respect to my fields, under the operation and inducements of a bounty-law. They would possess neither more nor less of the producing capacity on account of that law; but, as soon as the law was passed, I should have another market besides the home one to look to. I should be less careful to keep in *reserve* the producing capacity of my fields, because I should be sure of a market in the exportation; and, thus, in plentiful seasons at home, I should frequently send abroad part of the producing capacity of my fields, instead of reserving it, instead of hoarding it up, as above described, to be brought forth and exerted in seasons of domestic scarcity. A bounty-law, therefore, so far from answering its professed purpose of diminishing the evils of scarcity, must, in whatever degree it becomes effective, add to those evils by causing the exportation of the producing capacity of the land, and thereby retarding the return of plenty and prolonging the duration of dearth.

This, then, Sir, is the result of my inquiry: that, as the land possesses only a certain portion of producing capacity; that, as the whole of this capacity will, in the most suitable time and manner, be fully called forth and exerted by the demands for sustenance at home; and, that, as the granting of a bounty on exported corn can never add to the producing capacity, any law to encourage or permit the exportation of corn, is a law for exporting the producing capacity of the land; a law to abridge the domestic consumption; a law to check population, by creating want and misery; a law to prevent the unborn from being born, to dry up the milk of infancy, to stint and retard youth in its progress to manhood, to unstring the nerves and hasten the decline of manhood itself, to embitter the sorrows and sharpen the pangs of old age; a law to depopulate the hamlet and to people the work-house, to add to the more than a million of miserable paupers already in existence, to extinguish the last remaining spark of private independence and of public spirit in the bosoms of the common people, to weigh them down to the earth, to break their hearts, to disgust them with their country and their government, and to prepare them for a willing subjection to the foe.

As it is understood, that several petitions are to be presented to Parliament against the corn-law, by the large cities and towns; and as the law arose from the petition of the farmers, and was supported chiefly by the land-owners, I cannot refrain from making here a few remarks, which I think will tend to convince the farmers and landlords, that the law cannot produce any beneficial effect to them. Indeed, if they are satisfied with my arguments upon the principle of the law, a very little reflection will teach them to make this application. Yet, it may not be altogether unnecessary to point out here, in detail, some circumstances, which would have interrupted and encumbered the discussion of the principle.

It is well known, that the first law (passed in 1688) granting a bounty on the exportation of corn, "was passed with a view to give a premium to the country-gentlemen, in order to obtain their consent to the imposition of the land-tax." The present bill has been, by some persons, attributed to a similar motive; while the Edinburgh Reviewers, who seem to be quite willing to go as far as possible in approving of all your measures, are inclined to ascribe the bill to a motive still less worthy of a statesman, namely, party politics. "The success of such topics" (say they, after quoting a passage from the report of the corn-trade com-

mittee) " might not, perhaps, have been equally great, if the *Master of the State*" (These men have certainly been touched with the finger of ministerial grace!) " had already been fixed upon that vantage ground, " from which he may *now dictate* a policy more congenial to his former " system. Amidst the arrangements of foreign policy and of war which " may be supposed to absorb his mind " (Can they be serious, Sir!), " the humble and less precarious plans of domestic legislation may be " forgotten." What they add is well worthy of your serious attention. " But the minister who tampers for a present purpose, with his own " maxims, and indulges individuals in their frivolous fondness for " making laws, instead of opposing, to temporary interests, the spirit of " a general policy, cannot be true either to his own fame, or to the " lasting prosperity of Britain." These critics should, however, have done you the justice to observe, that the bill did not originate with you, nor during your influence over your predecessor. It was one of his pretty little presents to the nation; and you are to be blamed only because you adopted it. It might, or it might not, be intended by him as a sort of compensation for the new Income Tax; but, whoever takes time to reflect, will soon be convinced, that such compensation is a mere illusion, and that, it is impossible, that a bounty on the exportation of corn can produce any advantage to either the farmer or the landlord.

It is agreed, that an export bounty *will raise the average price of corn*: and this circumstance the petitioning farmers, political landlords and you, appear to think would be advantageous to the farmer; for your publicly expressed opinion was, that corn was, in July last, " at much *too low* a price to afford the grower a " reasonable profit.*" No matter how low, or how high, the price was: the words clearly conveyed your opinion, that the high price of corn was favourable to the grower, that is, to use a more common term, to the farmer. And, *why*, Sir, pray let me ask you, should the high price of corn be any more favourable to him than a low price; seeing, that the rent of his land, the feed for his horses, cattle and sheep, the food for his servants, the wages of his labourers, the repairs of his house, the price of his implements, his furniture, his dress, and of every article he uses, whether from necessity, for comfort, for convenience, or for pleasure, not only bear a due proportion to, but are regulated by, the price of his corn? In the country you will often hear unthinking farmers complain of the cheapness of corn, and say that it is " not worth the seed;" but, one sack of wheat generally brings eight sacks, and, it is pretty clear, that however small a sum eight sacks will sell for, the farmer can buy the seed with *one eighth* part of that sum. Accordingly, all the while we hear these complaints and bon mots from the farmers, we see them very busy ploughing and sowing, and as anxious as ever to get a good crop and to house it in good condition.

I am aware, that it will be observed, that one article, namely, labourers' wages, do not rise with the same rapidity as corn does. They are always lagging a certain distance behind; and, when corn rises very suddenly, the labourers' wages bear no proportion thereto. But, remember, Sir, or, if you should not, the farmers will *feel*, that this circumstance is no advantage to them, though dreadfully injurious to

* The average price of the quarter of wheat in the year 1803, was 2*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.*
—Ed.

the country. The agricultural labourer never receives more than enough to maintain himself and family; and, therefore, in whatever degree his wages fall off, considered relatively with the price of corn, in that degree he must, and does, receive aid from the parish, that is to say, from the farmer. Nay, viewing the farmer thus as the payer of the parish rates for the maintenance of the agricultural poor, the disproportion which is, by a rise in the price of corn, created between that price and the price of the labourers' wages; viewing the farmer in this light, we shall find, that the rise in the price of his corn is a very serious injury to him; for, the labourer, once upon the parish, once degraded, is but too apt to give up all exertion, and to be strongly inclined to live upon the farmer without any labour at all. This is, I am afraid, a very prevalent effect of the high price of corn, and a more fatal one cannot possibly be produced.

Nor is the landlord a gainer by the high price of corn, from whatever cause it proceeds, and, of course, not by a high price proceeding from a bounty on exportation. "The real effect of the bounty," says Smith, "is not so much to raise the real value of corn, as to degrade the real value of silver; or to make an equal quantity of it exchange for a smaller quantity, not only of corn, but of all other commodities. Though, in consequence of the bounty, the farmer should be enabled to sell his corn for four shillings the bushel instead of three and sixpence, and to pay his landlord a money price proportionable to this rise in the money price of his produce; yet, if in consequence of this rise in the price of corn, four shillings will purchase no more goods of any other kind than three and sixpence would have done before, neither the circumstances of the farmer, nor those of the landlord, will be in the smallest degree mended by this change. The farmer will not be able to cultivate better: the landlord will not be able to live better." Suffer me to express my surprise, Sir, that you should have completely rejected this doctrine of your great master, when you have, in so many instances, followed him too closely in those matters where the warlike or diplomatic statesman should have soared above the cold political economist!—As I am fully persuaded, that the petitioning farmers and landlords will, by this time, begin to perceive, that they have made a very great mistake as to the effect of a bounty-law; I cannot help flattering myself, that, their minds being once open to conviction, I shall be able to convince them, that, in another point of view, such a law must be injurious to them; always keeping before us the fact, that the bounty on exported corn will *raise the average price of corn*.

If the bounty on exported corn, raise the average price of corn, the next consequence is, as Smith observes (and as, indeed, we needed neither ghost nor Smith to tell us), "to degrade the value of silver;" that is to say, to depreciate the currency of the country (it is *not* silver now-a-days) further than it is at present depreciated. And, Sir, can the landlords and farmers, above all men living; can the landlords and farmers, whose common interest it is that money should depreciate as little as possible, in order that the one may grant and that the other may obtain as long leases as possible; can this description of persons; no, they never can, wish for any law, by which the depreciation of money must necessarily be accelerated! Upon this part of the subject, Sir, I beg your attention to a passage from the writer referred to in the former part of my letter. "Is it not strange,"

says he, "indeed, to observe a law made for the encouragement of agriculture, on a principle, obviously problematical, and demonstratively unjust, in a country pretending to be enlightened, where a practice remains unchallenged, which opposes an absolute barrier to all improvement, and which is daily gaining ground; the practice, we mean, of refusing leases to farmers, and compelling them to cultivate on the tenure of a single year? In almost every one of the agricultural reports of the different counties, this is complained of as a growing evil. 'I am sorry,' says the secretary to the Board of Agriculture, in his General View of the Agriculture of Hertfordshire, 'I am sorry to observe that a *prejudice* against the granting of leases, increasing daily, will, if not checked by the *good sense of the landlords*, injure, beyond any calculation, the agriculture of the kingdom.' That intelligent agriculturist, Mr. Kent, in his Agricultural Survey of Norfolk, says, 'that leases are the first, the greatest, and most rational encouragement that can be given to agriculture, admits not of a doubt in my opinion. But of *late years* there are very strong *prejudices* entertained against them. In many countries,' continues he, 'the *prejudice* is so strong, that an owner would *as soon alienate the fee simple of his estate* as demise it for a term of years. It grieves me,' says he again, 'to go into a country, which I often do, and find it almost in a state of nature, because the soil being wet and expensive to cultivate, the tenant cannot afford to do it without encouragement, and the owner's *insurmountable objection to leases* keeps him from granting the sort of encouragement which is essentially necessary.' Another of the best informed and most judicious writers on this important subject, Mr. Middleton, says, in his view of the Agriculture of Middlesex, 'It is, without doubt, a most *unreasonable prejudice* which many proprietors entertain against granting leases of their estates; for the withholding these certainly operates as a most powerful bar against every improvement.' And after a long discussion of the subject, he adds, 'leases appear to me to be of so much importance, as being perhaps the most powerful and rational means of promoting improvements in agriculture, that I hope I shall stand excused for having entered so fully on this branch of the report.' Do we then indeed '*suffer the jolly and ignorance of landlords* to withhold the first, the greatest, and most rational encouragement of agriculture, &c. &c.'?—Mercy! mercy! good Sirs! why treat the landlords so cruelly? It is a very plain matter-of-fact question that they have to decide; and, as it is evident that they cannot hope to gain any thing by preventing their own land from being well cultivated, I should be very much disposed to trust to their judgment without any inquiry into the reasons upon which it is founded. Let us, see, however, Sir, if we cannot, in the sole circumstance of the *rapid depreciation of money*, find a reason more than sufficient to wipe away all these heavy charges against the landlords.

Leases of farms were, previous to the commencement of your administration, and, I believe, so late as the year 1795 or thereabouts, generally granted for twenty-one years; some for fourteen years; some for eleven; some, but, comparatively, very few indeed, for a term so short as seven years. Now, Sir, you yourself did, during your speech upon the Civil List, last June, acknowledge that, since the year 1786, a space of only eighteen years, money had depreciated 60 or 70 per centum.

You might have said more than 100 per centum, as I shall, upon a future occasion, amply demonstrate. But, suppose the depreciation to have been *only* 70 per centum, and that I had, in 1785, let a farm, for a 21 years' lease, at the yearly rent of 170 pounds, should I not now most sensibly feel, that my income was reduced to 100 pounds a year? Should I not perceive, that, before the 21 years were expired, I should have, perhaps, very little left, seeing that out of the 70 per centum of depreciation during eighteen years, 50 per centum, at least, has occurred since the year 1796, that is to say, in the space of seven years? This is the most important circumstance; that, within *this last-mentioned space*, the depreciation has been so much more rapid than formerly, so much more rapid than even during the former part of your administration; and, accordingly we find, that it is "only till within these *late years*" that the "*prejudice*" against granting leases has prevailed. Indeed, that landlord who does not now perceive, that, to grant a lease of 21 years, would be nearly the same thing as to "alienate the fee simple of his estate," must be "nature's fool," and not yours. And are landlords then to be blamed, to be thus harshly censured, to be abused, to be called "prejudiced, foolish, ignorant," and what not, because they do not voluntarily set their hands and seals and irrevocably bind over themselves and their descendants to ruin and beggary, while others are wallowing in riches upon their estates! "Strange prejudice," indeed, that should make men dislike dying in a work-house and making over their children to live upon alms drawn from their own estates! What disaffected and disloyal rascals they must be, too, not to do this rather than thus expose the consequences of your paper-money system!—I was just going to propose some means of coming at them by the way of law; but I see that one of these agricultural surveying gentlemen (some of whom, be it well remembered, had the merit of being the first to recommend the seizure of the tithes and the stipendizing of the clergy) has some thoughts of the propriety of not "*suffering* the folly and ignorance of landlords" to withhold leases!—Really, Sir, I should like to know, whether the effects of a paper-money, not convertible into specie, ever entered these men's heads? And yet, one would think it quite impossible that it should not. That ARTHUR YOUNG, too, the Secretary to that profound body, the Board of Agriculture; the correspondent of the "*American Cincinnatus*;" that Arthur Young, who had travelled through a country of assignats; that this oracle of agriculture and political economy, who puts F. R. S. at the end of his name; that he, too, should be "*sorry* to observe that a prejudice against the granting of leases is "*increasing daily!*" Daily! The gentleman must have been very constant in his inquiries! But, where must he have lived? Had he never heard talk of the Bank restriction law? Had he never heard that the Bank was no longer obliged to pay its notes in cash; while, at the same time, these notes were, as to every practical purpose, made a *legal tender* in discharge of rent? I shall, in good truth, begin shortly to suspect, that a man may put F. R. S. at the end of his name, and yet be no conjurer.

But, Sir, not to trouble you with any more of these conjectures, I will now dismiss this letter with pointing out a practical advantage that may be drawn from the facts stated by these Agricultural Surveyors. They are represented, and, I dare say, very truly, as persons of unimpeachable veracity; and they assure us, not upon hearsay evidence, but upon the

result of their own personal inquiries and inspection, that, "of *late years*" (please to mark the phrase), "a strong and unconquerable prejudice" has existed, all over the kingdom, to the granting of farming leases; and that, this prejudice is carried to such a length, "that a land-owner would as soon alienate the fee-simple of his estate as let it for a term of years." Such is their first fact. The next is: that this prejudice "injures agriculture beyond calculation; that it is more injurious to it than all other disadvantages put together; and that, to remove this prejudice would be the *first*, the *greatest*, and *most rational* way to encourage agriculture." After which I need only add, that this prejudice evidently arises from no other cause than the rapid depreciation of money occasioned by the present paper-money system, leaving it to you, Sir, to determine, whether a much more *speedy* and *effectual* measure for encouraging agriculture might not be adopted than that of passing long bills about the prices of corn.

Deeply impressed with the truths that I have endeavoured to establish, and sincerely persuaded that, however erroneous your measures, you would wish not to accumulate evils upon your country, I cannot conclude without expressing a hope that you will, at an early period of the session of Parliament, propose a repeal of the odious and dangerous law which has given rise to this discussion.—It was my intention to have entered here upon an inquiry respecting New Enclosures and the State of the Poor; but these subjects must be deferred till another opportunity.

I am, Sir, yours, &c. &c. &c.,

WM. COBBETT.

Duke-street, Dec. 5, 1804.

LETTER VI.

TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM PITT.

(Political Register, December, 1804.)

"It is impossible not to see, in these feeble and sickly imaginations, that fatal temper of mind, which leads men to look for help and comfort from any source rather than from their own exertions."—Mr. WINDHAM'S Speech on the Preliminaries of Peace.

DIGRESSION II.

SKETCH OF THE PRESENT PROSPECT OF THE WAR.

SIR,—At a time when every post from the continent is bringing fresh proofs of the triumphant progress of our enemy; at a time when the man (a prayer for protection against whom makes part of the liturgy of our church) is putting on the crown, having already taken possession of the dominions, of Charlemagne, while, by way of episode in the grand drama, he is keeping us plunged in all the expenses, the embarrassments, the uncertainties and anxieties of war; at such a time, it is natural that men should inquire, when and how this state of things

is to terminate. This question is, in fact, frequently asked; and, it is truly melancholy to observe, that the answer is seldom, or never, found expressive of confidence in our internal resource, our ability, or our resolution. We rarely hear any thing beyond a vague undefined hope, that all will turn out well at last, that we are not yet to be conquered, and that something or other will happen to frustrate the designs of the enemy. Those who are called upon for some foundation of their hope, refer us, 1. To the powers of the Continent; and, 2. To the discontents of the people of France, sometimes appearing to think, that it is not the interest of Buonaparte himself to conquer this country, nor to subvert its government.

It must be evident, that a fallacious hope can be productive of no good to the country, and that it may be productive of great mischief; therefore, it is well worth our while to consider, what degree of solidity there is in either of the foundations above mentioned.

As far as we can speak from official documents, Russia appeared, at the close of her diplomatic intercourse with Napoleon, to be resolved, not on war, but, on a sort of hostile neutrality, a state, without doubt, very unnatural, but one not altogether without a precedent in the history of Europe. The views of Russia, as they have been before described, appear to have been very steady; and her grand object, through every recent reign, has been, to urge on her influence towards the South. This object was, as the Russian politicians seem to have thought, considerably advanced by the part which that power took in the ever-memorable German Indemnities. Prussia found her account in that distribution of territory and power; but Austria was cruelly injured and humiliated. Napoleon (I use his name to suit the purposes of perspicuity, always meaning, of course, to include the whole government of France); Napoleon took good care, however, that the Russian influence should not, by means of the German Indemnities, find its way permanently to the Southward; and, whether by the showing of great partiality to the princes connected by the ties of blood with the Imperial Russian family, or by the tone which the Russian plenipotentiaries were encouraged to take, the only effect which the new-modelling of the German Empire produced with regard to Russia, was, an addition to that jealousy, not to say envy and hatred, which was already entertained towards her by Austria; while, on the other side, the jealousy and the fears of Prussia could not have been diminished. That the ill-will of these two great German Powers should not have been greatly increased by seeing a Russian Plenipotentiary distributing the dominions of the Empire, new-moulding and new-modelling its constitution, would, indeed, have been something for an age to wonder at. But, long before the affair of the German Indemnities, Napoleon had provided himself with the means of setting Russia at defiance upon any future occasion. Those means we now find amply treasured up in a secret convention, concluded between the two powers on the 11th of October, 1801,* ten days after the date of the preliminaries of peace between England and France. On the 8th of the same month a treaty of peace was concluded between France and Russia; but, in this treaty, war is merely put an end to, and the ancient relationships of peace

* A full list of Treaties will be found in Martens's Law of Nations, republished by Mr. Cobbett, in 1829, p. 357.—ED.

are revived, without any mention of, or allusion to, other powers, except merely, that the Batavian Republic is included in the pacific stipulations. The important provisions, the adjustment of matter of dispute, were reserved for the secret convention, the substance of which convention we are now informed of through the mutual complaints of the parties relative to the non-fulfilment thereof. Napoleon, we are told, by the Russian notes, stipulated, 1. To evacuate the kingdom of Naples, and having so done, to engage to respect the neutrality of that kingdom, during the war then existing, and during all future wars; the latter of which stipulations he has certainly violated, and had violated at the time when the complaint was made by Russia, in the month of July, 1804. 2. He stipulated to establish, in concert with Russia, some principle whereon to come to a final settlement of the affairs of Italy; instead of which, complains Russia, he did, almost immediately after the secret convention was concluded, cause himself to be chosen, and actually became, without any concert at all with Russia, President of the Italian Republic, and, at the same time, disposed of the other parts of Italy according to his sole pleasure. 3. He engaged to indemnify, without delay, the King of Sardinia, whom, however, he has not indemnified, but, on the contrary, the chief part of whose territories he has annexed to France, and this, too, without consulting Russia. These charges are unquestionably well founded; but, Napoleon answers,* that Russia has not fulfilled her part, not only of the secret convention, but of the 3rd article of the treaty of peace, which was concluded three days previous to the conclusion of the convention.† He charges Russia with having violated that article in giving protection to French emigrants; in accrediting them to the neighbouring powers of France, where they might indulge their hostile dispositions against their country; in authorizing the conduct of Count Marckoff, who, during his residence at Paris, encouraged intrigues to disturb the internal tranquillity of France, and who even went so far as to place under the protection of the law of nations, French emigrants and other agents in the pay of England; in ordering a court mourning for the Duke D'Enghein. He then demands, as a preliminary to any step in the way of fulfilment on his part, that Russia shall evacuate the Republic of the Seven Islands, agreeably to the 9th article of the secret convention, which stipulates that there shall be no foreign troops in those islands, an article, says he, evidently violated by Russia, who has continued to send troops thither, which she has openly re-inforced, and has changed the government of that country without the consent of France. He concludes, with declaring, that Russia has, besides, violated the 2nd article of the secret convention, by manifesting a partiality for England, instead of co-operating with France, agreeably to the precise expressions of that article, “in order to consolidate a general peace, to re-establish a just balance in the four parts of the world, and to procure the liberty of the seas” D'Oubril, in his answer to this note of Talleyrand, treats the charges relative to the emigrants as vague and unfounded; he passes in silence over that relative to the mourning for the Duke D'Enghein; the taking possession of the Seven Islands he asserts was with the consent of France; but, as to the stipulated co-operation for

* See Talleyrand's note of the 29th of July last, *Political Register*, vol. vi. p. 58 and concluded in p. 890.

† See this treaty, *Register*, vol. i. p. 165.

“procuring the *liberty of the seas*,” he says not a word.*—It was necessary, Sir, to take this short review of the grounds of the dispute between Russia and France, in order to be able to judge, not only of the present probable intentions of Russia, but also of the line of conduct which Austria and Prussia, more especially the former, is likely to pursue. Austria, already deeply stung by the triumphant rivalship of Russia, by the direct interference of the latter in the affairs of the Germanic Body, and by the losses in territory and in power experienced through the means of that interference, must have been fired with indignation and rage at learning the contents of the secret convention of the 11th of October, 1801. This feeling, on the part of Austria, Napoleon looked forward to as an inevitable consequence of a disclosure of the terms of the secret convention; and, therefore, he always laughed at the complaints and remonstrances of Russia; for, by breaking with her, on account of non-fulfilment of his secret stipulations, he was sure to have Austria on his side. That he never intended to fulfil any one of the articles of the secret convention is, I think, evident; nor would it, perhaps, be very easy to determine, which would have been most detrimental to Europe, the fulfilment or the non-fulfilment of them: the dominion of Italy by Napoleon, or the introduction of Russia into the affairs of the South, which latter, to the extent contemplated by the secret convention, could not have failed to be speedily followed by the total overthrow of the Turkish Empire, and by the reduction of Austria to perfect insignificance; to say nothing about the “procuring of the liberty of the seas.” The final adjustment of the affairs of Italy, if Russia had participated therein, must have led to some changes in the Mediterranean and on the side of Turkey. Russia would have had something more solid than a piece of parchment for the due execution of the terms of such adjustment. In short, the result most probably would have been, that from four great military powers, the number of those powers, upon the continent, would have soon been reduced to two: an Emperor of the East, and an Emperor of the West. Napoleon wanted no equal; he therefore chose to preserve Prussia and Austria and to break with Russia; thus making France the one and only first-rate power, having three second-rate powers whom he might play off against one another, according as his views might require, and as their interests and passions might favour those views.—His views, at present, as far as relates to the Continent, assuredly are, not to be at war with either of the great military powers; to prevent Russia from encroaching upon the Turkish dominions; to keep matters of territory, dominion, and military force, as they now stand, and, at all events, if Russia should, in any direction, pursue an hostile course, to arm Austria or Prussia, or both, against her. That he will not succeed in these views the state of things affords us little reason to hope. Russia may, in order thereby to obtain a greater degree of influence in the Mediterranean, join us in the war, to a certain extent. Her object is to gain influence to the South; and, having failed to accomplish that object by the means of a pacific co-operation with France, she may endeavour to accomplish it by the means of warlike co-operation with England; and, with this view, she may join us in the war. But, it is not very probable, that we should gain much by her co-operation. On the contrary, if it be of importance with us to have great influence in the Mediterranean and the

* See his answer, vol. vi. p. 759.

Levant, the introducing of the Russian navy and influence into those parts appears to be the certain way of finally injuring our own interests; because, when we have once given her a firm footing, Napoleon will not fail to tempt her with a peace, in which our power, in that part of the world, should be sacrificed. Whether the temptation would succeed, or not, is a question the decision of which must be left to those who have observed the conduct of nations, under similar circumstances.—It seems, however, to be more probable, that Russia will not take any very active part in the war; because, without the co-operation of either Austria or Prussia, or both of them, she can make no impression upon Napoleon; and, for those powers to join Russia against him, in the present state of the Continent, would be to forge their own chains; seeing that the natural consequence would be, a peace, in which they would be sacrificed to Russia. Then would return the case to have been apprehended from the due execution of the secret convention of 1801; that is to say, the abasement of Austria and Prussia, particularly the former, and the division of Europe between two great powers, France and Russia. That this is the light, in which the subject is viewed at Vienna and Berlin we certainly have no positive proof; but, if it be the light wherein reason views it, we have no foundation to hope that they will view it in any other.—Before the recent acts of violence, committed by France, we talked about continental coalitions against Napoleon; and, since the commission of those acts, we have spoken with still greater confidence. But, we ought always to expect, that the powers of the Continent will act agreeably to their interests; that is, according to their own views of safety, or of ambition; and, when we come to look into the causes, which have created the quarrel between Russia and France, we find that the quarrel is for power, on the part of Russia, and that, such is the nature of that power, that the desiring to acquire it is, of all possible causes, the one most likely to create an irreconcilable enmity between that court and the other courts, with whom the wished-for coalition must take place, if it take place at all. As to the acts of violence, which Napoleon has ordered to be committed, particularly that committed upon our minister at Hamburgh, they would, doubtless, in other times, have roused the powers of the Continent against the aggressor; but, now-a-days, such offences can only be expected to be brought forward in the list of provocations, when a power is already disposed and able to make war; and, when we express such sanguine hopes from this source, we seem to forget the treatment which Mr. Drake, Mr. Smith, and other of our ministers, have received from the courts of the Continent. The Elector of Bavaria ordered our minister away on account of the charge preferred against him by Napoleon; Lord Hawkesbury delivers to the foreign corps diplomatic a note wherein he justifies conduct like that of which Mr. Drake was charged; whereupon Napoleon publishes an interdiction against all our ministers at neutral courts in the neighbourhood of France. As we are not permitted to doubt of the “prudence” of a doctrine promulgated by Lord Hawkesbury, we must content ourselves with the privilege of mourning its consequences. Perhaps, however, we may yet be allowed to express our surprise, that the government who openly justified conduct such as that of Mr. Drake, should never have openly obtained, or even demanded, any *satisfaction* for the deep disgrace inflicted in the driving of that gentleman from Munich.* Do we say, that the court of Munich was beneath the notice of a

* See the note of the Baron de Montgelas to Mr. Drake, *Register*, vol. v. p.

nation like England? the answer is, that it was not thought beneath the dignity of his Majesty to send a representative to that court. The Elector of Bavaria, through his minister, unequivocally expresses his abhorrence of the conduct of Mr. Drake, pronounces it to be inconsistent with the law of nations, and orders him, accordingly, not to appear again at his court. As far as we have heard, neither Prussia nor Austria have expressed any dissent from this decision of Bavaria: indeed, they seemed to assent to it, in the notes of their ministers, delivered upon the occasion, at Paris. What reason is there to suppose then, that they will make any important movement in consequence of the seizure of Sir George Rumbold, which appears to have been grounded upon our having publicly proclaimed a doctrine the contrary of that upon which they then acted? To seize a public minister is, indeed, widely different from a request made to a neutral court to send him away; and, it is also widely different from the seizing of the Duke d'Enghein; but, it is, nevertheless, not very likely, that those who remained entirely unmoved by the latter should be roused to war by the former. Our present inquiry is, not whether these courts act as become them; it is not what Austria and Prussia ought to do, but what they are likely to do; not what they think and how they feel as to our cause, but what part they are disposed to act during the war. And, I think, that man must be very sanguine, who expects them to arm for the purpose of avenging the seizure of our ministers at foreign courts.

As, in this disgrace of our corps diplomatic, the cause seems to have, in a great degree at least, originated with ourselves; so, it would be by no means difficult to show, that the state of things which has so completely divided Austria and Prussia from Russia, as to feeling towards France, originated, in great part, from the same source. Our general conduct during the last war, and more especially our abandonment of our allies at the peace, have alienated the Continental powers from British connection. Nay, that very secret convention, which has now proved so deadly an instrument in the hands of Napoleon, would never have existed, or would have been superseded, if we had acted a disinterested part in concluding the peace of Amiens; if we had not preferred the possession of colonies to the possession of influence upon the Continent of Europe; if we had not preferred what we regarded as profit, to our honour. In the declaration of the present war, complaint is made, in his Majesty's name, that the French "have annexed to their dominions Piedmont, Parma, Placentia, and the Island of Elba, without allotting any provision to the King of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of the most valuable part of his territory, though they were bound by a solemn engagement to the Emperor of Russia, to attend to his interests and to provide for his establishment."* To this the French have answered, "that, at the peace, they offered to England, provided she

676. It is not unnecessary here to remark on the ridiculous perverseness of the ministerial newspapers, who are continually representing Mr. Drake's Letters to Mahée de la Touche as "a fabrication" of the French; when, by just looking at the note of Montgelas, which note they themselves have published, it will be perceived, that the Elector causes Mr. Drake to be informed, that he has Mr. Drake's Letters to Mahée then before his eyes, *in Mr. Drake's own hand-writing!* How can any one place reliance upon prints that persevere in such barefaced falsehoods? How is it possible that the country can be served by them? Truth itself, coming through such vehicles, loses its character and its effect.

* Register, vol. iii. p. 744.

“ would leave *Ceylon to the Dutch*, to make such an arrangement in “ behalf of the King of Sardinia as she might propose.”* This fact has been published all over the world, and not a word has ever appeared in contradiction to it. Whether true or false the world believes it; and upon that belief will judge of us and act towards us. And, what a light are we placed in by this fact, when it is compared with our complaints made in behalf of the King of Sardinia at the breaking out of a new war between us and France! We complain, too, that, upon this subject, France has broken her promise to Russia. What, then, we knew of this secret convention, it seems, so long ago as the spring of 1803! But why did we leave the matter to Russia? Why did we leave in the hands of Napoleon this means of wheedling Russia into his power, the means of inflaming Austria against Russia, when we ourselves had wherewith to purchase for the King of Sardinia an establishment more ample than it was at all likely for Russia ever to obtain for him? Here, Sir, you must pardon me, if I recur, for a moment, to the debates upon the peace. “ A great military monarch, when he was at the lowest ebb of his fortunes,” said Mr. Windham, “ and had sustained a defeat, that “ seemed to extinguish all his remaining hopes, the terms of his letter “ written from the field of battle were—‘ We have lost every thing, “ but our honour.’ Would to God, that the same consolation, in cir- “ cumstances liable to become in time not less disastrous, re- “ mained to Great Britain! I should feel a far less painful load of de- “ pression upon my mind, than weighs upon it at this moment. But, I “ fear that we have contrived to combine in this proceeding, all that is at “ once ruinous and disgraceful; all that is calculated to undo us, in re- “ putation as well as in fortune, to deprive us of all those resources, “ which high fame and unsullied character may create, even ‘ under the “ ribs of death.’ Having next stated the case of Sardinia, and shown that it was our duty to make some sort of provision for her unfortunate monarch, he says: “ We have left Sardinia, however, without an attempt “ to relieve her, without even a helping hand stretched out to support “ or to cheer her, under that ruin which she has brought upon herself, “ with no fault on her part, while adhering faithfully to her treaty with “ us.—Naples, too, and Portugal and Turkey, will attest, to the end of “ time, the good faith of Great Britain; and show to the world, that *she* “ is not a power, who seeks her own safety by abandoning those with “ whom she has embarked in a common cause.”† What would he have said, then, if he had known, that we might have obtained an establishment for the King of Sardinia by the giving up of *Ceylon*! By the surrendering of a colony which has already cost us more, perhaps, in national strength than it is possible that it ever should restore to us! You, Sir, upon the occasion now reverted to, asserted, that we had acted towards our allies “ with dignified liberality.” You were ready to grant, indeed, “ that we ought to have claimed *Piedmont for its sovereign*,” but, said you, “ Could we have obtained it? Could we have procured its “ restoration unless we could have disposed of the King of Etruria, un- “ less we could have destroyed the Ligurian and Cisalpine Republics, “ and driven the French from the mountains of Switzerland? Unless we “ could have done all this, it would have been in vain to restore the King “ of Sardinia to his capital, surrounded as he would have been by the

* Register, p. 1924.

† Ibid, vol. ii. p. 1180.

“ French and by their dependent and affiliated Republics.”* When we recollect that you were consulted in every stage of the negotiation, and when we also recollect the proposal made by the French respecting Ceylon and the King of Sardinia, we shall need no comment to enable us to form a just opinion of the motive by which this argument must have been dictated. But, Sir, if we could not obtain *Piedmont* for its sovereign, we now know that we could have obtained *something* for him by the yielding of Ceylon; and, the world well knows that we obtained him nothing. Mark, besides, mark well, for the world has marked, our frankness and sincerity. We could think of nothing less than *Piedmont*, and that too, quite independent; quite clear of all annoyance from any of Napoleon’s republics; but, provided Russia will obtain an establishment for the King of Sardinia, we do not seem to care much what it is, or where or how it lies. It was “in vain,” perfectly “in vain,” for us even to re-place the King of Sardinia in “his capital,” and, of course, in his dominions; but, if Russia will get him “an establishment,” we will thank her; nay, we will quarrel with Napoleon, we will even make it one of our grounds of war against him, if he refuses to grant this “establishment,” through the means of Russia! How truly, then, was it observed by Mr. Wilberforce, that “the very integrity and good faith of the ministers and people of this country rendered us unfit for continental connection.”! —It may, perhaps, be said, however, that by utility in replacing the King of Sardinia in his capital, you confined your meaning to utility to *ourselves*. But we now see, that such an act would not have been useless even to us. So true it is, that in acting justly by others, we, in the end, are sure to promote our own good. In the first place, we should have derived from such a proceeding the negative advantage of preventing the enemy from blasting our fame by the disclosure of the fact, that we refused to give up Ceylon for the purpose of obtaining a settlement for our unfortunate and faithful ally. We should have derived likewise the advantage always attendant on acts of national disinterestedness. Europe would have acknowledged that we had not been shedding her blood for our own sakes; and that though we were unable to leave our allies as we found them, we did all we could for that end. We should have preserved our character for generosity and frankness; we should not have lost all but our honour; we should, in that respect, have retained our honour and lost nothing; and, in the career of a new war, we should have started with, at least, the hearty good wishes of the Continent of Europe. But, besides this general effect of the proceeding, we should have prevented, or lessened, some of the particular evils, which we now experience. Any arrangement that we could have made for the King of Sardinia might have failed in preventing *Piedmont* from being finally annexed to France; yet, we are not sure that it would have failed. And, who shall be certain, that the abandonment of that prince by us was not the principal cause of that annexation? If the King of Sardinia had been re-established in *Piedmont*, however surrounded by French arms and French influence, the ejecting him would not have been a slight matter. It might have again brought Austria and Russia into the field. It might, and it would, have retarded the execution of Napoleon’s projects. At any rate, it would have entirely prevented the secret convention between Russia and France, that convention the terms of which seem to have

* Register, vol. ii. p. 1141.

been drawn up for the express purpose of exciting the envy and hatred of Austria against Russia, after having kept Russia in the interests of France as long as her remaining so could be of any use to the latter. And thus, Sir, are we now smarting for that policy, which, looking at nothing but the Custom-house books, preferred a spice colony to the honour of the nation.—But, after all, some one will ask, is it possible that the powers of Europe, that Austria and Prussia will not rouse themselves? Rouse themselves for what? Against Napoleon? Why, he is the benefactor of the latter; and the former is a great power out of his reach, and in no danger from him, unless Russia be first let into the South. Swift tells a story somewhere about the curates and the bishops, the former crying out that the church was in danger, and the latter exhorting them to peace, observing, “we are very well as we are.” So say Austria and Prussia: and, if the heads of those nations were to read the London newspapers, they must be utterly astonished at our uneasiness on their account; at our friendly desire to promote their interests; at our philanthropic attention to their prosperity, safety, and independence; and, particularly at the tender anxiety we are constantly expressing for the preservation of their dignity and their honour. Sometimes this anxiety shows itself in our displeasure at their tame and pusillanimous conduct; and, there have been instances, where it has broken forth in reproaches, not to say downright abuse. Nay, we have not spared even menaces against them; and have, in a recent case, proceeded to put those menaces into execution, by seizing their treasure; as we have said, “If you will not make use of it for the maintenance of your honour, we will.”—Yet, is it possible, that the powers of the continent, that Austria and Prussia, would stand by and see Great Britain subdued and added to the dominions of Napoleon, rather than embark in the present war against him? Such a choice certainly is not impossible. But, this is not the true question. The true question is: Will Austria and Prussia, rather than engage in the present war, see Great Britain continue the war single-handed, though exposed to the inroads of Napoleon, and even to the danger of being annexed to his empire? And this question, I am much afraid, that, upon a review of all the above-stated circumstances, we must determine in the affirmative.

Time to recruit is very much wanted by Austria; and both Austria and Prussia must wish to see the ambitious strides of Napoleon directed in any course rather than to the North and the East. That it will force its way in some direction or other they must well know; directed to the Westward, it is not very easy to discover how it could endanger or annoy them; and, therefore, it is by no means unreasonable to suppose, that they would even wish to see it exhaust its force upon these islands. In answer to such a supposition, it will be asked, whether Austria or Prussia could be safe, if the British dominions were once subdued by Napoleon? But, Sir, Austria and Prussia will easily see, that this subjugation would not be the work of a few months, or of a few years; nor would it be at all astonishing, if they were to conclude, that the enterprise, though it might speedily destroy our constitution of government, and spread ruin and misery over the land, might cost more years than Napoleon has to live, and might eventually produce the restoration of the liberties of the continent.—For these reasons, Sir, it appears to me, that there exists no well-founded hope, that, in the course of this war, we shall derive any advantage from continental co-operation, unless we put ourselves in a

situation to take a commanding part in a continental war, by providing such an army as shall at once convince those, whose alliance we desire, of the sincerity of our views and the solidity of our power.

From discontents in France we have, if possible, still less to hope. There was, indeed, a time when much might have been reasonably hoped for from that source; but, that time is past; the French royalists have seen a peace of Amiens, and they have read of the proposition for sending GEORGES and his gallant companions to Canada. The time was not, perhaps, entirely past, at the beginning of this war; but, things are now completely changed, and never again, during the present struggle, will there be found in France a single arm raised in a cause in which England is engaged.—Besides, Sir, for us to hope for discontents in France, we ought to be able to assign some reason why such discontents should now exist, or should hereafter arise. There is reason enough, indeed, in the circumstance of Napoleon's being an Usurper. But, this sort of reason never has had any weight against a famous military chief; and, we should recollect, too, that, though the collecting of the suffrages of the people might be a mere mockery, yet, the dynasty of Buonaparte has, in appearance at least, been established by the choice of the French nation. If we look at the privileged estates, the nobility and the clergy, we find that the old nobility are either destroyed, or incorporated with the new; that the clergy are a body as much of Napoleon's creation as is the legion of honour; and, that not only the interests, but the honour (or, call it the character, or reputation) and the very existence, of both, are inseparably interwoven with the new dynasty, or, in other words, with the Usurpation. But, the coronation of Napoleon, which has been a subject of so much mirth, real or affected, in the British metropolis, is a circumstance of a still higher order. Its influence will be felt by every Roman Catholic in the world; and, we should not forget, that of the people of all Europe, these realms included, two-thirds, or thereabouts, are of the Roman Catholic religion. The London prints affect to regard the Pope as "a poor miserable old creature, dragged from his home, at this inclement season of the year, and at the evident risk of his life, to act a part in the impious farce of anointing the head and sanctifying the sword of a regicide and an apostate, previous to his being crowned with an Imperial Diadem." Poor miserable old creature, if they will have it so; regicide and apostate, as long as they please; but, Sir, the coronation, whatever be the actors, is no "farce:" on the contrary, it may, I fear, be justly regarded as a sort of prelude to the most serious and most awful drama that ever yet was exhibited on the face of the earth. The former, and, for aught I know, the present impiety of Napoleon has been, and may be notorious; though the world will not fail to form a just opinion of the motives of the British ministerial prints, in preferring this charge against him now, when their praises of him during peace are remembered, and when it is recollected, that the British ministers, particularly your colleague Lord Hawkesbury, solemnly assured the Parliament that, at the peace, Napoleon had "publicly asked pardon of God and man." But, supposing the new Emperor still to be impious; and supposing his act of apostacy in Egypt to be a stain never to be washed out. Will this circumstance tend to lessen the effects of the Papal benediction? Does history tell us, that the apostacy of Henry IV. rendered him an unpopular, or a feeble monarch? Or, do we read, that he was a most beloved and a most potent prince; and, though he perished at last by the hands of an assassin, his

death is said to have occasioned more public grief than that of any King of France, St. Louis only excepted. To the editors of London newspapers the Pope may, both now and at all other times, appear as "a poor miserable old creature." But, we must not, without hesitation, conclude that he will, at any time, appear in that light to the Roman Catholics of any country. The present Pope is not only in fact, but in right, according to the Roman Catholic faith, the head of their church; and, I must confess myself completely at a loss to discover how either his person or his office has been "humiliated and degraded" by his being called in to confirm a title, and to give his sanction to an authority, confirmed by a nation consisting of thirty-five millions of people, or, assumed by the most powerful sovereign, or chief, in the world. With affected contempt and commiseration, Buonaparte has been blamed for "reviving the *superstitious fooleries* of Charlemagne." The comparison is most unfortunate. Charlemagne was the first Emperor of the West; he was a great and glorious warrior; he defended the Pope against the arms of his oppressors; he was crowned by Pope Leo III.; his character was most noble; all his views were grand; he reigned long, with great glory to himself and with not less happiness to his people. Is such the man, whose "fooleries" Buonaparte is to be *laughed* at for reviving? But, suppose, merely for argument's sake, the anointing by the hands of the Pope to be, in our opinion and in reality, a "superstitious foolery." How does that lessen the value of the ceremony to Buonaparte, and how does it diminish its influence in Europe, if the Roman Catholics do not consider it as a "superstitious foolery," but, on the contrary, as a very important religious act, conferring honour and sanctity upon him who receives it? Why, it may be answered, that the Roman Catholics are, then, superstitious fools. This leaves us where it found us; for, their being superstitious fools, if true, will not deprive them of existence; will not make them fewer in number than two-thirds of the inhabitants of Europe; will not rob them of those faculties, which render their approbation valuable to him on whom it is bestowed. It is very easy to cry "superstition and foolery." The writer above quoted had only to open one of the books of Calvin, and he might instantly have collected together terms and epithets, wherewith to make, against the Roman Catholics, as dirty a diatribe as his heart could have yearned for. But, whatever other sins the Roman Catholics may have to answer for, *lukewarmness* is not generally one. It is of the very essence of the Roman Catholic church to inspire her sons with great zeal; great public spirit, as far at least as she is concerned; great devotion to her interest; great jealousy for her honour. And if they, at all times, possess these feelings, in what an uncommon degree must they possess them at this time; when, after a long series of persecutions and of degradation, they see her again raising her head? Think you, Sir, that they have not felt the spiteful treatment of their church? That they were unmoved spectators of the exultation of the saints, of both Old and New England, and every where else, at the time when the French armies were rifling "Anti-Christ and the Whore of Babylon?" Think you, that they have forgotten this? Verily they have not: and, if they do not now exult in their turn, at seeing the conqueror of so many countries, he who disposes of kingdoms, bowing at the altar of their church, submitting to her laws, and receiving his crown at the hands of their pontiff; if they do not exult at this, they must have much less zeal than they have usually possessed, or much more magnanimity than was ever

professed by any other class of mankind. Exultation at the effect will naturally be followed by some degree of praise of, if not of gratitude towards, the cause. What! praise of an apostate! There is the mistake: we regard him as an apostate, they as a convert. As a son that was lost, and that is found. And, as to his being a hypocrite, so much the greater the triumph of Christianity in general, and of the Church of Rome in particular; for his obeisance to the Pope, considered in conjunction with his hypocrisy, is a complete proof that temporal authority is not to be maintained without spiritual aid; and thus atheism and deism, after all their scoffing, are compelled to assume the garb of piety, and to bend their proud necks at the shrine of the Gospel. The Roman Catholics in foreign countries will be, however, still disposed to participate in the feelings of their rulers towards Napoleon, as far as temporal matters are concerned; that is to say, if they are justly treated by those rulers, and love them accordingly. But, even they, remembering that he has exalted their church, and taken her under his mighty protection, will not hastily wish to see his power subverted; and, as to France, every religious sentiment there will assuredly operate to the consolidation of his throne. Such, Sir, appears to me, to be the natural consequences of an event, which, since it was first spoken of, has been a constant subject of mirth amongst those sprightly gentlemen, who, to the honour of our country, conduct the ministerial newspaper press of the metropolis?*

* A burlesque representation of the coronation of Buonaparte was the brilliant conception of a rich loan-maker. It was to take place at a masquerade of his giving; the dresses, scenery, and dramatis personæ, are said to have been all provided; but, from some cause or other, just before the night of exhibition, Balaam's heart failed him, and the conception was left to descend to, and be improved on by, the newspapers and the mob. Accordingly, we were soon afterwards told, that the MAYOR OF GARRAT (a well-known burlesque upon elections and members of Parliament) was about to be raised to the rank of Emperor; and, it was stated in the newspapers, that SIR HARRY DIMSDALE, a muffin-seller, who was called Mayor of Garrat, had been *before certain police magistrates*, and asked them if there was any legal objection to his taking the title of Emperor, and being crowned accordingly, whereupon he was, it was stated, told by the magistrates, that there was certainly no impediment to the assumption. The account of the intended coronation shall be given in their own words.—“PROCLAMATION. To our dutiful and loving subjects of Garrat. We, the Imperial Court of Garrat, do hereby give notice to our beloved Subjects, that our August Emperor, Sir Harry Dimsdale, will be crowned, at his Imperial Palace, the King's Head, in Old Compton-street, Soho, on Monday, the 15th day of October, in the year of our Lord 1804, at the hour of eight o'clock in the evening. Given at Our Court in Compton-street, this 12th day of October, 1804.—God SAVE THE EMPEROR! The curiosity of the public was so great to see this mock coronation, that it was hardly possible at eight o'clock, the hour appointed, to find even standing-room in the place where the Emperor was intended to be crowned. The Emperor (who is a very little and deformed man, who used to hawk muffins about the streets) delivered three or four speeches full of professions of patriotism, and attention to the interests of the people, in a strain of caricature of the declarations which are *too frequently made in exalted situations* with as little sincerity as Sir Harry's. His Majesty made a bungle *in the delivery of one of his speeches*, which was very excusable, as he did not read them according to the usual form, but repeated them from memory. Some discontent was visible in the countenances of many, and some even dared to openly express their disappointment and dissatisfaction at having paid their half-pence and not seeing a crown furnished. Most fortunately there came in a party of volunteers, who offered themselves to constitute his body-guard, and immediately arranged themselves on his right and left for the defence of his royal person. Good order was attempted to be restored, by a motion that the

But, "the despotism, the severity of Napoleon's government: will not the people of France thereby be roused?" In answer to this, I cannot, in the first place, help observing; that, if we deny, that a despotic government is the only government suited to the character of Frenchmen, and that, repeating the sentiments of Voltaire, "good or bad they must have a *master*;" if we deny this, I cannot help observing, that I and all those who have entertained and expressed the same opinions with myself, flatly contradict our former assertions; and it must be fresh in every one's memory, that when, during the peace of Amiens, Buonaparte assumed the consulship for life, the ministerial writers expressed their joy on the occasion, regarding a despotic government, in the hands of a single person, as the only means of preserving tranquillity in France, and of "healing the wounds of Europe." These were their very words. Yet, now we are seeking, in this very sort of government, for the infallible means of disturbing the tranquillity of France, and for again opening "the wounds of Europe!" It is curious to observe how men's opinions change with their situations. How anxious they seem to find out the means of hiding their dangers and disgrace even from themselves!—In the next place, Sir, I should like to know, whence it is that these writers now conclude, that the severity of the government of France will produce discontents amongst the people of that country, while these same writers are daily contending, that, by similar means, a contrary effect has been produced in Ireland. Suffer me to quote, for instance, the Morning Post newspaper of the 13th inst.; "With respect to the report of the sailing of the French fleet, we are confident that no such intelligence has been received either in England or in Ireland, nor do we believe that there is the slightest foundation for the statement; and as to the rumour of approaching disturbances, we have the happiness to hear, that in the best informed and official circles, no apprehensions whatever are entertained in this respect. The reports which have for some time past been circulated respecting the state of Ireland, we are now well assured were, for the most part, erroneous. *No symptoms of discontent have of late been manifested in that country*; the accounts relative to the escape of state prisoners in different parts of the country are wholly unfounded, nor have there been, for some time past, any persons of that description in confinement, except at Kilmainham, and a very small number at Cork and Belfast. On the whole, the great body of the

"coronation should be postponed to the 9th of November, the day fixed for another coronation, when it was hoped that his Holiness the Pope might be prevailed on to assist in the performance of this important ceremony. The mobility, however, had come to see a coronation, and a coronation of some sort they would have. A *crown* bowl of punch was thought to come nearest in rank and sound of its title to the imperial crown. It was placed upon his royal head by his body-guard, and '*God save the King*' was sung in full chorus. Several huzzas and shouts of '*Long live the Emperor*' proclaimed that he was legally invested with the dignity." The *volunteers* coming to form his body-guard was quite in character. But, was the satire *really* aimed at Buonaparte? How could the anthem of "God save great George our King," sung in burlesque, be meant as a satire on the Emperor of France? I think one may perceive through the whole scene, and the description of it, something that it is by no means wise for magistrates to encourage, and that may, if only a little improved upon, tend to the producing of events far from laughable. In short, we may, by such means, degrade ourselves, our country, and our government; but never shall we thereby whiten one hair of Napoleon's head, or blunt the point of one of his half million of bayonets.

" people of Ireland are at present attached, *in a remarkable degree*, to the
 " government, and the country in general is *in a far more tranquil and*
 " *promising state than it has been for many years past*. That there
 " are some disaffected men in Ireland, the dupes of wicked and designing
 " outcasts, our information does not warrant us to deny; but we have
 " the consolation to know, that a very great proportion of the people
 " are actuated by the *most sincere and ardent sentiments of loyalty*; and
 " that should the enemy ever succeed in reaching the shores of that
 " country, they will find hundreds of thousands ready to repel the aggress-
 " sion, and to turn the attempt to the utter destruction of the aggressors."

Now, Sir, I by no means insinuate, that the government of Ireland, though the habeas corpus act is suspended, and though the people are liable to martial law, is as severe as the government of Buonaparte. My argument does not require that fact to be established. But, I humbly presume to suppose that it will be granted, that the government of Ireland is somewhat more severe than it was before the habeas corpus act was suspended, and before the people were made liable to be tried and adjudged by martial law; if this be granted, and if it be true that the people of Ireland are now " attached to their government in a remarkable degree," and that the " country in general is in a far more tranquil and promising state than it has been for many years past," the people being " actuated by the most sincere and ardent sentiments of loyalty;" if these two positions are advanced, or admitted, I should be glad to hear the argument whereon these writers ground their hope of discontents against Napoleon, arising from the severity of his government.—This argument, however, drawn from the experience of Ireland, is, it must be confessed, worth nothing, the radical position being shamefully false; and, I have only introduced it in order to show how completely destitute these writers are of principles whereon to reason.—A much better argument, against the opinion that Napoleon's government will be disturbed by domestic discontents, presents itself in the general, and, indeed, the natural effect of such governments; and one may safely aver, that the sovereign who has a body of enterprising nobility, whatever be their denomination; a national church, to which ninety-nine hundredths of the people are attached; a numerous, well-disciplined, and well-appointed, army: one may safely aver, that he who has all these at his command, need be under little apprehension from the discontents of the people. " The enemies of " tyranny " (said the Oracle newspaper of the 19th ultimo); " the ene-
 " mies of tyranny and oppression will be glad to hear, that the French
 " nation itself, doomed for some time past to vent its complaints in un-
 " availing murmurs, has at last courage to *remonstrate aloud against the*
 " *usurpation of Buonaparte*, whose pride and insolence are intolerable,
 " Talleyrand and Fouche, who may be called his right and left arms, per-
 " haps his very vital principle, *have indicated symptoms of dislike to the*
 " *will of the tyrant*. The armies are also beginning to *express sentiments*
 " *of disaffection*. Accounts from Boulogne state, that *universal discontent*
 " *prevails among the troops*; that all idea of their embarking for the pur-
 " pose of invasion has been abandoned; and that the flotilla men are ready
 " to *turn against their commanders*." Thus, Sir, are the people of this country deceived; thus are duped; thus are their spirits buoyed upon by false hopes, by a reliance upon any thing rather than their own national exertions! Napoleon, supposing the force of his authority alone to be insufficient for the purpose of repressing domestic disturbances, has, in the ruling

passion of Frenchmen, and in his inclination and ability to gratify that passion, I mean the love of national glory, means more than quite sufficient to secure, not only the tranquillity of the state, but the hearts of the people. It is not against a renowned military chief that a people rebels; it is not against such a chief that a people murmurs: no, Sir, they murmur and they rebel against rulers of an exactly opposite description. Such a chief may be tyrannical; but from this cause the great mass of the people will feel not much inconvenience. "To men remote from power" his tyranny will hardly be known; while the glory which his military achievements shed upon the country, will illuminate even the meanest hut, and will endear him to every one to whom nature has not denied the capacity of feeling that he has a share in that glory: and of those who do not so feel, the enmity may be safely despised. Besides, the soft, the silent, the cat-like paw of corruption and of perverted law; the exercise of tyranny under the name, and in the phrase, of justice and liberty, such as I have witnessed in America, for instance, is much more deleterious to society, as well as more grating to the soul of the individual, than the random bolts, the partial blows, of a single despot, which, at least, leave to the sufferer the consolation of being pitied. But, suppose the choice to lie solely between the loss of individual liberty and the loss of the glory of the country, shockingly degraded must be that people who would, for a moment, hesitate to prefer the former. The aversion to upstarts, I grant, is powerful and highly laudable: it has its rise in the most just and noble sentiments of the mind. But, Sir, those who have risen, however suddenly, by deeds of arms, are not upstarts. The term upstart will never be applied to the hero of the Nile. Extraordinary talents, exerted in rendering great public services, whether in the cabinet or the field, are a fair foundation for rank and power. Men exalted by such means may be an object of envy amongst their less meritorious or less fortunate rivals, but the mass of the people will seldom fail to acknowledge the justice of their claims. The upstarts whom good men hate are such as have risen by low and base arts, or who have grown up out of the follies or vices of their particular patrons, or of the government and governing system in general. They have been well denominated mushrooms; for they spring from the rotten part of the state, and the soil that bears them will seldom bear any thing else. Crawling sycophants, labourers in the dirty work of corruption, with all the endless list of jobbers of every description, such as I have seen in America, for instance. Such are the upstarts; men who, having, as it were, stolen fortunes from the public treasure; that is to say, from the labour of the people, become, by the means of those fortunes, the possessors of the land, making slaves of those whom they have already pillaged and impoverished: such are the upstarts whom every honest and honourable man must hate, and to whose sway he never submits without impatience. To the arrogance of military chiefs people have an apology for yielding; but, quietly to yield to the inglorious tyranny of tame speculators admits of no excuse. The tyranny of military chiefs is harsh; but it is not humiliating. It does not debase the mind, as well as empty the purse, of the sufferer. Hence it is that we have seen the French submit to almost any thing from their military rulers, while the people whom they have subdued, though they wanted the courage to resist their own cowardly masters, seized the first opportunity for shaking off their authority; as if they had said, "If we must be slaves, let us submit to those whose power and whose military fame will afford an excuse for

“our submission.” This, Sir, is a sentiment of a most dangerous tendency, and one which, I trust, the people of this country never will be tempted to adopt. But, at the same time, I cannot but think it full as likely that they should adopt such a sentiment, as that the people of France should now become generally discontented with the government of Napoleon.

Such, Sir, are my reasons for thinking, that, in the prosecution of the present war, there exists no well-founded hope, that we shall, pursuing our present policy, derive any aid from alliances on the Continent, or from discontents amongst the people of France. I beg to be understood, not as having described what *ought* to be the conduct of the continental powers, or of the people of France; but, what *will* be their conduct: and, the motive by which I am actuated is, to convince you, that, tremendous as the conflict will become, we have no reliance but upon our own exertions. What is the prospect of the war, with regard to those exertions, shall be the subject of another letter.—In the meanwhile,

I remain, Sir, yours, &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Dec. 13, 1804.

CORN LAWS.

NOTE BY THE EDITORS.—The following articles on the Corn Laws, Price of Bread, Enclosures, &c., we take from the *Register* of July and August, 1804, thus going back a few months from the date of the Letters to Mr. PITT, which were closed abruptly with the sixth, which precedes this. The reader will find that some observations which Mr. COBBETT proposed to discuss at length in the letters, are touched on in these articles on prices; and, in future numbers we shall be able to give his opinions more fully put forth on the subjects which he proposed in the Letters to Mr. PITT, a series which he intended to carry on to a greater length, had not other matters of more immediate interest pressed upon him.

ANOTHER of these laws is now passing, or has just passed. It were sincerely and devoutly to be wished, that conjugal love always burnt with as steady a flame as the love of law-giving! About three or four years ago law upon law came forth to prevent the exportation and to lower the price of bread-corn; and now we have begun to make laws to encourage what we then prohibited. If no law had ever been passed upon the subject, and if courts of justice had never meddled with the matter, the scarcity would not have been nearly so severely felt as it was; and the plenty would not now have been swelled to a superabundance, not so alarming, indeed, to the country, as the scarcity was, but injurious to it, and, eventually may be productive of very bad consequences. The restriction as to exportation is taken off, too, at a wrong time. There is no telling as yet, what will be the produce of the next harvest. We have had four dry summers successively; five successively have not been known in this country, within the memory of the oldest man living; and if we should now have a harvest like that of 1799, the quartern loaf may yet sell for a shilling before Christmas. If that should happen to be the case, will it not be said with truth, that Mr. Addington is the luckiest of

mortals ! Just as the reins of power were put into his feeble hands, plenty began to return : the next harvest, favoured by the seasons as well as by the extraordinary exertions in agriculture occasioned by the high prices, was the most abundant ever known in England. The produce of this harvest began to come to market, just as his measure of peace was concluded. *He* it was, therefore, that gave the country " peace and plenty ;" and thus this most dangerous fallacy got possession of the minds of the people. Plenty seems now to have increased till it ought to go no farther ; till, in fact, it is, in the opinion of the legislature, become an evil ; and in order to lessen it, we are to pay, out of the taxes raised upon us, a bounty for sending corn out of the country. This seems, therefore, to be a proper time to look back upon the progress of this plenty, and to see how it has been affected by the opposite states of *peace* and *war*, as exhibited in the price of the quartern loaf.

1802 1st January 1s. 0 $\frac{1}{4}$ d.	} PEACE.	1803 1st May - 9d.	} WAR.
February 1 0		June - 9 $\frac{3}{4}$	
March - 10 $\frac{1}{2}$		July - 9 $\frac{3}{4}$	
April - 11 $\frac{3}{4}$		August - 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	
May - 9 $\frac{1}{2}$		September 10	
June - 10		October - 10	
July - 10		November 10	
August - 10 $\frac{1}{2}$		December 9 $\frac{3}{4}$	
September 10		1804 January - 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	
October - 10		February 9	
November 10		March - 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	
December 9 $\frac{1}{4}$		April - 8 $\frac{1}{2}$	
1803 January - 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	May - 8 $\frac{1}{4}$		
February 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	June - 8 $\frac{1}{4}$		
March - 9	July - 8 $\frac{1}{4}$		
April - 9 $\frac{1}{4}$			

How silly, then, how stupid, was the cry of "*peace and a large loaf!*" And how scanty must have been the sense, or how abundant the baseness of those persons, who, calling themselves gentlemen, encouraged that cry ! It was indeed the lowest of all political tricks : the most shameful means of sheltering themselves from public indignation : an appeal to prejudice, to ignorance, to selfishness, to laziness, and to gluttony, wherever they were to be found.

PRICE OF BREAD.

In an article, published previous to the passing of the law for the exportation of corn, and for granting a bounty upon such exportation, an opinion was expressed, that every law of that kind was injurious to the community, every law restraining, or granting a premium upon, either the export or import of corn. The code of corn-laws and regulations present a mass of absurdities hardly to be equalled : and, what makes the matter worse, they are absurdities which are characteristic of a shallow brain. One would think they had resulted from the deliberations of

an assembly of shopkeepers and handicraftsmen. The nation has already paid dearly for those laws, to which no small portion of its present disgrace and danger may be fairly attributed, but it is very likely, that we shall soon experience effects more fatal than have ever heretofore been experienced from this cause. We have had three years of abundance, especially with regard to bread; and, it seems very probable, that the next year, beginning with September, will prove a year of what may, in this country, be called scarcity. It is now the middle of August, and there has been scarcely a fine day since reaping began. The wheat is, besides, much blighted. It is stated to be so all over the kingdom, and that the statement is correct with regard to two counties I can take upon myself to aver. The effect of this has already appeared in the sudden and very considerable rise in the price of bread, the quartern loaf having, in the space of six weeks, risen from 8½d. to 10d. That every day's rain will add to the price is certain. Wheat, were the weather now to become fair, must continue to rise for some time: bread must also rise; and, it would be by no means hazardous to suppose, that, before March next, the quartern loaf may sell for eighteen-pence. It becomes us, therefore, to consider by times what may be the consequences of scarcity, especially now that those who will feel the pressure are amply provided with arms, and have just received discipline enough to render them formidable to the state, should they unhappily be misled either by evil-minded persons or by their own wants. Scarcity is always accompanied with discontent in proportion to the sufferings which it creates, and, at this time, scarcity would be productive of uncommon suffering, because the previous abundance was uncommonly great, and, which is another important circumstance, was preceded by scarcity uncommonly severe. The mass of the people will never perform any more labour than is sufficient to yield them support in a way according with the customs of the country. The high wages of 1800 and 1801 having been kept up, the years 1802, 1803, and 1804, thus far, have been years of *comparative* ease, not to say of idleness. A rise in the price of provisions, without another corresponding rise in the price of labour, which cannot take place all at once, will make work scarce, not because there will be less of it to perform, but because more must be performed by one man in order to procure him support. It is not that "hands have been scarce" for three years past, but that provisions have been plenty. In times of scarcity we never hear of a want of labourers, but in times of plenty this want is a subject of continual complaint. Scarcity will, then, compel people to work harder than they lately have done; and how this will suit them, just at a time when other causes have contributed to confirm them in habits of idleness, it is not very difficult to foresee. They hate Buonaparte, and would, if put in the right way, defend their country against him; but, by the time that they have experienced half-a-dozen more premature alarms, the dangers of invasion will become an evil of magnitude much inferior to that of a scarcity of provisions. To talk to them philosophically upon the subject will be perfectly useless. Individual distress is but too frequently ascribed to the government, and when it becomes in any degree general, to expect that the government will not be looked to as the cause is to discover but very little knowledge of mankind. Considering, therefore, the critical state of the nation, the Minister should have been cautious how he adopted any measure that might afford a plausible pretext for making the monarchy answerable for the effects

of an unproductive season; he should have listened with great caution to the advice of contractors and corn-merchants, or to that other new race of beings who have sprung up from the dunghill of paper-money and who are called speculating farmers; yes, he should have listened to these persons with great caution, and even with distrust, when their object was to obtain a law evidently for the sole purpose of advancing their own interests, though the well-being of the whole nation should thereby be hazarded. Were I to allow that corn-laws, as they are quaintly termed, are at all necessary; and were it possible for me still further to allow, that, in times of plenty, it is wise for the people to tax themselves in order to give *premiums* for the exporting of the produce of their labour, I should then certainly say, that last Christmas would have not been an improper time for the passing of a law to open the ports for exportation; but, to pass such a law upon the eve of the harvest, and of a harvest, too, respecting the produce of which no very favourable opinion was entertained, was an act which, for reasons that need not be mentioned, I shall forbear to characterize, and indeed justly to characterize it would be no easy matter. The bill, upon its unexpected return from the House of Lords, was arrested in its operation till the 15th of November. It, therefore, never will, probably, operate at all except in an indirect way upon the store of the speculator, and directly upon the minds of the people, who, though they see whole fields of wheat blackened with the blight; though they see the rain fall day after day rotting the crop upon the ground, do still ascribe, and will continue to ascribe, the rise of bread to the law lately passed by Parliament at the instance of the minister. To an argument somewhat of this popular nature Mr. Pitt made a reply that showed him to be shockingly destitute of reflection upon the subject. During the few days that the bill lay before the Lords, wheat and bread had risen. This rise was attributed to the bill, by the gentlemen who opposed it, and it was fairly so attributed: it was a mere speculator's rise: the stock in hand assumed additional value the moment the bill had passed the House of Commons. Mr. Pitt replied, that there was an appearance that the harvest would be scanty, and that the rise ought to be attributed to that circumstance rather than to the bill before the House. But, if Mr. Pitt was sincere, how can we find an excuse for his persevering in the bill? While he asserted that corn was already "too low in price" and that it was necessary to prevent its sinking lower, though one could hardly approve of so crude and inconsiderate an assertion, one could not impeach his consistency; but, when he had discovered that the coming harvest was likely to be scanty, and when he contended that the price of wheat and bread had already begun to experience the effects of that cause, still to persist in passing a law, founded upon the existence of a supposed exactly opposite state of things, is what will, I am persuaded, meet with no apology except amongst the greedy speculators, whose purposes alone such a law, passed under such circumstances, was calculated to serve. The law is not, it is true, to go into operation till the middle of November; but it has already done mischief; it has already assisted the blight and the rain in raising the price of bread; and, which is still of more importance, it has laid the foundation for popular complaint against the government; for, though a single sack of corn should never be exported in consequence of this law, the people will ascribe to it a part, at least, of their hardships, and, at this moment, it is a general opinion amongst the common people, that ships are lying

in all our ports ready to take away the corn the moment the law begins to operate, and that the rise of bread is owing to the hoards that are forming preparatory to the 15th of November!—But the consequence the most dangerous of all, is that which may arise from the erroneous, though almost general opinion, that scarcity of provisions is inseparable from a state of war, an opinion that has been countenanced by far too many of those who are, or who ought to be, able to discover its fallacy. After the Bishop of London had expressed his approbation of the peace, *because* the people had endured nine years of war and three of famine, it was not astonishing to hear the people themselves drown all your complaints against the terms of the peace by bawling in your ears “peace and a large loaf!” while sentiments like those of the Rt. Rev. Prelate were repeated even to satiety from the benches of parliament, as well as from the pulpit, it was no wonder that “peace and plenty” became inseparable in the minds of the people; that they became the subjects of their toasts, their songs, and their allegories; no wonder that we saw, particularly amongst the base and stupid shopkeepers of London and Westminster, Peace represented by a vulgar greasy-looking woman holding a huge loaf in one hand and a foaming pot of porter in the other. The Addingtons turned this vulgar error to excellent account; they kept their places two years by the help of it, and, were not the monarchy and the country exposed to danger, it would be well now to let it work with all its force against their selfish and juggling successors. It would, however, be but a miserable satisfaction to see them overturned amidst the general ruin, and, therefore, I shall endeavour to show, that, as far as relates to the article of bread, at least, peace is not any more than war inseparable from plenty. When I touched upon this subject last (see page 516), I confined myself to the late peace and the present war. I shall now go back to the distance of half a century, giving the average price of the quarter loaf, in London, in each year.

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1793 - -	$7\frac{1}{4}d$	} WAR.	1801 to the end	} PEACE.		
1794 - -	$7\frac{1}{4}$		of Dec. -		$11\frac{1}{2}d$	
1795 - -	$10\frac{1}{2}$		1802 - -		$10\frac{1}{2}$	
1796 - 1	0		1803 up to the		$9\frac{1}{4}$	
1797 - -	8		end of April			
1798 - -	$8\frac{1}{2}$		1803 to the end		} WAR.	
1799 - -	$11\frac{1}{2}$		of Dec. -			$9\frac{1}{2}$
1800 - 1	5		1804 up to July			$8\frac{3}{4}$
1801 up to end	$6\frac{1}{2}$					
of Sept. 1						

It is said, and with truth, that the price of bread is not always, and in all cases, a satisfactory standard whereby to measure the value of money; but it is quite sufficient for the present purpose; for, if bread be cheap, the poor man's provision is not dear, and if bread be dear his provision cannot be cheap. In ancient times bread was emphatically styled the staff of life, and though modern inventions have enabled men, in certain cases, to dispense with it, yet, to the mass of mankind, to those who may be called the people of every civilized nation, it still is the staff of life. From the foregoing list of prices it will be seen, then, that war has not even the slightest tendency to enhance the cost of this first article of the poor man's subsistence; for, during three of the four wars of the last half century, including the present war, the average price of bread has been full as low, if not lower, than during the preceding peace, notwithstanding the constant depreciation of money. How senseless, then, is the cry of "peace and a large loaf!" How stupid or how base must those persons be who encourage that cry! And how anxious ought we to be to prevent the influence of such an error in the producing of another disgraceful peace! It will be perceived, that in about every six years there have been two years of scarcity, and we may reasonably suppose that two such years are now about to begin; at a most critical time they are indeed beginning, and if great wisdom be not displayed, on the part of those in power, the consequences may be fatal. It is not altogether certain, that a clamour for peace, and that an excuse for peace upon any terms, would be disagreeable to the minister; for, though it might be inconvenient for Mr. Pitt himself to make such a peace, he has shown us that he knows how to effect his purposes of that sort by proxy; and, those persons are very much mistaken who suppose, that the Doctor and his set, who are now acting just the same part that Mr. Pitt and his set acted during the year 1803, have so entirely broken with Mr. Pitt as to reject a reconciliation with the beneficent view of restoring peace and plenty to their country. In short, it appears by no means improbable, that, when the nation shall become heartily weary of this lingering war, and when to that weariness shall be added the discontent arising from the high price of provisions, we shall be transferred again to the care of the Addingtons, who, whatever may be thought to the contrary, will never be found in an opposition to the present ministry. Their pretexts for submitting to the enemy's terms would be, with very little variation, the same that they before made use of: it is far from certain that they would not regard an alarming scarcity as a very great blessing; and, therefore, it is necessary to forewarn the nation against the danger of again becoming their dupes; of again approving, from an erroneous notion as to the effects of war on the prices of provi-

sions, of a peace that shall add to the load of infamy heaped on their country by the treaty of Amiens. Mr. Pitt would desire nothing better than to hear a clamour for peace on any terms. A cry for "peace and plenty" is, perhaps, the very signal he is waiting for. It was not he who *declared* war; and it will not have been Mr. Addington who *conducted* it to the end: so that either of them has a loop-hole: a very narrow one indeed, but one that would serve their purpose extremely well, if they could once hear a clamour for peace upon any terms. This clamour, therefore, should be carefully avoided. Peace may be demanded at the hands of the minister; but, it should be demanded as an object which he ought to be able to obtain upon safe and honourable conditions, and the nation never should be inveigled to commit itself as to any concessions or sacrifices. The war is in the hands of the minister: it is for him, who has all our purses and our persons at his command, to end the war with honour to his Sovereign and to us: if he succeed, be his the applause due to a wise and upright statesman; but, if he fail, we shall not, I trust, again be satisfied with a childish representation of the "*difficulties* he has had to encounter," especially when we consider that they are difficulties, for the most part, of his own creating, and that such as are not of his own creating are amongst the common occurrences of life, and therefore ought not to be regarded as obstacles to the accomplishment of any object essential to the safety, honour, or dignity of the nation — Here I should stop, but there are two or three topics, closely connected with the price of bread, which I think so important in their nature, and of which I am so anxious to draw forth a discussion, that I shall take this opportunity of introducing them, though at the evident hazard of exhausting the patience of the reader. — As a standard of the value of money, the price of bread at any particular time is not satisfactory, because, as we have lately experienced, bread may be in price disproportionate to meat and other articles of subsistence; but, taking the average of a series of years, the price of bread is a standard sufficiently accurate for any practical purpose. Let us, then, see what has, according to this standard, been the progress of the depreciation of money.

Average price of the quartern loaf during the 10 years ending	s.	d.
with 1760	0	5 $\frac{3}{4}$
During 10 years ending with 1770	0	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
During 10 years ending with 1780	0	7
During 10 years ending with 1790	0	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
During 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ years ending in July, 1804	1	0

The observation that struck me in barely casting one's eye over the list, was, that 8 $\frac{3}{4}$, which was a price so low as to require the interference of Parliament and the offer of a bounty to export corn, was a price higher than ever was known, even in years of scarcity, previous to 1795! This being the case it was clear that money had *lately* depreciated in a proportion much greater than formerly; and hence it became an object of inquiry to know where the new proportion of depreciation began. By embracing, in the last average, a period of thirteen years and a half; the plentiful years of 1802 and 1803, and the still more plentiful half of the present year, are included in the calculation. This is giving too much advantage to the last stated average; but, it was best to bring the period down to the time when the minister declared that the price of corn was *too low*. The depreciation of money from 1750 to 1790 appears, accord-

ing to this standard, to have been gradual; and, notwithstanding all that has been said about the inadequacy of the price of bread as a standard, I am persuaded, that the proportion of depreciation, exhibited in the above-stated averages, will be found to correspond with other standards by which the degree of the depreciation of money has been determined. The depreciation during the last thirteen years and a half has, it will be perceived, been more than twice as great as during the preceding forty years. Money is not worth half so much as it was fifty years ago; and, indeed, this is a truth of which no man who was alive fifty years ago needs to be reminded. But, the important point is, that the far greater part of this depreciation has taken place within a few years; since the year 1790; since the establishment of the Sinking Fund, and since the consequent extension of the funding system, together with the inevitable increase of paper-money; but, with double strides has the depreciation advanced since the Bank has been screened from the just demands of its creditors; since the paper-money, though disgraced, has been made a *legal tender*; since the reciprocal connivance between the minister and the Bank has become apparent to all the world. If the stockholder has a mind to know what he has lost by the depreciation of money, he has only to look at the above averages of the price of bread, and he will at once perceive, that each shilling which he now receives in his dividends is worth just sevenpence halfpenny of the money which he bought stock with in 1790. He will perceive, that his 100 pounds is in fact reduced to within a trifle of 60, and that, of course, he is in reality receiving no more than three pounds a year for every hundred pounds which he deposited in the funds thirteen years ago. Nor has the loss come to an end: it is going on; and, if the system were to last another thirteen years, his hundred pounds would be reduced to 20, or, perhaps, to 10; for the depreciation proceeds, as we have seen, with an accelerated velocity. Is it not time, then, for fathers, mothers, guardians, and trustees to reflect upon the consequences of placing in the funds the fortunes of children, who, by the time they come of age, may probably not receive a shilling in the pound? But, long before the next thirteen shall have expired, the whole system will be blown to atoms even without any assistance whatever from extraneous causes. It contains within itself the seeds of its certain destruction: their growth may be quickened by war, or by any other circumstance, which, by adding to the taxes, adds to the quantity of paper-money; but grow they must, and their growth must produce the annihilation of the system, in spite of every measure that can be adopted by way of preventive.—Another topic which I could wish to see ably handled, is, the degree of effect which the increase of paper-money and the consequent facility of obtaining pecuniary accommodations, have in enhancing and keeping up the price of provisions, particularly bread, the materials for making which are of a nature to be held in hand for a long time, without damage and at little expense. Mr. Boyd and some others attributed, as Lord King observes, too powerful an effect to these causes. In 1801 I was of opinion that they had no effect at all of the sort attributed to them. But, I had just then left a country, which, though sufficiently stocked with paper-money, knew nothing of paper that was not, upon demand, convertible into specie, in which country, of course, pecuniary accommodation could not be extended to such a length as to enable the speculators to raise or to keep up the price of provisions. Mr. Howison and Mr. Foster have some good remarks upon this subject, but a more ample discussion of it

would be very desirable.—In plunging and groping about after adequate causes for the late scarcity, the wisacres of the board of Agriculture, with Lord Carrington at their head, fell upon two, which, at their suggestion, were moulded into the form of *Resolutions* by the Grand Juries of Yorkshire and other counties. These two were, the *want of a general enclosure bill*, and the *want of a fixed compensation to the clergy in lieu of tithes in kind!* It never entered into his Lordship's head, I'll warrant you, that the inundation of bank-paper had produced any effect at all, though he was, or had been, himself a Banker and even a maker of paper-money! As to a general enclosure bill, the idea discovered, in the person by whom it was conceived, a total ignorance of the laws and usages relative to landed property, whether public or private. Without a *revolution* as to property, the project was utterly impracticable; and in principle I am thoroughly convinced it was extremely impolitic, and still more unjust and oppressive. It would have swept a quarter of a million of people from the cottages to the poor-houses. The partial enclosure bills are frequently injurious enough in this way: the interests of the cottager are seldom thought of: the division is made according to the spiritual maxim impiously applied to the worst of temporal purposes; "to him who hath much more is given, and from him who hath nothing is taken even that which he hath;" and thus, that which for ages has been regarded as a paradox, is, by the effects of modern ingenuity, rendered a practical proposition. To know what the effects of enclosures and other agricultural schemes are, we have only to look at the amount of the poor-rates and at the number of the poor, both which have increased with the increase of enclosures; and, in those counties where the agricultural improvements, as they are called, have been pushed to the greatest extent, the agricultural population has diminished most, not *relatively*, but *positively* diminished, while the population of the country has, upon the whole, been increasing.—These are experimental truths, and because they are, they will not be attended to. Mr. Pitt, not content with projecting himself; not satisfied with a swarm of individual projectors, must needs organize a certain portion of them into a Board of Agriculture. The reports and other publications of this board will hereafter be preserved by curious men, as specimens of soæm foolery; but there will be found amongst them some of a very mischievous tendency, especially those which relate to the proposed "*compensation*," as it is called, for tithes in kind, which is neither more nor less than a proposition for seizing the revenues of the Church, and for making the Clergy stipendiaries of the state, or rather of the minister, just as the Constitutional Clergy in France were, during the short interval between the abolition of tithes and the total destruction of the monarchy. This was a pretty bold proposition for a "Board of Agriculture" to make, and when we consider who was at the head of the Board; when we further consider, that a proposition of the same kind was made by Sir Henry Mildmay in a speech early in 1801; and that Mr. Long, in his pamphlet upon the price of bread, points at the very same object as a remedy for the evil of scarcity; when we consider all this, it is impossible not to believe, that the project of abolishing the tithes originated with, or was approved of by, Mr. Pitt. It is, indeed, asserted, that, early in 1800, he had actually prepared a bill for that purpose, and that, though it was decidedly disapproved of by the then Attorney General, as being a most dangerous innovation, he proceeded so far as to submit it

to his majesty, whose decided disapprobation it also met with. The Clergy are all of them acquainted with the history of this project, and therefore when I hear Clergymen loud in the praise of Mr. Pitt, I cannot help regarding them as being much more intent upon furthering their own particular interests than those of the Church and of religion. These persons seem, by their conduct, to say: "So that I get a good salary for life, what need I care who pays it me?" Such Clergymen, and I hope they are few in number, I would beg leave to remind of the fate of the Clergy in France. Mr. Burke told them that they never would receive above three years salary, and they did not receive above two, the last of which was paid in assignats that had undergone a depreciation of 50 per centum. Sir J. Sinclair has expressed his approbation of the project for "commuting the tithes for *government securities*," and has cited the opinion of a person, who has pointed out the *advantages* that the Clergy as well as the laity would derive from such an arrangement. But, after the above exposition relative to the depreciation of money; little, I imagine, will need be said to convince the Clergy, that the proposed commutation would soon reduce them to beggary, and would not be long in levelling the Church establishment with the dust, and therein completing the work which Mr. Pitt began when he procured a law to be passed for alienating Church property in order to redeem the land-tax, a law not less unfair in its operation than unconstitutional in its principle, and aiming directly at the subversion of the Church of England! And yet there are clergymen of that Church who boast of being Pittites! But, even amongst the chosen twelve there was one Judas. —I have digressed so frequently and so widely that the reader must, I am afraid, have entirely lost sight of the object that ought principally to have been kept in view; namely, the ignorance which was discovered by the Grand Juries, the Board of Agriculture, and their abettors, in ascribing so much virtue to a general enclosure bill and to a commutation of the tithes. Fortunately no general enclosure bill has been passed, and no commutation of the tithes has taken place; yet corn has become cheap again, and not only has it become cheap, but *too* cheap, and so much too cheap, that the parliament has passed a law to raise taxes upon the people to defray the expenses of sending it out of the country! Where, then, was the necessity of enclosing all the commons and of commuting the tithes with a view of growing *more* corn? To represent the tithes as an impediment to agriculture, when it is well known that they have existed almost ever since the land was first tilled, requires no small portion of assurance; but, laying this point aside for the present, we hear Mr. Pitt now calling upon the parliament to pass a law for giving the farmers money to export their corn, because the land, notwithstanding the tithes, has produced *too much*; and, of course, if the general enclosure and the commutation of tithes were to cause more corn to be produced, we should have more money to pay in premiums to get the superabundance carried out of the country. —Nevertheless, if the quartern loaf should again rise to eighteen pence, I should not at all wonder to see a revival of these remedies, these state nostrums, especially the project of commuting the tithes, which would, I am afraid, be very popular; for the monied interest, which has ninety-nine hundredths of the press at its command, has succeeded in making the mass of the people believe, that the nobility and clergy, particularly the clergy, are their oppressors. The clergy are represented as wallowing in wealth,

while they have, in general, hardly enough to keep them alive. The paper-money system has placed the farmers above them, and their poverty begets poverty by forcing them to submit to compositions upon terms dictated by their grasping parishioners. Their tithes are represented as worth " fifty millions sterling," when it is well known that the whole of them together do not receive half a million annually, a sum far short of the aggregate annual income of ten loan-jobbers; and, what man of just sentiments can restrain his indignation, when he sees a minister making it a point of honour to keep faith with these loan-jobbers, while he can hardly withhold his clutches from plundering the clergy, *ten thousand* of whom have not so much to support them as the nation pays for the support of *ten* loan-jobbers! To maintain the more than Eastern magnificence of these leviathans of wealth seems, too, to be thought nothing of; nay, by the means of well-timed subscriptions, or some such device, they obtain applause and admiration for their generosity from the people, to whom they thus throw back hardly the fractional farthings upon the hundreds of thousands of pounds that they receive.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

(*Political Register, August, 1804.*)

The price of the quartern loaf having already risen to *a shilling*, I must take the liberty, though it should expose me to the charge of vanity, of again referring to the warning which was given to the minister in p. 516 of the present volume no longer than five weeks ago, when he was told, that if the corn-bill was persevered in, and if we should have a wet harvest, the quartern loaf would sell for a shilling before Christmas. That the bill here mentioned has had a considerable share in this sudden and alarming rise there can be no doubt; because, the moment it was passed, it became, and it continues to be, an inducement for the speculators in corn to withhold it from the market, which they are enabled to do by the facility which the paper-money system affords them of obtaining discounts and of postponing the dates of the demands upon them for payment. That, finally, all their corn must come to market, and that they will be ruined, if they keep it back too long, is certain; but, the knowledge of these facts will, in the mean time, be no consolation to the suffering people, nor will it afford the government any security against the effects of those discontents which scarcity never has failed, and never will fail, to excite. In my last article upon this subject, I expressed a wish to see the degree of this influence of paper-money upon the price of provisions, in times of scarcity, ascertained; and I spoke of the works of Mr. Foster and Mr. Howison. Speaking from memory, I mistook Mr. Foster's work for that of Mr. Parnell, who has made a quotation from Mr. Malthus, and has added thereto some very useful remarks. I still find, that neither of these writers affords the information to be wished for as to the *degree* of this dangerous influence; but, Mr. Howison has laid down the principle in a manner so satisfactory to my mind, that I am induced to believe that those, who have not had an opportunity of perusing his excellent pamphlet, will thank me for the extract I am now about to make from it:—

“ In articles of necessity, when limited in quantity, the distress may be
“ carried to a still greater degree by means of paper credit, or paper
“ money. The consumption of articles of luxury, or even of convenience
“ when the price is high, may be deferred until the price becomes suit-
“ able. But in articles of necessity that cannot be done. They must be
“ had as long as within the power of the user, at whatever rate. Any
“ means, which enable the possessor of such commodities in times of
“ scarcity, to withhold the articles from market, enable him to raise the
“ price just as high as he may choose, or as the last shilling of the user
“ can reach. Discounting of bills, in the late scarcity, enabled corn-
“ dealers to relieve the demands upon them for payment of prices, and
“ to feed the markets just as their avarice dictated, and thereby must
“ have added greatly to the distress in the dearth. By a speculation in
“ rum, founded upon discounted bills, it was raised to three prices,
“ which limited the consumption so much as to accumulate the quantity
“ beyond the power of the speculators. The consequence was, the ruin
“ of the speculators, and an after distress to the grower of the article,
“ arising from the glut. In this instance, discounted bills equally pro-
“ duced ruin to the adventurer, as in the diminished consumption it
“ caused an injury to the planter, to trade and to the revenue. By the
“ command of fictitious money in paper, the same thing may be done,
“ and is done, more or less, in every article. The Bank Directors, by
“ withholding, or pouring upon, the public paper money, may raise or
“ lower prices as they please, so long as the public have no check upon
“ them, by demanding the conversion of their paper into value. No
“ person, who buys during an increased circulation, can sell, during a
“ diminished circulation, without loss, if not ruin. By the restraining
“ law, nothing seems to be left with the public in self-defence against
“ such consequences short of the absolute rejection of paper money in
“ the first instance; for violent measures always give rise to severe, if
“ not to violent, remedies. Gold, the general standard of money in
“ society, is not subject to such abuse, and cannot be made the means of
“ such irresistible distress to individuals. It is as much beyond the re-
“ straint of power, as it is proof against the devices of private fraud and
“ of public deception. Fortunately for mankind, however, there are
“ times and situations, in which the prices of necessary commodities
“ cannot be influenced by the operations in money. Among the burning
“ sands in the deserts of Arabia, where there is little or no water, the
“ last sixpence might be extorted for a drink of water; but, on the banks
“ of the Nile, it is impossible to bring in ordinary circumstances any
“ price upon it, the quantity there being so much greater than the oc-
“ casion for it; and still water is of equal utility to the animal economy
“ in both places. Corn is now become in such plenty, from the late favour-
“ able seasons, that the fictitious state of paper money cannot influence
“ it; notwithstanding the depreciation of money, that article has fallen
“ back in price. Animals being longer in attaining maturity, butcher’s
“ meat cannot be so soon supplied, and, not being in such quantity, it is,
“ like most other articles of luxury, kept up in price upon the scale of
“ depreciated money.”—Then follows his conclusion, as expressed in the
“ words which have been chosen for the motto of the present sheet, and
“ which conclusion I take to be incontrovertible. The degree, however,
“ remains to be ascertained. The task would, probably, be very difficult
“ for persons possessing infinitely more information and talent than I can

pretend to; but, that the degree is not inconsiderable may, I think, be fairly presumed for the rise which has now taken place, and which is an increase of nearly one-half of the former price, in the short space of five weeks; an increase by no means to be attributed entirely to the prospect of a scanty harvest, but to the combined causes of real threatening scarcity, of the influence of a paper-money not convertible into specie, and of the act of Parliament recently passed for granting a premium on the exportation of corn. For the sole purpose of passing this law the late session of Parliament, already protracted to nearly eight months, was protracted a week longer, and was actually passed in the face of an acknowledgment, on the part of the minister, that there was a prospect of a scanty crop, and that that prospect had already, previous to the passing of the law, produced a rise in the price of bread! Call you this wisdom? Call you this prudence? Call you this man a "safe politician?" But this is only another instance of the indifference which Mr. Pitt feels with respect to any consequence to the public when compared with his own interest or ambition. Every debate is, with him, conducted upon *party* views. If he gave way upon the subject of the corn-bill, he lost some little of his consequence, and, perhaps, some few of his votes, rather than which the whole nation might perish. He was told, in opposition to the bill, that it had already caused a rise in the price of corn, and that this effect might become particularly injurious at the eve of a harvest which wore an unpromising aspect. Oh, oh! says he, this is a fine catch for me! Up he got, therefore, and insisted that the gentleman's argument made nothing against the bill, because, the prospect of the harvest being bad, the rise which had taken place in the price of corn ought to be attributed to that prospect, and not to the bill. This, with his manner of stating it, was quite a clever thing, and would not fail to bring a triumphant smile upon the faces of those profound statesmen and legislators by whom he is surrounded. But, as was before observed, he could not deny the enchanting effect of the bill, without acknowledging that the prospect of the harvest was bad, and to such a degree as already to have caused a rise in the price of corn; and, who is there that will attempt to justify him for having, with the knowledge of this fact, persevered in passing the bill? This is the act for which he is censurable, and highly censurable. The nation will, perhaps, owe more calamity to this one instance of his love of triumph in debate, of his passion for domineering, than to whole years of foreign hostility. —The high prices will occasion an increase of the paper-money, from the same cause that a similar increase is produced by every additional tax: the commodity being raised in nominal value, there requires, of course, a greater quantity of circulating medium to move it from hand to hand. The increase of paper-money will cause a further diminution in its value, and this depreciation will produce a further rise in the price of provisions, or will, at least, prevent the price from falling back to its former state. And thus, very probably, will the corn-bill have contributed towards the producing of troubles and mischiefs of which it is impossible to see the end. —A correspondent, whose letter comes from a town in Hampshire, says I am mistaken as to the state of the prices of labour. His words are these: "You are certainly misinformed with respect to the prices of labour. They have been reduced according to the prices of corn, and as low as they were previous to the great scarcity. As provisions become dear, they will rise again without any difficulty. They are always kept

“ in proportion to the value of the bushel of corn ; and the farmers, on “ the one hand, and the men themselves on the other, take care to lower “ or raise them continually.” Now, with due submission to a person who speaks so positively, I venture to state, that if this be the case in the country, it is not so in the town ; and, I believe, it will not be denied, that journeymen tradesmen, who can remove from master to master with the greatest facility, and who have besides (thanks to the countenance which Mr. Pitt and Parliament have given to benefit clubs) funds to maintain such as are thrown out of work by their demands of higher wages ; I think it will not be denied, that these persons are more likely to keep their wages up to a level with the price of bread than the country labourers are, who, for the most part, cannot quit their parishes, and would, in almost every instance, find it very difficult to quit their masters. That the farmers may not have reduced the rate of their men’s labour I will not insist, but even that they could not do all at once ; and, as to the men’s raising their wages according to the rise in the price of the bushel of corn, I would ask my correspondent whether he really means to say, that the country-labourer’s wages has, within these six weeks, received an increase of one-half of its former amount ? The bread has, during that space, risen from $8\frac{1}{4}d.$ to $1s.$, but, I am afraid that my correspondent will find, that no addition whatever has been made to the wages of the labourer. That they will receive an addition in time, there can be no doubt ; but it will come very slowly, and will be yielded to nothing less than that sort of necessity which bears down all resistance : in short, the labourers and their children must be deprived of every thing but bread, and must want even a sufficient quantity of that, before their wages will take any considerable rise. The interval is a season of suffering, of consequent discontent, and, if care be not taken, of great danger to the State, especially when we consider the effect which has been produced by that most injudicious, that mad measure, the corn-bill, and when we cast our eye over the multitudes, into whose hands the wisdom of the minister has put arms and ammunition. — With such a prospect before us, it behoves the minister to think betimes of means of prevention ; and not to stay till the danger is at our doors, and then tell us “ there is not time to deliberate ;” not to bring us into a state which will afford an excuse for the application of one of his desperate remedies ; a dose of his horse-physic ; one of his potent state nostrums. It is now more than a year ago that he was explicitly warned of the danger of scarcity united with his volunteer system ; not a month during the whole twelve has past without a repetition of the warning : the danger is now approaching, and, on his head be the consequences ! Be his conduct what it may, however, we must not neglect our duty in this dangerous season. Every one should, according to his means, encourage the people to bear the calamity of the times with fortitude ; to keep always in their view the important truth, that war does not tend to enhance the price of provisions ; and, above all things, to check every attempt to excite a prejudice against the persons engaged in the growing, the preparing, or the vending of bread ; for, let it never be forgotten, that amongst the charges of farmers, corn-dealers, millers, and bakers, will always be included the *risks* of trade. For this reason I cannot help regarding as very censurable, the following paragraph of a Portsmouth paper, of the 18th instant : “ We exceedingly lament in stating, that “ the price of Bread will increase here on Monday next 4d. per gallon,

“ which will make it 1s. 10d. Flour, which sold last week for 52s. per sack, the farmers enhance this week, to 53s.” Why the farmers? The farmers, like every body else, sell their goods for as much as they can; and are they, merely because they deal in wheat, to be pointed out as objects of public hatred? The harsh epithets bestowed upon speculators in corn or meal are equally unjust. To speculate in those articles is a trade, and though in consequence of the paper-money system, it is a trade which, in certain cases, is extremely injurious to the community, yet the persons who follow the trade cannot be blamed for making as much by it as possible; the livelihood of themselves and their families depends upon their success in this trade, and therefore it is as unreasonable to blame their speculations as it would be to blame a blacksmith for shoeing people’s horses. As to the *system*, indeed, which, after having made every thing else an object of gambling, has, at last, set the staff of life upon the cast of the dye, it is certainly an object of abhorrence; but that abhorrence should not be extended to any individual or any class. The same may be said of Bank-Directors and all the inferior tribe of paper-money makers, who, though they are somewhat more closely connected with the minister of the day, do, nevertheless, only follow a trade which is sanctioned by law, and of the mischiefs which that trade produces, they experience, perhaps, rather more than their share. Finally, we should avoid, on this score, all harsh reproaches against even the minister himself, who never was aware of the destructive tendency of his system of finance, and who for his own sake would now apply a remedy were it in his power. Besides, all he has done has been sanctioned by the different parliaments to whom his projects have been submitted; and, if he has produced mischief without measure, his associates are not few.

THE BUDGET OF 1805.

CONSOLIDATED FUND—TAXES—DEBT—LOANS, RENTS, AND LEASES.

This word always puts one in mind of the contents of the thing, of which, in its literal sense, it is the representative; and, upon no occasion, that I recollect, has this idea pressed itself forward with more force than at present.—Every year certain expectations are held forth; and every year they are disappointed. But, if the last year’s promises are broken, ample amends is made by the new ones, which never fail to exceed the former, whether as to magnitude or solemnity.—Upon a complete view of the financial state of the country it would be useless to enter until the whole of the annual accounts were laid before parliament; but, the Budget, taking its statements, as to the past, for truth, enables us to settle a point or two, with respect to which there has been some dispute.—The art of *financiering* consists principally in multiplying and confusing accounts, till, at last, no one has courage to undertake an examination of them. The way, therefore, to detect a financier of the Pitt school, is, to fix upon some one point, and that, too, a point as simple as possible in itself, and that will not very easily admit of being disfigured and confused. When my attention was first attracted to the subject of

finance, it appeared to me, that a gross deception was played off upon the people annually; but, an annual exposition of every little wheel, peg and wire in the immense machine, would have been an endless task. I, therefore, fixed upon one single point, namely, the *Surplus of the Consolidated Fund*, and, upon this point I have steadily followed the "two first financiers in the world" (as the *Sun* and the *Oracle* call them), from the month of December 1802 to the present day.

But, first of all, in order to render what I have to say intelligible, it may be necessary to explain what is meant by the words, *Consolidated Fund*. Who would not imagine, that it was a national resource already realized and set apart? In the common acceptation of the word *Fund*, it means something collected together. When we talk of a fund for the purpose of defraying any expense, we never suppose it to depend upon contingencies. If a man tells us that he has formed a fund for a certain object, we think him to mean that he has got so much money together; and, that there he keeps it apart for that special object. With this notion in their minds, the people, when they hear talk of the Consolidated Fund, think that the nation has a certain great fund, or stock purse; and, when they hear talk of the *surplus* of this fund, they think that the fund has grown beyond the demands upon it, and that they are in a fair way of becoming as rich as Jews. Whether any of them ever imagine, that they shall live to see the day when the overflowings will be distributed amongst them is more than I can say; but, that some of them, and those political writers, too, regard the consolidated fund as intended to defray all the expenses of the nation, will appear from the following passage of the *Morning Herald*, once before quoted. "From the official account of the income and charges of the year (1803), it will be seen, that the income amounted to 31,862,961*l.*, whilst the charges are only 26,700,533*l.*, leaving a balance in favour of the country of more than 5 millions, a circumstance without example in the whole of our financial history!" And, indeed, who can blame people for adopting such notions? Why are not the accounts of the nation stated like the accounts of individuals? Why are words and even whole sentences to have a meaning, when applied to national accounts, different from that which they have when applied to the accounts of individuals? What is it that constitutes *cant*? And, what are the purposes for which *cant* is used?

Who would ever imagine, that by the Consolidated Fund, was meant the money annually received at the Exchequer for all the permanent taxes of the kingdom: or, in other words, with an exception not worth noticing here, the whole income of the nation, war taxes not excepted? This *fund*, as it is called, is, by several acts of parliament, appropriated to the paying of the interest upon the national debt, the expenses of the civil list, and the pensions and salaries granted by Parliament; and what remains is called the *surplus* of the consolidated fund; which surplus, be it observed, is all that there is, except the war taxes, wherewith to meet the expenses of the army, the navy, the ordnance, and the miscellaneous charges, which four heads amount this year to 43,000,000*l.* sterling, while the famous *surplus* amounts to only 1,200,000*l.*, leaving, of course, 41,000,000*l.* to be raised by war taxes and by loans; and, accordingly we see, that 16,000,000*l.* in war taxes are counted on, and we have seen a loan made for 20,000,000*l.* Why then confuse and puzzle men by talking about a *fund* and a *surplus*? "Oh!" say the people of the

'Change, "but this fund is a very important thing. It is appropriated, "by acts of parliament, to the payment of the interest of the public debt: it is sacred and cannot be touched. The stockholder is thus "secured by the law. Let come what will; let who will go unpaid, he "must be paid." What a farce is this! Just as if any one would, or could pay the stockholders, if there were not wherewith to pay the army and the fleet! Yet does the mere notion, absurd as it is, prop up the faith of many; or, at least, amongst other notions, inspired by similar means, it tends to that end. The worst of it is, that this sort of faith is of a nature exactly the opposite to that of faith in the religious sense of the word; for, it is the property of the latter to enable men to smile in their last moments, whereas, the longer the former is entertained, the more horrid will be the catastrophe.

Having, as well as the confusion of the statements will permit me, described the nature of the consolidated fund and its surplus, I have now to beg the reader's attention to the several estimates relative to the latter, made, at different times, by "the *two first* financiers in the world." In December, 1802, Mr. Addington estimated the future surplus of the consolidated fund, without the imposing of any new permanent taxes, at 7,845,000*l.* a-year; but in order to keep within bounds, he took it, in his ways and means, *only* at 6,500,000*l.* Upon the subject of this estimate, I said, "I assert, that, if the accounts of last year be correct, "the surplus for this year will amount to only 4,974,654*l.* Here, Sir, "we are at issue. Time alone can finally decide between us." Time did decide: the year ended, and the surplus was only 5,162,533*l.* Proving the gross fallacy of "the first financiers'" estimate, the correctness of mine, within 187,879*l.*, which, in such a sum as that in question, is hardly worth notice.

The Budget, as it is very properly called, for last year, was brought forward in April, when Mr. Addington called upon the parliament to vote (and that they did so it is hardly necessary to say) 5,000,000*l.* as the surplus of the consolidated fund for the year 1804. But, we must take down his words here. "I now come to the surplus of the consolidated "fund, which I estimate at 5,000,000*l.* I shall be ready, *when called* "upon, to state, why I do not take it at so large an amount as in the "last year, and why it may be *fairly* taken at 5,000,000*l.* The House "is aware, that the produce of the consolidated fund, for the last year, "was calculated at 6,500,000*l.*, but, *in fact*, it realized only 5,162,533*l.* "In five quarters it had produced 6,100,000*l.*, but in the three quarters "following it fell below what I estimated it at. I see no reason to *im-* "pute blame to myself for having, upon these grounds, called upon the "House to vote 6,500,000*l.* I detailed my reasons to the House, and "the House approved of them !!!"* Thus, *silence* was, as indeed it ought to be, when accompanied with an affirmative vote, construed to mean approbation. A useful hint for those, who are disposed to suffer money votes to pass as mere matters of course!

Another year has now terminated. From the moment the account of the last year's permanent taxes appeared, I ventured to state, that the surplus of the consolidated fund for last year would not exceed 2,000,000*l.* I was deceived, for the other "*first financier* in the world" now has told us, that it produced 2,200,000*l.*!!! In doing this, however, he kindly

* See Parl. Debates, vol. ii. p. 353.

endeavoured to cover the blunder of his brother financier, by attributing the deficit "to causes which he could not but consider as *temporary*, as it proceeded, in a great measure, from stock in hand, &c. &c." But, the misfortune is, that this is no more than a tame repetition of the excuses made by the other "*first* financier in the world," who, in his farewell budget-speech above quoted, said, "I could show, *beyond doubt*, " that the deficiency from the amount voted, has arisen from the *suspension of the payment of certain duties*, and the increase of draw-backs, the amount of which may be *fairly* added to the surplus of the consolidated fund. I therefore, look forward to a probable amount *next year* (that is "to say the year just expired) of 5,000,000*l.*"* Now, however, we find, that, in spite of the addition of these suspended payments, so "*fairly*" added, the 5,000,000*l.* have dwindled down to 2,200,000*l.* as was, at the time, predicted. — Mr. Pitt has now estimated the surplus for the present year at 4,000,000*l.*; but, unless the war taxes fall off in a proportionate degree, or, unless money depreciates still more rapidly than it now does, I venture to predict that there will be *no surplus at all*, other than what may arise from new taxes, or war taxes brought into the consolidated fund, and thereby leaving a larger sum to be provided by loan. — Here, then, we have a quite satisfactory proof of Mr. Addington's skill and foresight, when, in such lofty strains, he congratulated the parliament and the nation upon the "*growing* produce of the consolidated fund." The speech, here alluded to, he afterwards published in a pamphlet. He said, that his statements were made upon "the most mature deliberation;" that he had "carefully and minutely examined all the facts upon which his estimates were founded;" and, let it be observed, that, in the next month of June (1803), after the war had begun, he repeated his statement in this respect, and said: "The *growing* produce of the consolidated fund is likely to *increase*." He accordingly included it in his ways and means at 6,500,000*l.* I beg the reader not to forget that this was *after* the war had begun; and, that, therefore, no excuse can be grounded on a change in the situation of the country. — *Grow* the surplus does, indeed, and very fast too; but, as the old women say of stunted children, it is downwards, like a cow's tail. First it was estimated at 7,845,000*l.* At its first start it reached 6,500,000*l.*; but this was a sort of Midsummer shoot. The next spring brought it to 5,100,000*l.*; and the next, to 2,200,000*l.* Observe, too, that this is the progress of the *falling off* in the *permanent taxes*, amounting, at the end of two years, to more than 5,000,000*l.* in the year, to which must be added more than 1,000,000*l.* for depreciation of money, according to Mr. Pitt's own declaration, during his speech upon the civil list.† — Upon the subject of the *loan*, it is impossible to refrain from observing, that we hear now again all the set phrases of congratulation, which we have heard repeated in every budget speech for the last fourteen years. It is always such an *excellent bargain* for the public! One may here exclaim with Condorcet: "*qu'il est bête cet être moral qu'on appelle publique!*"‡ It is, too, always a *bargain equally excellent* for the loan-jobbers! Mr. Addington never failed to say so, and his brother in finance has now repeated the saying in terms stronger than ever. But a trifling circumstance seems to have been forgotten, namely, that during this war we were to have *no loans*, at

* Parl. Debates, vol. ii. p. 353.

† Ibid. 905.

‡ "What a fool that being is that they call 'the public!'"

least not exceeding 6,000,000*l.* a year ! This is another case which calls on us to recur to their very words. "The committee," said Mr. Addington in his budget speech of 13th June, 1803, "will perceive, that the great object I have in view is, to raise a large part of the supplies within the year. The extent, to which I wish to carry this principle is this, that there shall be *no increase whatever of the public debt during the war.* In the first place it will be necessary to ascertain the probable amount of the annual charges during the war, and then to make provision for carrying on a vigorous and even *protracted* contest, without making any greater addition to the public debt than what will be annually liquidated by the Sinking Fund. The annual charge of the war, unless demands should be made upon us by the intervention of foreign powers who may wish to make a common cause with us, I think, *will not exceed 26,000,000*l.** I do not deny that this is a great, an enormous, sum ; but certainly not greater than the value of the object for which we have to contend. If, then, the House think proper to adopt the measure I am now proposing ; if I am right in my estimate of the growing produce of the consolidated fund, which I have considered at about 6,500,000*l.*, and if my calculation of the annual taxes be correct, which I have estimated at 12,500,000*l.* but, which, for this purpose, I will only take at 10,000,000*l.*, there will only remain a sum of 6,000,000*l.* to be borrowed, which will be more than covered by the sinking fund, which now *produces* considerably more than 6,000,000*l.* The *growing* produce of the *consolidated fund* is also likely to increase, unless we are again visited by those calamities by which the country has been afflicted. If, then, my calculations are correct, we shall be able to meet a war expenditure of 26,000,000*l.*, without any increase to the public debt, an object so desirable that no difference of opinion can be entertained upon the subject. I trust, therefore, this system will be adopted. It is one which has been before tried, and of which the effect is known. It has inspired confidence at home, and created *respect abroad.* But, the pecuniary effect is not all. It will be a difference in another respect : the difference between a temporary and a permanent tax. It will have another effect also : that of *convincing* the enemy of this country, that it is *hopeless for him to contend with our finances ;* that it is not in his power to affect us in that respect. It will have a still further effect ; that of *convincing* the other powers of Europe, that they may safely join with us in a common cause of resistance against the common enemy ; for, that the resources of this country are such as to give full security for the punctual discharge of any engagement it may enter into, and this is an object for which I have in view some *visions.*"

Now, all this is proved to have been false. Completely false. The surplus of the consolidated fund has continued to *decrease* ; the war taxes have not produced more than *half the amount* which they were, by this time, to have produced ; instead of 6,000,000*l.* a year, we borrowed 10 millions in 1803 ; in 1804, we borrowed 14,000,000*l.* ; and, this year we have already borrowed 22,500,000*l.* ; the war expenses, instead of 26,000,000*l.* a year, are already risen to 43,000,000*l.*, while 5,000,000*l.* only are pretended to be provided for subsidies, and while nothing has been voted by parliament on account of those visitations of scarcity, to which "the *first* financier in the world" thought proper to allude. At the time that the above flattering picture was drawn, even at an earlier

period, the following opinion was given in the Register: "We cannot estimate the total of the national expenditure of the present, and of every future year, even of this sort of warfare, at less than 60,000,000*l.* Therefore, however the man of finance may defer his loans; by whatever act he may hide from our eyes the path to bankruptcy, the loans must come at last, or, in one shape or another, the national debt, or rather the amount of the interest annually to be paid by the people on account of that debt, must go on increasing." The same was said, and, perhaps sooner, by Mr. Johnstone, whose predictions relative to the expenses of the war and the amount of the loans are now all completely verified.—The circumstance, then, that of making no addition to the debt during the war; the circumstance which was to work such wonders, that was to inspire confidence at home and respect abroad, that was to convince our enemy of the hopelessness of a contest against our finances, has proved an abortion. What our enemy may think upon the subject, must, perhaps, be left, to be discovered of those, at whose disposal the parliament leaves about 200,000*l.* a year of secret service money; but, what he says we know as well as they. "If," says REGNAULT to the Tribune, "you draw a parallel between the finances of the two states, you will find upon the opposite shore new expenses accumulating upon the expenses already immense; of a nation to whom a million and a half sterling was yearly necessary in an ordinary war, and who, in the present war, stands in need, for the first time, of a levy en masse; of a levy that costs it hundreds of millions of livres. It provides for that sum, it is true: but by goading the present, and by swallowing up the future, by resolving to fund its debt, swelled by the abuse of its only resource, loans. On our side, our numerous armies have been always the cause of our greatest expense; and their maintenance brings with it but an inconsiderable addition that is not made to bear upon a foreign country. The exposition, which will be shortly laid before you, will apprise you, that our territorial resources have provided for every thing; and that, instead of adding to our debt, during these two years of war, our sinking fund has begun efficaciously to operate for its extinction. What France has done, she may continue to do for 30 years, and has only to ask of Heaven that the sun may continue to shine, the rain to fall upon her fields, and the ground fecundize the seed deposited in it. Ten years more of war would make no addition to our debt; ten years more of war would add four milliards to the debt of England. Let her not forget, however, that if public credit be a powerful and formidable weapon, that the bow too strongly bent, snaps in the hand that holds it, and leaves naked and defenceless him by whom it is employed. Our fleets at Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort, have annexed to them armies resolved to pass the ocean with them. Our flotillas are ready to depart with these proud sons of war, who know no impediments, because they have surmounted all that, before them, had astonished the most intrepid. Let us continue to keep on our coasts soldiers inhabiting camps instead of barracks, and become intrepid sailors as well as brave warriors. Let the people of England in the meantime, arm, agitate, fatigue, exhaust, and discourage themselves. Let our resources and our revenue suffice for our expenses, and let there be no want but that of some extraordinary resources which the riches of our country ensure to us. In England, let the interest paid to loan-holders absorb, and exceed all possible means to pay those levies en

“masse which exhaust the nation without defending it: let this state of things prolong itself, and let the English Cabinet state the advantages that result from this situation, from which it derives equal danger and shame.” If, then, the enemy be “convinced,” as Mr. Addington said he would, of the hopelessness of a contest against our finances, it must be allowed, that he very well understands the art of disguising his conviction; for, the projects of invasion apart, he *seems* to be fully convinced, that a very few years of war must reduce our finances to the last extremity; and, if such be his conviction, I am afraid, that, *if the present system be pursued* (mark the qualification) he is but too good a judge of our situation. In short, and to draw to a close of these remarks upon the loan, it is, in my opinion, now clearly established, that, as long as the interest, without a deduction greater than what is laid in the shape of tax upon other income, continues to be paid upon the national debt, so long, whether in war or peace, *we must continue annually to make loans.** This is the sentence now irrevocably passed upon the nation; and, the only question for the fund dealers, is how long she can go on borrowing. That she must continue to make loans, if she continue to pay the interest upon the debt, who, that but casts his eye upon her expenditure, as compared with her income, can doubt. Her whole expenditure now, for a year, is 70,000,000*l.* Next year it will be 80,000,000*l.*, or very nearly approaching it. But, suppose it to remain at 70,000,000*l.*; her revenue does not surpass 45,000,000*l.*, even with the additional taxes. Suppose the war to continue five years longer; the annual amount of the *interest of the debt* will be nearly 40,000,000*l.* Where are the taxes to come from? The whole permanent revenue does not at this time, and will not this present year, amount to more than about 30,000,000*l.* Will the war taxes be rendered permanent? What, then, is to be done? But suppose the war to end with the present year. We well know that it requires a year’s war expenses to wind-up; and that would raise the annual interest of the debt to 30,000,000*l.*, absorbing the whole of the permanent revenue. Again I ask, then, what is to be done, unless we render the war taxes permanent? But, even that would not do; for who is there foolish enough to suppose, that 15,000,000*l.* a year, allowing the war taxes to yield so much, would suffice for the maintenance of a peace establishment such as that, for which, in future, we should have to provide? Never more, therefore,

* The system of making annual loans went on (with the exception of the years 1816 and 1817) regularly till the year 1819, when “*Peel’s Bill*” was passed, binding the country to pay the interest of its debt in gold. The loans raised from the time of the above prediction were as follows:—

A. D.		A. D.	
1804	14,500,000	1813	6,000,000
1805	22,500,000	1814	27,000,000
1806	20,000,000	1814	24,000,000
1807	14,200,000	1815	18,000,000
1808	10,500,000	1815	36,000,000
1809	14,600,000	1818	3,000,000
1810	12,000,000	1818	27,272,000
1811	4,981,300	1819	12,000,000
	12,000,000	1819	12,000,000
	6,789,625		
1812	22,500,000		

This statement we take from PEBBER’S “*Taxation, Debt, &c. of the British Empire*,” p. 246, and Table annexed.—ED.

while we continue to pay the interest upon the debt, shall we see a year pass over our heads without the government being compelled to make a new loan. These loans will be constantly adding to the debt; a circumstance of no importance, if it was not attended with that of a constantly increasing amount of *the interest*, which the people will be annually called on to pay in taxes. I am aware, that money will continue to depreciate, because it is quite impossible, that, while the funds last, the paper should ever be replaced by a currency of intrinsic value; and, I am also aware, that, as the interest of the debt will, of course, be paid in this depreciated money with an adherence to the nominal amount, the real amount to be drawn from the people will not increase to the same extent as the nominal amount; but, the increase of the real amount must still go on very rapidly; for, whenever the depreciation begins to be so considerable as to counteract the effect of the increase of the interest upon the debt, away goes the bubble in the twinkling of an eye.

So much for loans. The *new taxes* next demand a few remarks. A tax, supposing it to be unobjectionable in other respects, is good in proportion to its productiveness compared with the expenses of collection; and, in this light, the tax upon letters is excellent, because the expenses of the Post-office must be nearly the same, whether there be a tax collected or not. As to the additions made to this tax, they cannot be complained of, seeing that they have by no means kept pace with the depreciation of money, and that, therefore, people will not, in *reality*, now pay for their letters at so high a rate as they did twenty years ago. According to the *scale* system, however, it is hard to conceive any thing more unfair than the letter-tax. In imposing the tax on servants, on horses, on dogs, on windows, &c. care is taken (with what wisdom I do not pretend to say) to raise the tax upon each dog &c. in a certain proportion to the number of dogs kept by any one person; but, the letter-tax is a perfect leveller, making a labourer, who only receives one sheet of brown paper in a year to let him know that his son or daughter is alive, pay just as much as is, for one letter from the same distance, imposed upon a loan-jobber, under whose dispatches the mail-horses come daily sweating from every part of the kingdom. I do not speak of this as a hardship upon the labourer, but mention it merely to show, how idle it is to pretend to regulate taxation upon principles like that of the *scale*. I was glad to hear Sir Robert Buxton propose the abolition of the privilege of franking; not because I agree with him; but because the proposition and the sentiments by which it was accompanied, must certainly be considered as an earnest of the honourable baronet's conduct with respect to those who may be, at any time, proved to have been guilty of robbing the public.

The tax upon draught-horses has been censured, and it is, to be sure, consummately ridiculous to tax implements of industry with one hand, while a bounty for the encouragement of husbandry (which bounty comes out of the taxes) is held out in the other! But, as to the tax itself, there does not appear to me to be any objection against it, which would not equally well apply to all the rest of the assessed taxes. What is it to the farmer whether he pays the tax for his windows or for his horses? Light in his house is as necessary as horses are in his fields. Besides, where does the tax finally fall? Is it not evident that it falls upon the consumer of bread and meat? Is it not evident, that, in supporting it, the farmer will only share, in a very fair and exact proportion, with every other class

of people? The apprehensions, therefore, of that patriotic and pains-taking gentleman, Sir Robert Buxton, that the tax will turn arable fields into meadows (with or without the help of moisture), are, I trust in God, entirely groundless!

Whether the additional tax upon salt be particularly objectionable, or not, must depend upon its produce compared with the expense of collection, or upon some circumstance other than that of salt being one of the first articles of the necessaries of life, and, of course, forming part of the consumption in the family of every poor man; which is the only objection that I have yet heard urged against the tax upon it. If this objection be good, will it not bear equally strong against the tax on beer and on the things of which beer is made? I shall be told, perhaps, that while the rain and the dews fall and the earth teems with springs, men *may* live without beer, and that women and children *may* live without milk. They *may*; and so they *may* without salt, as the American Indians now do by choice. Nay, they *may* live without bread. But *will* they? And, are not bread and milk and butter and cheese and meat taxed? Yes, and that too very heavily in the taxes on land, houses, windows, and income; taxes which seem, in general, to be regarded as falling exclusively upon the rich. When we recollect that, ever since the system of taxation began in this country, the imposers of taxes have constantly professed to tax the rich as much, and the poor as little, as possible; and when we see, that, at the end of a hundred years' taxing, the rich are richer and the poor poorer than ever; when such is the evidence before us, is it not astonishing, that we should still be the dupes of those who, by laying taxes immediately upon the rich, profess to *spare* the poor? Such persons however, to give them their due, are in general, deceived themselves, as well as the deceivers of others. In short, I cannot help thinking, that all these objections to taxes because they weigh upon the poor, proceed from the want of a more general and enlarged view of the subject, whence men would easily perceive, that all taxes, be they what they may, must finally fall upon labour, labour being the only source of the means of paying taxes.—Some taxes are, however, more partial in their first operation than others; and, in some cases, they totally ruin one part of the community in working their way into general diffusion. Others are particularly objectionable on account of the mode of their collection. When they employ too many hands in proportion to their produce, and thereby not only cause a serious deduction from the productive labour of the country, but take the food from those who are employed in productive labour and put it into the mouths of those who do nothing that is profitable to the state, they are very injurious. The mode of collection may be odious and vexatious; as where it authorizes a set of officers to call you before them; to keep you from day to day dancing attendance upon them; to treat you as a creature at their command; to scrutinize into the state of your concerns; to examine the depth of your purse; to overhaul your books and accounts, your deeds, leases, mortgages, and bonds; to ascertain the state of your debts and credits; to remand you, and to call you up again at their pleasure. If, under such a system of taxation a man can be said to be a *free-man*, I should be very glad to know what it is that would make him a *slave*. But even all this is more congenial with my ideas of freedom than the exercise of those powers which, in America for instance, are given by the excise-laws. Count over the houses in the streets of any city or town, and you will

find, that into every fourth house, or thereabouts, an *excise officer* has (or at least had, when I was in the country) *at all times a right to enter, and range about in despite of the owner.* Many of them the excise officer never quits, without first putting his lock, or his seal, upon some part or other of the building; which lock or seal to break, or even to *touch*, the owner of the house trembles but to think of; and if, by any accident, or by any temptation, he should have swerved from the limits prescribed to him; nay, even if suspicion fall upon him, he hastens to prostrate himself at the feet of him, whoever he may be, that happens, in the instance, to represent the dreadful ministers of Excise. If his supplications and all other means of mollifying fail, swift ruin awaits him. He is instantly shunned by his friends; the mark of destruction is set upon him; first a jail and last a poor-house are his lot. This terrible system it was against which the people of Pennsylvania so strongly remonstrated. It is said, that the excise laws have been repealed, and that the system has been completely abolished, under the administration of Mr. Jefferson; if so, it is no wonder that he has been re-elected by the unanimous voice of the people. The Pennsylvania people, in one of their representations, said, "What is our situation? Our houses, regarded, in our law-books, as our *castles*, are entered, at pleasure, by persons who come with an authority from our rulers to force their way into and about them, if we dare to resist. The quantity of our liquor, the dimensions of our vessels, are ascertained by these bold intruders, who may come and break in upon our repose at any hour of the night; who affix their locks and their seals to our doors and our utensils; who act the part of inquisitors, in the most odious manner; who set neighbour to watch neighbour, who make one defray the expense of keeping the other as a spy upon his actions, who, in short, seem intended for no other purpose than that of raising money upon us, in order to pay one for keeping another in subjection, and thus to render us in reality a nation of slaves, suffering us to retain the forms of freedom merely to disgrace it." Of the excise-laws in this country I know little or nothing; but, that they are, in their operation and effect, very far indeed from answering the above description given of the excise-laws in America, I must, of course, be perfectly satisfied; because, were they not so, it is impossible that I should never have heard any thing said against them in parliament.

With respect to the addition to the Income Tax, I have nothing to say that I have not already said. My objection is not to the amount of it; not to its unfairness; not to the place on which it finally falls; but, to the effect which it has in checking industry and economy. It is, in the first instance, a tax upon these two virtues, so useful to individuals as well as to the state. As far as relates to the funds, however, I must acknowledge, that this tax did not originate with either of "the two *first* financiers in the world," but with that celebrated person, Mr. Thomas Paine! After having proposed the *abolition of the monarchy*, he proceeds thus, in the Second Part of his Rights of Man: "Reasons are already advanced in this work, showing, that, whatever the reforms in the taxes may be, they ought to be made in the current expenses of government, and not in the part applied to the interest of the national debt; for," says Thomas, who was a firm stickler for the funds, "it is now too late to inquire how the debt began. Those to whom it is due have advanced the money; and, whether it was well or ill spent, or pocketed,

“ is not their crime. By remitting all the taxes of the poor ” [quite a *first financier!*] “ they will be totally relieved, and all discontent on their part will be taken away ; and, by striking off such of the taxes as are already mentioned, the nation will more than recover all the expense of the mad American war. There will then remain only the national debt as a subject of discontent ; and in order to remove, or rather to prevent, this, it would be good policy in the stockholders themselves to consider it as *property*, subject like all other property to bear some portion of taxes. It would give to it both popularity and security, and as a great part of its present inconvenience is balanced by the capital which it keeps alive, a measure of this kind would so far add to that balance as to silence objections. This may be done by such gradual means as to accomplish all that is necessary with the greatest ease and convenience. Instead of taxing the capital, the best way would be to *tax the interest* by some progressive ratio, and to lessen the public taxes in the same proportion as the interest diminished.” [We have not been able to act, as yet, upon this latter suggestion.] “ Suppose the interest was taxed one halfpenny in the pound the first year, a penny more the second, and to proceed by a certain ratio to be determined upon, always less than any other tax upon property. Such a tax would be *subtracted from the interest at the time of payment*, without any expense of collection. One halfpenny in the pound would lessen the interest and consequently the taxes, twenty thousand pounds. The tax on waggons amounts to this sum, and this tax might be taken off the first year. The second year the tax on female servants, or some other of the like amount, might also be taken off, and by proceeding in this manner, always applying the tax raised from the property of the debt towards its extinction, and not carry it to the current services, it would liberate itself.” That the “ two first financiers ” in the world have not followed this later part of Mr. Paine’s advice we know ; but, I am sure it will not be denied, that to tax the funds, and the way of collecting that tax, were first suggested by him. Paine was a lover of traders and fund-dealers. He hated the legitimate aristocracy and the church, because they were, he clearly perceived, the principal supports of the throne ; and, therefore, we always find him railing against the landed interest, while he is, as is above shown, very lenient towards the fundholders. With regard to the title to the crown he goes back as far as the conquest by William the Norman ; rigidly inquires into the rights founded upon that conquest ; and maintains that no length of time or other circumstance, impairs the right of the people to choose whether they will adhere to their sovereign or not. But, when he comes to the national debt, quite another set of principles seems to have entered his mind. “ It is now *too late*,” says he, “ to inquire how the debt began ! ” I am of a very different opinion. The two first financiers in the world have my hearty thanks for taxing the funds in a proportion equal to that of other property ; and, though I think they have done tolerably well for a beginning, and are going on very well, I cannot help saying, that they would have pleased me still better if they had, at once, imposed a much heavier tax upon the funds than upon other property. Twenty-five per centum upon the interest of the national debt would not have been too much for the first year, to which an addition of five per centum might have been added every year during the war ; and then, as Mr. Addington

said, "our *burdens* would have been *lightened* in proportion to our *pressure*." All in good time, however! If the war continue three years longer, we may live in hopes of seeing something of this sort adopted.

Here, for the present, I should take my leave of this subject, did I not, upon recurring to the opinion which seems to be entertained as to the effect of taxing draught horses, think it of some importance to offer a remark or two upon a circumstance which appears to me a much greater impediment to agricultural industry than all the taxes upon the property of farmers put together; and that is the reluctance which has, for several years last past, existed to the *granting of leases*. This circumstance was mentioned once before, but I cannot refrain from again bringing it forward, when I am upon a subject with which it is so closely connected. Most of my readers know, that, since the commencement of the administration of Mr. Pitt, there has been established a certain department, called the Board of Agriculture. This Board, which has a Peer of the Realm for its president, is composed of persons profoundly skilled in the qualities of soils, in the divers arts of planting, sowing, drilling, dibbling, ploughing, reaping, and mowing. They study the science of breeding and feeding cattle and sheep; of fattening hogs; and of promoting propagation amongst the various sorts of these our fellow-creatures, for whose comfort and happiness the Vice Society and the Benches of Justices have shown so tender a solicitude. Well, this Board, of which Arthur Young, esq., F.R.S., is the Secretary, have taken particular pains to ascertain the agricultural state of the several counties of the kingdom. To this end they have sent out several persons to make actual surveys; and, indeed, it appears from the accounts of the Board that, in these surveys, no trifling sums of money have been spent, the annual charge to the public on account of the Board and its proceedings being about 3000*l*. The persons thus sent forth have made their reports to the Board, which reports have been published at the public expense; and as they have come forth under the sanction of so respectable a body, instituted too by Mr. Pitt himself, there is no one, at least no friend of Mr. Pitt, that will, I should think, venture to question the facts which they state. These surveyors, then, all agree, that the greatest impediment to the agricultural industry of the country, is, *the refusing of leases to farmers*, and compelling them to cultivate, if at all, upon the tenure of a single year. Mr. Young, in his general View of the Agriculture of Hertfordshire, says: "I am sorry to observe, that a *prejudice* against granting leases, *increasing daily*, will, if not checked by the good sense of the landlords, injure, beyond any calculation, the agriculture of the kingdom." Mr. KENT, in his Agricultural Survey of Norfolk, says: "that leases are the *first*, the *greatest*, and most rational encouragement that can be given to agriculture, admits not of a doubt in my opinion. But of *late years* there are very *strong prejudices* entertained against them. In many counties," continues he, "the *prejudice* is so strong, that an owner would *as soon alienate the fee simple of his estate*, as demise it for a term of years. It grieves me," says he again, "to go into a country, which I often do, and find it almost in a state of nature, because the soil being wet and expensive to cultivate, the tenant cannot afford to do it without encouragement, and the owner's *insurmountable objection to leases* keeps him from granting the sort of encouragement which is essentially necessary." Another writer, Mr. MIDDLETON, says, in his View of the Agriculture of Middlesex, "It is, without doubt, a most *unreasonable prejudice* which many proprietors

“entertain against granting leases of their estates; for the withholding of these certainly operates as a most powerful bar against every improvement.” And after a long discussion of the subject, he adds, “leases appear to me to be of so much importance, as being perhaps the most powerful and rational means of promoting improvements in agriculture, that I hope I shall stand excused for having entered so fully on this branch of the report.”

Here, then, is something worthy of the serious attention of parliament in general, and of Sir Robert Buxton in particular. Here is an official report, or rather, a concurrence of official reports, from persons paid by the government to inquire into the state of the agriculture of the kingdom; and the information it communicates, is, **FIRST**, That leases are the first, the greatest, and the most rational encouragement that can be given to agriculture; and, that the refusing of leases is the greatest possible impediment to agricultural industry, and, of course, to the production of corn, whereof our chief food is made. **SECONDLY**, That, of late years, there have arisen strong prejudices against the granting of leases; that this prejudice is daily increasing; and that, so powerful is it, that an owner would as soon alienate the fee simple of his estate as demise it for a term of years.—That such is the real state of the case cannot, I think, be denied. Few land-holders in the House of Commons can be ignorant of the facts stated by the agricultural surveyors; and, I believe, few of them will deny, that it would be advantageous to them if it were otherwise, and if they could venture to let long leases as formerly. The effect of this impediment to agricultural industry, is, a dead loss to the country; because, it prevents the land from being so well cultivated as it would be by the very same persons that are employed on it, and which persons eat just as much as if they worked more. No land at yearly rent was ever yet cultivated to the best advantage; and to yearly rents all the farms in the kingdom are fast approaching. But, though the agricultural surveyors, as well, indeed, as every one else, can clearly see, that the granting of long leases would remove this greatest of all impediments to agricultural industry, none of them seem to have thought it necessary to make the least inquiry as to the *impediment of the granting of leases*. They do, indeed, talk about a “prejudice;” a “strong prejudice;” an “unreasonable prejudice;” but, this is not the way to settle so material a point. Call it prejudice, if you will; but, then we come back to the place whence we started, and I ask you, whence this prejudice has arisen. What is the cause of it? Do you say, that it has arisen from the folly, or whim, of the land-owners? Then I ask: how did this whim never happen to take them before? For, you yourselves say, that, it is only of *late years*, that they have begun to refuse to grant long leases.—I have before thrown out some hints as to the true *cause* of this reluctance of landlords to grant leases; but I will here treat the matter a little more at large. Before the commencement of the very rapid depreciation of money occasioned by the enormous loans, the consequent increase of the quantity of paper-money, and especially by the stoppage of cash payments at the Bank; before this epoch, leases of farms were usually granted for 21 years; some for 14 years; some for 11 years; and some, but comparatively very few, for a term so short as that of 7 years. Last summer a large temporary aid was proposed to be granted to the Civil List, and also a permanent addition to it. That the grant was made by parliament we know; and, it should not be forgotten, that it was called for upon the ground of the *vast rise in*

prices (which is another phrase for depreciation of money), which had taken place, since the annual allowance for the civil list was fixed by parliament: that is to say, since the year 1787. Mr. Pitt said (see Parl. Debates, vol. ii. p. 905), "that no gentleman who reflected on the very considerable rise that had taken place in every article of domestic consumption and accommodation, could be surprised that His Majesty had not confined his expenses, under that head, within limits that had been marked out so long since. An increase of 40, 50, or 60*l.* per centum had taken place in such articles since the year 1787." Mr. Rose, in his pamphlet upon the civil list, published in 1801, stated the rise at 75*l.* per centum, and, in some cases at 100*l.* per centum. But, we have better facts to proceed upon than the statements and calculations of these gentlemen. That is to say, a circumstantial account of the rise in the price of bread, which is the true standard of the real value of money, for the last fifty years. From this account (which see in Vol. VI. p. 239) it appears that the

Average price of the quartern loaf, during the ten years ending	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
with 1760, was	0	5 $\frac{3}{4}$
During the ten years ending with 1770	0	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
During the ten years ending with 1780.....	0	7
During the ten years ending with 1790.....	0	7 $\frac{1}{2}$
During the thirteen and a half years ending in July, 1804	1	0

Such, then, has been the progress of the depreciation of money. Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Pitt will say: "No; it is *not depreciation of money*; it is only *rise in the price of commodities*." Be it so; but, call it what you will, the *consequence* is precisely the same to whomsoever is obliged to live upon a *fixed* income. Wheatley excepts the land-holders from those who suffer on account of the depreciation of money; "because," says he, "they can *raise their rents* to keep pace with the depreciation." Very true, and precisely for that reason it is, that they will now let their lands only from year to year. Previous to the year 1795 (for it was not till then that the rapid depreciation of money began), landlords had no objection to let long leases; because, as will be perceived by the progress in the rise of prices above exhibited, even a twenty-one years' lease produced but a slight falling off in the real value of their rents; but, when the man who had granted a twenty-one years' lease in the year 1780 found, in 1795, that his rent, though it preserved its nominal value, was really worth little more than half as much as it was when he let his farm; when he perceived, that other farms of the same value, now let for twice as much as he was receiving for his; when he perceived, that while he was daily sinking into poverty, his tenant was swelling into riches, and only waiting for the moment to ride over him; he began to inquire into the cause, and, when the lease expired, took good care not to grant another for above two or three years at most. Some landlords have continued to grant leases; and there will be still some found to do it for a year or two longer perhaps. Habit is very powerful; and, besides, the cause is not well enough understood to prevent all landlords from believing, that a good swinging addition to the old rent will secure them for the next 14 or 21 years. But, if the present system of finance be pursued, this purblind state will soon go off: the consequences will become visible to the dullest eyes: and then, as Mr. Kent says, the landlord will, indeed, as soon alienate the fee simple of his estate as demise it for a term of years.

Such, then, though the agricultural surveyors do not appear to have obtained even a glimpse of it, is the real cause of the refusal, on the part of landlords, to grant leases, which refusal is stated to be, and undoubtedly is, the most powerful impediment to agricultural industry. And how comes it that it has never attracted the attention, or, at least, never engaged the deliberative faculties, of parliament? It certainly is not, because it lies too deep for discovery, but, on the contrary, because it is too obvious. The moment the fact is ascertained, that the landlords refuse any longer to grant leases, the mind of every intelligent man traces back the effect to its efficient and only cause. But, where is the remedy? Who shall *remove* that cause? The impediment to agricultural industry is found in the refusal to grant leases; that refusal in the rapid depreciation of money; that depreciation in the excessive quantity of paper-currency; that currency in the stoppage of cash payments; that stoppage in the immense sums quarterly demanded *in payment of the interest on the national debt*. "Ha!" methinks I hear some Pittite exclaim, in the hollow voice of a tragedy hero, "beware how you touch the vitals of your country!" If such be her vitals, I would not stake much upon her existence for another four years, either of war or peace. Yet this is really the notion, which almost all men of all parties appear to have adopted. When a demand is made for money, the *mode of raising it* is the only subject of censure or criticism; and, when the minister is driven hard upon that head; "Well," says he, "show me a better way: if not you cannot find fault that I pursue this, for I tell you that so much must be got, or I cannot pay the interest of the national debt." To put an end to the payment of that interest; to suspend the payment during war; even to reduce it in amount; never seems to come, for one moment, athwart the mind of any man. To hear people talk upon this subject, a total stranger to our situation and circumstances, would think the national debt to be something belonging to the soil or the atmosphere of the country. We look at its progress with apprehension and even with terror; but we seem to wait for its final effects with that sort of feeling that malefactors wait for the day of execution. Here! here! and nowhere else, is the canker-worm that is eating out the heart of England! And until that ever-gnawing worm be killed, one moment's real peace she will never know.

END OF VOL. I.

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